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THE

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OF THE

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J. W. HINTON, D. D., Editor,

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THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF THE

METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH.

JANUARY, 1884.

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GREEK MYTHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

PROF. J. C. C. NEWTON, A. M.

A people are what they are, not from any single cause, but from a combination of many. Religion and Philosophy are, moreover, such large elements in the development of a people, that, if these are rightly interpreted, it almost interprets the whole life of that people. Preliminary, therefore, to the discussion of the relations of the Greek Mythology and Philosophy, it is necessary to inquire what are the ultimate factors determining the religious and mental history of any people.

They are: 1st, The Physical Conditions—the Material Environment; 2d, The Ethnic Germ of the race itself; 3d, God in History: (a) In Providential dealings, and (b) in Revelation. These three factors give us an indirect product, though indirect it be, the religious and intellectual life of any people.

When we consider the physical conditions of the Hellenic people, we find them to be most favorable. No people, in any age or country, ever had a better physical environment. Situated, as it was, where the corners of three Continents meet, the geographical location of Greece was most fortunate. Hellas, by which we mean

 (1)

both European and Asiatic Greece, together with the Grecian Islands of the Mediterranean Sea, was quite on the highway of the chief monarchies of ancient times. A glance at the map shows that in going from Babylon, Assyria and India to Central or Southern Europe, one would come in contact with Hellenic possessions and people. In going from Africa to Europe, and *vice versa*, one must go through Grecian territory. So, in travelling from Northern and Western Africa to Asia, the traveler or sailor would, probably, be spoken to by Hellenic people on the way. In fact, we may almost claim, as Hellenic territory, a portion of Northern Egypt, too, since the Ionians seem to have had settlements in the Delta from an early day. (See Brit. Ency. Vol. XI., Art. "Greece."

In physical outline, whether of topography or of direction and extent of coast line, we can scarcely conceive the conditions more favorable. The coast-line of Greece is greater than that of Spain and Portugal combined; it is indented and lined with islands and deep bays, affording many capacious and safe harbors. The land, even on the islands, is interspersed with mountains and valleys, giving every variety of scenery and production, and dividing the people into distinct tribes where individuality and independence could best be developed. While by mountain ranges and deep valleys thus divided off, no tribe or city, it is said, was more than fifty miles from the sea, nor ten miles from a mountain. Europe concentrates within itself all the physical conditions of the Eastern Hemisphere that are desirable; and Greece in this respect holds the same relation to Europe. The geographical and topographical conditions are *bold, sharp, varied.* Add to this a latitude and a climate blending all the advantages of the Temperate Zone, and we may justly say that no nation in ancient or modern times ever had a physical environment so favorable as the Grecian race. If nature is true to herself, one has a right to look to the land of Greece for something great in religion and philosophy, as well as in art, war and statesmanship.

The second factor indicated above was that of the Ethnic Germ. When we talk about development of national life, it implies that there is something to develop, something to start with, some differentiating quality inherent and not adventitiously taken on.

What then are the ethnic connections and qualities of the Greeks? In the light of modern ethnological science, and this largely the fruit of investigations in comparative philology, we can answer with some degree of certainty. Concerning their racial affinities and qualities, and even the region whence they came, we are now able to say what no Greek knew. What neither Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato nor Aristotle could tell, we are now able to say with confidence.

The Greeks belong to the Aryan or Indo-European family of nations. By a comparison of the Aryan languages, of which the Sanskrit is the eldest sister, it has been ascertained that out of about eleven thousand six hundred words, some two thousand are Sanskrit, and three thousand more belong to the other branches of the Aryan tongue. The original Aryan stock lived, it seems, somewhere not far from the Caspian region. It is evident that there was an original "cradle region" where this undivided Aryan people lived, and that afterwards there began to be separations; some of the tribes went Eastward or South-eastward, and have left us their language, the Sanskrit, while others came Westward and North-westward. These migration waves may be traced from Central Asia to Britain, West, and to India, East. Among the migrations to Europe we may name Greco-Italic, Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic and Turanian. The Greco-Italic moved along a Westward line, farther to the South, than the others. They were doubtless preceded by the Semitic migrations and Turanian for some distance along the same line, that is, into Phœnicia and Asia Minor and Egypt. Whether the Aryan race may be called the Japhetic, and whether the word Iones is derived from the word Javan in the Mosaic Genealogies, or not, cannot now be determined. Although the Aryans are relatively a backward race, later than the Semitic or Turanian, *to move out*, yet they seem to be of a higher Ethnic formation, finer type of mankind; they supplant the others, either by absorbing, or driving them out. Though somewhat behind in establishing great monarchies, building large cities, and erecting wonderful monuments, they are now in the van of civilization, they are now the chief workers in spreading over the world the civilization of Christianity. It seems that in their Westward march, our Aryan ancestors made in Asia

Minor a halt. How long they stopped is not known ; long enough some think, for the ancestors of the Celtic nations to make a distinct separation, then the Italic ancestry, and then those who were afterwards known in Greece as Pelasgi. The Greeks were without doubt a composite people, but just what is the proportion of the elements, is not easy to determine. We are warranted in saying that the Pelasgi had overspread the greater part of Greece both in Europe and in Southwestern Asia Minor, before the Hellenes appeared. That they had their seats at Dodona in Epirus, at Argos in Thessaly, and that in the Pelopenesus they had anciently extensive sway is beyond question; and that they were a race kindred to the Hellenes, is also evident. Other people are mentioned, as the Leleges, Curates, Dryopes, Dolopes, etc., but no one can say whether these were branches co-ordinate with Pelasgi, or included under them. Some authorities make these to be the younger branches of the older Palasgic tribe ; that the Leleges, for example, were a continuation and a higher development, and that even the Hellenes were a "side stream branching off from the Pelasgi." To this theory Herodotus lends countenance.

It is, perhaps, not far from the truth to write the Hellenic people=Pelasgi+Hellenes proper+Trace of Turanian blood. We may further say, that the Post-Pelasgic, or proper Hellenic migration wave, from the highlands of Asia Minor divided; one part, the ancestors of the Dorians, coming across the Hellespont into the highlands of Northern Greece, thence South into Pelopenese ; the other, the Ionian ancestry, to the eastern shores of the Aegean sea, thence across into Greece.* The Doric and Ionic members of the Hellenic family seem distinguished by a few permanent characteristics which we think can scarcely be accounted for, except upon such suppositions. The Ionians coming across from the Southwestern coasts of Asia Minor, where they had learned from the Phœnicians, the art of navigation and a fondness for enterprise, pushed along down the Eastern sea costs of Greece proper, and made settlements on the shores extending from the sea of Thessaly around to Argolis. So that when the Dorians drove the Achaeans out of their homes in the lower Pelopenese, this was the first step towards a *re*migration of the Ionians from Attica to their original settlements in Asia Minor. Rawlinson seems inclined to the

opinion that kindred to the Hellenic compound, if not included in it, ought to be named the Carians, Phrygians, and Lydians. Although some authorities are disposed to reject, as utterly worthless, every tradition of Turanian settlements in Greece, the general import of these traditions, makes it probable that there was an Egyptian settlement in Attica and Argolis, and a Phœnician colony in Bœotia. Add to the traditions the historical fact of extensive commerce of the Phœnicians and their colonizing habit for purpose of trade, and the fact that Egypt was at this time a flourishing land, teeming with people, and it becomes quite probable that settlements from both these nations were made in Greece.

The Greeks were, we therefore conclude, a composite race, a happy blending, in the main, of kindred but distinct elements. In their ethnic composition were provided the conditions necessary to the very highest development of national life. In the Pelasgians were found a substratum of enduring power, of great physical strength; in the Dorians and Ionians built upon this common foundation were exhibited, in the former, self-reliance, patriotism, seriousness, a fondness for warlike exploits; in the latter, intellectual penetration, lively spirits, love of art. Here, then, is a soil for the production of the richest sentiments of the moral nature, the highest conception of the intellectual. In order to the further elucidation of the subject, we must inquire what was the religious and intellectual status of the *early Greek settlers?* Did they have any religion? if so, what was it? Had philosophy yet dawned upon the Greek mind?

Older than any work wrought by the hand, more ancient than any literary documents, ever changing and yet more enduring than any monuments of stone, or brass, or clay, prior even to the whisperings of the earliest traditions, is language.

So that, with the lamps of the comparative philologist in our hand, we may walk back amid the fog and darkness of pre-historic antiquity and examine many things, and witness many scenes of old Aryan life. We may even commune with their thoughts and catch the fire of their feelings. As far as we can trace back the footsteps of man, even on the lowest strata of life, we see that the divine gift of a sound and sober intellect belongs to him; and the idea of a humanity emerging slowly from the depths of animal

brutality can never be maintained again. (See Chips from the German Workshop, Max Müller.) Since it is now established that the English and all the Teutonic dialects of the continent, and that the Latin, Greek, Slavonic, Celtic, together with the Oriental languages of Persia and India are all members of one family, and that these several nations are the descendants of a people who lived in Central Asia—since these are now well established facts, the scientific linguist can tell us much concerning the common life, faith and thought which the successive dispersions brought with them from their original "cradle region." This faith and thought must have been possessed by them in their original seat ere they went forth seeking new homes.

Before the separation of the Aryan race, the following terms illustrative of its civilization were in common use; father, mother, brother, sister—the domestic life; father, daughter, mother, and son-in-law—a step beyond mere natural relations. King, people, war—political life. Oxen, cows, horses, swine, goats, geese—terms indicating possessions. Besides this, Aryan people worked in metals, built houses and villages, were acquainted with agriculture, used ground grain, and salt in cooking; they knew something of sewing, and weaving; had boats worked by oars but not by sails; they divided the year by moons, and had a decimal notation. As to the religion, light is gradually increasing. From the Vedas, we learn that though the powers of nature and its most striking objects are beginning to be worshiped as Divine under different names, there is yet no complex system of mythology such as we find even among the Homeric Greeks. There are no genealogies, no marriage of gods and goddesses. Monotheism still prevails, and the idea of the unity of the Godheads in Djauspiter (Zeus, Jupiter) is still consciously felt. Zeus is the "Heaven-Father," the "All-Father." We learn from the Vedas that the Ancient Hindoos believed in immortality, personal immortality.

Now all these things, the earliest Greeks must have brought with them into Greece. We may be sure that with very little change whatever, ideas, customs and arts—the simple arts—and whatever of religious knowledge were possessed by the undivided Aryans, were still held by the separating peoples upon their entrance into their new homes. The Greeks who first set foot on

the soil of Europe were a simple, plain, but not a savage people. The fact that their kings ruled by Divine favor, and offered sacrifices and prayers for the people, shows that the patriarchal form of government, in which priest and king were united in one person, has not been entirely lost.

An important fact connected with the early religious history of the ancient Greeks and other ancient nations is now being placed upon an unquestioned basis, namely: That originally the religion of those ancient peoples was dominated by Monotheism.

Rawlinson, Herodotus, Vol 1., App. V., says: The religion of the ancient Persians was not even elemental, that the worship of fire and sun was of later introduction, that the original belief was pure dualism; that in the inscriptions there is the worship of One Supreme God under the name of Ormazd with an occasional mention of an evil principle.

Max Müller, Chips from a German Workshop: "That *Zeus* of the Greeks, was originally God, is most carefully brought out by Welcker." It is a significant discovery of Comparative Philology, "that the same idea which found expression in the ancient religions of the German, Brahman and Slavs, has been preserved under the same simple and sublime name by the original settlers of Hellas." The etymology of the Sanskrit Djaus-piter, the Greek *Zeus*, and the words Jupiter and Divine, is no less interesting to the philologist than important, in the inference drawn, to the student of Comparative Religion.

The Pelasgian Priestesses at Dodona used the following formula in their prayer: "*Zeus* was, *Zeus* is, *Zeus* shall be, O great *Zeus*!"

The author of "Ten Great Religions," speaking of the local distribution of the deities among different tribes of the Greeks, says, page 275:-"*Zeus* alone retains the same name from the first." Again, Rawlinson, Herodotus, Book II., Appendix III., on Gods of Egypt, says: "Originally, indeed, they (Egyptians) had the unity, worshipped under a particular character . . . . . which is the case in other countries also. In like manner, the ancient Hindoos have one Supreme Being, Brahme, (neuter,) the great One. . . . . The same orginal belief in one God may be observed in Greek Mythology; and this accordance with early traditions agrees with the Indian notion, that truth was originally deposited

with men, but gradully slumbered and was forgotten. In Greece, *Zeus* was also universal and omnipotent, the one God containing all with himself," etc. That the idea of one Supreme God was brought from Central Asia by the first Greek immigrants into Asia Minor and Greece, and that the Monotheism, amid the polytheistic multiplications was never completely obliterated, seems thus pretty well established. In view of modern scientific theories relative to man's origin, too much stress can scarcely be put upon this fact. As we shall further see, it has an important bearing upon the conflict between philosophy and religion of later Greek times. Gathering up from various sources our information concerning the Greeks prior to the time of the Homeric epics, it amounts to something like the following:

(a) That they had the ordinary institutions of domestic and social life; females were respected, and polygamy discouraged. Slavery prevailed at first under what may be named a domestic form.

(b) There was a recognized form of government in which the tribe was above the city, and the authority was vested in the king, who was honored as a special favorite of heaven, but whose power was not absolute; for there was the Boule, the body of nobles, constituting an advisory council, and the Agora, the assembly of the people.

(c) The warlike virutes were honored—distinction between war and piracy not strong—still heralds, guests, and even strangers, were considered as inviolable under certain conditions. Sagacity, and personal prowess were the chief virtues.

(d) There was considerable advancement in the arts, and acquaintance with the comforts and refinements of life. This is seen in the palaces of Menalaus and Alkinoos, in the public meetings, the elaborate pleadings of the eloquent Nestor, and the dignity of Hellena, and the loveliness of Mansikaa. Homer describes the scepter, which Achilles hurled to the ground, "as glittering with the golden nails." Besides raising flocks and herds, the Greeks were an agricultural people, growing grains and wines. Their large ships, so minutely catalogued and distributed among all the different tribes of the Greeks, prove that they had been long prior

to the Trojan war, a sea-faring people. There were two classes of ships, the war ships and the merchant ships.

(e) The religious feelings were very strong. From the first there were regular rites of worship, and fixed places therefor. There were priests and priestesses, but not an exclusive hereditary class as in Egypt. Polytheism has already so prevailed, until in Homer's day, the idea of the One Supreme Deity has become bedimmed. The offering of prayers and sacrifices by the king in behalf of his people, shows that somewhat of patriarchal ideas has been transmitted.

(f) The Greeks had, for sometime before Homer's day, a literary capacity. Whatever theory of the Homeric writings may be adopted, it must be remembered that a nation has to live many centuries before such a production can be born. There must be from five hundred to eight hundred years of settled, distinct, national existence back of such a production as the Iliad or Odyssey. In the sentiments therein set forth, the customs, manners and beliefs referred to, and the scenes described, we have an unmistakable comment on Ante-Homeric Greek life. We see that they are as a nation inspired with strong religious sentiments, and intense poetic conception. The poets of Greece were the prophets. They were supposed to pour forth their verse under a Divine afflatus. The hearers were poets, too, in feeling at least. Poetry was their life and joy. They were poets in the deep sense of the word, by looking at all nature and all life on the sentimental, spiritual side. Here is a fact worthy to be remembered in forming a correct theory of the intellectual development of the Greek mind. There is yet no skepticism, no scientific, philosophic skepticism, with its destructive negations depreciating the religious beliefs of the people; these come later.

The history of the Greek Mythology may be divided into two periods. The first, a period of growth. The second, a period of conflict. The first extended from Ante-Homeric times to the rise of Philosophy, The history of Greek Mythology during the first period, falls under the *law of change* from the *simple* to the *complex.* Beginning, as we have seen above, with Monotheism in the old Aryan faith, by enlargements and multiplications, it ends in a complicated congeries of gods many, and idols many, with numerous

and glaring incongruities. Polytheism has almost obliterated the knowledge of one supreme God. The influence, operative under this law, are: 1st, the Mythopoeic Tendency. We do not attempt anything like a full discussion of the origin and nature of myths—a most difficult subject. No question is more perplexing, no phase in the history of religion so strange as that which has produced such a mass of absurd stories, some of them repulsive to a high degree, concerning gods and heroes. It is not peculiar to Grecian Mythology, but is a phenomenon, more or less common to all the Pagan religions. And to some extent to the forms of Christianity. It is this which demands a more serious study. It is this that convinces us that we can not solve the question of their origin by saying with Mr. Grote, that, "they represent a present which never had a past," by saying that they are wholly the factions of the poets. We can not believe that a people with such a civilization as the Iliad and Odyssey demonstrate, should have been preceded by a race of men whose delight consisted in inventing absurd tales of gods and other fabulous beings; tales which frequently offend the moral sense, shock all the feelings of a nature which is not brutal. And yet, these very things, which all decent men would be ashamed of, have crept in and become a part of the character of the gods, make a part of the religious faith of the early devout Greek. We think that the following facts taken together will partially explain the existence of the Mythopoeic Tendency in Greek religion:

1. An exuberant imagination. The Greek mind was easily responsive on the emotional side to the strange, the marvelous. The Greeks had a strong sense of the spiritual. All phenomena was, therefore, the manifestation to them of living, acting beings. The reflective stage of development being later, the early Greek knew but little of the "law of sequence," of the systematic and mediate operation of forces in nature. Everything was to him an exhibition of fresh life, for which, under the great intuition of causation, it was necessary that he should postulate an immediate cause, such as Naiads, Nereids, Nymphs, Demons, etc. Not only in the temples and before the oracles did the Greek regard himself as in the presence of the divinities, but the groves, the valleys, streams, mountains and the clouds, were peopled by spirits. Many

things, concerning the gods, wholly repulsive to the modern mind, would be easily produced by the ancient poets, the minstrels of such an age, and would be as readily embraced by their wonder-loving hearers. A fertile imagination without a co-ordinating criticising faculty, is capable of strange freaks. So an adulterer and a parricide is a god to be worshiped. This solution reasonably applied to much of Greek myth, when applied to such an extreme case as the above, must be considered as a last resort. Uranus, maimed by his son Kronos, and the latter swallowing his own children at birth to prevent a fore-boded rebellion, are myths, the creation of which, we would like to place upon some other foundation than that of an exuberant imagination or poetic fancy.

2. We now come to another fact which happily explains many of these myths, the law of *linguistic growth*. The *growth* and *decay* of *metaphors*, as traced in their etymology by Max Müller, when taken in connection with the peculiar conditions of mental training, incident to a people whose scientific sense has not yet been developed, explains many of these perplexing myths of Greek religion. That Müller's theory will solve as many of them as he seems to hope, may be questioned, that it clearly solves many and saves us from the unwelcome influence that the Mythopoeic period in the history of pagan religions is one of temporary madness, and chaos is made manifest. We have to remember that the literature was at that early period poetic. Even the prose was poetic in temper and style. This, with that other fact that abstract terms and abstract conceptions, were scarcely known, would necessitate a great deal of bold metaphor in the descriptions of natural phenomena. The sun rising out of the sea, chasing away the darkness, hiding the stars, the blazing noon sun with his burning rays, the sun or the moon again received into the embrace of the sea in the West, the dawn, the night, the clouds, thunder, lightning, changes of seasons, the majestic mountains lifting their heads to the clouds, the surging, awe-inspiring ocean, whose unexplored shores impressed the early Greek with a painful sense of the immense, the unlimited, the blue expanse above in the night season, with the silvery, moving moon, and silent stars—what a fruitful source of metaphor, is here ever present to the mind of the people. Nor need we be surprised, for in modern, scientific times, when nature

is largely divested of her living expression, the poetic interpretation of nature's movements, *cannot* be suppressed, so that we hear a Wordsworth exclaim:

> "Mountains and vales and floods, I call on you
> To share the passion of a just disdain."

As it was with the physical world, so of human life, its sufferings, sleeping, old age, dying. And so we have in modern times:

> "*Age!* twine thy brow with fresh spring flowers,
> And call a train of laughing *hours.*"

But suppose the meaning of this metaphor should, in some way, be lost—the words age and hours cease to have metaphorical value, then would the meaning of the passage be, that some queen was crowned by her glad subjects as their lawful sovereign. Now this is what Max Müller proves to have taken place. Bold metaphors referring to the striking objects and phenomena of nature, have lost their original value under the inevitable law of decay and vicissitude of language, and the more so when words were not treasured up in lexicons and grammars. Let us apply this explanation to a few practical cases. Accordingly, we find that when prayers, the lame Litæ, are called the daughters of Zeus, it originally meant that he was the protector of suppliants. Again, where we speak of the sun following the dawn, the style of the ancients would make them *speak as if they thought of the Sun loving* and *embracing the Dawn.*

Another example Müller takes from Hesiod. Hesiod calls Nyx (night,) the mother of Moros (fate,) and the dark Ker (destruction,) also the mother of Thanatos (death,) Hypnos (sleep;) the tribe of the Oneiroi, Dreams. And this progeny she bore without a father. Again, she is called the mother of Momos (blame,) and of the woeful Oizys (woe,) and Hesperides (evening stars.) She bore Nemesis (vengeance,) Apetes (fraud,) Philotes (lust,) etc.

Now when this is translated into modern literalism, we have, "the stars are seen as the night approaches, we sleep, we dream, we die, we run danger during night; nightly revels lead to strife and woe; an evil deed in the night at first concealed, will be

revealed and avenged, or, lust is indulged and hatred attempts to avenge itself in the darkness of the night.

Now, supposing the original meaning of the metaphor to be lost, the obvious interpretation would be that Nyx was some powerful divinity. The mother of such a progeny and without a father, could not belong to the human race, and, therefore, must be assigned to the family of the gods. Add to this the almost universal habit among ancient peoples of applying to their kings and heroes appellations of the sun, moon, etc., and we see that the *nature*-worship, the second development of the Aryan race, and brought to Greece by the first emigrants, could easily be transformed into a system of Anthropomorphic Divinities, families of gods and goddesses. Thus the *law* is from the *simple* to the *complex*. This is sufficient to illustrate the influence of the two chief factors under the operation of this law in its earlier stage of development from a system of *nature*-worship to that of Anthropomorphous gods, heroes, etc. (We had marked many other cases for illustration, as given by Müller, but deem it unnecessary.)

Hence we have a system of theogony becoming more and more complex, viz: In the Homeric Theogony there are two dynasties of divinities; in the Hesiodic, which is later, three dynasties; in the Orphic, four.

2d. Another factor later than the two just mentioned, but serving to increase the complexity in the arrangement of the gods and the worship belonging to each, was the inter-migrations of Hellenic tribes. Just as uniform crystalization is disturbed by a shaking, so the local distribution of the gods, their authority, and the rites paid to each, are too confused to admit of classification. No well defined lines separate them; the only partial exceptions are ATHENE, POSEIDON, APOLLO. To ZEUS a sort of universal homage and dominion were assigned. The immediate cause for *this* complexity is manifestly to be found in the general breaking up of the tribes prior to historic times.

A map of Grecian lands, with lines drawn to represent the migration movements which took place among them, would be highly interesting. Some of these cannot be traced. We may venture to indicate the location and direction of a few. A line from Northern Greece into Pelopenesus, general direction Southward. At termi-

nus of this line in Argolis, etc., a line runs into Achaia, thence curving to the North-east into Attica, thence East across the Aegean sea into Asia Minor. Two or three lines running in an opposite direction, and earlier made, ought to be traced from Asia Minor to Greece. Again, there are migration lines from Thessaly into Boeotia and *vice versa*. Other lines can be traced, as belonging to this earlier migration period, according to some, from Italy into Epirus, and from the Western shore of Greece, perhaps Epirus, into Italy. (We do not here take account of the migrations of the colonization period.) Under such conditions, we can readily see how the religion of the tribes would be disturbed. Two peoples, though of the same Hellenic race, coming together, would bring some dissimilar elements; there would naturally ensue a fusion, and though one might dominate the other, the weaker would not be wholly eliminated. A change would thus take place; the readjustment of a triad, the introduction of a new god, and of new rites, new ideas, customs, morals, etc., would all result in fulfilling the *law "from the simple to the complex."*

3d. An other factor in the process of development of the Greek religion, is the contact and influence of the surrounding nations. The Egyptians on the South, Phrygians and Lydians in Asia Minor, Thracians in the North, with Phœnicians must exercise no unimportant influence upon Greek religion. There has been a class of writers who, it seems, have allowed their admiration of Greek originality to so daze their eyes as to cause them to forget, first, that the Greeks had an historical origin and connection with some ancestral people, and second, that notwithstanding their originality, they were greatly affected by the civilizations of surrounding nations. The Greeks were, at the same time, endowed with strong *originating* power and large *receptive* capacity. An active, inquiring race, trading with these surrounding nations and probably with colonies established by these neighboring nations along their own coasts, as was certainly with the Phœnicians, could not but be considerably modified in their religious life, as in other matters. Many of the rites of later Grecian worship are clearly traceable to foreign influence. The Eleusinian mysteries are believed to contain a distinct Egyptian element.

Indeed, Herodotus goes so far as to say that the twelve major

deities were introduced from Egypt. Without stopping to give instances of analogy or identification between Grecian and foreign deities, we are satisfied that the magnitude of the foreign element both in the philosophy and Mythology of Greece, has not until recently been appreciated. The philosophy of Greek History is impossible without it. Grecian originality was not isolated originality, but was rather the power to appropriate and assimilate to itself the productions of others, giving them a *Hellenic mould*, which they never afterwards lost. Thus we have in resumè the three factors:

1st. The mythopoeic tendency, as arising from peculiar poetic conditions of mind, and the law of linguistic growth with respect to metaphors in the early times.

2d. The early migrations of the Greeks *inter se.*

3d. The influences of foreign nations. The combined operation of these gives us the general law of development, viz: "From the simple to the complex."

We come now to the second period of Greek mythology: This is the period of conflict between Religion and Philosophy, and we may say that it is the period of mythologic decay. We are now to walk upon ground every foot of which needs to be closely scrutinized. Every step upon this field must be taken with caution and reverence. It is a field of battle, a battle which has been waged for ages, and is now going on. But before proceeding further we may get a better view of the field of conflict if we first count up the forces which the religion of the Greeks has to marshal in her defence. Let us inspect her strong-holds, and make her bulwarks. We enumerate briefly:

1st. The poetic literature of the Greeks, together with Herodotus the father of history, is a powerful ally of popular religion. The poets are the prophets, the interpreters concerning gods and men. They had the ear of the people, they moulded public opinion in these matters.

2d. Tribal traditions, family genealogies, and eponyms are continually reminding the people of the miraculous interpositions of the gods and the marvelous exploits of their deified heroes. Many of the principal families proudly trace their lineage back to a god. Many of the surviving institutions of the people were memorial

of traditional events: For example, the memorial ship of the Athenians, and certain of the public processions and festival days observed in different parts of Greece.

3d. Art is an important ally of religion. The temples were the centres both of religion and of the arts. The Masters wrought the statues of the gods, and the columns of the orders under the patronage of religion, and so art gave to religion a concrete proof by constantly appealing to the emotional, and the imaginative in the mind of every Greek, and thus strengthen his faith in the gods and his adoration for them. Who could look upon Phidias' statue of Jupiter, at Olympia, or of Minerva, in Parthenon, without being most strongly affected? Art is a vehicle for religion to the common people, as well as to the most cultivated. All alike would drink in the silent inspiration as they gaze upon their temples beautiful and sublime. It would have been an insult to their finer feelings, even to intimate that these representations were *false*, that there *were no gods*, as they stood in enraptured awe before the statues of the deities. The genius of these masters was to them inexplicable if these things were not true.

4th. The general incorporation of religious notions and sentiments in the practical affairs of the Greeks. The author of the "Ten Great Religions," seems to maintain that religion sat rather loosely upon the Greeks, that it was not really a very serious matter with them, and that they had no great concern for their gods. In *all deference*, a careful induction of the facts leads *us* to a different conclusion. We have marked fifty distinct references, all illustrating the influence of Greek religion upon their every day affairs, social and political. We can only mention a few of these. We mention the almost innumerable instances of the consultation of their oracles. Oracles were consulted to know whether they should go to war, join battle, make treaties, send out colonies, and where plant them. The immense wealth of the temples and oracles, accumulated by the offerings and gifts, is another proof of the religious character of the Greeks.

THE SOUL.

BY PRESIDENT GEO. T. GOULD, D. D.

By the term Mind, is meant spiritual phenomena, considered as a whole; and the science of such phenomena is known as Psychology. Like all terms employed in Mental Philosophy, those here used seem to have been of physical origin. Psychology, a derivative of Psyche, the Soul, is traced to a Greek verb, meaning to breathe, or to blow. The word Soul itself runs back to a Gothic root, signifying to storm. Spirit is the Anglicized *spiritus*, and of consequence from the Latin *spirare*, to breathe. Animus sprang from a root, meaning wind. Ghost shows at once its kinship to the German *geist* and therefore its descent from *gescht*, which means air. *Pneuma*, the Greek for a spirit; *atma*, the Sanscrit for mind; and nephesh and ruach, the Hebrew for soul and spirit, may all be made to show their connection with breath or wind.

Thus might illustration be accumulated to large extent; yet in all such cases the idea intended to be conveyed is anything but what this physical origin might seem to imply. Phenomenal nature divides itself into two distinct and opposed classes: that which takes place without us and that which takes place within us; that which we apprehend through sense-perception, and that which we apprehend through self-consciousness. The first we may designate as the sensuous, the second as the mental. For all phenomena we are, by a law of our constitution, compelled to posit some substance or substratum, some entity, in which the phenomena inhere. For the sensuous, matter is the assumed underlying nexus; for the mental, spirit is the basis which we assume.

Hamilton states the question with his usual clearness: "The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one."

Locke, long ago, in his Essay upon the Human Understanding, expressed himself strongly and well upon this subject:

"We have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of the body; the one being supposed to be the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without, and the other supposed to be the substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that . . . from our not having

any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence than we can for the same reason deny the existence of the body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit."

Some physicists and material philosophers have been so wrapt up in their investigations and meditations that they seem not to have apprehended the self-evident truths which Hamilton and Locke have so plainly set forth. Says George Henry Lewes: "The law of continuity excludes the hypothesis of a distinct spiritual substance." Says Büchner: "Unprejudiced philosophy is compelled to reject the idea of an individual immortality; and of a personal continuance after death. . . . . Experience and daily observation teach us that the spirit perishes with its material substratum." Says Burmeister: "It is entirely inconceivable that a soul should exist without a brain." Says Feuerbach: "No one who has eyes to see, can fail to remark that the belief in the immortality of the soul has been effaced from ordinary life." Says Moleschott: "The times are past when spirit was assumed to exist independently of matter." To these may be added the names of Chaumette, Mirabeau and Danton, whom the French Revolution threw upon the surface of affairs. They first erected statues to the goddess of Slumber in the cemeteries and wrote over their gates, "Death is an eternal sleep;" the other two, when about to die, expressed their expectation of entering into nothingness. A few more could be added to our list, but these must suffice.

As materialists usually pride themselves upon their attainments in physical knowledge, a single physiological consideration may here be presented. When the extremities of a paralytic are tickled they will move and jump about in a manner ludicrous to behold. When the armpits are tickled, one is convulsed with laughter though he strive ever so hard to subdue it. When certain excitants, such as snuff, come into contact with the mucus lining of the nose, protracted sneezing ensues, however inappropriate may be the surrounding circumstances. An emetic in the stomach, or the mechanical irritation of the fauces, will produce nausea and vomiting. Finally, a solution of tobacco applied directly to the brain lessens the activity of the heart, while an application of alcohol

largely augments its activity. In all these cases, as well as in many others which could be mentioned, the local affection is by proper nerve communication brought to bear upon the brain. Here a certain mysterious influence is generated, known as nervous force. This, through certain other nerve channels, is discharged upon the appropriate muscles, and the final movement is produced.

But the movement of the limbs, in a normal state of health, can be produced in the absence of all tickling, by the mere exercise of the will. The laughter, too, can be voluntarily imitated; or under the stimulus of wit or glad tidings, it becomes as convulsive and incontrollable as when the tickling is employed. The recollection of previous sneezing can often-times aid us in doing so again; while by the mere exercise of will, all the contributing muscles may be brought into requisition, and the process of sneezing be imitated to perfection. So disgust, or even the remembrance of some offensive scene or circumstance, seldom fails of producing nausea and vomiting. And, lastly, grief will retard the circulation just as does tobacco upon the brain; while joy will accelerate it in the same way as does the local application of alcohol.

Now, in all the instances of the first class, there is a physical agent, external to the brain, acting upon it either directly or indirectly through certain nerve channels, and generating in the brain the nervous force, fluid, or energy, by which alone the muscles are made to act and the final results are accomplished. In all the cases in the second class, such external physical agent is absent; yet the same nervous energy is generated, is discharged upon the same muscles, and the same movements are produced. We say in the second case that the exciting cause is the will or emotions: If, by these terms we mean, as does the materialist, only certain movements in the brain substance, then evidently we have not answered the question at all. We have only, by the use of words, disguised the absurdity of saying that the brain motions are produced by the brain motions. It is these very motions of whose origin we are enquiring. Assuredly they are not self-produced, or spontaneous; since they come only to order, and at selected and designated times. In the first instances, the cause is an agent external to the brain, and one having an existence independent of it. In the second, instances, the effects being the same, the cause must be equally

external to the brain and independent of it. In a word, it must be that soul, of whose independent existence the mind of man has intuitive knowledge.

The belief in the reality of the soul is a necessitated one; it is an intuition, and therefore necessarily true. This follows from the universality of the belief. The few Diogoneses who have lived in tubs and cut themselves off from association with their kind, cannot destroy the argument, that man is a social being, drawn as it is from what otherwise is an universal custom. The few monstrosities to be met with, such as two-headed calves, brainless children, and the like, militate not against the statement that nature delights to produce forms pleasing and attractive. Still less can the materialists, numerable as they are upon the fingers, and easily traced to the modifying causes producing them, detract from the argument for spirit, based as it is upon otherwise universal consent.

Says Quatrefages, one of the most distinguished Anthropologists of our day: "In every country, with all people, in all races, we find the belief in beings superior to man, and influencing his destiny for good or evil. Everywhere we find the belief in another life succeeding to the actual life." Says P. Renouf, the great Egyptologist. "A belief in the persistence of life after death, and the observation of religious practices founded upon this belief, may be discovered in every part of the world, in every age, and among men representing every degree and variety of culture." Even Herbert Spencer is constrained to acknowledge: "Everywhere we find, expressed or implied, the belief that each person is double, and that when he dies, his other self, whether remaining near at hand or gone far away, may return, and continues capable of injuring his enemies and aiding his friends."

Lubbock, Tylor, and the rest of that school, have attempted to break the force of this fact by attributing the genesis of the spirit idea to dreams, fainting fits, epilepsy, shadows, trances, and the like. A more groundless superstructure, and a falser one, was never erected by the whimsicalities of man. In reading their efforts, one can but wonder that minds with such real vigor of grasp and range of attainments, should squander their wealth upon so puerile an hypothesis. The very grandeur of the culmination—an infinite, ubiquitous, omniscient spirit-god—and the absolute

universality of the belief, show that the origin could not have been as these philosophers would persuade us.

If we take the Turanian races, that branch of the human family to which belongs the most ancient civilization now extant, that of China; and to which belonged the most ancient civilization the world ever saw, that of Egypt, we will find this belief in the soul prominent and emphatic, as full grown at the dawn of history as it is now strong and vigorous. Egyptian civilization seems to come upon the stage of observation fully two thousand five hundred years before Christ, or only about seven centuries after the deluge. We have, from their monuments and tombs, a very full and complete account of the life and religion of this most ancient people. Nor is any point more thoroughly established than the prominence which they gave to their doctrine of immortality. According to Renouf, "The word *anchin*, which literally signifies 'the living,' is in innumerable places used emphatically for the departed. . . . In the very ancient inscription of Una, the coffin is called *hen en anchin*, 'the chest of the living.'" Says George Rawlinson:

"Belief in a future life was a main principle of the Egyptian religion. Immediately after death, the soul, it was thought, descended into the lower world (Amenti) and was conducted to the Hall of Truth, where it was judged in the presence of Osiris, and of his forty-two assessors, the Lords of Truth, and Judges of the dead. Anubis, who was called 'the director of the weight,' brought forth a pair of scales, and after placing in one scale a figure or emblem of Truth, set in the other a vase containing the good deeds of the deceased, Thoth standing by the while, with a tablet in his hand, whereon to record the result. If the good deeds weighed down the scales wherein they were placed then the happy soul was permitted to enter the boat of the sun; and was conducted by good spirits to the Elysian fields (Aahlu), to the Pools of Peace, and the dwelling places of the blest. If, on the contrary, the good deeds were insufficient, if the scale remained suspended in the air, then the unhappy soul was sentenced according to the degree of its ill deserts, to go through a round of transmigrations in the bodies of animals more or less unclean. Ultimately, the wicked soul, which had proved itself incurable, underwent a final sentence at the hands of Osiris, and being condemned to complete and absolute annihilation, was destroyed upon the steps of heaven by Shu, the Lord of Light. The good soul, having first been freed from its infirmities by passing through the basin of purgatorial fire, guarded by the four aped-faced genii, was made the companion of Osiris for a period of three thousand years, after which it returned from Amenti, re-entered its former body, rose from the dead, and lived once more a human life upon the earth."

From this belief came the whole system of embalming, of swathing in linen, of stone sarcophagi covered with lids that could not be moved, of pyramids built over tombs, and of tombs excavated deep into the solid rock.

The oldest civilization of Asia, that of Chaldæa, belonged also to this Turanian branch of the human family. Coming to the view of history in all probability about one hundred years after Egypt did, we find her religion characterized by the same great belief of man's spiritual nature. As they left no "Book of the Dead," or other sacred ritual, we are dependent for our knowledge of their belief in this particular upon the information gathered as to their burial customs. Three kinds of tombs have been discovered as in use among them. The first were brick vaults, in which whole families were interred. The second were clay coffins shaped like a huge dish cover. These were seven feet long, two or three feet high, and two and one-half feet broad at the base. Under them were never placed more than a man and his wife. The third kind were large clay jars, made to fit one over the other at the mouth. In these a single body, slightly bent, was placed, and then the jars were sealed together with bitumen. But whichever was the kind of tomb employed, one thing was invariable: articles of use and ornament, weapons, food, and drinking vessels were always interred with the body. These were to furnish sustenance and to afford pleasure to the soul in the land to which it had gone.

One of the earliest civilizations in Europe, the Etruscan, is likewise supposed to belong to this Turanian family. Originating at least as early as eight hundred years before Christ, it was in the full enjoyment of palaces, cities, music, paintings, sculptures, and the refinements of life generally, while yet Rome was but "a collection of mud huts, surrounded by a palisade." Religion filled the foremost place in the thoughts of this people; and among the objects of their worship were not only the deities proper, but chiefly and more especially the Lares or Ancestral Spirits of each family. Tylor, in his Etruscan Researches, tells us: "The true temples of the Etruscans were their tombs." Again he says:

"The tombs themselves are exact imitations of the houses. There is usually an outer vestibule, apparently appropriated to the annual funeral feast; from this a passage leads to a large central chamber which is lighted by windows

cut through the rock. The central hall is surrounded by small chambers in, which the dead repose. . . . These chambers . . . are furnished with all the implements, ornaments and utensils used in life. The tombs are, in fact, palaces for the dead to live in. The position and surroundings of the deceased are made to approximate as closely as possibls to the conditions of life. The couches on which the corpses repose have a triclinial arrangement, and are furnished with cushions carved in stone; and imitations of easy-chairs and foot-stools are carefully hewn out of the rock. Everything, in short, is arranged as if the dead were reclining at a banquet in their accustomed dwellings. On the floor stand wine jars, and the most precious belongings of the deceased—arms, ornaments and mirrors—hang from the roof, or are suspended on the walls. The walls themselves are richly decorated, usually being painted with representations of festive scenes; we see figures in gaily embroidered garments reclining on couches, while attendants replenish the goblets, or beat time to the music of the pipes. Nothing is omitted which can conduce to the amusement or comfort of the deceased.

"Their spirits were evidently believed to inhabit these house-tombs, after death, just as in life they inhabited their houses."

Rawlinson tells us:

"Over the dark realms of the dead ruled Mantus and Mania, king and queen of Hades, the former represented as an old man, wearing a crown, and with wings on his shoulders, and bearing in his hands, sometimes a torch, sometimes two or three large nails. . . . Intimately connected with these deities, their prime minister and most active agent, cruel, hideous, half-human, half-animal, the chief figure in almost all the representations of the lower world, is the demon Charon. . . . He is generally represented as a squalid and hideous old man with flaming eyes and savage aspect; but he has, moreover, the ears, and often the tusks of a brute,' with sometimes 'negro features and complexion, and frequently wings.' . . . His brow is sometimes bound round by snakes; at other times he has a snake twisted round his arm. . . . When death is being inflicted by man, he stands by 'grinning with savage delight; 'when it comes naturally, he is almost as well pleased; he holds the horse on which the departed soul is to take its journey to the other world, bids the Spirit mount, leads away the horse by the bridle or drives it before him, and thus conducts the deceased into the grim kingdom of the dead."

Indeed, time would fail to tell all the ways in which this interesting and peculiar people have left on record their belief in futurity.

The most long-lived civilization the world has ever seen, is the Chinese; reaching back as it does almost three thousand years before Christ, or to the very time when Egypt stepped to the front of nations. It, too, is Turanian; and here we find belief of man's spiritual nature in its most pronounced and exaggerated form. According to Dr. Legge, Professor of Chinese in Oxford Uni-

versity, millions of this people fancy that their dead are in a sort of purgatory, and that they will spite and injure such of their descendants as fail to secure their deliverance.

As far back as the time of Confucius, or five hundred years before Christ, this belief of man's immortality had crystalized into ancestral worship. This Sage represents the founders of the Chan dynasty as once every season repairing and beautifying the temple of their ancestors, setting forth the vessels that had belonged to them, displaying their various robes, and presenting the offerings of the several seasons. Nearly two thousand years before Christ, during the Hsia dynasty, the worship of ancestors had so fully established itself that small rectangular wooden tablets were employed as resting places for the Spirits. They were set up in front of the worshiper, and had written upon them: "Seat of the spirit," or "Seat of the soul," or "Lodging place of the spirit." Subsequently, under the Chan dynasty these tablets were for a time substituted by living relatives of the same name, who personated the deceased, received the worship offered, and partook of the viands presented. But the belief of man's spiritual nature antedates by many centuries even this early ancestral worship; for we find that when the Chinese written characters were invented, more than five thousand years ago, they then believed that when a man died he had not ceased to be; and they put that belief on record in one of their primitive characters, which they named *kwei*, and used to designate the spirits or names of departed men.

When we go to the Semitic races, the mother races of Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism, we find this belief in the soul fully acknowledged and illustrated. The earliest civilization in this family was the Assyrian. Taking its rise some one thousand five hundred years before Christ, when Moses first began to lead the children of Israel out of Egypt, it reached a grandeur and a glory, especially in matters of architecture, that are a wonder even to our times. While the future life seems not to have filled the place in their thoughts which it filled with the nations already mentioned, yet the cuneiform inscription make it fully to appear that they believed in the continued existence of the dead in a place of happiness for the good, and of misery for the wicked. In places the prayer is made that the sun, the greatest of the gods, may receive the soul of the

departed into his holy hands; while in other places, the souls of the good are "represented as clad in white, radiant garments, as dwelling in the presence of the gods, and as partaking of celestial food in the abode of blessedness."

Another early exponent of civilization in this family, was the Phœnicians. The best authorities place their rise about simultaneous with the Assyrians. They were the merchants and mariners of the ancient world, and the wealth, luxury and refinements of the world accumulated in their cities. Though they were the inventors of alphabetical writing, we have but the scantiest of remains from which to gather our information of their manners, customs, and religion. Philo of Byblus, a Syro-Phœnician Greek, in the early part of the second Christian century, gave to the world a translation, as he said, of an old Phœnician history written by Sanchoniathon, a priest. Both the original history and Philo's translation, have perished; only a fragment of the latter having been preserved by Eusebius. We are dependent, then, upon the few inscriptions found in the mother country and her colonies, and upon the incidental allusions of contemporaneous peoples. Much doubt must therefore continue to rest upon many points. One thing, however, seems fully to appear: the Phœnicians believed in the immortality of the soul; since, according to Sanchoniathon, many of their gods were but deified rulers and heroes.

Of Judiasm, which reached its highest political importance and magnificence under Solomon, about one thousand years before Christ, we need say nothing at this place. The multitudinous references to the soul or spirit of man in the sacred books of the Jews, leave no doubt as to their faith upon this point. Neither shall we speak of Christianity, with its four hundred millions of followers, in nearly all nations, countries and climes. Though Semitic in origin, it has found its largest following amongst the sons of Japhet.

The Arabs, another race of the Semites, remained unlettered and unknown till the days of Mohammed, or about the beginning of the seventh century after Christ. Under the influence of the religion which he compiled, and of the Koran which he wrote, they started upon a career of conquest and civilization which culminated in the glories of Bagdad and Granada. At present this religion

is embraced by some eighty millions of our race. On the questio of man's spiritual nature it utters no uncertain sound. It teache the doctrine of an intermediate state, of a resurrection of the dea and of a general judgment. None can escape the punishment o eternal fire except the followers of their own religion, which the call Islam, or Obedience to the Divine will. A Moslem, thoug is judged by his actions. These are weighed in a balance, held b the angel Gabriel, so that one scale hangs over heaven and th other over hell. His good deeds are placed in one side, his ev deeds in the other. As the scale turns, so his destiny is decide Should he be awarded heaven, he finds awaiting him, garden groves, marble palaces, richest viands, and ravishing music, whil he is ministered unto by seventy-two Houris more beautiful tha angels. But the way to this heaven lies over the bridge Es-Sira which stretches over the midst of hell, and is finer than a hair an sharper than the edge of any sword. All who fall in battle fo the faith, are assured of this blissful immortality, regardless o other qualifications.

Amongst all the members of the Aryan family of races, th spirituality of man's nature is fully recognized. Their earlie civilization seems to have arisen among the Irans, or ancestors o the Medes and Persians. This, too, is put about one thousand fiv hundred years before Christ, though the Indic or Sanskrit civiliza tion followed hard upon its heels at an interval of less than thre hundred years. Both of these have left us their sacred book From the Zendavesta we learn that the Irans were "devout an earnest believers in the immortality of the soul and a conscious future existence." Milne gives us the substance of its teaching i these words:

"On the third morning after death comes the fiend Vezaresha and carries o the wicked soul. At the head of the Chinvat bridge over hell into paradis all souls await judgment. . . . To the waiting soul comes a maid of divin beauty, or fiendish ugliness; she is his own conscience; the dogs who guard th bridge are at her side. The wicked, unguarded by the dogs from the howlin pursuit, fall from the bridge into hell. But the lovely maid leads the righteou soul above the Hara-berezaiti; Vohn-mano rises from his golden seat at heaven gate and welcomes him into the undecaying world."

The Rig Veda, or earliest of the Indic scriptures, knows nothin of the trasmigration of souls; which came afterward to enter s

fully and fearfully into both Buddhism and Brahmanism. In the place of this doctrine, according to Prof. Whitney, appears

"A simple faith that the life in this world is not the last of man, that after death he goes to an abode of happiness above. . . . . Death to them was surrounded with no terrors. They regarded it as only an entrance upon a new life of happiness in the world of the departed. Somewhere beyond the grave, in the region where the gods dwelt, the children of men were assembled anew, under the sceptre of him who was the first progenitor of their race, the divine Yama."

To show the early Vedic poets' aspirations after immortality, we will quote a hymn as translated by Max Müller in his Chips from a German Workshop:

"Where there is eternal light, in the world where the sun is placed,
In that immortal, imperishable world, place me, O Soma!
Where king Vaivasvata reigns, where the secret place of heaven is,
Where these mighty waters are, there make me immortal!
Where life is free in the third heaven of heavens,
Where the worlds are radiant, there make me immortal!
Where wishes and desires are, where the bowl of the bright Soma is,
Where there is food and rejoicing, there make me immortal!
Where there is happiness and delight, where joy and pleasure reside,
Where the desires of our desire are attained, there make me immortal!"

This ancient Vedic religion developed into Brahmanism and Buddhism, the modern followers of which are estimated at six hundred and fifty millions of our race.

As the belief in man's spiritual nature was common to the Irans and the Sanscrit Indians, so it was found amongst all the other members of the Aryan family, whether they be Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Greeks or Romans.

Of the Celts it will suffice to say that according to Cæsar, as quoted by Sir John Lubbock, "Among the ancient Britons money was habitually lent on what may strictly be termed 'postobits'—promises to pay in another world."

Of the Slavs the American Cyclopædia informs us: "In addition to their gods they believed in good and evil spirits, and demons of different kinds; in the immortality of the soul, and in a retribution after death."

The Teutons were embraced in two main divisions, the Scandinavians and the Germans. The Encyclopædia Britannica says: "The religion of the ancient Germans was essentially the same as

that of their Scandinavian kinsmen." The mythology of both "included the three sisters of fate, two of whom were fair and good, the third dark and evil. Beneath the gods were giants, elves, and dwarfs. After death it was believed good men were received into Walhalla; and by good men were meant warriors who never shrank in battle—above all, warriors who died fighting." In this paradise the time is spent in drinking mead and eating the flesh of the boar, which is renewed every day. Bifrost, the rainbow, is the bridge to this heavenly land; and the frost giants of Jotunheim, the devils of this religion, would pass over it into the land of rewards, were it not for the red part of the bow, which is burning fire.

The worship of Greece was eminently that of nature invested with human personality. "The earlier gods," says James Freeman Clarke, "we must needs consider, not as persons, but as powers of nature, not yet humanized. The last, seated on Olympus, are 'fair humanities.'" Again he says: "These deities were not brought to them from abroad, but developed gradually among themselves out of nameless powers of nature into humanized and personal deities." Almost every visible object had its god or goddess, until the pantheon was absolutely multitudinous. Still, the Greek thought well of himself and not very well of the gods; while he gave himself but little trouble about the under world, over which presided Persephone and her shadowy husband Hades. That he believed, however, in his own spirituality follows from the fact that, according to Thirlwall, we must add to the gods proper those of a lower grade, "thirty thousand in number, guardian demons, spirits of departed heroes, who are continually walking over earth, veiled in darkness, watching the deeds of men, and dispensing weal or woe."

So, too, the Roman, though eminently practical and temporal in his aspirations, frequently turned his thoughts to an after life, "with a sort of shiver at the prospect of becoming a pale shade, haunting the neighborhood of the tomb, or dwelling in the cold world beneath, shut out from the light of day." Perhaps it were well, to show the belief of Greece and Rome, that we quote some of the distinguished thinkers of each nation. Addison says: "All the philosophers of note in Greece, and the learned men of Rome, endeav-

ored to establish and inculcate into the minds of men the formation of the Universe, the superintendency of Providence, the perfection of the Divine Nature, the immortality of the Soul, and the future state of rewards and punishments." Plato, we know, believed in the pre-existence of the soul, and from that fact argued the perpetuation of its career after severance from the body. Aristotle has left his views much in doubt. St. Thomas Aquinas, Spengel, Origen, and others, have argued his belief in immortality. Averroes and others have taken the opposite view. According to Prof. Bain, "Aristotle reserves a certain portion of the soul for independent existence." He divides the intellect into two parts, the receptive and the constructive. The first is inseparable from the body and perishes with it; the second is the purest manifestation of intellectual energy, and is immortal. Rawlinson seems to settle the question when he gives us Aristotle's own words: "It is absurd to suppose that the good and ill fortune of their friends in this life does not, at some time or other, penetrate to the departed. And it would clearly be very unfeeling if it did not effect them in some degree. It will effect them, however, much less than if they were alive, and never to such an extent as to make them happy if they are not happy otherwise; nor if they are happy, to annul their happiness." Such language can have no meaning but upon the supposition of Aristotle's belief in continued existence after death.

Socrates, in his seventieth year, was compelled to drink the judicial hemlock. To his weeping friends he said: "It would, indeed, be inexcusable in me to despise death, if I were not persuaded that it will conduct me into the presence of God . . . , and into the society of just and good men; but I draw confidence from the hope that something of man remains after death, and that the state of the good will be much better than that of the bad." Xenophon, the historian and disciple of Socrates, puts this speech into the mouth of Cyrus, the great Persian king: "Think not, my dearest children, that when I depart from you I shall be no more; but remember that my soul, even while I lived among you was invisible to you; yet by my actions you were sensible it existed in my body. Believe it, therefore, existing still, though it be still unseen. . . . For my own part, I could never think that the soul's consciousness is lost when it is discharged out of an unconscious habitation.

But when it is freed from all corporeal alliance, then it truly exists." Cicero, in his treatise on old age, quotes from Cato, who thus speaks to Scipio at the age of eighty: "My soul has always raised itself and looked forward on futurity, in this view and expectation, that when it shall depart out of life it shall then live forever; and if this were not true that the soul is immortal, the souls of the most worthy would not, above all others, have the strongest impulse to glory." Says Cicero himself: "If I am wrong in believing that the souls of men are immortal, I please myself in my mistake; nor while I live will I ever choose that this opinion, wherewith I am so much delighted, should be wrested from me." Again he says: "There is, I know not how deeply imprinted in the minds of men, a certain presage, as it were, of a future existence; and this takes the deepest root, and is most discernible in the greatest geniuses and most elevated minds." Thus have we listened to the voice of civilization in all ages, and in every land; and in every branch of the human family, we have heard but one teaching—the existence and immortality of the soul. Before hearing what the mind of man has to say upon this subject, sitting in the night of barbarism and in its valley and shadow of death, let us not forget that whereunto we have already attained. The human race is numbered at one billion three hundred and ninety-two million five hundred thousand. Of these one billion one hundred and thirty-six million five hundred thousand, or largely more than four-fifths are already accounted for as Christians, Buddhists, Brahminists, Mohamedans and Israelites—professors of religions which emphasize the doctrine of man's spiritual nature. Of the remaining two hundred and fifty-six million, or less than one-fifth, we have some knowledge of the religious views entertained by two hundred and forty million; and amongst them all, denial that man has a soul is nowhere to be found.

The Mincopies, or inhabitants of the Andaman Islands, are among the most degraded of our race. They cover themselves with mud and tattoo their bodies, but wear no clothing. Marriage lasts only till the child is born and weaned, when the parents separate and each seeks a new partner. They live chiefly upon fruits, mangroves, and shell fish; and in many of their habits are little, if any, above the brute. Yet even these poor wretches believe in

another life; and when a chief dies they keep a lighted fire under the platform which bears his corpse, to appease his powerful spirit. The Hottentots are, in many respects, among the most disgusting savages. Their filth is inconceivable; while their barbarity is so great that those enfeebled by age beyond the ability to work are "confined to a solitary hut at a considerable distance from the kraal, there, with a small stock of provisions placed within their reach, but without anyone to comfort or assist them, to die either of age or hunger, or be devoured by some wild beast." Yet these, too, believed in another life; since they were afraid of ghosts, and dedicated to their great men who had died, certain fields, mountains and rivers, which they saluted with reverence in passing.

The Basutos, a tribe of the Kaffir race, believe in a life after death. They locate the place in the center of the earth and call it *the abyss that is never filled.* The Bechuanas, another tribe of the same race, believe so fully in ghosts that the bravest of them are sometimes afraid to go out in the night, lest they should meet the spirit of one whom they have killed.

The Bushmen are put by many travelers even below the Hottentots, having neither domestic animals nor canoes. Burchell says they never reflect. Lichtenstein asserts that they have no names. Bleek regards them as the lowest of all human races, and Hæckle sets them almost on a par with the chimpanzee and gorilla. Yet their belief in man's spiritual nature is seen in their deification of their great men after death, whom they worship with prayers and supplications. According to Tylor:

"The Zulu will say that at death a man's shadow departs from his body and becomes an ancestral ghost, and the widow will relate how her husband has come in her sleep and threatened to kill her for not taking care of his children; or the son will describe how his father's ghost stood before him in a dream, and the souls of the two, the living and the dead, went off together to visit some far off kraal of their people."

The Yoruba negroes believe when a child is born that it is the soul of some dead ancestor who has returned to earth. The Guinea negro regularly offers food and drink to the images of his dead relatives, and in times of distress these people gather in crowds on the hill tops and in the forests, calling in piteous tones to their ancestors for help. In Dahomey the king sends messengers ever

and anon to his dead father by messengers whom he kills for the purpose; and when the king himself dies, hundreds of men are sacrificed at the grave in the belief that their spirits will follow and aid him in the land of the departed. So, in the Congo land, according to Winwood Reade, a son killed his mother simply because he thought that as a glorified spirit she could be of greater service to him than she could be while here in the flesh. Other Africans will fasten the jaw of a slain enemy to a horn, or his skull to the big drum, that the clatter and clang, the clash and jar, may torment the ghost of the dead owner.

The Feegeeans belong to the Negrito race inhabiting certain of the Pacific Islands. They go almost naked, are inveterate cannibals, and seek the reputation of being murderers as the highest object of their ambition. They fatten slaves for their tables; and when they are considered sufficiently fat and tender, they are roasted alive to increase their flavor and delicacy. Yet even these wretches believe in futurity; for when a great man dies, his wives and slaves are put to death that their souls may accompany his upon its journey. Believing that they enter upon the future life just in the condition in which they leave this, they have great dread of living till they become old and infirm. Consequently, dutiful children take their parents before old age comes upon them, bid them an affectionate adieu, and bury them alive; saying that they do this because of the love which they have for them.

The Tasmanians inhabit Van Dieman's Land. Having no clothes, no houses, no canoes, no weapons, except a pole sharpened at one end, they live on mussels, cockles and periwinkles. Their condition is low and degraded in the extreme. Yet they believe in guardian spirits, having the pleasing superstition that the soul of a dead father has the care and oversight of his son.

The New Zealanders believe that when one is eaten, his soul, as well as his body, passes into the eater. Hence, when eating the slain after a battle, they seek for the oldest and most distinguished warriors. However, those who are properly buried, and escape other dangers to which the soul is exposed, have a blissful immortality in the happier regions of the spirit land.

In the Friendly Islands, it is only the chiefs who are assuredly immortal. With reference to other classes there is more or less

uncertainty. The chiefs, however, on being freed from the body, go at once to Bolotoo, an island to the North-west, supposed to be well stocked with all that they loved in this life. A sick Australian believes that some angry ghost has gotten into him and is gnawing his liver; and when the sick man finally dies, weapons, ornaments and food, are buried by his side.

On the continent of Asia, the Mongols worship the souls of Genghis Khan and his princely family; the Malays fear to waken a sleeper by shaking him, lest they should hurt his body in the absence of his soul; and the Itelms of Kamtshatka, who according to Peschele, worship the water wagtails as the authors of Spring, believe in the renewal of all creatures down to the smallest fly.

The Caribs see their heroes in the constellations, and show their belief of immortality by placing grains of Indian corn in the hands of their dead. Indeed, the American Indians generally bury with the deceased the objects of greatest use to him in life. The Patagonians kill the horses of the dead, that he may have whereon to ride in the land to which he goes.

"The Greenlander," according to Max Müller,

"Believes that when a man dies his soul travels to Torngarsuk, the land where reigns perpetual Summer, all sunshine, and no night; where there is good water, and birds, fish, seals, and reindeer without end, that are to be caught without trouble, or are found cooking alive in a huge kettle. But the journey to this land is difficult; the souls have to slide five days or more down a precipice all stained with the blood of those who have gone down before. And it is especially grievous for the poor souls, when the journey must be made in winter or in tempest, for then a soul may come to harm, or suffer the other death, as they call it, when it perishes utterly, and nothing is left."

From Catlin's account of the Choctaws we learn that—

"They hold that the spirit lives after death, and that it has a great distance to travel toward the West; that it has to cross a dreadful, deep and rapid stream, over which from hill to hill, there lies a long, slippery pine log, with the bark peeled off. Over this the dead have to pass before they reach the delightful hunting-grounds. The good walk on safely, though six people from the other side throw stones at them; but the wicked, trying to dodge the stones, slip off the log and fall thousands of feet into the water which is dashing over the rocks."

The Eskimos lay the head of a dog by the grave of a child, that the soul of the sagacious brute may show the ignorant babe the way to the land of spirits.

"In Peru," says Tylor, "where a dead prince's wives would hang themselves in order to continue in his service, and many of his attendants would be buried for him to take their souls with him, people declared that they had seen those who had long been dead walking about with their sacrificed wives, and adorned with the things that were put in the grave for them."

Carver gives account of a burial among the Minnesota Indians, so early as 1766. Schiller combined the characteristic features in a poetic dirge. I give Bulwer's translation, as quoted by Sir Charles Lyell:

"Here bring the last gifts!—and with these
The last lament be said;
Let all that pleased, and yet may please,
Be buried with the dead.

"Beneath his head the hatchet hide,
That he so stoutly swung;
And place the bear's fat haunch beside—
The journey hence is long!

"And let the knife new sharpened be
That on the battle day
Shore with quick strokes—he took but three—
The foeman's scalp away!

"The paints that warriors love to use,
Place here within his hand,
That he may shine with ruddy hues
Amidst the spirit land."

From such modern examples we get the clue to the ancient funeral rites, the traces of which lie scattered over Europe and America in the burial mounds, dolmens, tumuli and barrows which so largely abound. In many of these is found a principal skeleton with attendants ranged around; while bronze weapons and golden arm-rings, or stone implements and bracelets of animals' teeth, together with drinking vessels and remains of food, show the unity of the race in its customs and practices as well as the antiquity of the belief in the separate existence of the soul. Of these burial places, one especially is worthy of all consideration. In 1852, on a hillside near Aurignac, in Southern France, was discovered a grotto containing seventeen skeletons. M. Lartet, after careful examination, concluded that the grotto had been used as a place of

sepulture. Immediately without the cave were the remains of bones broken for marrow, as were also the traces of fire, showing that funeral feasts had been held there; within the cave were such remains as made it evident that trophies of the chase, food for the dead, and articles of utility and ornament had been interred for the use of the deceased in their journey to the bourne from which they would not return. These relics are supposed to reach back to the highest antiquity of our race, and with that antiquity they connect the sacred rites of burial and the belief of the separate existence of the soul in a future state. They show that amongst these cave dwellers of the rude stone age, living and dying even before the dim dawn of history, there was then the belief that man has a soul.

Thus have we searched the world around, and from the highest civilization to the lowest barbarism, from the remotest antiquity to the latest utterances of our own day, except a few materialistic philosophers, we find man, regardless of time or condition, uniting with one heart and one voice to proclaim the belief in his own spiritual nature. Such belief must, therefore, be necessitated; it is an intuition, and as such is as certainly true as that any whole is equal to the sum of its parts.

SUICIDE—CAUSES AND CURE.

BY REV. H. M. DUBOSE, OF TEXAS.

I. *American Journal of Medical Science.* October, 1881. Article XI., Medico-Legal Relations of Suicide, by Royal Whitman.

II. *The Anatomy of Suicide*, by Forbes Winslow, M. D., London.

This subject has been chosen not because of its sensational character, but because of its tragic significance as a factor in the sum of human misfortune. It is a canker that has eaten into the very heart of modern society, and, unless removed or stayed, will seriously involve its vital functions. Can it be that there is a single ill afflicting humanity that has not a remedy prescribed somewhere in the *materia medica* of moral truth? The limitless resources of personal sympathy in the Gospel and the comprehensive teachings of Christian philosophy forbid the entertainment

of so hapless and desponding a thought. Yet it is at once a sad and singular fact that the crime of self-destruction has attracted but a modicum of thought during all the centuries of Christian progress. It is true that some interest has been awakened in this country within the last two decades. One or more publications are being devoted exclusively to the study of statistics showing the prevalence, growth, physiological and psychological causes of suicide. Much, too, has been written in a professional way; but little has been attempted beyond an effort to settle the medico-legal relations of the subject. The genius that shall touch the matter in any practical way; reach a moral diagnosis of the disease and definitely prescribe a moral treatment, is yet to appear.

Dr. Forbes Winslow stands almost alone among English medical writers, as having risen above a mere scientific view of this wide-reaching evil, and treating it as a moral as well as physical disease. But, unfortunately, he carries into this higher discussion a medical fallacy that leads him at last to a false conclusion, *i. e.*, that all attempts looking toward self-destruction result from mental unsoundness.

As a further evidence of the meagre thought given to this subject, it may be stated that before 1870 the United States Census Bureau collected no statistics under this head. So far as I am informed, there has never stood upon the statute books of any American State a single legislative ruling defining its legal status and relations. A few judicial decisions may have touched it, but only incidentally. It stands undefined so far as any popular sentiment or teaching is concerned. Its tragic recurrence in the midst of repose and imagined security has so shocked our sensibilities as to leave little room for reflection or passionless thought.

Suicide was rare among ancient peoples, if we except the later Romans and the period of Greek luxury. Not above three cases of deliberate suicide are recorded in the Bible; but in modern times the evil has fallen like a plague on communities and nations. It is the testimony of Dr. Lisle, a celebrated French physician, that the number of suicides increases every year in France, and in all other countries, out of proportion to the increase of the population; that climates have no influence on suicides; that the tendency to suicide increases from infancy to old age. In France and the Ger-

man States it has come to be regarded in many of the higher circles as a test of honor and courage that a man take his own life when his reputation is stained or his fortune wrecked. Especially has this sentiment obtained in the great Universities of Paris, Berlin and Leipsic, whence it has been carried to many lands, like sediment of ore from the mountain's bosom. Suicide has increased as the world has advanced in scientific knowledge and appliances.

The authority above quoted remarks on this head that "it is not true that education ought to be considered as a preservative against suicide. On the contrary, suicide has increased in direct proportion to the amount of instruction that has been afforded the population, not only in France but in all countries where inquiries have been made." This suggests a grave question: Are these facts in any way related? Are they cause and effect? Has the increase of knowledge and light lessened the worth and appreciation of life? The sanity of any man suggesting such a thought would be justly and universally questioned. Yet, other and efficient forces to which this crime stands related as effect, have emerged in the process of the moral and social evolutions of the age. These are extraneous to and opposed to the spirit of true philosophy; albeit, not a few latitudinarian and agnostic theories, embracing much of truth, have tended to weaken the barriers and remove the safeguards of life. These will be noticed hereafter.

The following figures will show the potency of that false philosophy of self-directed expiation so nearly allied to the terms of the "code." The actual suicides reported in the United States during the year 1880 were as follows, viz.:

From gunshot	472
From poison	340
From drowning	155
From other causes	1,550
Total	2,517

These statistics can be little more than an approximation. Indeed, in view of the difficulty of obtaining reliable data for census returns on so delicate a matter, the purposely obscured medical opinions sometimes rendered, together with other nameless causes, I should say they fall at least fifty per cent. short of the actual facts.

This will appear, if we take the statement that, as early as 1840, the rate of suicides in the cities of New York, Boston and Philadelphia, was in the proportion of one to every twelve thousand inhabitants, while the census average in 1880 was about one to every twenty thousand of the whole population. The same proportion now holds with reference to these cities and the entire country. This is accounted for upon the supposition that suicide is more common in cities than in the rural districts. This discrepancy is, however, due to the facts above stated—the better efficiency of the methods employed to obtain statistics in cities, and the difficulty of disguising suicides. If our position be well taken, then it will appear that the rate is one suicide to every fifteen thousand inhabitants of the entire country. Take in connection with these figures the ascertained fact that three-fourths of the remainder of the deaths reported in the census returns are due to inflammatory diseases and cerebral disorders; and, further, that one-half of these result directly from indulgence, self-abuse and excesses of all kinds, and we reach the alarming conclusion that over three hundred thousand of the American people are every year directly and indirectly precipitating their own dissolution and digging their own graves.

But it is not our present purpose to enlarge this discussion to these bounds. Its narrower significance is sufficiently large for philanthropic study and effort. Acts of self-destruction, according to these statistics, aggregate more than eight every day in our own country. That is, more than eight people, every day, violently end their own lives in these United States. As many as twelve cases of suicide were reported for one month, during the present Summer, in the little city of San Antonio. Who, we may seriously ask, is safe from his own hands? We may be safer from violence without than violence within. We may stand in less danger of assassination than self-destruction. A man who in the yellow light of the morning was a prince in his family and a lord among his fellows, is found at evening weltering in his own blood, with the fatal helebore upon his lips or hushed in a dreamless sleep in the arms of ocean. It may be seriously doubted if there is a man who has had a large share of the duties and vexations of life who has not at some time had the tempter to whisper in his ear wily words and delusive promises. The temptation has at least shaped itself

into the question, "Is life worth living?" It is here that faith achieves a signal triumph. But for this mighty support and the shuddering dread of the shadowy unknown, what could prevent thousands from blindly setting their barks adrift upon the sunless waves? It is this fear of something after death that makes us draw back; it is this trust in God that gives equipoise after we have drawn back.

With the physical disorders operating as causes or motives in prompting self-destruction, this paper will have little to do. They have been sufficiently set forth in the explicit terminology of medical science; and, besides, they must always be reckoned as secondary, and, hence, less important than the mediate causes to be traced to moral conditions and social surroundings. It does not appear that it ever occurred to the ancients to offer insanity as an explanation of the phenomenon of suicide. The odium attaching to its perpetration and the severe laws punishing it as a crime, indicate the very decided sentiment universal among all ancient and mediæval people. Opinions gradually changed, however, until they culminated in the sentimentality of the first half of the present century, which assumed that self-destruction was *prima facie* evidence of insanity. This opinion was held by a number of English authorities of eminence and skill. One of these, Dr. Rowly, says:

"As no rational being will voluntarily give himself pain, or deprive himself of life, which certainly, while human beings preserve their senses, must be acknowledged evils, it follows that every one who commits suicide is indubitably *non compos mentis*, and is not able to reason justly, but is under the influence of false images of the mind, and, therefore, suicide should ever be considered as an act of insanity."

Whitman quotes from Esquirol and some other writers of his time, who regarded all suicides as insane. Esquirol himself is very decided on this point, and says: "I believe that I have now proved that an individual will only put an end to his life when he is delirious; and that all suicides are mentally diseased." "Suicide is an act of delirium," says Falret; and his countryman, Boudin, reached an even more radical conclusion. He is bold to assert that "suicide is always a disease and always an act of insanity; therefore, it merits neither praise nor blame." These views we are disposed to adopt without any well directed investigation or reflec-

tion. It is charity, but is it not too broad? Is it not charity at the expense of scientific truth? and worse still, is it not charity at the expense of that enlightenment after which we have long struggled?

I have just read the story of a horrible crime committed in the Hague. A father, after hanging his five innocent children, destroyed his own life. Nothing, it would seem, but an insane hallucination could suggest so revolting a deed as this. But quite different and quite to another use is the well authenticated story that a young man in France spent more than three years in contriving an instrument of self-destruction. It was a guillotine, arranged to strike the fatal blow by means of a weight set in motion by the exhaustion of a vessel of water. When completed, he calmly placed his neck under the axe, while the water, drop by drop, measured out his life. This may have been madness, but if so, it is the madness of method. Nothing seems clearer than that a large proportion, and in my opinion a large majority, of those who take their own lives do it coolly and deliberately, and in the full possession of their faculties, displaying the same freedom and untrammelled decision that they did in the affairs of life.

This view is supported by an array of scientific and professional authority, the very formidableness of which carries conviction. Indeed, it may be said that the tendency of current speculation is toward the abandonment of the theory of insanity except as a co-ordinate cause. Among the later opinions may be quoted the utterances of Dr. Leroy in his "Treatise on Suicide," published in Paris some years ago:

"If in the number of suicides, an important part, perhaps one-third, be ascribed to mental disease, perhaps a more important part should be reserved for those individuals in whom one can but suspect a cerebral change escaping our means of investigation, a modification due to hereditary degeneration or to special degeneration of the faculties, caused, perhaps, by excess or social position. Then there will remain still a third class of individuals, with whom this act, often caused by irritation, can no more be attributed to insanity than can excess of anger, and all the states of moral depression which follow the sudden loss of hope or delusions."

Still later and more explicit is the declaration of Dr. Gray, an American physician, "that suicide is always an unnatural act, but in the large proportion of cases, if not the majority, is committed

by sane people." A serious, if not fatal, consequence is involved in the affirmative settlement of this question. Because suicide is unnatural and contrary to reason, not a few argue that it is hence the result of insanity. But what crime is not committed in open revolt against reason? Are not murder, robbery and licentiousness all unnatural and contrary to true reason? In truth, where is the difference between assassination and suicide? Are they not prompted by kindred impulses? Shall we excuse one as being less voluntary than the other? "What will become of morality if it is decided that to kill one's self is always an irresponsible act, and never a crime? Nothing is good or bad, but are equally the result of insanity."

In this way it may be clearly demonstrated that many of the arguments brought forward to prove that suicides result from insanity are fallacious, because they apply with equal force to any crime and thus destroy the justice and authority of all law. Cases are not wanting in which the act of self-destruction is clearly seen to be "the result of reason and discrimination," as a desire to escape disgrace or punishment. The motives moving to suicide are sometimes obviously selfish. I am told that the Knights of Honor, the fraternity of Odd Fellows, and some other benevolent orders, have been forced to cancel the endowments of suicides in order to protect themselves from unnatural impositions.

A passage from the writings of the Prussian Griesinger will complete this line of evidence:

"There is no insanity present when the feeling of disgust with life is in exact relation to the actual circumstances; where evident moral causes exist, which sufficiently account for the act; where the resolution has been deliberately made and might have been abandoned had the circumstances changed, and in which we discover no other symptoms of mental derangement, as when a man prefers death to a miserable, contemptible life. The abhorence of life, and the idea of self-annihilation correspond to the intensity of the painful irrepressions which bear upon the individual."

It is of prime importance to the main object of this paper that this point be settled in the negative, as indeed there seems to be little difficulty in the way of doing. A failure, however, to do so relegates it from the circle of moral questions and places it in the list of those irremediable ills to which flesh is heir. But, whatever view we may be disposed to take; whatever extenuating cir-

cumstances we may be willing to admit; whatever weakness we may desire to excuse, we should never lose sight of that responsibility lying behind sequences that have impaired reason and inaugurated ruin. These themselves afford scope for inquiry and reformation.

Those perverted religious and philosophical teachings which have emerged from the chaotic speculations of the age, must be reckoned among the most prolific causes of self-destruction. This observation finds sufficient confirmation in the mere recital of a well-known fact, that in those countries where these teachings have assumed the most practical forms the crime of self-murder has been most common. German pessimism tells its own story. Parisian irreverence has made life valuable only with its accidents of place and money, while the purposeless revolt against Latin superstition has reached a frigid rationalism that chills the last vestige of life's ardor, and lays it open to any possible calamity. "It seems reasonable to suppose," remarks Whitman, "that a materialist believing that death implies annihilation, or even a person with uncertain ideas as to the future state, can easily imagine certain situations where he would prefer death to a life which offers no attractions for him."

Materialism, and its kindred rationalistic errors are abroad in the world to-day, a busy multitude, doing their direful work. Rationalism is the giant, Thor, overturning our altars, desecrating our Sabbaths and making secularists and self-murderers of our young men. False views of life, impatience, disappointed greed, together with a lack of moral courage to meet the stern issues of existence, operate as immediate incentives to self-destruction. Confronted by "the sea of odds," often presented in life, the question, "To be, or not to be?" finds a quick answer in the "bare bodkin" philosophy. These have their rise in defective moral education, in unhappy surroundings and disappointed ambition. Those who set out to "make the most of life," usually get the least, and eventually fling it away, passively, if not violently. Many a young man begins life with the thought that it was given him simply to make money. For money, he exchanges conscience, honor, domestic peace. Money made cannot be kept—the supposed object of life fails, it becomes a burden, and so he stamps it out as he would a

worm at his feet. The world is living too rapidly. Especially do the American people make life too much of a whirligig. We wear it out before we learn its uses, it is henceforth of little service. We need an infusion of sober brains. Classic habits restored and operated with the quickened perceptions of modern intellect would make life a new experience. We must take time for our nerves to relax and our brains to suspend their tensions; else the devil will destroy the whole fabric.

By no means the least common danger to which life is exposed, and one easily reached and corrected, is the useless and criminal employment of powerful agents in the treatment of simple ailments. The physical organism bears vital affinity to the hidden life. It cannot be tampered with without setting in motion the most serious consequences. The use of these agents has produced strains on nerve and brain that have become, and are becoming, hereditary, and will perhaps be perpetuated through all time. I do not make this assertion from the non-professional standpoint of my own investigations, but supported by unquestionable medical authority. The obviation of this trouble will decrease the evil tide so much; and the causes are to be dealt with in the abstract. If not wholly removed, they may be, by careful study and effort, reduced to the minimum.

It would seem scarcely worth the while to ask the question: "Is suicide a crime?" and yet a respectable protest is to be confronted. Chiefly on the ground, I suppose, that the mental states, sanity or insanity, under which the act is perpetrated does not admit of responsibility; and that, after all, a man has the same plenary power over his own life, which, so far as he is concerned, is an accident that he has over his goods and chattles. These fallacies destroy themselves. Suicide, then, stands out as murder—foul murder—in the same light it would be if another had been slain under the same conditions. The man who takes his own life is as guilty of blood as if he slew the wife of his bosom, or the mother who gave him birth. Some ancient peoples burned, left unburied, and otherwise insulted the bodies of suicides in punishment of their crime. Others confiscated their estates and nullified their wills. Self-destruction entails suffering on others, and is, therefore, the highest type of selfishness. A man in one of

our coast cities destroyed himself because he failed to find employment, and he knew his family would suffer the next day. What selfishness! What folly! Suicide is robbery against society; but most of all, it is defiance of the living God. The crowning madness of the universe is that which rushes man into the presence of Jehovah before his time. When the evil spirit assaulted one of old, his reply was, "Wait on the Lord!"

Is there a cure? Is there balm in Gilead? Can this growing tendency to destroy soul and body at a single stroke be checked be stayed? The work is many featured, rising from the simplest incidental causes to the mighty generalizations of philosophy and religion. As indicating the general scope of this work, I would say society must be reformed, made vulnerable and given a conscience. It must become the guardian of our holy traditions, raise the standard of honor, and make holy the bridal and marital vows It must hush the revelry of the dance, dash aside the wine cup and set the brand of its curse upon the gamblers' brow. The Sabbath must be respected. Weary brains and weary limbs must find repose one day in seven to prevent the snapping of physical tension and the collapsing of moral conviction. Corporations, if they will not bow at the altars of God, must be forced by the strong arm of law to bow at the altar of humanity. It is not the law and man who most frequently conspire against their own lives, but those who otherwise are nerved by worthy impulses, yet are ground to earth by cares and the iron demands of heartless task-masters.

As the mightiest of all these agencies which are to lift humanity above this foul disgrace, this blighting misfortune, must be named the gospel of the Son of God. When all else fails it shall consummate the task. To all the ramifications of society it is addressed There can come to humanity no evil suggestion, no calamity that has not been fully provided for, and no grievous temptation that has not been met and overcome in the life of the incarnate Saviour Those who walk in Him will never stumble. The gospel bids us live. It is the efficient cause of life; it gives balance to all its powers in a world of contending forces; bears it safely through the shadows to its final unfolding in the sure repose of immortality Never say die!

METHODIST CHURCH MEMBERSHIP.

BY D. C. KELLEY, D. D.

In the Methodist QUARTERLY REVIEW, for July, under the heading, "The Wesleyan Condition of Church Membership—Its Modifications," Rev. J. H. Potts, M. A., of Detroit, Mich., gives a full and, for the most part, a fair criticism of the point of doctrinal difference which was pointed out in an article in the Southern Methodist QUARTERLY REVIEW, of January, 1882, as having sprung up since the division of the church. Our article was on Fraternity, and our object was, as far as might be, to take out of the way all dead issues, all narrowness and prejudice which prevent a fuller and freer intercourse between the ministers and members of the two churches. While engaged earnestly in this work we came face to face with what seemed to us a very grave departure from original and historic Methodism. Holding original Methodism in this particular, as in others, to be of primitive Christian type, the departure was declared to be from early Christianity as well as from Wesleyan Methodism. The objections made are fairly stated by our critic; his general manner is both candid and kind. One thing greatly surprises us: the light estimate he seems to place on the presence in the Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the two questions and answers involved in this discussion. He says of their form for receiving persons into the church: "Its use, though general, is not compulsory, so we apprehend." Again he says: "Were this the only impediment to organic union between the two great branches of Methodism on this continent, it could probably be modified in the twinkling of an eye so as to be acceptable to all concerned." The Discipline is open before us; there is not one word in it, so far as we can find, indicating that the Ritual for the reception of members is not as binding as that for Baptism, or the Lord's Supper. It would not be pleasant to believe that a departure so important as this could be made in a temper so trivial. Are we to believe that a great church has come to look upon the fundamental question of the terms of church membership in the light of mere expediency? Much as we desire to see all obstacles removed to a full and free fraternity, we shrink instinctively from a method of procedure which claims to prove the departure right

on Scriptural grounds, and then proposes to modify on grounds o expediency. The issues are far deeper than can be dealt with in this form; they are practically among the profoundest and most vital with which the church has to deal.

Our critic mistakes our position when he supposes that we hold that "all who profess a desire to flee from the wrath to come, etc.,' must on that bare profession be *at once received into the Church*. The pastor with us occupies the precise position he himself desiderates in the last paragraph but one of his article when he says: "It is no secret that the almanac rule of probation fails to give satisfaction in our own Church. Let all Methodists go back to the Wesleyan idea, use the principle as local circumstances require, and they will have in common a safe, just and needful law." We have simply done away with the almanac rule of probation and retain all the principles involved in the Wesleyan rule.

The pastor must come to believe that the purpose to be saved from sin is *fixed* in the heart, that repentance is sincere, that the faith has the right object and that the purpose of obedience *is for life*. The pastor may, as perhaps many pastors do, claim that no man who intelligently takes these vows but has saving faith, but this conviction upon the part of the pastor and its profession upon the part of the candidate, are widely removed the one from the other.

The New Testament Church, as we understand it, was not a church of the saved, but a church of disciples who were in the process of being saved. None had reached a lower point than the fixed desire; none had failed to produce fruits of repentance; none had any other object of faith or obedience than Jesus Christ. This desire, this repentance, this faith, were objects of profession at the very door of the Church. Whether as yet the Holy Spirit witnessed adoption was not a question then, nor in Methodism, until the departure of Episcopal Methodism so late as 1864. Let us agree as far as we may. There is no difference between us on the question of the doctrine of conscious pardon or the witness of the Spirit. We *teach* this with the same emphasis, but we do not place it at the door of the Church as an obstruction to penitent and sincere approach.

We hold to the original definition of the General Rules,

"*having the form* and *seeking the power* of godliness." Our critic is not fortunate in the intimation "that Mr. Wesley's method of receiving members into the societies was special and not designed for use as in a regularly constituted Church."—(Henkle.) This definition, in form, was adopted by the Conference which gave organic life to the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1784. That the word Society might mislead no one, several of the early editions of the of the Discipline, say 1789 to 1796, read thus: "Our Society (Church) is no other than a company of men having the form and seeking the power of godliness." This language was used by those who were contemporary with Mr. Wesley in describing what we and they recognized as a genuine Church of God. With this definition, as will appear later, agree all the rituals and teachings of the undivided Methodist Episcopal Church.

Before proceeding to this point, however, a little space is given to the question of terms of membership in the primitive Church. As we are writing for Methodists, who are all familiar with this argument, it is not needed that much be said. Mr. Potts quotes from Lord King a sentence which has no real bearing on the question at issue. Allow a quotation which does apply: "Primitive Church, (p. 99.) All those that were baptized were looked upon as members of the Church, and had a right to all the privileges thereof," except, adds Lord King, "they had been guilty of gross and scandalous sins," in which case they were expelled, "and not admitted again till by penitent and holy deportment they had testified their grief and sorrow." Penitence, holy deportment, were the conditions of restoration, as they evidently were of admission, having the form and seeking the power. Mr. Potts also quotes Bishop Stillingfleet—(Henkle,) take from the Irenicum, p 164, the following: "If we require *positive* evidences of grace in every one to be admitted to ordinances as the only thing giving rights, for my part, I see not how, with a safe and good conscience, ordinances can be administered by any. If positive signs of grace be required, a man's conscience cannot proceed upon any certainty without infallible knowledge of another's spiritual state, which I suppose none will pretend to." "These remarks," says Dr. Henkle, "are a part of an extended argument by Bishop Stillingfleet to prove that the primitive Church was constituted on the basis we

find set forth in our General Rules." Stillingfleet again says: "Men may despair of ever finding *positive signs of grace* in admission of church members, in any law of Christ.'" It would be easy to add quotations to the same effect from Justyn Martyr, Origen and other fathers of the Church. With this view, the Church of England and the Presbyterian Churches agree in the Confession of Faith. It is declared that the officers of the Church have the power to shut the Kingdom of Heaven against *impenitent* and to open them *to penitent sinners.* It may be claimed that we make more out of this question and answer than the Methodist Episcopal Church intends by them. That they are new to Methodism is admitted by all. So grave an addition could not have been made without a well defined object. To find that object we need only to look to the surroundings. The General Rules had before clearly stated that the the only condition is "a desire to flee from the wrath to come and to be saved from their sins." In perfect consistency tests of the sincerity of this desire had been instituted. "Doing no harm," "doing good," "attending upon the ordinances of God," the three-fold vow of repentance, faith and obedience of the baptismal covenant. These all consist with the definition "having the form, seeking the power." These methods are formal evidences of the fixedness and genuineness of the desire of salvation. But this new question and answer, by the very fact of the addition, declare the old basis insufficient. This question is not a new form of proof that the party has the form and is seeking the power. It is not a mere added evidence of the genuineness of the desire for salvation. A question added for this purpose would have been of minor moment—would be a question of methods not of vital principle. The question and answer either mean nothing distinctive or they declare the definition defective and the one condition insufficient. It is not, as Mr. Potts seems to think, one of a variety of methods to carry out the original fundamental conditions of church membership, but a positive departure from that declaration. It is not only at war with the fundamental teachings of the General Rules, but equally antagonistic to the whole body of our ritual and doctrine. No one will hesitate to acknowledge that baptism gives Church membership, and no condition should be added at variance with the vows there taken. The addition

of the questions and answers in the form of reception of members should therefore be only specific enforcement or emphasis given to some one of these vows, not something outside and beyond them. Or else we have the strange spectacle of a man baptized into the Church who should be stumbled at a vow of different substance from those taken in his baptism, would be *in the Church* by baptism, but halted at the door of the Methodist Episcopal Church. That the baptismal ritual recognizes true and humble penitence and a desire to lead a new life, following Christ as the one condition, is evident in every exhortation, lesson, prayer and vow, from the first exhortation to the congregation to the close of the service. "I beseech you to call upon God, the Father, through our Lord Jesus Christ, that of His bounteous goodness He will grant * * * * that which by nature they cannot have, that they, being baptized with water may also be baptized with the Holy Ghost, and being received into Christ's Holy Church may continue lively members of the same." This sounds the key-note to the whole service. The question and answer under consideration would have demanded an exhortation to thanksgiving on account of the gift of the Holy Ghost and the prior adoption of these persons into the family of God.

You will excuse an earnest emphasis of the *absurdity*, not to say the *fanatical* presumption, which places Church membership on any other ground than the scriptural conditions of baptism. On the question of the proper subjects for baptism our authorities have never varied. We quote from two of the latest. Miner Raymond, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in his Systematic Theology, says:

"All are agreed that persons of sufficient age to understand, and who have been instructed sufficiently to know the nature and design of the ordinance; who profess to believe in Jesus Christ as the Son of God and the Saviour of men; who desire to receive baptism in the name of the Holy Trinity; and promise to renounce the world and to keep God's commandments, are proper persons to receive this holy ordinance, and may be baptized."

Pope, in his Theology, says:

"The theory of the Church, held by those who reject infant baptism, is not a sound one. It is simply this: That none are to be admitted to membership who do not give credible evidence to the congregation of being regenerated. This principle, as adopted by the Congregationalists, allows all such professors

to communicate and to bring their children to baptism for their training towards the full privileges of the new covenant. As adopted by the Baptists it allows of no membership at all until a credible profession of living faith is made and sealed in the sacrament. These views are altogether too narrow for the spirit of the Catholic Gospel. It is impossible to limit the Church, or admission to its ordinances, to the regenerate as approved by men. All who profess faith in the doctrines of Christ, who are seeking salvation, whose lives do not contradict their profession or impeach their sincerity, may be accepted to baptism, and their children with them. To such all the ordinances of religion are open; according to their faith they are dealt with, and *the Lord knoweth them that are His.*"

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper proceeds in invitation, confession and prayers alike on the basis of *penitence* for sin and intention of a new life upon the part of the participants, yet these are supposed to be members of the Church.

So much for ritualistic consistency. We go deeper still when we turn to the doctrinal teachings. To our mind, Mr. Potts could not have blundered more seriously than when he referred to the Band Societies as evidence that "conscious pardon" was required at the door of the Church. These societies are well known as nurseries *in the Church* of higher development of Christian life and experience. None came to the Band who had not already entered the door of the Church. Yet the first question for the Band meeting is: 1. Have you the forgiveness of your sins? The next, 2, Have you peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ?

These questions, and others of like character, are conclusive of two very important facts. First, That conscious pardon was not a requirement at the door of the Church. Second, The existence of these rules for the Band meeting show, beyond all question, even if other proof were not abundant, that the absence of these questions at the door of the Church was not forgetfulness on the part of Mr. Wesley and the fathers of the Church, but of set purpose. He assigned them their proper place in the Band meeting, and not at the door of the Church. As means of edification, not of obstruction.

If further evidence is needed we have it in the mature convictions of our founder, declared late in life, by which he condemns any such use of the doctrine of conscious assurance as is contemplated in this question and answer:

"Indeed, near fifty years ago, when the preachers, commonly called Methodists, began to preach that grand Scriptural doctrine, *Salvation by Faith*, they were not sufficiently apprised of the difference between a servant and a child of God. They did not clearly understand that every one 'who feareth God and worketh righteousness,' is accepted of Him. In consequence of this they were apt to make sad the hearts of those whom God had not made sad. For they frequently asked those who feared God: 'Do you know that your sins are forgiven?' And upon their answering 'No,' immediately replied: 'Then you are a child of the devil.' No! That does not follow. It might have been said (and it is all that can be said with propriety): 'Hitherto you are only a *servant*; you are not a *child* of God. You have already great reason to praise God, that He had called you to his honorable service. Fear not; continue crying to him, and you shall see greater things than these.' "—Vol. II. (Sermons), pp. 385-386.

Mr. Fletcher says:

"If it be urged that the spirit of God witnesses to all sincere seekers of the Kingdom of God, that they are in a damnable state, till they feel the pardoning 'love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost given to them,' I deny the fact, and assert that the Divine Spirit can no more bear witness to an accepted mourning Cornelius, that he is *not accepted in any sense*, than it can give testimony to a palpable contradiction. The truth is, our unbelieving fears and awakened hearts are very prone to surmise the worst, and we are very apt to take their surmisings for divine impressions, *even when we 'bring forth fruits worthy of repentance.'* I doubt not but that St. Paul himself, in his agony of penitential grief, when he spent three days and three nights in fasting and prayer, had many such gloomy thoughts; but they were certainly lying thoughts, as well as those which David wisely checks, in some of his psalms. Who will dare to say that Ananias found the Apostle in a damnable state, though he found him without a *sense* of sin forgiven, as appears from the direction which he gave him: 'Arise; why tarriest thou? Wash away thy sins, calling upon' (and consequently believing in) 'the name of the Lord.' "

Do we state the facts too strongly when we declare that the insertion of this question and answer is, in this light, shown to be in contradiction to the definition of our Church, and the condition of membership found in the General Rules, incongruous with the ritual for baptism and the Lord's Supper, inconsistent with the maturest views of Wesley and Fletcher, and a reproof to Ananias in the case of Paul? Much more might be strongly and truthfully said. We are content to close this part of our response with two suggestions both Scriptural and practical:

1. The confession of sinfulness, repentance and a desire for a better life, has, in the case of the Publican, the endorsement of the Master—the Pharisee's profession of goodness his condemnation.

The Master does not accuse either the one or the other of falsehood, but he puts on record his sense of the relationship of man to God, as one calling for confession, not profession. The shrinking, humble, penitent, sensitive and timid soul, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, the poor in spirit are deterred by the question—the bruised is broken, the smoking flax quenched—effrontery and coarseness enter with unblushing confidence.

Every pastor of experience can readily call to mind cases of which the following is a type: We know a husband and wife; the former ready, in season and out of season, to give in language, strongly tinged with boasting, his experience of assurance; the wife, after thirty years of life beneath the same roof, cannot be induced to say that she is assured of her adoption, yet so truly Christian is her whole, gentle, self-denying life, that not a child but would rather be with mother if she were shut out of the Church, than with father in it—not one of them who would not much rather risk following mother in death than father. The old rule is best—test a man by his repentance and his desires, rather than by his professions. This new question rejects the only safe rule given us by Jesus Christ by which to judge of Christian character: "By their fruits you shall know them," and substitutes one unsafe and unauthorized—that of simple profession.

2. We quote from Platform of Methodism by Dr. Henkle, page 67:

"Under the appearance of elevating the standard of qualification for Church membership, its practical tendency is to lower the standard of Christian experience. For, when a true penitent is seen earnestly struggling for deliverance, but not assured of pardon, the officers of the Church, and others, convinced of his sincerity, and sympathizing in his mental distress, are strongly inclined to afford relief by offering him the privileges of the Church; but as this cannot be done without a profession of saving faith, he is encouraged to lay hold on the weaker evidences of that state, and thus be able to claim a place in the Church. Accordingly, when the Church is willing to receive him, he feels authorized to infer his justified state. Whereas, when he is taught to believe that the Church is the place in which the sincere penitent may *seek* assurance, as well as enjoy it, his admission there does not give him the endorsement of the Church—as in the other case—that he is already in a pardoned state. And, in point of fact, we think it will be conceded, without much controversy, that the lesser evidences of a pardoned state are most readily admitted, and relied on, in those Churches where a profession of saving faith is required as a condition of membership.

"In Mr. Wesley's first Conference it was asked: 'Is perseverance absolutely

necessary to our being in the favor of God, or may there possibly be some exempt cases?' We dare not positively say there are not, was the answer."

Mr. Potts is decidedly more unfortunate in his method when he attempts to defend the second question and answer. They read thus:

"Do you believe in the doctrines of Holy Scripture as set forth in the Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church?"

Answer.—I do.

At an earlier part of his article he has declared that: "From this it will appear that Mr. Wesley's method of receiving members into the Societies was special, and not designed for use as in a regularly constituted Church."

To show how little he has understood Mr. Wesley on this subject, we give a paragraph from Stevens' History of Methodism: Volume I., page 187:

"Such was the original platform of Methodism. It comprises not one dogmatic statement, nor hardly what could be called an ecclesiastical requisition. All earnest enquirers after religious truth and spiritual purification throughout the world could approve it with scarcely a qualification. It was a purely catholic and apostolic expression of Christianity. At a later date, Wesley exclaimed in his journal: 'O, that we may never make anything more or less the term of union with us, but the having the mind that was in Christ, and the walking as He walked.'"

Mr. Potts again says: "Mr. Wesley was not opposed to creeds. He knew that in regular Churches they were essential." In reference to Mr. Wesley's mention of the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, for the use of the American Church, interrogation marks and exclamation points are made to do rather excessive work when he writes: "What! Mr. Wesley prepare a creed for the Methodists?" * * * * Was belief in these Articles made obligatory? Not directly, yet the tendency was in that direction.

No one has denied that Mr. Wesley had a creed, and that Methodist teachers have a creed and teach it with all proper earnestness, but how far he fails to understand Mr. Wesley is evident when we find Mr. Wesley, in his eighty-fifth year, while preaching in Glasgow, writing:

"I subjoined a short account of Methodism, particularly insisting on this circumstance: there is no other religious society under heaven which requires nothing of men in order to their admission into it but a desire to save their souls. Look all around you; you cannot be admitted into the Church or society of the Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Quakers, or any others, unless you hold the same opinions with them, and adhere to the same mode of worship. The Methodists alone do not insist on your holding this or that opinion. * * * Now, I do not know any other religious society, either ancient or modern, wherein such liberty of conscience is now allowed, or has been allowed, since the age of the Apostles. Here is our glorying, and a glorying peculiar to us. What society shares it with us?"

This declaration, made after the organization of the Church in America, directly denies the *tendency* which is attributed to his preparation of the twenty-five Articles, and is a complete refutation of the idea that Mr. Wesley used the words Church and society in a different sense. He applies Church and Society alike to Methodists, Presbyterians, Anabaptists and Quakers.

Dr. Stevens, in his History of the Methodist Episcopal Church, says:

"The possible results were once discussed in the Conference. Wesley conclusively determined the debate by remarking: 'I have no more right to object to a man for holding a different opinion from me than I have to differ with a man because he wears a wig, and I wear my own hair; but if he takes his wig off and begins to shake the powder about my eyes, I shall consider it my duty to get quit of him as soon as possible.'

"Is a man," he writes, "a believer in Jesus Christ, and is his life suitable to his profession? Are not only the main, but the sole inquiries I make in order to his admisston into our Society?' Did he design the American Church to be equally liberal? As the 'General Rules' used in England were retained after the Christmas Conference in America, as the 'only one condition' of membership, and the 'Articles of Religion' are not mentioned in these Rules, but placed apart in the Discipline, are not the Articles to be considered rather as an indicatory than an obligatory dogmatic symbol—an indication to sincere men, seeking an asylum for Christian communion, of what kind of teaching they must expect in the new Church, but not of what they would be required to avow by subscription."

Mr. Potts greatly errs, as we think, when he regards these questions and answers as belonging to *methods*, such as probation or no probation, tickets or no tickets, meeting in class or direct pastoral investigation; they are altogether in a different category. As to whether hunger and thirst after righteousness, or profession of assurance, are the conditions of Church membership, is a matter

not of expediency, but of revelation, and vital to the being and work of the Church.

He says that these questions are only asked at the end, not at the beginning of the probation, and declares that, in the meantime, the candidate "has been in the full enjoyment of all the religious privileges of the Church." If, by this, he means that the party has received baptism and the Lord's Supper, then, by every Scriptural sign, he is a member of the Church—all other conditions are human and presumptuous. *No General Conference can declare a man baptized by her authority anything less than a member of the Church so long as he is true to his baptismal vows.* We will join you in teaching assurance as the privilege and duty of all; we will give all emphasis to the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit—we cannot join you in making a condition of Church membership other than the New Testament reveals.

Mr. Potts, in his historical survey, allows his imagination to make 1784 and the organization of the *Methodist Episcopal Church* a contrast in some sense to the previous condition of *Societies.* If he had read with care the minutes adopted by that Conference, he would have found a direct declaration that men might be accepted of God in some cases who were not conscious of the fact, and would have found the following excellent caution against the action of the Methodist Episcopal Conference of 1864:

"5. Does not talking without proper caution of a justified or sanctified state tend to mislead men? Almost naturally leading them to trust in what was done in one moment? Whereas, we are every moment pleasing or displeasing God, according to our works; according to our present inward tempers and outward behavior."

This is consistent with Arminianism and the doctrine of the possibility of apostacy. To be consistent, if we enter the Church on a profession of assurance when doubts arise, we should withdraw. Yet, what Christian life is not the scene of hope and fear? withdrawal in all cases of doubt would be full of disaster to both the Church and the world looking on. With Calvinists, who hold to the doctrine "once in grace always in grace," there could be consistency in the requirement, *at the time,* of reception into the Church, that the applicant should profess direct consciousness of pardon; for once in possession of this grace the future is secured. No disaster

could be greater than to impose upon pastor and people the exclusion of all persons who, at any time, might doubt their acceptance. Many such, as is shown by our choicest Christian biography, become the brightest ornaments of the Church. Not only this, but such inquisitorial office over the inner emotions of our brethren, God allows to no man, or set of men on this earth. The state of the heart and opinions are known to God, and it is His alone to deal with them; we are to deal with the life and the life alone.

The tendency of these questions and answers is directly from Mr. Wesley, and the immense breadth of view which is now exalting him to reverence in the whole world of devout thought. Such views as we have quoted from him were more than a hundred years in advance of his age. We have but now reached the state of advance where, within and without the Churches, the largest minds and cleanest hearts are hungering after the liberty which Christ gave to his Church, when he rebuked John, who had forbidden one casting out devils because he "followeth not us." No man can, in his heart, follow what he sincerely believes to be right, conforming, as best he can, his life to the light given, without finding all saving truth. It is not their points of eccentricity, or their new discoveries, which have given to Goethe, Carlyle and Emerson the imperial hold which they possess in the world of culture to-day. A place, which resplendent and controlling as it is, will broaden and heighten immensely toward the birth of a new century, but the simple fact that they demand bravely, and as sincerely as bravely, freedom of thought; and despised with burning intensity the narrowness which would restrain this Christ-guaranteed freedom in others. Emerson protecting Harriet Martineau in the face of a Boston mob, unbeliever as she was, whatever else he might have been, was, in this act, nearer the Christ type than any priest or Levite of the city. We speak of these men in the one point which gives them their transcendent and increasing domination of our age, that therein we may see, as practical men, the trend of the best thought of our own times.

The men who saw with the clearness of these men, this truth, in the last generation, who possessed a fullness of faith which enabled them to despise the applause of the present that they might speak for all time the truth that was in them, might have been numbered

with few numerals; the next generation will find them not only intellectually, but spiritually, its masters. I have never written for publication the name of Ingersoll, but am impelled to say, by the urgency of truth, that his ribaldry, wit and eloquence would have alike made little impression upon our times had he not found one anti-Christian fortress within our gates against which every time he has hurled a dart, the better sentiment of the age has responded with genuine applause. Reference is had, of course, to his attacks of the New England educational foundation to which no new truth must ever be brought.

Little men who see nothing except by the light of the present shining through the narrow bars of expediency, being, as they always have been, in the numerical majority, would, if allowed, soon fence in and roof over the kingdom of God, and make the the door of entrance just large enough to let in men of their own peculiar dimensions. The Church that gives away to these men to-day blind and deaf as they are to the grander and better movements of the age, dooms itself to death or deep repentance in a few short years. These poor blind lovers of peace would soon make of the kingdom of Christ a stagnant pool, breeding malaria and death. Movement, storm, wild blasts, sweeping tornadoes, are all better than stagnation. Allow the first and you may escape the last; dam up healthy freedom, and disruption and death are God's alternatives; history profoundly proclaims this truth.

When Mr. Wesley inserted in his general minutes the following questions and answers which were also adopted by the Christmas Conference of 1784, he was three hundred years nearer the altitude of Jesus of Nazareth than the author of the two questions and answers under consideration, and the Christmas Conference of 1784 in adopting them was one hundred years nearer the summit of the mountain of Christian truth than the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church of 1864:

1. "Who of us is *now* accepted of God?
He that *now* believes in Christ with a loving, obedient heart.
2. But who among those that never heard of Christ?
He that, according to the light he has, feareth God and worketh righteousness.
3. Is this the same with he that is sincere?
Nearly, if not quite."

What but contempt and defeat could Methodism deserve in the future, should we place as fundamental to Church membership instead of New Testament teaching, the expediency of the hour, and desecrate the name of our far-seeing founder by crowding into his place, as leaders, a race of fanatical pigmies who neither think themselves nor propose to allow thought to others, whose panacea, for all ills to which humanity is heir, is a dose of their *personal* experience. For these men, in their place, we entertain the kindest feelings; but in the name of reverence, let them keep in their place. On fundamental principles, we want revelation not fanaticism, not Lilliputian illumination.

The age to which we have come is one peculiarly inclined to substitute expediency for principle, to build for the present rather than for all time. There is much in Church methods and government left to the Church of the present under the leadings of the Spirit and the developments of Providence; but the terms of Church membership rest on firmer ground than any shifting sand of present expediency, are not to be at the mercy of changing majorities in Church convocations. Methodism has no right to its present place as a *Church of Jesus Christ* if it proposes to deal with the grand principles which underlie the terms of membership as if it were a human society, subject, at every point, to human legislation. Principles are one thing, methods of enforcing them another; this question lies among the principles—not the methods; belongs to the realm of inspiration—not to human unwisdom. I write, as before, for fraternity—the object to keep our Methodism, as nearly as may be, at one. More than once have we heard one of our great leaders, recently dead, say: "My conscience would not allow me to be a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church with these terms of membership unrepealed." I do not know for how many I speak, but if these questions were out of the way, should the time come when fortune would place the writer in a community where the Methodist Episcopal Church of the true Methodism was alone present, he would not hesitate to prefer membership in it to any other church. With these questions and answers unrepealed, he would not enter.

NOTES.

1. A purpose to be a Christian, a state of penitence, a desire to be delivered from sin, were clearly the terms of admission to the Christian Church at the very commencement of it. This will appear from the following:

"From that time Jesus began to preach, and to say, Repent; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. And Jesus, walking by the Sea of Galilee, saw two brothers, Simon, called Peter, and Andrew, his brother, casting a net into the sea; for they were fishers. And he saith unto them, Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men. And they straightway left their nets, and followed him. And going on from thence, he saw other two brethren, James, the son of Zebedee, and John, his brother, in a ship with Zebedee, their father, mending their nets; and he called them. And they immediately left the ship, and their father, and followed him."—*Matthew* iv.: 17–22. See "*Methodist Armor*," *by W. T. Hudson.*

NOTICE.—Peter, Andrew, James and John were engaged, when Christ found them, in their daily toil. Christ commanded them to follow Him. The command was very simple. The thing to be done was not mysterious, and there was no difficulty in obeying it. The thing was practicable. It lay in the scope of their ability to forsake their calling and follow Him. Christ is the Head of the Church, and they united themselves to Him. There is no profession of regeneration preceding their joining themselves to Christ. There is no relating of their experience. There is no demand made by Christ requiring them to be converted before they become His disciples. As far as we can see, there was only a desire to be saved, and "they immediately left the ship, and their father, and followed him," in order to be saved.

LOCKE ON GOVERNMENT.

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Among all the acute and masterly contributions which Englishmen have made to political science, no book can vie with Locke's Essay on Civil Government, in the universality of its influence upon popular opinion and upon the development of constitutional forms.

The whole world has felt the inspiration of this man's genius, and nations to whom his name was almost unknown have gone out to battle for the doctrines which their leaders learned at his feet.

The multiform constitutions which in the nineteenth century divide the allegiance of the Anglo-Saxon race are founded on the principles which John Locke expounded two hundred years ago, and exemplify his theory of the relation between prince and people; between the government and the governed.

If, in our day, a work so important and so beneficent receives but infrequent public notice, it is for the reason that the sentiments of its author, victorious over all contradiction, have passed into political axioms which no longer attract attention, because they have ceased to provoke dissent. As an English critic said of some of Bentham's writings, the history of the book is like the fate of a shell which lies buried under the ruins its explosion has produced. But no work so distinguished for dialectic force and clear, polished statement can ever become obsolete among lovers of literature, even though theorists may reject many of its propositions, and society is no longer shaken with its debate. It will continue to be reverenced as are the arms of old heroes used in war for the life of the nation, for it was in times gone by a mighty weapon of attack and defence in the fierce contest between tyranny and popular government.

The treatise is what the Germans call a *Tendenz-schrift*, that is to say, a work which, though nominally scientific, is yet in fact a more or less conscious manipulation of the principles of science to the end that some existing institution may be vindicated or destroyed, or that some militant policy be aided or condemned. Such books, by learned, brilliant and persuasive argument have often secured the triumph of great truths. But few indeed are the

works of this class whose permanent scientific value is comparable to their influence upon manners and men. The exigency of the hour, the heat and din of battle leave no opportunity for that cool and passionless reflection which produces philosophy.

Locke indeed announced in his preface that he hoped by his book to establish the throne of William III., and to justify the men who overthrew the house of Stuart. And it is in defending the great measures of the Revolutionary party that the writer displays his highest vigor and constructs his most cogent argument. His work is a manly and eloquent plea for liberty and common sense in political constitutions; but it cannot be called a satisfactory and thorough analysis of the cardinal ideas of law, government and constitution.

Our present purpose is to consider not the political efficiency, but the philosophical basis of the essay. If we discover that the premises are sometimes faulty and insufficient to sustain the noble and emancipating conclusion, we may perhaps find a partial explanation in the circumstances under which the book was written, and in the immediate object its author had in view.

One Sir Robert Filmer wrote, some time during the reign of Charles II., a crude and ridiculous plea for monarchy by Divine right. He styled his work "Patriarcha," because he deduced royal prerogative from patriarchal custom. He also wrote some "Observations on the political theories of Hobbes, Milton and others." The Jacobite clergy of the day were constant in their effort to spread the doctrines and increase the reputation of the latest apostle of absolutism. His works were cited in their pulpit as having an authority scarcely inferior to that of Holy Writ; and his argument furnished them matter for many inflammatory and seditious harangues. Locke's book was written to expose the sophistry of the courtier and counteract the propaganda of the priests.

The present generation reads with impatience and disgust an argument in which the Divine right of kings is derived from the original sovereignty of Adam. Whether the writer reasons *pro* or *con*, the subject is to modern minds equally tedious and distasteful. Not only is the judgment of Christendom for the most part settled and nearly unanimous in favor of liberty and against absolute power, but the whole debate, with its postulates and its methods, is

foreign to the mental habit of the present age. The expansion literature and the increase of knowledge have removed tl tendency to look to the Hebrew Scriptures as the grand treasu of all science and truth. The day is past when Hebrew mode were men's highest ideals of ecclesiastical and civil institutions, a when Hebrew precedents were conclusive of every social a political question.

Nevertheless, Part I. of Locke's Essay, in which he considers a refutes the crudities and fallacies of Sir Robert Filmer, will ev retain a charm for men of letters, because of its close and impre nable argument, its withering sarcasm and its ingenious style. is an exceedingly difficult task to argue with a fool and yet pr serve the dignity and appearance of a rational creature. O cannot conceive of a more tiresome and unremunerative exerci than to follow the mental somersaults of a man who, ignorant of a logical rule and insensible at once to the force of an argument a the weakness of a fallacy, mistakes assertion for proof and his ow vain and wandering fancies for indubitable truths. Surely no m ever was less favorably endowed by nature to take part in a grav philosophical discussion than Sir Robert Filmer; his ignoranc his bigotry and stupidity, would have excused Locke in an occ sional outburst of denunciation and severity. But he experience at the hands of the great exponent of liberty and toleration, a mo gentle and respectful vivisection. Sir Robert's discomfiture w complete. Locke exploded every hypothesis which had sufficie stability to be undermined, and having isolated every conclusio from any premise which Sir Robert had laid down, left it to peris for want of support. And when the thread of the knight's arg ment was lost, like some tropical river, in the waste sands of contr diction and uncertainty, Locke patiently boxed the compass to sho that the sunken current had no outlet in any direction, but h disappeared forever in the slough of its own making. Nothi can surpass the brilliant and destructive irony of Locke's replies the baseless assertions which formed the staple of his opponen argument.

"Sir Robert," he said, "has too much lessened a subject authority to leave himself the hopes of establishing anything by bare saying it: one slave's opinion, without proof, is not of weig

enough to dispose of the liberty and fortunes of mankind. If all men are not, as I think they are, naturally equal, I am sure all slaves are; and then I may, without presumption, oppose my single opinion to his."

Filmer maintained that no such thing as political freedom existed in the world, but that man was born subject to government. Not that government of some sort was a necessity to man from his birth, but that all men were born in subjection. Adam, as first father, was first governor, and his power devolved by inheritance, according to divine decree, upon all reigning princes. But scanty, indeed, was the groundwork upon which these propositions were based; in Locke's own phrase, "Sir Robert confutes 'the erroneous principle of man's natural freedom' only by the bare assumption of Adam's authority.'" The mental processes of the knightly disputant seem to have been about as follows: Adam had paternal authority by divine decree; paternal and political authority are identical; Adam, therefore, had political authority by divine decree. Adam first had political authority, all present possessors of political authority must claim under a first donee; therefore, princes derive their political authority, somehow or other, from Adam, and hold it as he held it by divine appointment. Finally, paternal and political authority being the same in nature, though not in circumstance, the subject could no more throw off the one than the child could rid itself of the other.

To this reasoning Locke replied with force and pertinency, that if political power be deduced from the paternal office, it must rest upon the paternal function, the act of begetting, and as a man could not have paternal, neither could he have political authority over children not sprung from his loins. And so where the son had children before the father's decease, either the theory must fail, or a conflict of political authority would arise. And, further, reason and God's Word give the mother an equal claim with the father to the reverence and obedience of the child, which, of course, "was not at all to Sir Robert's purpose."

"We know," wrote the courtier, "that God, at the creation, gave the sovereignty to the man over the woman, as being the nobler and principal agent in generation." And Locke replied: "I remember not that in my Bible. * * * * But it is no new

thing for our author to tell us his own fancies for certain and divine truths, though there be often a great deal of difference between his and divine revelations, for God, in Scripture, saith 'His father and mother that begat him.'"

Locke's position naturally led him to emphasize the records which disprove the universality of patriarchal rule, even in times when the tribal organization was the prevailing form of social discipline. He conceded that the patriarchal system was the earliest, but he stoutly contended that it was not the only natural form of government. All the patriarchs, Filmer asserted, exercised supreme dominion over the goods upon which their immediate children were dependent; and he treated this imaginary feature of early domestic policy as a source and proof of Adam's unlimited sovereignty. He added, that this sovereignty passed, as did the goods to Adam's heir. Now, these assumptions were undoubtedly good law in England in the seventeenth century, but Locke was not long in disproving their claim to universal validity. Adam and his issue, was the reply, being a common need, had a common right to the fruits of the earth: the children were not successors, but co-owners with their father before his death.

"Men are not proprietors of what they have merely for themselves; their children have a title to part of it, and their kind of right is joined with their parents in the possession which comes to be wholly theirs, when death, having put an end to their parents' use of it, hath taken them from their possessions; this we call inheritance."

Here, in a single sentence, Locke has forecast all the results of later investigation into the rationale and early history of the devolution of property. Sir Henry Sumner Maine can tell us but little more. And, moreover, continues the champion of popular rights, when you have proved a right to inherit the goods, you have, by no means, established a right to succeed to the sway of the ancestor. An estate passes by inheritance from regard to the necessities of the heir, which are no sort of a foundation for a claim to empire. The good of the governed is the reason for political power. So that, if for the nonce, we admit that the right of primogeniture in matters of property is a principle of natural law, we

can draw no true analogy to justify the eldest son in usurping his father's dignity and authority.

Sir Robert very wisely made no attempt to discover who was the rightful heir to Adam, but left every crowned head to claim for himself that august title. Locke, however, with a keen and just perception of the weak point in his opponent's argument, brought all the force of his logic and sarcasm to the task of demonstrating the utter futility of the whole theory of transmitted sovereignty, unless an unbroken succession can be traced, and the true and only heir be discovered.

If, said he, this political authority of Adam has devolved upon reigning princes by inheritance, it must be according to some settled rule of descent. If this rule is the natural one of equal division among children, then there are as many princes as fathers. If it is the conventional one of primogeniture, then there is but one lawful prince in all the world, and we are, upon this theory, in duty bound to discover and obey him. Neither of these conclusions can be very agreeable to ruling potentates.

But difficulties, such as these, seem never to have disturbed Filmer's serene complacency. And so uncertain were the processes of his mind that he probably thought he had forestalled all cavil, when, to explain the fact of democratic government, he abandoned every premise he had previously laid down, and declared that "the multitude, sometimes as governors of the commonwealth, had the fatherhood or absolute power."

These are the main points in the dispute; but in order to completely meet the argument of his opponent, Locke proceeded to show, further, that the mere fact of creation was not enough to clothe Adam with sovereign power over his adult offspring; that the decree by which he was given dominion over nature, and the lower animals, was no charter of suzerainty over men; that when Eve was subjected to the conjugal rule of her husband, he did not thereby become lord of life and limb over her and her issue. However, into these discussions, we shall not follow him. He closed his criticism of the "Patriarcha" with a long review of sacred history, for the purpose of proving that a line of royal succession did not exist, and that the doctrines of the modern courtier were foreign to the thought and practice of early communities.

Deprived of the Scripture proofs, Sir Robert's argument lost all its sacramental unction and prophetic force.

Locke's own theory of government, like the systems of Hobbes and Rousseau, was based upon the idea of compact. The notion that government had its origin in force, alone, was abhorrent to him. To avoid the conclusion "that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it," he thought he "must, of necessity, find out another rise of government, another original of "political power." It is not difficult to discover the reason for this unwillingness to rest the general framework and theory of government upon force. Locke, and all those philosophers who approved the doctrine of an original social compact, lived in an age or country where there was an ever recurrent strife against royal usurpation, and the past upon which they looked back was a long, dark chapter of feudal riot and oppression. Constitutional government was still in its infancy. Rulers chafed under its novel restraints, and, secure in the support of mercenary battalions, violated its principles with impunity. They plundered the community of its wealth to glut their selfish appetites, and robbed the citizens of liberty and life to gratify their horrid craving for arbitrary power. Having no thought for the public weal they had no hold upon popular sympathy. The swords of their hirelings were the real defenses of their thrones, and the impotent misery of their subjects the surest pledge of their continued dominion. To a free-minded and conscientious scholar the proposition that all government depended upon force seemed a justification of the misrule he saw around him. He must have a theory of social union which would encourage the subject to resist tyranny and would strengthen the moral obligation upon Princes to rule wisely and well. He must have a theory of sovereignty which would imply some connection between existing lordship and those great, general and beneficent objects which are the chief end of all public authority, and the plainest reason why it should be established and obeyed. He cannot repel force with force and constrain the rulers to govern justly; his only recourse is to a moral appeal. Yet he dare not rely on a particular discussion of the various duties which attach to princely station and accompany

royal power; for his labor would then be a mere homily, and he knows how the great resent exhortation. Fenelon pursued that course in writing the Adventures of Telemachus. The mild counsel of the devout priest served only to excite his sovereign's distrust, and the King, in wrath, condemned him to pass the remainder of his days remote from court and the capital of his country. No! the liberal philosopher must go deeper; he must lay these great principles and objects at the very foundation of royal authority. They must not be a mere ethical restraint, but an original condition of power. As men are constituted, it is no small advantage to be able to aver that the principles and rights for which one contends are guaranteed by the law of the land. Hence the supreme importance of making the limitations upon royal prerogative and the eminent and comprehensive maxims which all agree should regulate its exercise, a part of the primary constitution of government.

To considerations such as these is due the peculiar complexion of that singular speculative movement which produced the dogma of the *contrat social*. That movement was a passionate declaration of independence, rather than a discriminating and scholarly investigation into the beginnings and rationale of government. It was not a scientific inquiry addressed to men of thought, but it was a standard set up before all the people around which the friends of liberty and justice might rally for the conflict with oppression and wrong. It was first political and then philosophical.

Having such an origin and purpose, it is not surprising that the speculations of this school should be characterized, and to no inconsiderable degree vitiated, by a fundamental confusion of moral and legal ideas. We who have seen the great light which the intellect of Austin shed upon the philosophy of government and of jurisprudence, experience, in reading the reflections of earlier thinkers, the sensations of one who turns from the full blaze of a summer noon into the dark and curtained chamber where he passed the night. The student acquainted with the clear and constant definitions in the "*Province of Jurisprudence Determined*" pursues almost with impatience an exposition by any of Austin's forerunners.

Locke, in this Essay, exhibits all the vices of his school. His

primary definitions are loose and fleeting, and he scarcely ev tests them by a reference to any of the general facts of governmen As a consequence, he altogether fails in the establishment of hi subordinate conceptions firmly upon the platform of first princ ples. No where does he attempt a comprehensive analysis of co stitutional forms.

As already explained, his whole conception of law and gover ment is ethical. Though he deals with a positive science, his defin tions rarely stop short with simple description, but comprehen also the reason and the ideal perfection of the phenomena.

"Political power," he says, "is the right of making laws wit penalties of death, etc., for the regulating and preserving of pro erty, and of employing the force of the community in the exec tion of such laws and in the defence of the commonwealth again foreign injury." This right those who exercise it derive from th consent of the governed.

Now, power is one thing, and the right to exercise it is quit another thing. Power is the practical ability to perform an ac the word *right* sums up all the circumstances and consideration which render it fitting and proper that a particular person shoul exercise the power. Here, then, on the very threshold of the dis cussion, we encounter a radical misconception and ambiguity i the leading premise.

Usurpation, on the other hand, is declared to be the possessio of power to which another had a right by existing law, an tyranny as the exercise of power beyond right, to the detrimen of the public. Both these propositions involve the idea of actua political power divorced from all considerations of justice and right which is contrary to the original definition. Locke is oblivion to this inconsistency, because, to his moral perception, there is n difference between tyranny and anarchy, between usurpation an social war. As with him, the end of government is part of th idea of government, so is the end a part of the idea of power. I exercised to unrighteous ends, the power is not political, but des potic. Law is, in reality, the victorious sentiment in a conflict c opinion, in a battle of desires. But to Locke, it was a rule c eternal right. Government, also, was no mere *modus vivendi*, n arbitrary constitution of a triumphant majority, but a huma

instrument of divine justice, an avenger of crimes against nature and a defender of God-given rights.

In accounting for the origin of political institutions, therefore, Locke's chief endeavor is to trace the right. He commences with the right of every man in the state of nature to punish any offender against those natural laws upon the observance of which, existence depends.

The injured party may administer monitory punishment, and demand reparation. There are no limits to the exercise of his power, and he may properly do any thing calculated to accomplish these ends. He may take the life, or enslave the person of the wrong doer. Slavery is right, when it has such an origin, but in no other case; for men, being free by nature, cannot barter away their liberty by agreement, any more than they can divest themselves of their moral responsibility or their will; neither can a man give to another, what he does not himself have, the power of life and death over his own person.

Now, of course, no man can, by contract, lose his natural freedom, which is simply the power of choice; and for that matter, he can never lose it by force. But whether a man may put himself in a servile relation by agreement, is not a logical question at all, but one of positive law. And it is hard to see, how, in a state of nature, such an agreement could be unlawful, except in the sense of being immoral, and surely the evils of slavery which have sprung from contract would not be greater than the evils of slavery imposed as a punishment for crime. If servitude *per se* is not immoral, then the contract to serve, not being illogical, would not be void, but enforceable by the law of nature. For Locke himself says, that "truth, and the keeping of faith, belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society;" hence, upon first principles, a man might be enslaved for violating his contract to serve.

Locke sought an escape from difficulties such as these, by distinguishing between a state of nature, and a state of war. In the state of nature, all men were honest and just, without being subject to a common superior; but when some did wrong, and the innocent resisted the aggression, the state of nature ceased, and a state of war began. Natural liberty belonged to the state of nature, and therefore slavery could not be established by contract; because, if a man

lost his freedom, he was no longer in the natural state. In a state of war, on the other hand, slavery became possible by forfeiture. Reasoning so whimsical, scarcely deserves serious refutation. How could liberty be forfeited even in a state of war, except according to the law of nature, since there was as yet no other rule. And this destroys all distinction between the two states, for by the definition elsewhere given, the state of nature is "the condition of subjection to natural law." In fact, the unfortunate savage placed himself beyond the pale of the state of nature, the instant he undertook to enforce the slightest precept of natural law.

Locke next proceeds to investigate the origin of the commonwealth. The confusion and strife of a state of war, the intolerable evils which spring from the want of a common arbiter, brought about the formation of political societies. This, then, is political society, simply the substitution of the power and discretion of the community for the power and discretion of the individual in determining the differences which arise among men. Out of the association of the members comes forth the community, a new and independent entity. The logical phantom of a personified society has, however, no strength of its own, and to accomplish its will, must employ the force of its members. The member is bound to furnish the necessary muscular aid, because, forsooth, "the judgments of the commonwealth are his own judgments, being made by himself or his representative." In other words, the vaunted substitution is confessedly illusory; the individual is still the umpire of his own quarrel and the defender of his own right. The transition out of a state of nature into a state of commonwealth proves to be a mere matter of form.

This political or civil society Locke explains is based on consent, because no bonds can be laid upon a freeman without his permission. He cannot be subjected to the will of the community unless he so agrees. A political community is one body, and its only possible will is that of the majority. By his own free determination man enters into political society, and by that act subjects himself to the will of the majority. Now strangely enough, although we are told that a man cannot sell his independence to one master and become a slave, because he thereby gives the master power of life and death over him; yet, upon this hypothesis, he may enter into civil society and

by compact put his life and property into the hands of many masters. It is urged that a distinction may be made here, having regard to the different objects for which this power of life and death is exercised in the two cases; and that while it is impossible for one man to gain by contract a right to dispose of his neighbor's life, yet every man has that power as a means of redressing injuries and enforcing just claims, which is the case in hand. ' But the explanation adds no strength to the position, for it is clear, upon this statement, that the compact is nugatory since the community took nothing thereby which they did not before possess.

To the objection that history had preserved no record of such a compact, Locke returned the ingenious answer that the silence of history respecting the beginnings of government did not disprove the proposition.

" We are not to suppose that the armies of Xerxes were always men, because history tells us nothing of their infancy." Besides, he added, the objection is not strictly true; history does inform us of some commonwealths, as Rome and Venice, which were started by the free association of individuals who had cast off every other political connection. And, indeed, it is in the nature of things that all government, whatever its form, must have resulted from compact, whether history reports or conceals the process. This last suggestion is no mere arbitrary dictum, as it appears. It is not improper, in such connection, to appeal to " the nature of things." Indeed the foundations of all sound philosophy of government must be laid deep in the principles of human nature, and in the actualities of human existence. Locke's error at this point was not in the method but in a misconception of the real nature of governmental action.

The obscure past may, with comparative ease, be dismissed with an appeal to the nature of things; but the present cannot be so summarily dealt with. Its problems are patent to every observer, and they cannot be solved by assertion. The position of the slaves among any people is always glaringly inconsistent with the theory of the consensual origin of government. Locke endeavored to avoid the difficulty by the quibbling plea that the servile class are not members of civil society. And yet they are subject to its laws, surrounded by its institutions and constitute an active factor in its

growth. Whether assent is essential to the formation of political society, was the very point at issue.

Passing from the consideration of the origin of government through compact, Locke goes a step further, and with Hooker derives the obligation of all law from the consent of the subject. The proof offered is the circumstance that no one man can enforce his will upon a whole community, unless they consent to his dictation. This, however, is only true of the majority; the dissatisfied minority must submit whether they consent or not; and that they do not consent is clear, from the fact that they have to be forced to obey. To Locke's suggestion that the minority assented to the rule of the majority when they entered the society, and continue bound by that assent, it may be said in response, that the consent which is to be the justification of a present command must be a present consent. And, moreover, it is not true, as a point of ethics, that a promise once made is eternally binding. No man is obliged by a promise to his own destruction, and every one must judge for himself of the time when he can no longer abide by his word.

It is this exaggerated notion of the sanctity of contract which prompted Locke to except from the authority to the community by the social compact the right to do unjust acts. He believed the individual to be morally bound by his covenant, unless an unjust law could be shown to be without legal obligation. He forgot that unless the community receives the discretion to judge of what is just and unjust, nothing has been changed by the covenant; and if it can decide that question, then the covenant contemplates the possibility of an unjust command which shall be legally binding. Locke clearly perceived that obedience to a good law was a moral duty, and that resistance to a bad law was also a moral duty; but he falsely imagined that these duties would clash if we accorded to both commands the same positive legal authority. For even if we concede that the community exists by reason of a social compact, made without any reservation, the citizen would not be morally bound to obey an unjust law; not, however, because the covenant has not given such a law positive constitutional obligation, but because, when judged by standards which are above all law and all constitutions, the injustice of the command was a sufficient ground for rescission and revolution.

Locke's conception of both natural and civil liberty was a purely external one. The essence of freedom he made to consist in the mere absence of foreign constraint, taking no account of that inherent and inalienable power of self-determination, which is man's real and only liberty. "Natural liberty" he defined as "freedom from any superior power on earth," and "civil liberty" as "freedom from any authority save that set up in the community by consent." Despotic power being established without consent annihilated freedom. In other words, liberty is not inconsistent with compulsion, provided there was an original cession of power to compel. Can there be a more evident contradiction than the grant of a power to compel? If I am willing to do the act, why grant a power to coerce me? and if I am to be compelled against my present wish, and in spite of my strenuous resistance, what matters it whether I have originally granted the right or not? In any event, I succumb only to superior force. Since I cannot abdicate my free will, I cannot, subjectively speaking, make an irrevocable grant of power. Then is not the authority, which I have ceased to approve, equally despotic with that to which I never consented. There is but little doubt that Locke's design in adopting these definitions was to show an essential difference between liberty and license, and to convince the timorous and law-abiding that liberty was consistent with an obligation to obey the law. The attempt, of course, failed. Liberty cannot exist, if the opportunity of present choice be withdrawn; and to say that man is free is to divest the law of any irrefragable obligation. The advocates of liberal opinions need not fear such a conclusion. To say that a man is free to do an act, is a very different thing from saying that it is proper and right that he should do it. Law cannot destroy liberty, though it seeks to conform the will of the subject to the mind of the law-giver. It is an effort on the part of the community to influence and lead the decision of the agent by other motives than those which lie in the natural consequences of the act. But man always remains free to obey or disobey, and some other means should be taken to induce his compliance than the imagination that by a mysterious convention he has abdicated the power and duty of choice.

Milton's lines express the true philosophy of law:

> "Commands are no constraints. If I obey them,
> I do it freely."

And when I obey, I do so because I deem submission right or expedient, and not because I authorized the behest.

On the subject of popular sovereignty, Locke was especially clear and definite. The legislature, he maintained, has only a derivative and fiduciary authority; the supreme power resides in the people. But the community, he added, is not the supreme power "as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved; whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme power." Popular sovereignty is, therefore, a latent force, visible and effective only in times of revolution and reorganization: the practical working sovereignty is in the administration. As a rough outline of the situation, this statement might pass unchallenged; but the demands of sound and accurate theory are not satisfied by any view which implies a possible hibernation of the sovereignty of the people. Looking away from the accidents which sometimes give to a compact minority a temporary supremacy over a disorganized and inferior majority, and viewing society as a whole and nations in their ordinary condition, it is apparent that every government, whether elective or hereditary, exists only by the constant and sustaining will of the community among whom it has jurisdiction. The people are the great reservoir of inventive energy and of martial force; and in the long run nothing can withstand the militant intellect and muscle of the majority. A government may, for a time, coerce a disaffected and impotent majority, and its statutes will have positive legal obligation. Nevertheless, it is an attempt to stay the inevitable; such a domination cannot endure, when the greater number have once resolved. Democratic institutions aim merely to facilitate the expression and speed the accomplishment of the will of the more numerous faction.

The establishment of the legislative power is, in all commonwealths, the first and fundamental positive law. This power, according to Locke's conception, is supreme but not arbitrary, for

it is itself subject to a rule of the natural law, the preservation of society. Since, however, the legislative, or the majority who appoint and sustain it, are the sole judges of what is necessary for the preservation of society, it does not clearly appear how much the suffering individual has gained by the assurance that the power is not arbitrary. We have here another manifestation of the old error, the fanciful limitation of political power by moral considerations.

In the same way, Locke pronounced absolute monarchy inconsistent with civil society, on the ground that there was no common arbiter between prince and people. If, said he, there be any man in the community not subject to the laws of the community, there is no appeal but to heaven in the disputes between him and them; i. e. they are, as to each other, still in a state of nature. But in a case where an individual, not professing to sovereign power, simply refuses to obey the law of the community, is there between him and them, in fact, any other appeal than to heaven, and does not this by parity of reasoning put him and them again in a state of nature? So that, as long as the laws are obeyed, men are in a state of commonwealth; but when they are disobeyed and punishment is resorted to, men are again in a state of war, which is the very thing civil society was founded to avoid.

How a common arbiter is to be set up between ruler and subject consistently with stable government, Locke did not undertake to say; but with a true Englishman's complacency in the institutions of his country, remarked that "the people . . . could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament or what you please." A common arbiter between prince and community was an institution upon which Locke was not inclined to insist. He made in practice a short end of all difficulties by reserving, in every case, the ultimate decision to the people.

To the historical objection that governments sometimes originate in conquest, Locke replied that in a just war, the conqueror had despotical power over the vanquished and their consent was unnecessary, according to the law of nature; but that a conqueror in an unjust war set up a government thereby which had no obligation whatever.

Such an answer is an abandonment of the whole theory of the Essay. It sanctifies despotic power and concedes that true government may sometimes be lawfully established without consent. On the other hand, it contradicts the facts in denying operative legal force to the ordinances of the victor in an unjust war. An appreciation of this difficulty probably drew from Locke the auxiliary explanation, that the whole community never can all be conquered subjects, since there must always be some who have freely assisted the conqueror to subjugate the rest. His theory, however, is discredited beyond redemption by the admission that any in the commonwealth are governed without their assent.

Sir Robert Filmer, despairing of the effort to trace the kingship from Adam down to the reigning prince, had said: "It skills not which way kings come by their power, whether by election, donation, succession or by any other means; for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings and not the means of obtaining their crowns."

Here is the fundamental doctrine of Austin formulated by a Royalist courtier before 1680. But the author of the proposition was incapable of perceiving both its scientific force and its incompatibility with his leading premise. Locke saw the true import of the assertion when he retorted: "To what purpose, then, do we go back to Adam? why was not Oliver a lawful king, and where will you find a usurper?" He dare not admit such a statement to be scientific truth lest he weaken a monarch's sense of responsibility. To this same apprehension it is doubtless due, that while he, with so great ingenuity and precision, assigned the source and confined the province of paternal and conjugal authority to the relationships to which these powers are incident, his mind never opened to the cognate suggestion that political power may best be derived from the special relation in which men stand to each other as inhabitants of the earth, without the intervention of a contract.

In the chapter on the dissolution of government, the distinction above noticed between the destruction of a given constitutional organism and the dissolution of society, is very satisfactorily worked out; and the result has a permanent scientific value. This portion of the Essay, however, is mainly a defense of the Long Parliament. Even the most casual reader will observe a striking simi-

larity between the phraseology of this apology and that of the Declaration of American Independence. Many passages in the Declaration are evidently mere reproductions of Locke's eloquent prose, with such formal changes as seemed to be dictated by "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind."

In conclusion, we shall let Locke tell, in his own words, what seemed to him the most probable way in which governments were introduced among men. Opinion upon that point is now nearly unanimous; and Locke is so clearly in harmony with the results of modern historical research, that the account becomes a fresh testimonial to the singular penetration and profound learning which distinguished this remarkable man:

"I am also apt to believe that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued entire together without mixing with o hers, as it often happens, where there is much land and few people, the government commonly began in the father; for the father having, by the law of nature, the same power with every man else to punish as he thought fit any offences against that law, might thereby punish his transgressing children, even when they were men out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him against the offender in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so, in effect, make him the law-maker and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care, and the custom of obeying him in their childhood, made it easier to submit to him rather than to any other. If, therefore, they must have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together, who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father? unless negligence, cruelty or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it. But when either the father died and left his next heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage or any other qualities less fit to rule, or when several families met and consented to continue together, there it is not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him whom they judged the oldest and most likely to rule well over them."

This is as clearly the language of common sense as anything that Locke ever wrote. Modern investigation has done but little more than confirm his ingenious statement. And in this matter Locke has greatly the advantage over his critics of the so-called "historical school;" because his view of the origin of government gives greater play to human instrumentality and choice, in what is after all the work of human brains and hands. One of Locke's biographers, Prof. Fowler, assumes that the cardinal error of

Locke's position, was the assumption of a state of nature which history shows to be a pure fiction, and in refutation quotes with approval the celebrated postulate of the historical school, that "governments are not made, they grow." The perusal of the foregoing paragraph should suffice to convince any one, that with Locke, the state of nature was not so much an epoch in the world's history, as an abstract term, used to designate the situation of every individual, ancient or modern, who at any time, from whatever cause, was in point of fact beyond the bounds of political society. And the correlative phrase, "the law of nature," did not refer to any suppositive code of ancient times, but indicated those *a priori* principles which are the conditions of man's well being, when considered apart from the relationships of an organized community.

Locke's error was not that he ignorantly misstated the true historical origin of government, but that he, in common with others of his school, misapprehended the real nature of its action. And the merit of having corrected this mistake does not belong to the leaders of the great conservative reaction, who sought to deter mankind from rattling upon the established order, by persuading them that government had, from the beginning, developed unconsciously like a tree, and would, of its own motion, in the fullness of time, slough off its abuses, as the chestnut does its burr. That honor is due to the school of Austin and Bentham, the "Analytical Jurists," who first drew the clear line of demarcation between the department of morals and the realm of law, and first accurately defined the true nature and operation of a command.

The principles of the historical school had in Europe, a temporary ascendency, but the Revolution of 1848 demonstrated their insufficiency, and marked the return of popular sentiment to the doctrine of Locke, that "government," as Burke once expressed it, "is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants." It is true, that a too constant regard to the principle that government depends upon popular consent, is apt to produce a habit of mind favorable to rapid revolution, and tends to obscure in untrained intellects, the importance of stable institutions and of the laws which govern the political development of a people. It is unquestionable that mankind cannot exist together without government,

that it springs from their necessities, and not from their caprices But Locke never maintained such an absurdity. He admitted that man has only the alternative between government and destruction; but the organic form which the government should assume, and the ends of its immediate action, are, he declared, determined by the free choice of the community; not by the fiat of the Almighty, as some of his contemporaries pretended; and certainly not according to any law of unconscious development like the growth of a beard, as some modern philosophers suggest. Indeed, this criticism, which is still too current in our day, is nothing more than a misrepresentation of the great men who expounded the, in some points, erroneous, but in the main, beneficent doctrine of the social compact. Men, indeed, should be taught to respect the institutions which experience has tested and associaton has hallowed, to venture on the work of destruction with reluctance and caution, and on the work of reconstruction with humility and circumspection. But what consideration of truth or policy will dictate the attempt to check all investigation into the inception of government, and all effort toward reform by the ridiculous and incomprehensible assertion that the state is an "*Ewiyes Werden*," without beginning or end, developing and modifying itself throughout the long ages of its history, according to an unconscious and superhuman law.

DWIGHT M. LOWREY.
Philadelphia, Pa.

HAYNE'S POEMS.

BY REV. GEO. WMS. WALKER, OF SOUTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE.

Poems of Paul Hamilton Hayne: Complete Edition, with numerous Illustrations. Boston. D. Lothrop & Co. 1882.

Paul Hamilton Hayne is one of Nature's own interpreters. Born in the South, where Nature is wont to wear her sunniest smiles, it is eminently fitting that he should sing her loveliness. He is the poet—

> . . . . . "In whose living breast
> Dumb Nature found a voice, how sweet and wise!"

No more is he an imitator of Nature's sweet songster, Bryant, than is Bryant an imitator of Wordsworth, who was the first poet to love Nature with a personal love.

Hayne was born in Charleston, S. C., January 1st, 1830. H father, Lieutenant Hayne, a naval officer, died at sea, while Pa was an infant. His mother, who had recently passed away, was " South Carolina lady of good English and Scotch descent." Amor his "youthful poems" is one to the memory of his father, whe occurs this verse:

"Never in childhood have I blithely sprung
To catch my father's voice, or climb his knee;
He was a constant pilgrim of the sea,
And died upon it when his boy was young."

The mother's influence was gentle, yet strong, on her frail chil Little did she dream that she was training the poet of the Sou when reviewing his earliest verse. Yet who can divine a mothe dreaming who could predict: "The bird grown fleet and strong

"Might yet outsoar the morning."

In his *Legends and Lyrics*, first published in 1872, is a poe "To My Mother," where are to be found these two verses

"To thee my earliest verse I brought,
All wreathed in loves and roses,
Some glowing boyish fancy, fraught
With tender May-wind closes;
Thou didst not taunt my fledgling song,
Nor view its flight with scorning:
'The Bird,' thou saidst, grown fleet and strong,
'Might yet outsoar the morning.'

. . . . . .

"I bless thee, dear, with reverent thought!
Pale face, and tresses hoary,
Whose every silvery thread hath caught
Some hint of heavenly glory;
To thee, with trust assured, sublime,
Death's angel-call that waitest,
To thee, as once my earliest rhyme,
Lo! now, I bring my latest!"

Our poet is a graduate of Charleston College.

"Inheriting the prestige of a noble name, high position, and a sufficie amount of wealth, the world was before the youth, and he was free to choo his path. From earliest boyhood his fondness for literature, particular poetry, was pronounced, and there was everything around him to foster t love. The Charleston of thirty-five years ago was a very different pl from the Charleston of to-day. The old Huguenot element, with its aris

cratic names and associations, was strong, and the large admixture of good English blood helped to make its people just a little exclusive. Boston herself did not gather the mantle of her self-importance in a more queenly manner about her than did this city by the sea. There was a decided literary element, too, among its higher classes. Legaré's wit and scholarship brightened its social circle; Calhoun's deep shadow loomed over it from his plantation at Fort Hill; Gilmore Simms' genial culture broadened its sympathies. The latter was the Mæcenas to a band of brilliant youths who used to meet for literary suppers at his beautiful home; and here it was that the love for old Elizabethan lore, and the study of the English tongue, which has always characterized Mr. Hayne, found one of its best stimulants."

From college he entered enthusiastically into literary life. At one of Gilmore Simms' literary suppers originated the idea of a monthly magazine in Charleston that might serve as an exponent of Southern talent and culture. Mr. John Russell took the management of it, and Mr. Hayne was chosen its first editor. In honor of its publisher, it was called *Russell's Magazine*. Of this magazine's brief career, its only editor says:

"On the first day of April, (ominous coincidence,) the initial number of '*Russell's*' appeared. It was neatly printed in the style of '*Blackwood*,' and the general impression, typographical and intellectual, made by it, was certainly favorable. In the long run, however, a want of capital proved, in this case, as it must prove in all similar cases, fatal! 'Eleemosynary literature,' as Mr. Simms used to call it, can never be permanently maintained; nor, were that possible, would it, in all likelihood, be *worth* maintaining. Nevertheless, we struggled on with the work for years; nor until the completion of the *fourth* volume, did we confess ourselves beaten, and retire with our defunct 'Maga' from the public view. The lost means and labor expended on this monthly I have always looked upon as counterbalanced by the facilities for publication it afforded to our gifted local authors; especially to Timrod, some of whose most charming and characteristic poems were composed for its pages."

In 1855, when he was some twenty-five years old, was published by the old house of Ticknor & Co., Boston, his first volume of poems. Another volume appeared in 1857, and his third in 1860. "In the meantime he had married Miss Mary Middleton Michel, of Charleston, the daughter of an eminent French physician, who received a gold medal from Napoleon III., for services under the first Napoleon at the battle of Leipsic." This was indeed a happy match for our poet. Mrs. Margaret J. Preston says truly of her:

"It is but the scantiest justice to say that she has been the inspiration, the stay, the joy of his life. No poet ever was more blessed in a wife, and she it is, who, by her self-renunciation, her exquisite sympathy, her positive, material

help, her bright hopefulness, has made endurable the losses and trials that have crowded Mr. Hayne's life. Those who know how to read between the lines can see everywhere the influence of this irradiating and stimulating presence."

"The Bonny Brown Hand," "An Anniversary," "Love's Autumn," and "A Little While I Fain Would Linger Yet," more directly than any others of his poems, sing the praises of this "irradiating presence." The first of these poems closes with this tender verse:

"Oh, flittingly, how flittingly, the parlor shadows thrill,
As wittingly, half wittingly, they seem to pulse and pass!
And solemn sounds are on the wind that sweeps the haunted hill,
And murmurs of a ghostly breath from out the grave-yard grass.
Let me feel your glowing fingers
In a clasp that warms and lingers
With the full, fond love of earth,
Till the joy of love's completeness
In this flush of fireside sweetness,
Shall brim our hearts with spirit-wine, out-poured beside the hearth.
So steal your little hand in mine, while twilight falters down,
That little hand, that fervent hand, that hand of bonny brown,
The hand which points the path to heaven, yet makes a heaven of earth."

In "Love's Autumn" occurs this exquisite tribute to this noble woman:

"Love's spring was fair, love's summer brave and bland,
But through love's autumn mist I view the land.
The land of deathless summers yet to be;
There, I behold thee, young again and bright,
In a great flood of rare transfiguring light,
But there as here, thou smilest, Love, on me!"

How tender and devoted the love that could draw forth this fervid sigh:

"A little while I yearn to hold thee fast,
Hand locked in hand, and loyal heart to heart;
(O pitying Christ! those woeful words, '*We part!*')
So ere the darkness fall, the light be past,
A little while I fain would hold thee fast."

The disasters of the civil war left nothing for the homeless and ruined man, but exile among the "Pine Barrens" of Georgia. "There he established himself, in utter seclusion, in a veritable cottage, behind whose screens of vines, among the peaches, melons and strawberries of his own raising, he has fought the fight of life

with uncomplaining bravery, and persisted in being happy." The fifteen years that have shut him in here amid "his greenery and his pines," writing as his frail health would permit, and in manly independence has endeared "Copse Hill" to our poet's heart, and will yet make it throb with life—the Rydal Mount of the South. How firm a hold this cottage has taken on the affections of its inmate, let the poet sing:

"On a steep hill side, to all airs that blow
Open, and open to the varying sky,
Our cottage homestead, smiling tranquilly,
Catches morn's earliest and eve's later glow;
Here, far from worldly strife and pompous show,
The peaceful seasons glide serenely by,
Fulfil their missions, and as calmly die,
As waves on quiet shores when winds are low.
Fields, lonely paths, the one small glimmering rill
That twinkles like a wood-fay's mirthful eye,
Under moist bay-leaves, clouds fantastical
That float and change at the light breeze's will—
To me, thus lapped in sylvan luxury,
Are more than death of Kings, or empires' fall.".

And again in "Forecastings:

"Though I be dead, with faded hands and head
Laid in unbreathing rest.
Dear cottage roof! thou still mayst lure me back,
Among the unconscious living a wan guest,
Veiled, as Fate veils the dead."

Here, in "these old, familiar haunts," his "happiest days of tranquil manhood knew," his pen has not been idle. In 1872, the Lippincotts published his *Legends and Lyrics*, and in 1873, his edition of his friend Henry Timrod's poems was brought out, accompanied by as exquisitely pathetic a biographical memoir as literature gives an example of. In 1875, *The Mountain of the Lovers* appeared. A life of Gilmore Simms waits in manuscript a publisher. Memorial sketches of Governor Hayne—Robert G. Hayne, our poet's uncle—and Mr. Legaré, together with his biography of Timrod, show him quite at home in prose, and an adept in this delicate work of friendship. Besides, during the last five years his name has appeared as frequently, perhaps, in our current literature as any of America's many writers. And now, in

1882, D. Lothrop & Co., of Boston, bring out in handsome and attractive form *Poems of Paul Hamilton Hayne.**

Hayne is, perhaps, nearer to Wordsworth as an interpreter of Nature than any American poet. Wordsworth's view of Nature was entirely different from that held by the poets before him. They believed that the visible universe was dead matter set in motion like a machine and governed by fixed laws. On the contrary, he said it was alive—that there was a soul in all worlds—that "an active principle subsists" in Nature, and, "entering into all things, gives to each of them a distinct life of their own. But the life that varied itself in each thing was, at the same time, one life. He gave this one life personality, and he called it Nature, but, in fact, it was in his view the one living Spirit of God, who, in ceaseless action, made at each moment the outward universe. This soul of Nature was distinct from the mind of man, and acted upon it. It had powers of its own—desires, feelings and thoughts of its own, and by these it gave education, impulses, comfort and joy to the man who opened his heart to receive them." Hence, Wordsworth could love Nature with a personal love, because he did not mix Nature with his own mind, nor make her a mere reflection of himself, nor regard her as dead matter. She was a person to him, distinct from himself, whom he could love as a woman. "He could brood on her character, her ways, her words, her life as he did on those of his wife or sister." "Hence his minute and loving observations of her and his passionate description of all her forms." Let the lover of Wordsworth take up these *Poems* of our poet, and he will quickly see that just so personally does this "recluse of 'Copse Hill'" look upon Nature in her varied forms, and as lovingly commune with her; while some of his descriptions

*In reviewing this volume of *Poems*, Hermann Grimm, "one of the ablest o living writers and critics, an accomplished scholar thoroughly versed in American and European literature," says in the May number of the *Deutsche Rundschau*, a leading literary review of Germany: "The circle which these poems embrace is great, and the poet's spirit is everywhere at home, wherever he enters. Hayne has the peculiar gift of genuine talent which calls things by their right names. In reading this volume we have come upon many poems of which we would have gladly given a translation, but we have not been able to restrain ourselves from giving a translation of the following." Grimm here translates Hayne's poem called *A Character*.

of her are as passionately personal and lovely as he who dwelt and sung where Rydal and Grasmere water meet. See this close affinity to Wordsworth in *Nature, the Consoler*. Especially where he tells us:

"The universe of God is still, not dumb,
For many voices in sweet undertone
To reverent listeners come;
And many thoughts, with truth's own honey laden,
Into the watcher's wakeful brain have flown,
Charming the inner ear
With harmonies so low, and yet so clear,
So undefined, yet pregnant with a feeling,
An inspiration of sublime revealing,
That they whose being the strong spell shall hold,
Do look on earthly things
Through atmospheres of rich imaginings,
And find in all they see,
A meaning manifold;
The forces of divine vitality
Break through the sensual gloom
About them furled,
All instinct with the radiant grace and bloom
Caught from the glories of a lovelier world."

Again we see how completely he is under the control of his fair "Consoler" in this exquisite sonnet:

"O God! what glorious seasons bless thy world!
See! the tranced winds are nestling on the deep,
The guardian heavens unclouded vigil keep
O'er the mute earth; the beach bird's wings are furled
Ghost-like and gray, where the dim billows curled
Lazily up the sea-strand, sink in sleep,
Save when the random fish with lightning leap,
Flashes above them, the far sky's impearled
Inland, with lines of silvery smoke that gleam
Upward from quiet homesteads, thin and slow:
The sunset girds me like a gorgeous dream
Pregnant with splendors, by whose marvelous spell,
Senses and soul are flushed to one deep glow,
The golden mood of thoughts ineffable!"

Again, what personality is found in these lines:

"On a June morning, when the verdurous woods
Flashed to the core of dew-lit solitudes,

Murmured almost with a human feeling,
Tenderly, low, to frolic breezes stealing
Through dappled shades and depths of dainty fern,
Crushed here and there by some low-whimpering burn, etc."

Here again is nature finding a human voice for a well nig human feeling:

"So hushed the noontide, and so breathless still
The drowsy air, the voice of one far stream
Came like thin whispers, murmuring in a dream.
. . . . . .
Steeped in the mellow sunshine's noiseless rain,
All nature slept; alone the matron wren,
From the thick coverts of her thorny den,
Teased the hot silence with her twittering low."

These words call up the tender dallying of a lover:

"No more, no more amid my rippling hair
Could I have felt soft finger of the air
Dallying at dawn or twilight—on my cheek
Have felt the sun rest with a rosy streak,
Pulsing in languor; nor with pleasant pain
Drooped in the cool arms of the loving rain,
That wept its soul out on my bosom fair."

What could be more poetically descriptive of a gorgeous sun set, and how personal:

"One final burst of sun-set—Amethyst,
Ruby and Topaz—blazed among the bows.
. . . . . .
Only the golden and evanishing ray,
Which, softened by cool sparkles of the dew,
Flashed through the half-closed lids of weary day."

Here follow a few selections from the many vivid and person interpretations of nature found all through our poet's poems:

"The winds have ceased their murmurings—on my ear
The rill-songs melt to threads of delicate tune,
And every small note dancing in the moon
Expands, and brightens to a spiritual eye,
Luring me up to immortality."

"O heart!" I said, thy vernal depths unclose,
That mirror nature's, warm airs come and go
Of whispering ardors o'er thoughts budded rose,
And half hid flowers of sweet philosophy;

While now upglancings now borne swift and low,
Long like the swallow darts through fancy's sky."

"While all about me, like keen clarions blown,
From breezy dells, and golden heights afar,
Their stern *reveille* the wild March winds sound."

'O woodland water! O fair-whispering pine!
Loved by the dryad none but I have viewed!
O dew-lit glen, and lone glade, breathing balm,
Receive and bless me, till this tumult rude
Merged in your verdant solitudes divine,
My soul once more hath found her ancient calm."

"Ever I walk the earth,
As one whose spiritual ear
Is strangely purged and purified to hear
Its multitudinous voices.
. . . . . .
"I pass with reverent thought,
Attend to every tiniest trill of sound,
Whether by brook or bird
The perfumed air be stirred.
But most, because the unwearied strains are fraught
With nature's freedom in her happiest moods,
I love the mock-bird's and brown thrush's lay,
The melted soul o May."

"On my brow the dew
Dropped softly, and I wake to all the low,
Strange sounds of twilight woods that come and go
So fitfully,"

"Here lingering long, amid the shadowy gleams,
Faintly I catch the (yet scarce as one that dreams)
Low words of alien music, softly sung,
And rythmic sighs in some sweet unknown tongue,
And something rare, I cannot clasp or see,
Flits vaguely out from this mysterious tree."

"O! mother-earth, thou hath a ruthful breast,
Which yearns to fold thy humblest child from pain,
Then fall like flowers; both claim the self same balm,
The equal peace of thy majestic calm."

"Bend, bend thine ear!
Oh! hark and hear,
What vows each blithe new-comer,
Each warm June breeze that comes and goes,
Is whispering to the royal rose,
And star-pale lily trembling nigh."

These are only a few of the many beautiful passages that mark Hayne as a reveler in, as well as a revealer of, nature. Let any one read "Unveiled," "Windless Rain," "Thunder at Midnight," "Forest Quiet," "The Solitary Lake," "Forest Pictures," "Cloud Pictures," "Midsummer in the South," "Woodland Phases," "Aspects of the Pines," "Muscadines of the Southern Forest," and he will yield a ready assent to our poet when he sings:

"Ah! nature seems
Through something sweeter than all dreams,
To woo me; yea, she seems to speak;
How closely, kindly, her fond cheek
Rested on mine, her mystic blood,
Pulsing in tender neighborhood,
And soft as any mortal maid,
Half veiled in the twilight shade,
Who leans above her love to tell
Secrets almost ineffable!"

Besides these interpretations of nature, there are to be found as beautiful and often passionate personifications of her varied phases as beautify and intensify Wordworth's poetry. Such are the following, gathered almost at random from the volume reviewed:

"Latest of all these marvelous transitions,
And crowning all with their ineffable grace,
The eyes of night's empress, witching sweet,
Scatter the shadows in each secret place."

"O Autumn! wondrous painter! every hue
Of thy immortal pencil is steeped through
With essence of divinity."

"Peace broods upon the ocean, rules the air,
And up the sunset's dazzling pathway walks
Like a saint entering Paradise."

"Hark! how those lusty trumpeters, the winds,
Urge on the black battalions of the clouds,"

"All sorrow hath its bounds, o'er which there stands
That friend of misery, gentle-hearted Death,
Balms of oblivion holds he, and the realm
Wherein he rules hath murmurous caves of sleep."

"Well, well, I fear not death,
Trusting that death, perchance, is but a night

Shorn of all morrow, a long dreamless slumber,
O'er which the ages, hoar and solemn nurses,
Chant their majestic lullabies, that hold
Spells of oblivion; either thus, or I,
Whose life-sun rose in shadow, sets in blood,
Shall find a nobler being in some star
Beyond the silvery Pleiads."

"One hour to smite, or smitten dies
On the wild breast of victory!"

"Her face was pallid as a cold white streak
Of wintry moon-light on Siberian snows."

. . . "As if merry pulses timed their beating,
The frolic sea-waves near,
Dancing along like happy maidens playing
When blithe love goes "a-Maying,"
And wreaking on the shore their pouting blisses
In coy impulsive kisses;
Whilst he—old dullard—cannot catch or hold them,
Nor in his massive, earthen arms enfold them,
The laughing virgin waves, so archly, swiftly fleeting!

. . . . . "The grateful rain
Burdened with benedictions, rushed and foamed
Down the hot channels, and the foliaged hills,
And the frayed lips and languid limbs of flowers;
And all the woodlands laughed, and earth was glad."

. . . . "The one small glimmering rill
That twinkles like a wood-fay's mirthful eye,
Under moist bay leaves."

The same rill that struck the poet's fancy as "a wood-fay's mirthful eye," at another time in unison with the other rivulets through "solemn pine-groves" fleets

"Sparkling, as if a Naiad's silvery feet
In quick and coy retreat,
Glanced through the star-gleams on calm summer nights."

"When the last quick sunbeams shiver
Spears of light athwart the river,
And a breeze, which seems the sigh
Of a fairy floating by,
Coyly kisses
Tender leaf and feathered grasses," etc.

And the face of the ocean is dim and pale,
And there rises a wind from the chill North-west,
That seemeth the wail of a soul's unrest." etc.

. . "While heaven with bridegroom's kiss
Wakens the virgin earth to bloom and bliss,
Enamored breathing and soft raptures born
About the roseate footsteps of the morn,
An old world's song . . . steals on me."

. . . "The limpid pool
Lay crouched like some shy Naiad in the cool
Of mossy glades,"

. . . . "Those bristling rocks,
O'er which the chafed sea, in quick thundering shocks,
Leaps passionate, panting through the showery spray,
Roaring defiance to the calm-eyed day."

"Yon laughing rivulet quells its silvery tune,
The pines, like priestly watchers, tall and grim,
Stand mute, against the pensive twilight dim,
Breathless to hail the advent of the moon;
From the white beach the ocean falls away
Coyly, and with a thrill; the sea-birds dart
Ghost-like from out the distance, and depart
With a gray fleetness, moaning the dead day.
The wings of silence overfolding space,
Droop with dusk grandeur from the heavenly steep,
And through the stillness gleams thy starry face,
Serenest Angel—Sleep!"

The entire "Ode to Sleep," from which the last quotation is made, is as pathetic as it is exquisite—an impassioned longing after "tired Nature's sweet restorer:"

"The whole foul crew embarking, had been seized
By wind and wave, God's executioners,
The pitiless doomsmen of the wrath of Heaven."

"Here the warm sunshine fills
Like wine of gods the deepening, cup-shaped dells,
Embossed with marvelous flowers."

"Yet cool and constant in his manful might,
As some stanch rock 'gainst which the tides rebel
In useless rage, with hollow, billowy knell."

"At that mild season when the vernal sea,
O'erflited by the zephyr's frolic wing,
Dances and dimples in the smile of Spring."

While round the woodland waste and glimmering heights
The mist of gloaming trails its silvery shroud."

"The woeful sky slow passionless tears did weep,
Each shivering rain-drop frozen ere it fell.

. . . . And tender night became
A formless void, through which no starry flame
Touched the veiled splendor of her sorrowful face,
Like mourning nuns, sad-robed, funeral-bowed,
Day followed day."

"The Arctic Visitation," from which the last lines are taken, is as weird as Lord Byron's "Darkness," which it vividly brings before the mind of the reader.

. . . . "Whose life-term seems
Brief as a summer wind's or wave's,
Breaking its frail heart on the shore."

. . . . . "As low
And soft as happy winds that blow
At Spring-time o'er the wild bloom beds,
When the blue harebells lift their heads
To hearken to those strains of peace."

Nothing can be more decidedly personal and yet far too delicate to be accused of ultra-fleshliness than these opening lines of his "Muscadines:"

"Sober September, robed in gray and dun,
Smiled from the forest in half-pensive wise;
A misty sweetness shone in her mild eyes,
And on her cheek a shy flush went and came
As flashing warm between
The Autumnal leaves of slowly dying green,
The sovereign sun
Tenderly kissed her; then (in ruthful mood
For the vague fears of modest maidenhood)
Behold him gently, lovingly retire,
Beneath the foliaged screen,
Veiling his swift desire—
Even as a king, wed to some virgin queen,
Might doom his sight to blissful, brief eclipse,
After his tender lips
Had touched the maiden's trembling soul to flame."

"Storm Fragments" throbbing all through with life, gives us this beautiful piece of personification:

"The storm had raved its furious soul away;
O'er its wild ruins Twilight, spectral gray,
Stole like a nun, 'midst wounded men and slain,
Walking the bounds of some fierce battle-plain."

In his "Welcome to Frost," what an appropriately beautiful name does he give to this icy spirit!—

"Majestic afreet of weird Arabesque!"

This fine piece of personification is found in the "Battle of King's Mountain:"

"When mad September breaks her heart across the Hatteras rocks."

In "Harvest-Home," from many beauties we cull this one:

"Thus on the verge of Winter's dreary rest,
Nature rejoices in rare pomp of power;
To breeze and sunbeams bares her prodigal breast,
And robes in purple her last shadowless hour."

But my limited space admonishes me that I must desist from these selections, though many others marked for illustration of our Poet's pure fervor in writing of Nature, remain unused.

Mr. Hayne has not lost sight of the pleasure given to eye or ear in alliteration. This style of wording must come on us unawares and as a relief to the set rhythmic movement. "All alliteration," says Lanier in his "*Science of English Verse*," "for the sake of alliteration is trifling, and in Modern English verse it is to be used with such delicate art that the ear will unconsciously feel its indefinite presence, varying the verse as brief irregular bird-calls, heard in the wood here and there, seem to add a delight to the moss of green. . . . All alliteration which attracts any attention as alliteration is loud." This "delicate art" is felt in many places among the poems under review, as it steals upon us unawares varying the main rythm by irregular and unlooked for groups which break the monotony of the rythmic beat.

Can anything be more delicate than the exquisite closing of the poem, "My Daughter?" and coming upon us so unlooked for, since 'till the closing line we thought the daughter a reality:

"The delicate darling of a dream."

This charming little poem calls up gentle Elia's revery, "Dream-children," where the happy vision is dissipated in these closing words:

"We are not of Alice, nor of thee, nor are we children at all. The children of Alice call Bartrem father. We are nothing; less than nothing and dreams. We are only what might have been, and must wait upon the tedious shore of

Lethe millions of ages before we have existence and a name—and immediately awaking, I found myself quietly seated in my bachelor arm chair, where I had fallen asleep, with the faithful Bridget (Elia's sister) unchanged by my side—but John L. (or James Elia) was gone forever."

Here are a few examples of alliteration found here and there in Hayne's poems, but, of course, to be enjoyed fully only in the the connection where they occur:

"The humble bee with burly bass drones by."

"A war on the helpless, unhelmed head."

"Who smite with hellish hate must look for hate as hot from hell."

"Unfolds her blossoms and outbreathes her balm."

"What shadows of sound survive, the waves' far sigh, etc."

"A tireless trick of tinkling rhymes he had."

"Mad missiles of a morbid mood."

"Thy soul has learned from lays of loftiest lyres
What laws should bind weird fancy's wild desires."

Phonetic syzygy has been as subtly used among these poems. This co-ordination of similar consonant sounds differs from alliteration in that the latter is limited to the letter always beginning an accented syllable, while phonetic syzygy is a "recurrence of all same, or like, consonant sounds, whether at the beginning, middle or end, of accented or unaccented syllables." Professor Sylvester first gave this name to such a succession of consonant sounds. Sidney Lanier calls attention to perhaps the most perfect example of phonetic syzygy to be found in literature: "The two perfect lines of Tennyson whose physical beauty depends on their suave syzygy of M-colors, aided by a delicious distribution of vowel-colors:"

"Or moan of doves in immemorial elms
And murmur of innumerable bees."

What a lulling sound the co-ordination of the S-colors gives to this line, found in Hayne's poem "Not Dead:"

"The soft, slow clouds that seem to *muse* on high."

While in this line, from his "Mountain Sonnets," he gives us the phonetic syzygy of M-colors:

"The immemorial mountains seem to rise."

In his memorial poem "To Bayard Taylor Beyond Us," occurs his pleasing co-ordination of consonant sounds:

"Some stars like steely basks on blazoned shields,
Stud constellations measureless in might."

Again witness the delicate M-coloring in these lines from "The King of the Plow:"

"Where the wind-songs are set to the mystic,
Mild murmur of passionless dreams."

There is much about these M-colors that calls up Tennyson's lines already mentioned. There is still more in Hayne's classic English and masterly art that reminds one of that master of English verse. While in these lines—

"Launched on a baffling sea of mystic thought,
His reason in a whirling chaos, lost
Compass and chart and headway,"

Are to be seen pretty much the same idea that Tennyson has pu this way:

"This frail bark of ours when sorely tried,
May wreck itself without the pilot's guilt,
Without the captain's knowledge.

Perhaps a closer imitation to a beautiful fancy of Shelley's in "The Cloud," is to be fouud in Hayne's "The Solitary Lake." In "The Cloud" Shelley had this lovely conceit:

"That orbed maiden with white fire laden,
Whom mortals call the moon,
Glides glimmering o'er my fleece-like floor
By the midnight breezes strewn;
And wherever the heat of her unseen feet,
Which only the angels hear,
May have broken the woof of my tent's thin roof,
The stars peep behind her and peer;
And I laugh to see them whirl and flee,
Like a swarm of golden bees,
When I widen the rent of my wind-built tent,
Till the calm rivers, lakes and seas,
Like strips of the sky fallen through me on high,
Are each paved with the moon and these.

Hayne gives us the same idea, with a day-light glamour to the picture, in these lines:

"Dreamlike, in curves of palest gold,
The wavering mist-wreaths manifold
Part in long rifts, through which I view
Grey islets throned in tides as blue
As if a piece of heaven withdrawn—
Whence hints of sunrise touch the dawn—
Had brought to earth its sapphire glow,
And smiled, a second heaven, below."

"By the Grave of Henry Timrod," is as full of tender memories and as exquisitely expressed as are to be found in Elizabeth Barrett Browning's "Grave of Cowper." While his "Personal Sonnets," and "In Memoriam," breathe a tender love for living friends, and friends "beyond us." How keenly our poet enjoyed his visits to John Greenleaf Whittier and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow let his poem dedicated to them—"The Snow-Messengers"—tell us. The former poet he calls:

"Our pure, hale-minded Cowper of the West!"

While the latter poet he calls:

"The cordial prince of kindly men!"

In his management of the sonnet Hayne is unsurpassed even by Wordsworth, who may be said to have restored this form of song to modern poetry. His longer poems would require a separate study. Suffice it here to say that in comparison with his lyrics they suffer, yet too much cannot be said of "The Wife of Brittany," written in the measure of "tuneful Chaucer," whom he invokes that his

"Strain some faint harmonious echo bears
From that rich realm wherein thy cordial art
Throbbed with its pulse of fire 'gainst youthful England's heart."

In these longer pieces, as well as well as in some of his shorter ones, while there is plenty of color, metaphor, and illustration, the verse and movement are not altogether sustained throughout the entire piece.

Mr. Hayne has always been ready to reply to the call of his State and section. His "Poems of the War," "republished with no ill feeling, nor with desire to revive old issues, but only as a record and a sacred duty—*Fidelis ad urnam*," together with his "MacDonald's Raid," "The Battle of King's Mountain," "South

Carolina to the States of the North," "The Stricken South to the North," "Yorktown Centennial Lyric," are a proof of his readiness to sing whenever his countrymen bade him. Pre-eminently among America's poets has he sung the praises of the pine and the ocean. "Under the Pine," "The Voice in the Pine," "Aspect of the Pine," "In the Pine Barren," "The Dryad of the Pine," "The Pine's Mystery," "The Fallen Pine Cone," besides the numerous mention of those "Titans" in other of his poems are a witness for his fondness of "this mysterious tree." Our poet is not much given to humor, though he has "Humorous Poems." Childhood's prattle caught his ear, while its innocency won his heart. He has his "Poems for Children," but nothing in them can compare with Longfellow's "Children," and "The Children's Hour."

His poet friend, Henry Timrod, realized in his death the fulfillment of the prediction of the hour in "the solemn day" that slept for him. Timrod sang of this "solemn day:"

"As it purples in the zenith,
As it brightens on the lawn,
There's a hush of death about me,
And a whisper, 'He is gone!' "

His sister, writing to Mr. Hayne of his death, says: "He died at the *very hour* which, years ago, he had predicted would be his death hour. The whisper, '*He is gone!*' went forth as 'day purpled in the zenith!' " While our poet has not made any prediction of his hour in a "solemn day that sleeps" for him, yet he has sung his wish as to time and place in this touching lyric, "Two Songs:"

FIRST SONG.

"Let me die by the sea!
When his billows are haughty and high,
And the storm wind's abroad;
When his dark passion grasps at the sky
With the power of a god,
When all his fierce forces are free,
Let me die by the sea.

"Let me die by the sea!
To his rhythms of tempest and rain,
I would pass from the earth,

Through death that is travail and pain,
Through death that is birth;
'Mid the thunders of waves and of lea,
Let me die by the sea.

"Let me die by the sea!
When the great deeps are sundered and stirred,
And the night cometh fast,
Let my spirit mount up like a bird,
On the wings of the blast
O'er the tumult of wave and of lea,
O'er their ravage and roar,
She would soar, she would soar,
Where peace waits her at last.
Oh! Fate, let me die by the sea."

SECOND SONG.

"Ah, no! Ah, no! I would not go
While earth and heaven are black;
When all is wildly drear and dark,
Guard, guard, O God! this vital spark!
But I would go when winds are low,
And distant, dreamy rills,
Are heard to lapse with lingering flow,
Between the twilight hills;
With earth, and wave, and heaven at peace,
Then let these outworn pulses cease.

"How this "Second Song," tells the second thoughts of our poet, showing that the surroundings of his after life with their "aromatic freshness of the woods, their swaying incense of the cathedral-like aisles of pines, the sough of the dying summer winds, their glint of lonely pools, and the brooding notes of leaf-hidden mocking birds" have completely won our poet's heart in his "exile's home!"

"May he who so sweetly sings the praises of
The loveliest land that smiles beneath the sky,
The coast land of our Western Italy,"

late have his peaceful wish fulfilled.

ATONEMENT—ITS CONSERVATIVE FORCE.

BY REV. W. JACKSON, MONTREAL, CANADA.

The excellent article of Dr. Yates, in the October number of this REVIEW, delighted us. In the main we agree with him, and thank him for his able elaboration of the subject of a "Plurality of Inhabited Worlds." As we read the Doctor's third proposition, however, we were led to ask ourselves: Is the beneficial influences of the atonement of Christ confined to the human race? With certain passages of Paul's epistles in our mind, we were compelled to answer this question in the negative. The passages to which we allude seem, to us, to imply that while the earth was the theatre of Christ's atoning death, there is no race of intelligent beings in any part of the universe whom it does not reach and benefit. There is nothing in this proposition, according to our thinking, which necessarily conflicts with Dr. Yates' main position and we regard this as an aspect of the atonement which needs to be emphasised. We will, therefore, take as the basis of a few observations on this subject, nineteenth and twentieth verses of the first chapter of the epistle to the Colossians.

The one thing which distinguished Paul from his brother Apostles, and that which best enables us to understand his life, is the peculiar impression the idea of a universal religion made on his mind. This idea never so profoundly engrossed any other human soul. In his endeavors to make this idea a fact, he spent all his transcendent gifts and graces. Of course this idea was a revelation from God, not the product of his own brain. It was this idea that kindled his enthusiasm, nerved him with exhaustless energy and strengthened his fortitude and endurance. This was the inspiration of all his travels, sermons and epistles. The world for Christ and Christ for the world, was the ambition which fired his great soul and kept it continually ablaze.

The letters he addressed to the Churches his energies had founded, are monuments alike of his greatness of intellect and heart. Many of his words wing us away into the mysteries of the Deity or sink us in the depths of His immeasurable love. Some of them take us back to the verge of creation, or carry us down the cycles

of eternity. The scripture we have named is one of the profoundest utterances that ever fell from his lips or leaped from his pen. In its grasp of redemption, and its influence on man and angels, it stands alone; like the highest peak in a vast range of mountains, its base is on the earth, its top is lost in the clouds of heaven. "It pleased the Father that in Him should all fullness dwell; and having made peace through the blood of His cross, by Him to reconcile all things unto Himself; by Him, I say, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven."

Our readers will perceive that Christ is here revealed to us, not only as the Incarnate Word, and the Redeemer of men, but also as the conservator of the moral universe. The redemption of man by Christ is here predicated with being a means of good to the angels in heaven. What is called "the moral influence" theory of the atonement is a one-sided half-truth when applied to fallen man; but is a blessed whole truth when applied to the unfallen intelligences who surround God's throne in the heavenly world. This we conceive to be the Apostle's meaning when he speaks of Christ's death reconciling the heavenly hosts to the Eternal Father. Reconciling not in the sense in which that term is applied to man, but the bringing and binding together in eternal harmony of these holy intelligences by the study of this wondrous scheme and the Divine character as seen therein.

Some of our readers may be inclined to regard these statements as the speculations of the writer rather than the voice of God. To the "law and the testimony," therefore, we make our appeal. If it be not the voice of revelation let it be rejected at once. Before proceeding, however, there is this remark to be made: we are indebted solely to Paul for what we know on this subject. He alone was commissioned to publish it to the world. With the single exception of the Scripture already named, all he has given us on this subject is found in the Epistle to the Ephesians. In the first chapter of that Epistle, beginning at the seventh verse, we read: "In whom we have redemption through his blood the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of his grace; wherein he hath abounded toward us in all wisdom and prudence; having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself, that in the dispensa-

tion of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and in earth, even in Him." We cannot, as some, regard the Apostle as here speaking of the gathering of the Jews and Gentiles into one Church. It seems to us that by "the dispensation of the fulness of times" Paul means the final outcome of *all* the dispensations; and by "the things in heaven and in the earth" he means different orders of intelligent beings.

Turning to the third chapter of the Epistles, beginning with the eighth verse, we read: "Unto me who am less than the least of all saints is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ: and to make all men see what is the fellowship (or "dispensation" as it ought to be rendered,) of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ; to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus the Lord." From this passage it seems evident, to us, that it was part of the Divine plan in the redemption of man by Jesus Christ, to impress the mind of the angels with the excellency of His character, and in this way secure their allegiance for ever.

Looking back at the text in the Epistle to the Colossians in the light reflected upon it by these passages, it seems to embody and to voice the same truth. It is God's purpose "to reconcile all things unto Himself; by Him, I say, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven." Bengel, we are aware, regards this verse as though it referred to the reconciliation of angels to men by the death of Christ; angels being God's friends, were man's enemies, while he was hostile to God. The reconciliation, however, of which Paul speaks, is not of angels to man, nor of man to angels, but of both to God. As Alford remarks: "Sinful creation is reconciled to God strictly *by* Christ; sinless creation is reconciled to God, by a nearer relation, and a higher glorification of Him"—by the law of sympathy and love.

These are all the passages of Scripture which treat of this subject directly, and they teach us first this much: While the angels, as holy beings, did not need the death of Christ as an atonement

for sin; nevertheless the fruits of His redemption tend to their benefit. God will, "in the dispensation of the fulness of times," by the death of Christ, gather into union and harmony *all* holy beings, with Christ as their Head and Lord.

We say all *holy* beings, for the arguments for universal restoration to the favor of God, based on these Scriptures, are ruled out by the emphatic phraseolgy of each of the tests. It is only of "things in heaven, and things in earth," of which the Apostle speaks. There is no mention of hell here. True, Christ is Lord of all worlds, but when Scripture speaks of His general kingship there is mention made of the world of woe. True, that "At the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in *heaven*, and things in *earth*, and things *under the earth*." But there is a marvelous difference between the mere acknowledgement of Christ's universal sovereignty, and loving sympathy with His person, and loyalty to His laws. This is just the difference between all holy intelligences and the rebellious part of God's creation. The question of Universalism, in any of its varied forms of development, finds no countenance from these tests; and must, therefore, be decided without any reference to these particular Scriptures. They seem to stand as the expression of Divine thought in relation to the final outcome of the atonement of Christ in relation to the whole universe of intelligent beings. If our conception of these Scriptures be correct, then they furnish us with some lessons of vital consequence.

First. They teach us that all moral beings stand in peril, from which the atonement of Christ, by means of its conservative force, will effectually protect all who have passed their probationary period in the love of virtue and loyalty to God.

We have two striking illustrations of the fallibility and peril of pure moral beings in the case of angels and men. Among the myriads of beings who surrounded the heavenly throne, a vast multitude were unfaithful to their powers and privileges. For these there is no redemption. No doubt our readers have often asked themselves, as we have done, "How is it that man was redeemed, while the angels who sinned were not?" Was it because the angels were each a separate creation, while mankind sprang from a federal head? If this conjecture be correct, the race

to which we belong must stand in a somewhat different relation to God and His law to what the fallen angels do. Whether this be the right solution of the question or not, the fact itself is indisputable; and, from what we know of the character of God, we are bound to conclude there was some just and good reason for the difference, though we cannot at present discern it. But this is a digression. The angels sinned against such light and love that for them there is no possibility of recovery. Their great gifts increased their responsibility and their peril; and now, in misery commensurate with their crime, they await "the vengeance of eternal fire." Adam, the federal head and representative of the human race, fell from the high position and the holy estate in which his Maker placed him.

Absolute freedom from liability to fall, belongs to God alone. Freedom is essential, inherent in the nature of all moral agents. To say that an agent is free, is to admit the possibility of failure. Well has it been said that "In finite beings freedom to do right involves freedom to do wrong always and everywhere." Do our readers ask if we then believe that saints or angels in heaven may fall into sin? We believe that they retain the power to sin, but sin is not so much a question of *ability, as of will.* What we think this subject teaches, is this: Such will be the influence of redemption on the minds of angels, and saved men, that they will have no *will* to sin. "The pure spirits who shall have, through a sufficient probation, maintained their integrity and entered upon their reward in the very presence of God, with all about them and all within them mightily tending to strengthen all goodness, shall be, though not naturally, nor absolutely, yet in fact and in effect incapable of transgression." This leads us to a second thought suggested by this subject, viz:

To accomplish this end, the atonement of Christ, contemplates the gathering together into one kingdom, all holy intelligences, "Whether they be things in earth or things in heaven."

All pure moral beings retain their freedom in heaven, but the conservative influence of the death of Christ, renders it not only *probable,* but *certain,* that they will never exercise it in the guilt and folly of rebellion. The angels are represented as diligent students of the mysteries of redemption. They have been Christ's

chosen instruments in working out His beneficent purposes in reference to man. They are to be the companions of redeemed men through the unending years. Their interest and service in connection with human redemption, acts with a gracious reflex influence on their own destiny.

There are two ways of preventing the commission of evil. We wish, for instance, to prevent a child learning to swear; we cut out his tongue, or destroy his power of hearing; that is one way; or we instruct the child in the folly and sin of such conduct, and set before him the example of our own lives until this sin becomes and abomination unto him. In other words, sin may be prevented by lessening the power of a moral agent; that is one way; or it may be prevented by fortifying his motives and love of virtue; that is another and better way of attaining the same end. Throughout eternity good men and angels will retain all the powers they now possess, but such will be the influence of redemption on their minds, as they see it in all its depths and heights, that sin will not only be distasteful but utterly abhorred.

Sin sent a shock through all the heavenly intelligences working ruin and death. The transgression of the heirarchies of heaven struck the first note of discord in the universe of God. The obedient host stood in mute amaze as they beheld their former companions hurled from heaven's height into the dark abyss. When man, the best and noblest of all God's intelligent creatures followed in the wake of "wicked spirits in high places," there was additional cause for alarm, as the howl of sin's discordant notes reached the battlements of heaven.

More strange to angels still would seem the assumption of human nature by the Second Person of the God-head for the redemption of a guilty, rebel race. But when the fulness of all the dispensations shall have come; when angels and men shall have been drawn together by the magnetic power of the cross; when redemption shall have fused all God's obedient creatures into a white heat of gratitude and love; when all the depths of the wisdom and goodness of God, as seen in the gospel, shall have welded angels and men into one harmonious and happy whole; such will be the views of God's character it will inspire, that eternity

will be spent in the adoration of a Being so wise and glorious, so just and good.

A *third* lesson suggested by this subject is, that it is a great relief to our reason to be able to see that the Incarnation of the Son of God and the unfathomable mystery of the Divine Sacrifice had a wider scope than this little world and its few inhabitants.

This earth is but a speck in creation. Myriads of worlds lie hidden in the depths of space. Whether these worlds are inhabited by intelligent moral agents, is, at present, beyond our ken; much may be said on both sides of the question. Supposing them to be inhabited by moral agents, and supposing them to be benefited in any way by the death of Christ, we regard it as gratuitous to assume that this would, in any way, lessen its value as a manifestation of God's love to man, or weaken the motives which ought to induce him to accept it as such. If the mighty arm of my Heavenly Father, in stretching out itself to rescue me, confers a boon upon one of a different race, it is none the less a deliverance to me, while we can but regard it as shedding additional lustre upon the character of God—His wisdom, might and beneficence.

However it may be with reference to the worlds which lie about us in space, we are warranted by revelation in believing in the existence of a countless multitude of angels. Now, there are men who have no infidel beliefs, who are staggered at the amazing condescension of God in the redemption of our world by the death of His Son—at heaven emptying itself for such as ourselves. Offered principally for man, as an atonement only for man, the death of Christ is much further reaching in its results. By a reflex it is designed to reach all worlds and become the bond and unifying power of all holy intelligences. The Sun of Righteousness which has arisen on us with such healing in His wings, is to reach and brighten all worlds, and conserve and intensify the happiness and worship of the sinless hosts of heaven.

The stray light which the Scriptures quoted throws on the results of Christ's meditation reveals a breadth and height of glory transcending all our conceptions. We are apt to look at all things in the light of our own narrow sphere, and limit all results by the bounds of our own vision. Here we see that the redemption of man by Jesus Christ is only a part of a vast and glorious scheme

which shall ultimately reach and bless all the obedient in God's creation.

These indirect benefits of the atonement, though they are but very imperfectly understood, are fitted not only to enlarge our minds, but to benefit our hearts. Whatever draws us out of self, or the immediate sphere in which we move, helps to expand our conceptions of God and widen our sympathy with the other races His hands have made. This subject presents the moral government of God as vast and complicated; but, at the same time, by redemption, His purpose is to reduce it to one unique and harmonious whole, including "all things in heaven and in earth."

All this is part of an eternal plan which the Deity has been working out since first His power was displayed in the creation of intelligent creatures, namely: the conservation and unification of all holy beings. The scheme of redemption is the instrumentality God employs in working out this beneficent end. While the immediate and direct objects of redeeming grace are sinful men, it has a comprehensive though indirect bearing on the whole universe. It is designed to reconcile all things to God; and bring all holy intelligences under one system of perfect order, harmony and love. When the years of old time shall have exhausted themselves, and the cycles of eternity shall begin, what a jubilee awaits the sons of God! *Then* all sin shall be subdued, and all incorrigible and impenitent sinners shall be shut up where they can no longer contaminate others with their vileness or hatred of God. *Then* all the great and true from every age and every rank in creation, shall be gathered into one, and Christ shall be "all in all to the glory of God the Father."

Finally, this subject opens out to us some satisfactory notion of what the saved are to do in eternity.

The popular notions of heaven are exceedingly defective and unsatisfactory. Who can persuade himself that intelligent, redeemed men can find eternal enjoyment in the popular notions of "crowns," and "psalms," and "songs." We do not undervalue these Scripture terms. They have a significance dear to the heart of every good man. They stand for realities which ought to make the soul thrill with rapture. But these figures do not, by any means,

express the whole of the heavenly life, nor even the chief part of it, especially as popularly understood.

In one of the passages quoted from the Epistle to the Ephesians, there is an expression which may help us to form some intelligent idea on this subject: "To the intent that *now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church, the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which He hath purposed in Christ Jesus, our Lord.*" Here we are taught that the redeemed church is to be the eternal manifestation and unfolding, to the heavenly host, of the wisdom of the Divine purposes in the redemption of man by Jesus Christ.

We have spoken of the shock to the angels caused by the introduction of sin into the universe. Reasoning from what we know of man, is it too much to say that the permission of evil was a subject unfathomable to angel minds? and if this is true of the introduction of sin, what shall we say of the recovery of man by the incarnation and death of the Son of God? Remember, the angels witnessed the downfall of their companions unfollowed by the appointment of a Redeemer; therefore, when they saw heaven empty itself for the redemption of man, is it too much to affirm that it was a matter of wonder and amazement—had depths and heights they could neither fathom nor scale? But when "the fulness of the dispensation of times" shall come; when they shall behold the outcome of the mediatorial scheme in the glorified Church; when they look back upon the methods, and around upon the results, they will be overwhelmed alike at the wisdom and the love of God.

The multitudes of redeemed men are, in Scripture, represented as "crying with a loud voice, saying, Salvation unto our God which sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb." The angels are represented as witnesses of this, and, moved at the sight, in response they cry: "Amen; blessing, and glory, and wisdom, and thanksgiving, and honor, and power, and might, be unto our God forever and ever, Amen." Taking these Scriptures as the basis, are we not warranted in affirming that the chief employment of heaven will consist in the study of the Divine character as exhibited in the redemption of sinful men?

Thus, the redemption of man by Christ, secures the highest

destiny of the creature, the love and adorement of the Creator. "Unto the praise of the glory of His grace" is to be the final outcome of the mediatorship of Christ. The ultimate aim of human redemption is to tune the lips of angels and sanctified men to the praise of God—to fill every heart with love, and make the universe echo with hallelujahs to Him who died on the tree. May both the reader and the writer be ready to participate in the joy of that triumphant hour by a hearty acceptance of the benefits of Christ's mediatorial work.

TWO WOMEN.

BY ISABEL D. MARTIN.

The Power of Christian Benevolence. Illustrated in the life and labors of Mary Lyons. Published by the American Tract Society.

A Life Worth Living. Memorials of Emily Bliss Gould, of Rome: By Leonard Woolsey Bacon. New York. Anson D. F. Randolph & Company.

The woman question seems hard to settle. No sooner does it appear to be quieted in politics and the more thoughtful of the sex rejoice in the belief that the "woman suffrage" agitation is over and and that a heavy burden of responsibility, which we are most unwilling to assume is not to be laid upon us, nor are we to be forced into a position in the struggle of life for which we are unfit, than the question comes in another form and takes other, and perhaps still more serious aspects. Who is to decide for us the true boundary of woman's sphere? Who is to tell how far she is bound to go when duty seems to point the way? Who is to judge whether she must crush down the instincts which seem to her God-given, and which prompt her to silence, and retirement from the public walks of life? or who is to say whether even the voice of the Church and its ministers may be taken as an infallible guide, and tell her where the true calls of duty stop, and the voice of a morbid or a misguided conscience begins? When we are told, as we sometimes are by our ecclesiastical superiors and teachers, that what we believe to be the plain teachings of the Bible, both in letter and in spirit, "were not meant for these times or this country," in our bewilderment where are we to turn?

These are serious and embarrassing questions, and I believe, in expressing them, I but give voice to perplexities which are troubling many a woman in the Church, whose great desire it is to do her duty "in that station of life to which it has pleased God to call her."

It is, then, very refreshing and full of comfort to find, now and then, the lives of women passed before the public, but not *in* public, whose days were full of work, who, with large heart and brain, devoted themselves to the good of others, and who, without o'erstepping the bounds of modesty, in life, made their influence for good felt far and wide, and, dying, left behind them names which shall be held in everlasting remembrance.

One such woman, Mary Lyon, of Mt. Holyoke, has been called by one of the greatest of American teachers, "the Dr. Arnold of her sex." A high tribute indeed, and yet, when we reflect what Mary Lyon accomplished in her day and generation, and what has been done, and is now doing, by those to whom her life was an example and inspiration, it seems to fall short of her merits. For to-day wherever the Gospel is preached, the influence of this good woman is felt.

Born in an obscure country-place, among the hills of Massachusetts, she, with six other little children, were early left to the sole care of a widowed mother. After the death of the father, the family were left to depend principally upon their own exertions, for though rich in the inheritance of faith from godly ancestors, they had little of this world's goods. Her opportunities for education in childhood appear to have been very limited, though, as one of the youngest of a family intelligent and well educated, she must have received some instruction at home; and wherever she attended school she was noted for her facility in grasping knowledge, and the assiduity and perseverance with which she applied herself to her studies. She was remarkable from her earliest years for her attention to religious teaching, but it was not until she was nineteen years old that she felt that her heart was renewed by the Holy Spirit, and, even then, her feelings were not so marked as to give her entire confidence that she was accepted of God. But as she grew in years and in experience, the light became stronger and stronger until at last it broke into the perfect day.

The life of Mary Lyon is particularly encouraging to others who have been denied the advantages of early intellectual training, and who, with scant means, are endeavoring to fit themselves for the use and enjoyment of life. In the autumn of 1817, at *twenty* years of age, with slender purse but courageous heart and eager brain, she entered the Sanderson Academy, at Ashfield, between four and five miles from her birth-place. Here friends were found, able and ready to assist her in her search for knowledge. They recognized the vital spark of genius and sought in every way to aid in increasing its lustre and adding to its brilliancy. So great was the appreciation of her abilities by the trustees of the academy that when they found that her means were exhausted they tendered her the free use of its advantages. It was about this time that the idea of preparing herself for a teacher's life seems first to have suggested itself to her. She more than ever applied herself to her studies, and her progress was so rapid as to be a marvel to all who witnessed it. Her services as a teacher became in demand, and whenever there was an opportunity to benefit herself or others she would seize upon it by taking a class of pupils, and, as soon as she had earned a sufficient sum of money, would go to some place and put herself under tuition in any branch in which she felt herself deficient.

In 1821, with the amount acquired by her own labor and the small remnant of her patrimony, she went to attend the Rev. Dr. Joseph Emerson's school, in Byfield, Massachusetts, and this she ever regarded an important era in her life. Her room-mate wrote of her: "Mary is gaining knowledge by handsfull;" and in no knowledge, we are told, did she grow faster than in that of God and His will.

In the fall of the same year she returned to Ashfield and taught in the Sanderson Academy. She brought with her from Byfield not only increased learning and skill in teaching, but a quickened desire for the salvation of souls and clearer views of her own duty, which led her to make an open profession of her faith in Christ by joining the Congregational Church in the spring of 1822.

About this time she was called upon to make an important decision in life, and after much thought and prayer she accepted the invitation of Miss Grant—afterwards Mrs. Barrister—to assist her

in the Adams Academy for Girls, at Londonderry, now Derry, New Hampshire. As the school at Derry did not include the winter season Miss Lyon, during the winter vacation, would teach other and less advanced teachers, who would gather together for her instruction at different localities, or she would visit places where she might cultivate her own intellect, at one time availing herself of the generous invitation of Prof. Eaton, of Troy, to attend the lectures on Natural Science at the Rensselaer School. And all this time her earnest desire was for the salvation of herself and others. She writes: "My daily desire for myself is that I may know and do the will of God, that I may live by faith, that I may have a calm and quiet mind, and that in some way or other I may be permitted to do something for the salvation of souls." And her prayers were answered by a gracious revival in one of her schools in the spring of 1828.

In the limits of an article like this it is impossible to note all the various places in which, from time to time, she felt called of God to teach. Suffice it to say that in each she was encouraged by the wonderful success which followed her efforts, and that every year was marked by her steady growth in grace and wisdom, and the ever increasing enthusiasm with which she pursued her calling.

During the summer of 1833, Miss Lyon thought that the time had at last come for divulging and putting into operation a scheme which, for years, she had been cherishing and maturing in her own brain—*i. e.*, to establish a Protestant Seminary for young women. She thus writes to a friend: "During the past year my heart has so yearned over the adult female youth in the common walks of life, that it seems to me as though a fire were shut up in my bones. I should esteem it a greater favor to labor in this field than in any other on which I have fastened my attention."

With the hearty aid and concurrence of her friend, Miss Grant, she prepared a circular unfolding the nature and design of her plan, of which the principal features were: A building and furniture, suitable for the purpose, to be put into the hands of trustees worthy of the trust; teachers who, for the love of souls, would be willing to work for less salaries than they could elsewhere command; all the domestic work to be performed by members of the school; board and tuition so low as to barely cover the expenses

of the school; any surplus to be cast into the general treasury for the benefit of the school. Such is a brief outline of the plan of Mary Lyon's life-work. Like all pioneers, she met with obstacles of every kind. The parsimony of some, the disapproval of others, the taunts of foes, the skepticism of friends, surrounded her on all sides. But her courage and her faith knew no faltering. She never lost sight of the great object before her. And her prayers were mighty and her labors most abundant. By word and by pen she pleaded the necessities of the case. Travelling by day and by night visiting towns, villages, wayside farms, she gave herself no rest. And when, at last, the site for the building was secured, and the work on the house begun, every part of it received her most elaborate personal care until, by the Fall of 1837, so much of the building was finished and furnished as to justify her opening the school. In a few days, the eighty pupils for whom Miss Lyon had prepared, had gathered to the place. One inflexible rule was, that all pupils should board at the school. But these pupils were not mere school girls. The greater part of them were over twenty years of age, and some had suspended their education in order to finish it at this institution. Most of them were young women who, like Mary Lyon herself had done, were struggling through difficulties and embarrassments of all kinds to gain their education, and were, therefore, well qualified to appreciate the advantages afforded them at Mt Holyoke Seminary, the name of the new school. It was, indeed, a life of trust on which pupils and teachers were alike entering, but they made up their minds to self-denial and mutual help and forbearance, and to endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ. The following August, Miss Lyon, with a happiness which is seldom given to mortals to feel, gave, through the hands of her pastor, diplomas to the three first graduates of the Seminary.

It had been a question with those who had watched Miss Lyon's course whether the high tone of piety which had predominated in the schools in which she had heretofore been engaged, and to which she seemed to hold everything else subordinate, could or would be associated at Mt. Holyoke with a high literary standard. The question was soon answered. During the first year of the existence of the school very few of the pupils were not professing Christians,

but every year after that, for a long series of years, there was a protracted special season of religious interest among the pupils, always preceded by deep humiliation and fervent prayer on the part of Miss Lyon, her friends, the teachers and pious pupils of the institution. And in all these seasons believing that "duty never conflicts with duty," the ordinary work of the school went on, except in individual cases, and we are told that a person might live for weeks in the seminary during one of these revivals and yet see nothing unusual, save for a deep solemnity and tenderness during religious services. Of course, the spirit of consecration and devotedness to Christ which characterized Mary Lyon and all her co-laborers could but result in the desire to spread the glad news of salvation over all the earth, and so the seminary soon became a nursery of missionaries. It was in reality a mission station itself, and the feeling that the work must not be confined to home fields soon made itself apparent. Miss Lyon's sympathy for the heathen was so ardent and active, and her power of impressing her feeling on others so intense, that the result was altogether wonderful. For the first fifteen years of the existence of the school every senior class had one or more representatives in the missionary work, and constantly the teachers would exchange the work at Mt. Holyoke for the still greater privilege of carrying the Gospel to the "multitudes beyond." And not only did a few give themselves, but all gave their money. Up to 1858 the annual offering of the seminary varied from six to eleven hundred dollars, and this from teachers who were voluntarily working on less salaries than they could have obtained elsewhere, and from pupils, most of whom came from families of small means, and who, to procure an education, were daily performing menial tasks; for, be it remembered, there was not a servant employed in the establishment, save in exceptional cases. These offerings, too, were not made from impulse, but on a systematic plan. A tithe, Miss Lyon taught and practiced, was a debt, more than that, a privilege to give.

Mary Lyon's life was full of labor, but full of reward. Few careers have been so crowded with privileges and blessings. She was permitted to give thirty-five useful years to the advancement of her sex. For twelve years she saw her life-work crowned with success. The institution of which she had dreamed, for which she

had toiled and prayed, flourished beyond her utmost anticipations. She lived to see the seed she had sown spring up and bear fruit in every quarter of the globe, and to know that it was her glorious reward to have what she had done held in memorial of her wherever the Gospel was preached.

When the end came her last words to her school, spoken in the face of a deadly epidemic, were: "Shall we fear what God is about to do? There is nothing in the universe that I fear but that I shall not know my duty or shall fail to do it." And her last utterance, in answer to the question, "Is Christ precious?" with uplifted hands, through choking throat and parched lips, an emphatic and joyous "Yes!"

In direct contrast to the surroundings of the early life of Mary Lyon were those of Emily Bliss Gould, and in almost complete a contrast were all the circumstances, habit of thought and course of life. The one, born among the rugged hills of Massachusetts, reared to habits of self denial, innured to hardships, grew up amid a large family of struggling brothers and sisters. The other first saw the light in the metropolis of North America, was brought up in the lap of luxury, caressed and petted, the only child of a wealthy and indulgent father. One passed her life entirely among her own people, and in her various fields of action never went beyond the borders of her native New England. The other crossed the ocean, and far away from her kindred and her father's house, passed years of care and labor, and the monuments of her work may be found to-day scattered from the blue waters of the Mediterranean to the white-crested cliffs of the Alps. Only in one point did the lovely lives of these two women meet; each had the blessing of possessing the inheritance of a godly ancestry, and each a parent "passed into the skies." But widely separated as they were by age, locality, position and circumstances, there were frequent occasions when their work came in contact, and the influence of the one told upon the other. Emily Bliss was born in New York city in 1822. Her father, Dr. James C. Bliss, was for many years an eminent and beloved physician of that place, and her mother, Mrs. Maria Mumford Bliss, was one of the most noted Sunday school workers of her day. Her last dying words to her only child, the little Emily, then nine years old, were: "Let the Lord

Jesus Christ be your guide. Follow Him, for all your well-being for time and eternity depends on your devotion to Him." The lesson of that solemn hour was never forgotten. The child early began to follow in the footsteps of the mother, and the sight of Emily Bliss, when herself little more than a child, teaching a Sunday-school class of forty children was long remembered by those who saw it. She had every advantage of education afforded by both the cities of New York and Philadelphia, and her naturally quick mind and conscientious devotion to study enabled her to profit by every opportunity of advancement offered her, so that she became a well educated, beautifully accomplished woman.

In 1853 she married Dr. James B. Gould, who, the year after the marriage, entered into partnership with her father. But this congenial association and domestic happiness only lasted for seven years, when the failure of Mrs. Gould's health necessitated a sea voyage, and, in May, 1860, she and her husband sailed to Europe, where Mrs. Gould was to find her life work and her grave; for she never again saw her native land. It was found that she was one of those peculiarly constituted persons to whom sea-sickness is not only a horrible malady but a real and dangerous disease. After much hesitation, Dr. Gould and his wife decided to make their residence abroad.

Before settling upon any one place, however, they made the tour of the continent, both enjoying the wonders of art and the beauties of nature of the old world, as only they are able to do who, with cultivated minds and reverent heart, can exclaim: "*My* Father made them all!"

At last, following what they believed to be the guiding hand of Providence, they determined to make their home at Rome, and here Dr. Gould re-commenced the practice of medicine, which he continued in the Eternal City for fifteen winters, the summers being passed either in travel or among the neighboring hills.

The first part of their life at Rome fell among those days when the Papal power seemed to be filling up the measure of its iniquities, the time just before the emancipation of the city, when there was little that could be done of Christian work. But Dr. and Mrs. Gould became worshipers at the little American Church, which was then a centre of Christian communion to the sojourners in that

beautiful, benighted land. There were opportunities of doing good among her fellow worshipers at this church and among sick stranger patients of her husband, and these Mrs. Gould never neglected, while in the meantime her self-culture was being carried on, and slowly but surely was she being prepared for the work which was preparing for her.

In no point, perhaps, do the lives of Miss Lyon and Mrs. Gould differ more than in the manifestations of their religious feelings. Mary Lyon's religion, while deep and thorough, was also open and demonstrative. It was a deep current always at flood-tide, whose waters constantly overflowed and enriched the country around. Emily Gould's, while equally profound and sincere, was almost entirely without words. It was a stream which fertilized and fructified as it passed through the land, and whose presence you only knew by its gentle murmur and the rich luxuriance of the vegetation along its borders. To Miss Lyon life was a battle field; to Mrs. Gould a happy home.

During the first three years of her stay in Rome Mrs. Gould made frequent visits to Florence, and while there found an occasion of serving God in her favorite way—ministering to little children. Many years previous to this time an Italian had fled to England for liberty of conscience, had there founded an asylum for Italian children, the orphans of exiles. When safe to do so he returned to Italy, bringing three children with him. To their number others were added, and in 1866 Mrs. Gould discovered this orphanage, the aim of which was to save the daughters of Italian Protestants from the snares of sin and the evils of Popery. It was in an unwholesome situation and destitute of comfort, although Mr. Ferrith, the founder, had done all in his power to provide for the well-being of the children. Mrs. Gould immediately set to work, secured the interest of many Americans at home and abroad, and for many years the home was chiefly supported by her exertions, in fact, until it became independent.

The house of Dr. Gould had been for some time an object of suspicion to the Roman police. It was reported that on Sunday evenings sounds like the singing of hymns were heard to come from his parlors. That strangers, and even some Italians, were suspected of assembling there to worship God. And now that it

was discovered that his wife was engaged in collecting charitable gifts for poor children in a neighboring town, and they *Protestants!* it was time that forbearance should cease. Dr. Gould was brought before the Police Court, but as he was now physician to the American legation it was considered expedient to hold his case under consideration so far as he personally was concerned. But his wife's offence was a different matter. She must appear in court to answer for her crime, and, present in the Court, was Monsignor W., with all his dignity and his purple, to help intimidate this bold foreigner. But the brave little woman turned upon court and priest in such a manner that they were fain to let her go without even a reprimand.

She had also, during her summer trips, made several visits to the higher parts of Switzerland and the Tyrol, and had gone into the valleys and ravines of the Waldenses, whose story is a part of the history of our faith.

In one of these visits to the Vaudois valleys she had seen an ancient church, wasted by fire, and even roofless; but in which, from generation to generation, these simple, faithful people, though from time to time driven away by the sword, would return to worship the God of their fathers. Through Mrs. Gould's agency, enough money was collected to put this venerable church in thorough repair, and her name is cherished to-day among those warm-hearted mountaineers as a sacred thing.

It was Mrs. Gould's fortune to be in Italy during stirring times; just as she landed in Havre, at the end of May, 1860, the tidings reached her that Garibaldi, with his red shirts had entered Palermo in triumph, and by the 8th of September, with uplifted fore-finger, the symbol of "*Italia Una*," he had entered Naples and announced that the peninsula of Italy was to be a united and free country. The same year Victor Emmanuel had entered the States of the Church and annexed the two Sicilies, the Marches and Umbria to the crown of Italy. When, in 1861, Dr. and Mrs. Gould, in April, visited Naples, they stopped at Gaeta, and saw the debris of a devastated town. Then came the war of 1866, the Vatican Council of 1869–70, the Franco-Russian war of 1870–71, and finally the liberation of Rome.

In all these days, crowded with the events of history, Mrs.

Gould was constantly busy. Her continual correspondence with friends at home, as well as with the public journals of the United States, all show how keen was her interest in all the transactions taking place around her, how intelligent her appreciation of the situation of affairs, and how near to her heart lay the interests of her adopted country and its people.

But while every benevolent enterprise that now sprung up among the various Christian denominations represented in Rome, found in her a cordial helper, she was laying up in her own heart a scheme born of her own knowledge of the needs of the people which she believed would do most for the good of the inhabitants of Rome.

We give the story of the beginning of the work in her own words:

"In the old days when our hands were tied in Rome, we were in the habit of laying before our friends who came to us in their European wanderings, the needs of a school and an orphan house for girls established in Florence. As we begged them to aid us in taking care of these noble institutions, I remember often saying to them: 'I cast my bread upon the Arno, hoping, after many days, to find it upon the Tiber.' When the events of the 20th of September had occurred, we came down to Rome, from a visit to the Waldensian valleys, to find, indeed, the bread we had cast upon the Arno awaiting us upon the Tiber. Bibles were sold upon the very spot where, a few years ago, they had been burned. The Gospel was openly preached—no man forbidding. The books of the lamented DeSanctis were bought with great avidity by his Roman fellow-citizens; the New Testament was freely read to those who could not read for themselves, and, in short, the Pope, as he could in no otherwise fulfill Bunyan's vision, had shut himself up in his cage whence he glared on the pilgrims, but could no more do them harm. All this was very delightful; but to civilize and Christianize a community you must begin with the young. This is especially the case in Rome, where woman occupies so low a place in the social scale, and is so entirely under the dominion of the priests, and where the men are, so many of them, infidels in their notions. We hoped that a school would be started at once which we could aid, but no one took hold of such an enterprise; and when I attempted it I could not find, in all Rome, a proper Italian female teacher. Nor did friends at home, nor friends abroad, put funds into my hands, as I had hoped they would do, to aid in hastening on the new day which had dawned upon Rome.

"At length, utterly discouraged, with fifty francs in my pocket, and no teacher to aid me, I decided to go forward alone and open a school on the 20th of March. The Vaudois clergyman kindly allowed me the use of the rooms where his services are held—a most convenient and comfortable suite of apartments. Three children, whose parents attended the Vaudois (Waldensian)

Church, were my first pupils. In the course of the day, two others were brought to me by an American lady, and in the course of the week the same lady brought me four more. The next week the school had grown very decidedly, and at its close numbered twenty-two children, and on the 1st of May thirty were present."

Well acquainted as Mrs. Gould had become with the ignorance of the Roman people, she was not prepared for the lamentable depths brought to light by her own more intimate acquaintance with the children, and which was fully corroborated by the report of the commissioners of the Italian government as the result of their inquiries soon after the liberation of Rome. She had, then, to begin at the very foundation with her institution, and, above all things, to proceed with care and caution so as to gain the hearts of parents and children. All the tact acquired in her years of society life, all her acquirements and accomplishments, were brought into requisition. Music she found to be a great aid, and in less than six months she had the joy of hearing—

"Io sono un agnellino;
Trovato dal pastre
Un povero bambino
Salvato dal signore."

Sung to the tune "I want to be an angel," by these poor, little, neglected lambs. Mrs. Gould, herself, prepared a little manual of English for the use of the school, and classes were formed in all the more useful studies, and the first Christmas was celebrated with a beautiful Christmas tree to which decorations were contributed by representatives of five different nations. On Sunday a Sunday-school was held, devoted entirely to religious instruction. Of course such a work could not go on in Rome without violent opposition and even persecution. Annoyances of all kinds were showered upon Mrs. Gould; scandals were circulated; she was hooted at as she walked the streets, and even insulted by the papers of the press of the ultra-montane party. But none of these things moved her; she saw her work prospering in her hands, and with her tremendous will, aided by the tender care and skill of her devoted husband, even set sickness, itself, at defiance. And then she was in His hands for whose sake she was doing this great work. But at last, when she saw the way open to fulfill her heart's desire to found a Home for destitute Roman children, and

Miss Mary Ellis, of the *Mt. Holyoke Seminary** arrived in Rome to aid in directing the schools which had arisen from the nucleus she had formed, she lay down, overcome with nervous prostration, and became dangerously ill. A band of young English and American girls who were visiting Rome, came forward and offered their services as teachers in her place, and for their self-denying work, were cordially thanked in the *Italic* newspapers.

Besides the Sunday-school for children, morning Sunday classes were formed for adults, which were eagerly attended. The Home was begun on a small scale; at first Mrs. Gould assumed the entire support of six girls, all under peculiar circumstances. But she found that the influences of such a place were needed more for Roman boys than even the girls, as the girls were more guarded and tended at home and by friends, and in the schools the teachers found it next to impossible to counteract the evil influences to which the boys were exposed in the street; she therefore secured for a Home for children of both sexes two floors of a disused monastery. She was greatly assisted in this enterprise by many benevolent friends, and as in the case of the schools, her success exceeded her most sanguine hopes.

This was a work peculiarly near to Mrs. Gould's heart, as her love to little children was one of her strong characteristics, and here her beautiful influence was most strongly felt. One illustration of her method of training children must suffice: Believing that we never can begin too early to inculcate the duty and privilege of helping others, the reward of a week's good behavior in the Home and in the school, as long as they were under her direct control, was to be allowed to put a *soldo* in the box for the Florence orphans.

The object of the writer of this article has not been to attempt even a sketch of the life and labors of these two women, but only, in an imperfect manner, to give some idea of what they accomplished. Mary Lyon, amid poverty and hardship, Emily Bliss Gould in a foreign land, weakened by long suffering and constant pain, only one, therefore, of the many and ingenious schemes of Mrs. Gould to obtain the necessary means to carry on her institu-

* Mary Lyon's school.

tions will be mentioned. The list of helpers will also help to show the character of those who warmly sympathized with her work and aided in its progress: She had established, among other trades in one of the schools in which manual labor was taught, that of printing, and her idea was to issue a book of miscellaneous pieces contributed by various authors. The book to be published from the school press, and the contributions to be free-will offerings from the writers. In the list of those who gladly gave their time and their talents to the cause, are found such names as George P. Marsh, Wm. W. Story, Matthew Arnold, T. A. Trollope, William and Mary Hewitt, etc. It was decided to call the book a "Wreath of Stray Leaves." Little did the projectors think that its blossoms would only appear in time to wreath a chaplet for the grave of its originator. For the end was now come. The life of constant care, work and self-denial at last told too surely on the delicate frame. The assiduous care of her devoted husband, whose full sympathy had been at once incentive and reward in all her labors, the loving ministrations of friends, the deep affection of the dark-eyed Roman children, could no longer sustain her against the ravages of disease; and amid the lamentation of the children of the schools and the Home at Rome, of the Orphanage at Florence, of the schools of the Waldensian valleys, the soul of Emily Bliss Gould went up to receive the "Well Done" of the Master. "Her works do follow her."

HUMAN FREEDOM: DIVINE NECESSITY.

BY REV. WM. I. GILL, A. M., MADISON, N. J.

The relation between the freedom or necessity of human volition and the necessity or freedom of the Divine volition, as a topic of direct discussion, is a comparatively new question in the history of human thought. It has, indeed, always lurked in the purlieus of the debates on the freedom of the human will. Nece-sitarians have conceived the necessity of the Divine volitions as being a symbol of the volitions of man, and have argued that as moral character attaches to God, notwithstanding his necessitated volition, it may also attach to the volitions of men though they also be necessitated;

and this has always been a strong support of the necessitarian doctrine.

That the Divine volitions are necessary as an expression and executive process of the Divine nature, has never been much doubted; and not till quite recently has the question received a serious and systematic discussion in opposition to the more ancient and prevalent doctrine; and the honor of initiating this movement belongs to the Rev. Dr. Whedon, editor of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, issued by the Methodist Episcopal Church, New York, and his notion has had a rapid and wide, though not universal, acceptance in the Methodist Church. This class of thinkers have become persuaded that the necessity of the Divine volitions must be disproved in order to the disproof of the necessity of human volitions. Thus the issue of freedom or necessity was made on the principle common to the two parties, that freedom or necessity must belong equally to God and man; one side insisting that both God and man are necessitated (though they sometimes call this necessity freedom), and the other side contending that they are both free and not necessitated.

I do not here design to enter at length into the question of either the Divine or human freedom or necessity, but only into the question whether human necessity logically follows from the necessity of the Divine volitions; for I have been compelled to accept both extremes, that man is free though God is not. Hence, I hold that both parties in this controversy are in error in part, both wrong in the assumption that God and man must be alike necessitated, or both alike free: and I propose to show that God may have a moral character consistent with necessitated volition, and that man *in his probationary state* cannot.

I hold that the infinite perfection of the Divine nature makes his volition alike perfectly necessary and moral. Because He is infinitely perfect He could not have done otherwise than He has done in the past; and for all the future but one set of actions is possible to Him; for there is but one best, and infinite perfection must do precisely that and nothing else, whatever that may be. His nature is infinitely exalted and unchangeable, and it is the source of all stimulus and motive to the Divine activity; for no others are possible before creation, and after creation all others must

be infinitely inferior. He must, therefore, act from, and in conformity with, His nature. To do otherwise, were to transcend infinity, either by soaring above it or diving beneath it, and either is impossible because contradictory to the notion of infinite perfection.

There is an aspect in which the Divine freedom is often and justly affirmed, both in Scripture and common religious speech. God is free relative to certain powers and rights of man. Compared with God, a man is utterly powerless and insignificant. Where was man when God laid the foundations of the earth? and what is he that God should consult him, or give an account of His matters to him? No creature has power to understand Him, much less to restrain Him, or in any wise to impel or compel Him. What He does cannot but be supremely from Himself, from his own nature; though that nature always and necessarily considers the conditions and needs, and deserts of His creatures; but He is too greatly good, as infinitely perfect, to be able to do aught but the best.

This Divine necessity, it will appear, is wholly subjective. It belongs, in its source and origin, entirely to Himself, and not to anything beyond Himself. *His action and its merit is wholly His own*, though it is not optional that He can do otherwise. It is this which constitutes His supreme glory. He is so great, and so absolutely solitary in the magnitude of His power that he cannot be influenced from without, and He is so supremely excellent and immutably excellent in the quality of His power, that He cannot even be influenced from Himself, except to do that which is good and best, and that His fixedness or the necessitation of His volition arises from the infinite and unrivaled energy of the good within Him.

An infinite being cannot be bad, for if he is bad, he is not infinite. Goodness, in the superlative degree, is contained in the notion of infinite perfection. An "infinite devil" is a contradiction in terms, unless it is used only as a strong phrase for a great, but finite bad character. A being of infinite knowledge and power must see and feel with infinite force the superiority of goodness to its opposite, so that his action in accordance with it must be with him a psychological or subjective necessity. On the other hand, *a creature*,

if necessitated at all, is necessitated wholly from without. His subjective composition and condition is from without by birth and education and various circumstances, and that in connection with the outer world necessitates all his action, and all these are necessitated ultimately by God to be precisely what they are and to do precisely what they do. Though man acts voluntarily, yet he acts only as his will is determined ultimately from without by an eternal force which is either God or nature, the former according to Theistic necessitarians, the latter according to Atheistic necessitarians. The phrase, necessitated volition, has, therefore, an essentially different meaning, according as it is applied, to man or God. As applied to God, necessitation is wholly subjective. As applied to man, necessitation is ultimately entirely objective, though it is immediately and subordinately subjective, because it is through the subject that the eternal force operates. The power and motive force of God is underived and eternal. That of man is all derived from without. The power of impression and of impulse and volition, and the very form which the volition takes is thus derived. Objectively, God is perfectly free, and objectively as well as subjectively, man is necessitated in every particular and detail of substance and quality, and action, and passion. In the essential and fundamental points of comparison, the two necessities are contrasted as opposites, and no inference concerning personal moral worth can be drawn from one to the other.

For aught I know, man might have been made after this pattern of necessity, his freedom (so called) consisting in being absolutely necessitated, objectively and subjectively to do voluntarily just what he does do, and unable in any particular to will or to do anything else than that. By this law of necessity he might be appointed to undergo a gradual necessary education in the light of a growing intelligence and necessary moral purpose, till the animal and emotional nature is trained, disciplined and moulded into complete and spontaneous conformity to his higher nature. If this were the destiny and course of all intelligences, so that all surely, and at no intolerably slow pace were moving toward such a goal of exalted and happy subjective harmony, this aspect of the kingdom of God would have a very great and inspiring grandeur. This appears to be the unformulated notion of many philosophic

Universalists within and without the pale of the evangelical faith. Under such a scheme of necessity, the creation of infinite perfection, there would be no devil or demons, and all apparent evil is real good, because necessary and ancillary to the ultimate and perfect result, and it is appointed and necessitated for that very reason.

In such a universe, not a particle of moral blame can ever be justly attached to any creature, whatever they be or do. Everything is not only a necessity, but a beneficial necessity. Men and animals may interfere with the temporary pleasures of each other at any given time or place, and may injure or kill and devour, but all equally exemplify the same beneficent necessity, and the men, each and all, will be better off for it in the end, because all, by the fiat of infinite perfection, are on their way, in the best possible track and shortest cut to the ever better and best. Whether in holy cloisters or in jails, or brothels, all are equally on the path of right ascension and their goal is sure.

This is Augustinianism in its proper form of perfect logical consistency. Its great error, on the score of both logical consistency and beneficence, is its doctrine of moral reprobation. It teaches that God is the author of all things, and yet that He hates and condemns, and punishes men and angels in vast numbers and in terrific forms and degrees, without end and without hope of alleviation, for being the necessary effects of His own volition, which is always holy, just and good. One of this class of divines, a Princetonian, recently said to me, in conversation, that he "could not see how God could be absolutely sovereign over all and secure all things according to His infinite wisdom, unless He determined all." Very well; if He determines all, He approves of all, since He cannot be supposed to act against His own moral judgment, whence it follows that all moral disapprobation is precluded.

But the fact is, God does emphatically disapprove of some things, which demonstrates that He does not determine all things whatsoever comes to pass. Moral approbations and disapprobations on the part of God (as well as men) prove that there are some things which are intrinsically good and some things which are intrinsically bad or wrong. It is equally clear that what is intrinsically wrong cannot be the product of infinite perfection.

We are, therfore, driven to the conclusion that God does not do

all things, nor determine all things, nor secure that every man shall do that which is the best possible for himself or others. The course which He has adopted proves that such a course would not have not been the best on the whole, from whatever misery it might have saved some; and that the best is that in which He leaves and appoints a sphere of contingency which is foreseen in all its processes down to the last detail, and so anticipated and provided for, that the sum total of the result is better than it could have been on any plan of universal and detailed necessity. Within this sphere of contingency the creature has power to take either of two opposing courses: for or against God and the right. This is his moral power and the ground of his personal and moral responsibility, and the condition of his development of any personal moral worth. It is the base of the whole scheme and doctrine of the moral economy with its rewards and punishments; and it explains how and why God allows certain evils and yet does not ordain them, but severely condemns and punishes them.

All parties are agreed in affirming the moral responsibility of men. But it does not appear that there is any articulate agreement on the nature, elements and grounds of this responsibility. Here is the root of our difficulty. Responsibility is not simple, as often supposed, but complete and various in its relations if not in its elements. Suppose we raise the question whether God is responsible? The answer will be yes or no, according to the aspect and relations in the light of which the question is contemplated. How can God be responsible to His own creatures? Who is there that has either right or power to call Him to account? These are questions which have often been asked in full confidence that there is no answer, or only an answer in the negative. There is no answer if responsibility implies superior power and extra personal power to inflict a punishment beyond that which is contained simply in the uttered judgment. In this light God is utterly irresponsible.

But this is not the only, nor even an essential element and condition of moral responsibility. It consists in being amenable to the moral judgment wherever there is any such faculty of judgment, whether or not it be attended and enforced by any other power. The moral power is a law. The moral faculty is a law

to itself, whatever may be otherwise the degree or limitation of the power of its subject. Thus God is responsible unto Himself, to His own moral judgment, which can approve only that which is morally good and perfect; and it is such action and the disposition whence it flows, which is the supreme source of His own moral felicity.

For the same reasons, He is responsible to the moral judgment of those of His creatures on whom He has bestowed the moral faculty. They must approve or condemn, and their approval in their proper and normal condition, (which is the condition in which they will fully and gladly approve,) is an added glory, if not felicity, to God, beyond what were possible without creation. That judgment of the creature, as well as the Creator's own judgment, binds God to treat the creature in such a way as will ultimate in the best on the whole, and so that no one suffers needless, or unjust, or uncompensating pain and misery of any kind, or from any cause, and that moral interests shall be always treated as of supreme importance and quality, and the source of the greatest and noblest of all possible felicity.

The Bible very clearly teaches this responsibility of God to man. "Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?" inquired the divine angel, addressing Abraham. "Are not My ways equal," (just)—He expostulated through the lips of the prophet Ezekiel. All appeals to His justice, or righteousness, or goodness imply this, as when it is said that He is a just God and a Saviour, and faithful and just to forgive us our sins; and that He abideth faithful, and cannot deny Himself.

As God holds Himself responsible to the normal moral judgment of mankind, much more must He hold Himself responsible to himself. It is this responsibility to Himself which makes Him acknowledge his responsibility to men. We are thus led to the annunciation of the following moral principles which will not be disputed by our opponents, however they may evade the logical consequences:

(a) The first principle is that there is a moral righteousness or unrighteousness intrinsic to the nature and action of power not necessitated from without beyond itself, and that righteousness is

good, excellent, admirable, intrinsically and in its effects, and that unrighteousness is just the opposite.

(b) The second principle is that the moral faculty which makes and allows this judgment calls before it all beings, finite or infinite, and pronounces judgment upon them according to the first principle, and the best knowledge the mind has attained of the party judged, the finite mind here allowing for possible error. This is involved in God's moral justification of himself in Scripture and the implied demand for this on the part of man.

(c) The third principle is that every one is responsible for whatever he does from himself, without being necessitated by any power beyond himself. This is implied in the foregoing and in all moral thinking.

(d) The fourth principle is that those who are at all responsible are responsible for the foreseen and designed consequences of their action and volition. Who lights a fuse is responsible for the explosion; and the destructive action of the torpedo belongs to him who placed it and conditioned it for its effect. Hence the maker of the material and animal worth must be held responsible for all their action, processes and results. They are either good or bad and whichever that be, it all belongs to God. Of course, we believe that in the end and on the whole, and therefore all along, as means and conditions of the best, they are all "very good," just because we already believe this of God. If we did not believe that of them we should not believe the same of God, their Maker, who has determined for them their whole nature and all its actions and results.

Hence, if God made man to be and to do just what he is and does, and that, by inevitable necessity, though it be in part a necessary voluntariness, then God, and God only, is responsible for man's disposition and action and consequent condition. Man has no personal moral character and responsibility. That all belongs to God. Wretched men may then deplore their lot, but they cannot condemn themselves for it. If there is any condemnation at all it is all reserved for, and applied to, the Author and Cause of all. God is responsible for all that ever comes to man, whether among the lost in hell or among the saved in heaven. There is but one cause, and on Him rests all the glory and shame of whatever exists.

But this is entirely false, even up to the awful summit of blasphemy. All the sin and vice and crime of earth and hell are not to be saddled on God. Nor is it enough for us to escape it merely by a *non sequitur* denial. We are bound to be rational and consistent all through our intellectual process and moral judgments. While we hold that man is responsible to God for his actions, we are bound to render to ourselves a rational account of the grounds and elements of that responsibility. If we affirm that responsible man receives his very being and all his powers from God, we must hold that God has not determined all the action of these powers, and that he has left their action in its highest form and dignity, as a moral choice, wholly to the man himself to determine in himself, and wholly from himself, what it shall be, whether it shall accord with the will of God and righteousness or go against them. If it goes against them, it cannot be of God, cannot be determined by Him, as the supposition of that is self-contradictory. Some take one course and some take the opposite, and all are able to do either one or the other, able to do in each case just the opposite of what he does do, else there would be no contingency. Moral probation would be impossible, and all questions concerning the issues affecting individual moral character would be precluded; because all are alike and all are equally without any moral character, though they have various and different powers and dispositions.

Let it be observed that this freedom of man is only necessary for the ends of moral probation. We have, therefore, no reason for affirming it where no moral question is involved, and where no moral volition is required. In all purely intellectual processes, as such, the course is one of natural agency, not of supernatural agency, one of necessity and not of alternative freedom; and this non-moral and naturalistic sphere in human life is very large. Hence, we see how the course of human life is very largely reconcilable with what is observed of its aggregate and average uniformity in society; a result which is also heightened by another consideration, concerning the temporal limits of probationary freedom.

Moral probation, because it is probation, the determination, *ab initio*, of a moral character and career, implies a coming period to its power of alternate free volition. It is no longer necessary when that career has been already determined and when that char-

acter has been already formed and fixed; and not only is it then needless, but it is impossible. Its very action destroys its power by its normal subjective effects. It must develop into a uniform necessity of good or evil, according to the moral quality of the free alternative, and supernatural action from which this first nature has grown. The notion of eternal probation is eternal nonsense. To be on probation is to be on trial as to what fixed moral character we will become, which of the only two opposing classes of character we will be identified with fully and forever. It therefore logically implies the anticipation of everlasting fixity in good or evil.

Hence, even in this world, there is an element of growing stability in character, confirmed by habit in good or evil, till it appears irreversible, and so anticipates, or at least foretokens an absolute moral fixedness in the eternal world approaching. The known comparative fixedness of character in this world is an element in the causes of the average social uniformity which our necessitarian statisticians uncomprehendingly adduce against the doctrine of probationary moral freedom as the power of alternative choice between right and wrong.

This fixedness of moral character and condition of the saints in heaven, as the logical, as well as practical *result of a moral probation in this life*, utterly eviscerates the necessitarian argument based on it. That necessary fixity is of their own making (under grace.) They could never possess it as a personal moral merit of their own, but for a previous unfixedness, a power of moral freedom and alternative contingency in which they could have so acted as to have fixed themselves in evil instead of good. When they were in that free condition, they deliberately sought as their ultimate goal, as their happiest, and holiest, and noblest aspiration, this final fixedness in the harmonious and all-dominating energy of a perfectly sanctified nature.* This they did when they could have done otherwise, and of this choice, their present high and immutable felicity is the moral consequence and reward. They expressed and cherished this choice by prayer and praise, and denial of sinful proclivity, and by doing good as they had opportunity. By such a life, they sought to confirm themselves in good and avoid the alternative of being fixed in sin, because one or the other was recognized as the coming necessity, and that it was for them then to

determine, in the exercise of a power of supernatural moral choice, which of these it should be, and that it was in their power to choose either in spite of all the force of nature in subjective condition and external circumstances.

The foregoing exposition also thoroughly nullifies the necessitarian argument based on the person and work of Christ. He could not be free, it is argued, because his work and its sacrificial virtue was pre-ordained. If he was a theanthropic person, as the orthodox theology teaches, he is lifted out of all comparison with man up into the sphere of God, who is not free like probationary man. If he was strictly and purely man with all the common human faculties and subject to the characteristic laws of the human mind, then he exemplifies the truths we have expounded; or at least he cannot be adduced as any exception and disproof. "He was tempted in all points like as we." But if he was necessitated to resist temptation and we to conquer temptation after a period of necessary compliance with it, all the awe and moral concern belonging to the life of either is extinguished with the extinction of the contingency which moral probation implies. I hold that, in Christ, there was a real example of human life as it should be, with a true moral probation as in Adam and all men of full spiritual privilege and faculty, and that, therefore, there was the same contingency; that God foreseeing what choice would be made, planned and prophesied accordingly with just the same certainty on His part as if He had Himself determined it.

When this first final state in holiness is attained, man is like unto God on the score of necessity. Like God, all his action is now the necessary outflow of a holy and immutable subjectivity. He is not, as he never was, morally controlled from without, and once he was not necessitated to goodness from within, but now he is. This necessity is entirely his own creature, initially, at least, by the action of his will, and it has, in consequence, by the help of God, become at last a part of his spontaneous nature. This result and condition is the final and supreme object of the probationary moral economy. The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and they are saved, and the harvest they reap is beyond all impairment or exhaustion.

We have, then, three doctrines as the roots of all moral concep-

tion: (1.) God's subjective necessity; (2.) Man's initial probationary moral freedom; (3.) Man's final moral immutability. Without the first and the last, we could have no guarantee or certainty, forever and ever, of the stability of the moral kingdom of God; and without the second, we have no moral kingdom at all, because we have no creature of moral power and responsibility. These three doctrines, so far from being incompatible, logically implicate each other.

In brief, man must be an original fountain of good or evil, or he has no character except that which attaches to the causes of his action, which causes ultimate in God, who, in that case, is the only moral person. Now, God and the human conscience treat man as if he were such an original fountain of action and personal character, and that is to treat him as having a supernatural power of alternative choice of either good or evil, in the exercise of which, some choose good and some choose evil. Man must have this power in order to merit or demerit of his own. On the other hand, God has it not, and needs it not, for this purpose, because there is no power beyond or above Him to operate upon Him and influence Him, and His influence is wholly subjective, its source being exclusively and eternally in Himself, so that the character of the action from its cause is always and entirely His own character and the expression of it. Infinite moral merit implies the impossibility of doing wrong, else it is not infinite. Finite moral merit implies just the contrary, else it is wholly necessitated from without, and personal moral merit is impossible. So far from arguing for necessitated moral worth in man because of its existence in God, we have, in the difference of the two persons, as finite and infinite, the strongest reasons for the opposite conclusion. God is necessarily holy. Man is necessarily neither holy nor sinful, but free to either; but in the very exercise of his freedom he is digging its grave, and transmuting himself into an immutable condition. Here we rest our case.

If our exposition and arguments are true, they are very important, and cannot fail to be effective for good. They will remove a serious and enfeebling misgiving among Arminian divines, and considerably weaken the defenses of necessitarianism, against which we shall always labor at a disadvantage so long as we admit their principle that God's immutability is an argument for the necessity

of human volitions; for the divine immutability can never be surrendered. Such a thought is not only repulsive to philosophic minds, but it strikes with horror the common heart and conscience of mankind, and troubles and perplexes, and therefore enervates, the polemical Arminian himself in spite of his dogmatics. Let us grant the subjectively necessitated action of God, and that He is yet holy, and then show that this logically proves not the necessity, but the freedom of the moral volitions of probationary man, then the fulcrum on which, with our previous consent, the necessitarian places his lever, is removed and He is powerless; while as concerns the Divine immutability, we stand on the same ground with Him—the ground on which all human thought, and feeling, and inspiring hope are based—where we feel firm and safe, and forever secured. We shall then have unity in our own ranks, and command a more profound respect from our opponents, whom we vanquish on their own well-chosen ground.

MARY OF BETHANY.

The evening air, perfumed with early spring,
Breathed soft o'er Bethany; and Paschal Moon,
Rounding to fulness, shone on hill and dell,
With mellowed light akin to chastened thought.
All other homes were homeless now to Christ,
Exiled from Galilee and hither come
From City of the Palms to find brief rest.
It was a beautiful retreat, where vines
And almonds bloomed, and shade of olives screened
The day from glare of rocky mountain slopes.
Aforetime it had been to Him most dear,
And dear 'twas still amid the mournful hours
That hastened to their end. It was the home
Of Lazarus, of Martha's busy care,
Intent on kindly deeds, taught now of Christ,
The blessed art of an industrious peace,—
The home of Mary, too, in that rare sense
Which marks a home as vestibule of Heaven.

A feast had been prepared. Upon a couch
Reclined the honored guest,—the brother near,
A touching contrast, seen of all, but most
By Mary's keener eye. There lay the Christ
Of God,—the seal of sonship on His brow,—
Undarkened by the near approach of gloom;
And, in his eyes most luminous, the truths
That Judah's ancient prophets had revealed.
Though young, as yet unworn, his years had reached
Their limit in advance of time, and naught
Remained of earth for him, of Him for earth,
Except a death of holy sacrifice,
Ordained of God to make atonement full.
Beside Him was the friend, late from the grave,
Subdued to awe, and, in his reticence,
A pathos felt by all whose insight read
Its deep significance. Close to the group,
The sisters stood, each in her mien unlike,
Yet each to life and character most true.
The face of Martha, quick to show her moods,
Could ill conceal her nature's restlessness,
While Mary's wore an introverted look;
Serene was she—in outwardness composed,—
Holding herself obedient to herself
As one who knew a crisis was at hand.
What fluctuating moments came and went!
With pulses intermittent—her aim assured
As pure—but she in conflict—such as comes
To woman's soul where prudence would enforce
Some harsh restraint on her impulsive love.
But gratitude prevailed. She gazed and mused
'Till o'er her swept an inspiration's strength,
And breaking in her hands the balsam vase,
Its contents poured upon His head
And feet, and wiped those feet with her long hair.
Oh Love! Thy gifts can ne'er too costly be
From such a heart to honor such a friend.

But is the noblest deed from censure safe?
Low murmurs stole around 'till Judas asked:
"Wherefore this waste? Had it been sold to help
The poor, most worthy then had been its use."
Ah, was it so, forsooth? So thought not Christ,
Whose words were instant in her strong defence.
Here read Apology Divine for flowers
That bloom; for every bird that sings; for Arts
That human hands employ to deck the world.
No sentiment, if true in thought and act,
Can ever be a waste. Things uses have
To sight and sense; and things have uses known
Alone to God. The beautiful endures
Because its roots, unfed by soil of earth,
Live on the infinite.

Athens, Georgia. A. A. L.

LIBRARY TABLE.

Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments. By Milton S. Terry, S. T. D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. In one volume, 8 vo., pp. 781. Price $4.00.

This work is the second volume of the Biblical and Theological Library issuing under the editorial supervision of Dr. Crooks and Bishop Hurst. In this QUARTERLY for July 1880, on the occasion of the publication of the first treatise, the writer said:

"The series will embrace the entire field of apologetic, dogmatic, exegetical and historical theology. Dr. Harman opens with his comprehensive and critical Introduction, Dr. Bannister writes on Hermeneutics, Drs. Bennett and Whitney on Archæology, Bishop Foster on Systematic Theology, Drs. Crooks and Hurst (the editors) on Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology, Dr. Ridgaway on Evidences of Christianity, Dr. Winchell on Christian Theism and Modern Science; Dr. Crooks takes also the laborious and delicate task of preparing the History of Doctrine, and Dr. Hurst closes the course with the History of the Christian Church. The editors are men imbued with the spirit of impartial exactness and painstaking thoroughness, exhibited in the best German scholarship, and their names carry the guarantee that, as this library certainly attempts, on the largest scale, the most complete programme in American theological literature, so it will be unsurpassed as a treasury of the permanent results of recent learning, and as the reliable resort of the critical theologian. It would be difficult to secure another corps of contributors (mostly specialists) such as we have in the authors of these volumes. The projectors and publishers deserve the gratitude of biblical students; and this library, if it fulfill its promise, will stand, with McClintock and Strong's Cyclopædia, a worthy monument of the completed development of doctrine and theological scholarship in American Methodism, during the first century of its existence. Such an evidence of vital growth was to be expected from the great popular Church of America."

Since the preceding was written, some changes have been made in the list of contributors: Dr. Terry has been substituted for Dr. Bannister as writer on Hermeneutics; Dr. Jas. E. Latimer for Bishop Foster on Systematic Theology; and Prof. C. J. Little, of Dickinson College, for Dr. Winchell on Christian Theism and Modern Speculative Thought. Perhaps Bishop Foster's "Beyond the Grave," and Dr. Winchell's "Pre-Adamites" may have satis-

fied the editors that these were not the fittest men to do the work required, and the consequent changes explain the delay in the issue of the remaining volumes of the library.

In the *Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics*, which constitutes Part I., of Dr. Terry's admirable arrangement of his subject-matter, the author compares the Bible with other sacred books, as the Avesta, the Veda, the Koran, and the Eddas, and has discriminating chapters on the biblical languages, Hebrew, Chaldee and Greek. Of the Hebrew, it is beautifully said: "It appears in full development in its earliest written monuments, as if it had been crystalized into imperishable form by the marvels of the exodus and the fires of Sinai." The Divine calling of Israel, and their national separateness, served largely to preserve it from any considerable change. It retained every essential element of its structure until the canon of the Old Testament was complete, and then it ceased to be a living language. But, though dead, it does not cease to speak. It seems, rather, to have arisen, and to flourish in another and immortal life. When it ceased to be a spoken language, behold, it was already petrified in records more enduring than the granite tables on which the ten commandments were written by the finger of God. As the ancient cities, buried under the ashes of Vesuvius, now speak from the tomb of ages and reveal the life and customs of the old Roman world, so the pictorial and emotional language of the Hebrew Scripture transports us into the very heart and spirit of that olden time when God talked familiarly with men. . . . It is, in some respects, a reflection of Canaan itself. It has a strength and permanency like the mountains about Jerusalem. It can whisper melodious tones for ode and psalm and elegy, soft and gentle as the voice of the turtle dove, or the gliding waters of Shiloh. It can excite emotions of terror like the rushing floods of the ancient Kishon, which swept whole armies away. . . . . It has landscape paintings as beautiful as the wild flowers of Sharon, charming as the splendor and excellency of Carmel, and awe-inspiring as the glory of Lebanon. Through it all, there breathes a spirit of holiness as impressive and solemn as if proceeding from the mysterious darkness in which Jehovah came down on Mount Sinai, or from the veiled Holy of Holies on the Mount Zion which he loved. Surely this

language was admirably adapted to enshrine the law and the testimony of God. It is like the wonderful bush which Moses saw at Horeb; behold! it burns continually, but is not consumed. And when the devout student comes within the spell of its spirit and power, he may hear the sound of a voice exclaiming: 'Pull off thy sandals from thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground,'" pp. 105, 106.

Dr. Terry takes occasion to remind us that Paul did not possess the classical Greek education such as he is commonly supposed to have acquired in the University of Tarsus, for though he has an occasional quotation from Greek writers (Acts XVII: 28, Titus I: 12) the passages are such as would naturally be current among the people. This part of his subject the author closes with chapters on Textual Criticism, a science which could, with a little pains, be more extensively cultivated among ministers than it is, Inspiration, and the Qualifications of an Interpreter. These qualifications are intellectual, educational and spiritual. Among the intellectual are reckoned a sound, well-balanced mind, quick and clear perception, mental acuteness—such as De Wette possessed in so eminent a degree—imagination, correctness and delicacy of taste, a right apprehension of the relations of reason and revelation, and aptness to teach. The skillful and reliable interpreter ought to have a very broad education, embracing the sacred languages, comparative philology, philosophy, natural science, history, general literature, antiquities, politics, geography and chronology. Spiritually there should be an absorbing desire to know the truth, a tender affection, enthusiasm, and reverence for the word of God, and the enlightening and sustaining influence of the Holy Ghost.

Part II., the *Principles of Biblical Hermeneutics*, is by far the largest and most important section of the volume. The author's plan is not simply to state a hermeneutical principle in the abstract, but to illustrate and exemplify it by applying it in the actual interpretation of the Scriptures. Often the passages selected for this purpose are among the most interesting and difficult of interpretation in the Sacred Volume. Dr. Terry's work thus becomes, in some sort, a critical and select commentary. In a view of the different methods of interpretation, (Part II., chapter 2,) we have succinctly recounted the principles of the allegorical, mystical,

pietistic, accommodation, moral, naturalistic, mythical, rationalistic, apologetic, and dogmatic methods of handling the Word of God, concluding with a presentation of the true grammatico-historical method. In a chapter on the primary meaning of words, the manifold value of etymology is eloquently pointed out:

"Whatever may be the common meaning of a word, as used by a particular people or age, it often represents a history. Language has been significantly characterized as fossil poetry, fossil history, fossil ethics, fossil philosophy. 'This means,' says Trench, 'that just as in some fossil, curious and beautiful shapes of vegetable or animal life, the graceful fern, or the finely vertebrated lizard, extinct, it may be, for thousands of years, are permanently bound up with the stone, and rescued from that perishing which would have otherwise been theirs, so in words are beautiful thoughts and images, the imagination and feelings of past ages, of men whose very names have perished, preserved and made safe forever.' Benjamin W. Dwight declares etymology to be 'fossil poetry, philosophy, and history combined. In the treasured words of the past, the very spirits of elder days look out upon us, as from so many crystaline spheres, with friendly recognition. We see in them the light of their eyes; we feel in them the warmth of their hearts. They are relics, they are tokens, and almost break into life at our touch. The etymologist unites in himself the characteristics of the traveler, roaming through strange and far-off climes; the philosopher, prying into the causes and sequences of things; the antiquary, filling his cabinet with ancient curiosities and wonders; the historiographer, gathering up the records of by-gone men and ages; and the artist, studying the beautiful designs in word architecture furnished him by various nations.' Take, for example, that frequently recurring New Testament word, *Ékklesia*, commonly rendered *Church*. Compounded of *Ék*, *out of*, and *Kalein*, *to call*, or *summon*, it was first used of an assembly of the citizens of a Greek community, summoned together by a crier, for the transaction of business pertaining to the public welfare. The preposition EK indicates that it was no motley crowd, no mass meeting of nondescripts, but a select company gathered *out from* the common mass; it was an assembly of free citizens, possessed of well understood legal rights and powers. The verb *Kalein* denotes that the assembly was legally called (compare Acts XIX, 39), summoned for the purpose of deliberating in lawful conclave," pages 175, 176.

Then follow full chapters on the *usus loquendi*, synonyms, context, scope, and plan, comparison of parallel passages, historical standpoint, figurative language, simile and metaphor, fables, riddles and enigmas, and the interpretation of parables and allegories, of proverbs and gnomic poetry, and of types and symbols. Great light is thrown upon the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, Matt. XXI. 33–44, through its comparison with Isaiah V. 1–6, and

the analogous parables of the Marriage of the King's Son and the Great Supper.

But perhaps the most original and suggestive portions of the book are the chapters on apocalyptics. Under this head Dr. Terry discusses the prophecy of Joel, large sections of Daniel, Ezekiel, and Zechariah, Christ's eschatological discourse in Matt. XXIV., with the parallels in Mark and Luke, Paul's doctrine of the *Parousia* in the Thessalonian epistles, and in 1 Cor. XV., and the Apocalypse of John. While many may not accept the conclusions of Dr. Terry in their entirety, all must recognize the soundness of the principles of his procedure. Chiliasm, and other wild interpretations of the Revelations of John, and of New Testament apocalyptics and eschatology generally, can only be corrected by a careful examination and thorough collation of Old Testament apocalyptics, out of which the New so evidently sprang. So far as the Old Testament apocalyptic prophecies have been fulfilled, or are expressly interpreted by Christ and the Apostles in the New Testament, we are put in possession of the hermeneutical laws which are to guide in the interpretation of apocalyptics generally. There is little or none of the startling imagery of the Book of Revelations, that is not reproduced from the Old Testament. The language, figures and structure of Daniel, Ezekiel and Zechariah furnish John with almost all his materials. And it is only by going back to the standpoint and usage of these Hebrew apocalyptic seers that we can ever hope to discover general principles which shall apply to the interpretation of all these prophecies. Joel is the first author of that species of apocalyptic writing, which reaches its climax in the last canonical book of the New Testament.

Lastly, in Part III., through more than a hundred pages, Dr. Terry gives us the *History of Biblical Interpretation*. We have chapters on the ancient Jewish, the later rabbinical, the earliest Christian, and the later patristic exegesis. The great exegetes of the middle ages Bede, Theophylact, Lanfranc, Aquinas, Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus and others; Wycliffe in the fourteenth century; Gerson, the great Parisian doctor, so influential in the Council of Constance; Reuchlin and Erasmus, the leaders of German humanism—all receive appropriate notice. Luther and Melancthon,

Zwingli and Œcolampadius, Calvin, Beza, and Bullinger, with others, represent the exegesis of the Reformation. In the seventeenth century the names of Lightfoot, Pocock, Hammond, Ainsworth, Usher, and Owen, in England; of Casaubon, Cappel, Simon and Bochart, in France; of Arminius, Grotius, Voetius, Cocceius, and Leusden, in Holland; of Olearius, Glassius, Schmidt, and Pfeiffer, in Germany, are prominent. In the eighteenth century the science of textual criticism makes note-worthy advances. Kennicott, DeRossi, Mill, Bentley, Bengel, Wetstein and Griesbach, are the great names of the century in this department. Among English exegetes in this century are Patrick, Lowth, Whitby, Henry, Doddridge, Scott, Dodd, (whose work was substantially reproduced by Coke without acknowledgment,) Macknight and George Campbell, who translated the Gospels, accompanying the translation with dissertations and notes.

The English deistical and skeptical writers, Blount, Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Tindal, Chubb, Bolingbroke and Hume, and the representatives of French unbelief, Condillac, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and Volney, provoked a more attentive consideration of Revelation, its contents and claims, and brought out the rejoinders of Chandler, Sherlock, Conybeare, Leland and Waterland, of Bishop Butler, in the immortal Analogy, and of Warburton, in the Divine Legation of Moses. Contemporaneously in Prussia Frederick the Great was making the Court of Berlin the focus of a brilliant school of unbelief, while in Germany the same century witnesses the rise and decline of Pietism. The University of Halle, within whose walls in a period of thirty years, more than six thousand theologians were trained, was founded in 1694. Here Spener, the father of Pietism, Francke, and members of the learned Michaelis family, labored in professorial chairs. Mosheim, professor at Göttingen, more celebrated as a church historian, wrote also commentaries on several New Testament books; but the name of John Augustus Ernesti, who wrote the *Institutio Intrepretis Novi Testamenti*, is probably the most distinguished in the exegesis of the eighteenth century. Semler, in theology, and Kant, in philosophy, prepared the way for the rationalism, which vigorously asserts itself in the first half of the nineteenth century. But here we can no longer follow Dr. Terry

into the details of the history. In Germany are Rationalistic, Mediation and Evangelical schools of interpretation. Among the most eminent names are those of Paulus, Eichhorn, Strauss, F. C. Baur, Schleiermacher, Neander, De Wette, Gesenius, Ewald, Hupfeld, Hengstenberg, Hävernick, Bleek, Ullman, Tholuck, Stier, Olshausen, Winer, Meyer (by many capable judges regarded as the greatest New Testament exegete the world has produced), Keill and Delitzsch. In England, in the earlier part of the century, Kitto, Horne, Bloomfield, Clarke and Benson continued the issue of exegetical works in the forms of dictionary, introduction and commentary. More recently Alford, Wordsworth, Trench, J. B. Lightfoot, Murphy, Stanley, Jamieson, and, above all, Bishop Elliott, have maintained a high type of biblical scholarship. In America Moses Stewart and Edward Robinson have been our ablest scholars in the field of biblical literature, while J. A. Alexander, C. Hodge, Whedon, Cowles, Conant, and others, are certainly worthy of mention. Perhaps the most important biblical labors of the present century have been the practical settlement of a revised Greek text of the New Testament by such critics as Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Westcott and Hort, and the issue of a revised version of the English Bible. This entire history of biblical scholarship, as told by Dr. Terry, cannot fail to be of the deepest interest to all students in the great field of Scripture interpretation.

Dr. Terry has done his work well, and the publishers have left nothing to be desired in the style of the volume. This book is not one for absolute beginners, yet, on the whole, Dr. Terry has written for learners rather than the learned. If any criticism at all should be made on the author's treatment of his subject, it would be that sometimes the chapters partake rather too much of the character of independent essays, so that occasionally his work lacks that continuity of structure which marks the highest style of literary and scientific performance. On the other hand, his style is clear and strong, his sentences compact and vigorous, his mastery of his materials evident, and his distribution of the subject perspicuous and helpful. Perhaps the fault alluded to above, if fault it be, is to some extent unavoidable, when the almost infinite variety of topics that fall to be treated in such a work is considered. The

book can be unequivocally recommended to all ministers and theological students who are seeking a complete and reliable treatise on all subjects connected with the interpretation of the Bible.

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A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS FROM ENGLISH AND AMERICAN POETS. 8 vo., 761 pp. New York. T. Y. Crowell & Company. 1883.

There is no need, at this date, to demonstrate the utility or the interest of such a work as this. All will appreciate the language of Voltaire, quoted on the title page: "The multiplicity of facts and writings is become so great that everything must now be reduced to extracts." If such was the need in the time of Voltaire, much more is it now, for it is not going too far, I think, to say that the number of "facts and writings" has doubled since his time. The little rivulet of literature has become a broad and deep river, and much that is beautiful is likely to be lost, either from being mingled with that which is base, or from being swallowed up in the ocean of the past. It is for such books as the one under consideration, to preserve for after-times those

> "Jewels five words long
> That on the stretched fore-finger of Time
> Sparkle forever."

Many have essayed this task with more or less success. Bartlett's is perhaps the best known work of this kind. But his book, it will be remembered, is a dictionary of "Familiar Quotations." The book above mentioned is not restricted to *familiar* quotations, and is all the better on that account, for not only is there a broader field from which to choose, but the verses chosen are frequently the very ones that ought to be recorded or they would be lost forever. The arrangement of the book is superior to that of Bartlett's. The quotations are not arranged under the head of the authors from which they are taken, but under the words illustrated. Each quotation is numbered and can easily be found by the aid of a thorough concordance at the end of the volume.

There is also an index of authors. Following each author, are the numbers of the quotations made from his writings. It will

not be surprising to find that, of the five thousand nine hundred and fourteen extracts included in the volume, over sixteen hundred are from Shakspeare. His mind seems to have delivered itself upon every possible subject, and generally more appositely than all others. Some have had more than justice done them, some less. Bailey, Gay and Thomson have each more extracts allotted them than Tennyson. Longfellow has three times as many. Indeed, R. H. Stoddard himself, the editor of the American edition, has almost as many. Surely this is out of proportion to his merits. Modesty should have made him content with less, especially as he has had to pass by altogether Poe and Timrod; the latter, according to one authority, presenting "more quotable passages than any poet since Byron." The authors, after Shakspeare, furnishing most extracts, are in order: Byron, four hundred and ninety; Pope, three hundred and seventy-five; Cowper; Longfellow; Milton; Young. The subjects most fully treated are in order: Love, Death, Woman, Poetry, Life, Man. Love has twenty-six pages and two hundred and thirty-five quotations allotted to it. The subjects are arranged alphabetically, and most of them have cross-references to kindred subjects, by which the quotations on any particular theme are greatly multiplied. Poetry has the cross-reference, Imagination, Metre, Milton, Poet-Laureate, Shakspeare. The work is based upon Bohn's edition, revised, corrected and enlarged, with twelve hundred quotations added from American authors. It is an excellent work, but needs re-editing in some respects. This could best be done by a Southerner. New Englanders are too near-sighted to see beyond their own borders. J. C. H.

THE GROUNDS OF THEISTIC AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF. By GEORGE P. FISHER, D. D., LL. D., PROFESSOR OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN YALE COLLEGE. 12mo. pp. 488. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Clearness and ease of style characterize this volume, as they characterize all the writings of Dr. Fisher. Affluence of learning, fertility of illustration, reasonableness, and candor are also among its estimable characteristics. The volume discusses the Personality of God and of Man, the Arguments for the Being of God; the

Principal Anti-theistic Theories—Pantheism, Positivism, Materialism, Agnosticism. The first three chapters, devoted to these topics, are remarkably interesting. The remaining sixteen chapters are devoted more especially to the Christian faith. They contain a very able refutation of the theories maintained by Hume, Huxley, Buckle, Renan, Kuenen, and other opponents of the Bible as a miraculous revelation. Among the more important of these sixteen chapters are the fourth, on the Possibility and the Functions of Miracles; the fifth, on Christ's Consciousness of a Supernatural Calling verified by his Sinless Character; the sixth, on the Proof of the Miracles of Christ independently of Special Inquiry into the Authorship of the Gospels; the tenth, on the Miracles of the Gospel in contrast with Heathen and Ecclesiastical Miracles; the nineteenth, on the Congruity of the Natural and Physical Sciences with the Christian Faith.

Some passages in this volume are so expressed that wrong inferences will, perhaps, be drawn from them. We do not suppose, however, that the author of the volume can be said to sanction these inferences. He cannot be charged with advocating all the conclusions that other men may derive from his words. We might extract from the volume many remarks which are decidedly adverse to the loose views entertained by some of the advanced theorists on the subject of biblical inspiration. Our space obliges us to limit ourselves to what are supposed to be his opinions on the subject of miracles. Certain teachings of the Bible are often evaded on the ground that they are not made prominent by the sacred writers, and that accordingly they may be interpreted with much latitude. The biblical testimony concerning miracles cannot be evaded in this manner. It is given in various forms, directly and incidentally, expressly and impliedly. It is woven into the warp and woof of the Bible. It cannot be eliminated from it without unraveling its whole texture. If we yield to the claims of the sceptical critics, if we admit that the Gospels in their present form were not given to the Churches until after the close of the first century, we must still believe that the Churches of the first century had a decided faith in the miracles which are recorded in the Gospels, or in phenomena of the same character and the same authority. The testimony in their favor is a thread drawn through the whole tissue

of the New Testament and of the earliest traditions regarding Christ and his Apostles. It is therefore a testimony which must be received with faith and reverence, or else the inspiration of the Bible must be regarded as uncertain.

This view of the biblical miracles is supposed to be the view of Professor Fisher. It is given with special clearness in his sixth chapter. The design and the importance of the miracles are stated with equal distinctness in his sixth and other chapters. He obviously believes the miracles to be "an indispensable criterion" of the mission of the apostles (p. 149); "a distinguishing sign of their office" (p. 151); a "voucher for the truth" of their narratives (p. 160); "a visible sanction given by God to their teaching and work" (p. 108); verifying the authority of Christ (p. 161). He says that "the gospel miracles are for the express purpose of attesting revelation. They are the proper counterpart and proof of revelation" (p. 281). "The persistence of the faith of the apostles in Jesus as the Messiah, and of his faith in himself, admits of no satisfactory explanation when the miracles are denied. . . . Had there been no exertions of power to impress the senses, and the mind through the senses, it is incredible that the apostles could have believed in him, and have clung to him, in the teeth of all the influence fitted to inspire distrust. We might ask how Jesus himself could have retained immovable the conviction that he was in truth the Messiah of God, if he found himself possessed of no powers exceeding those of the mortals about him" (pp. 162, 163). "Professor Fisher quotes a remark of Canon Mozly in his Bampton Lectures (pp. 5, 6): "The coincidence of the miracle with the professed message of God proves design on the part of God to warrant and authorize the message." (Page 113.)

The common faith of the Church in regard to the design and importance of miracles may be thus represented. A biblical writer—Paul, for example—affirms that the dead will be raised. He virtually says: 'In order to prove that the dead will be raised, I will perform a work which no man is able to perform without a miraculous interposition of God. My performance of this work proves that God authorizes me to teach the resurrection of the dead. It proves that he teaches this himself. Therefore it is true that the dead will be raised.' According to this theory we find

frequent references to the fact that Paul and the other apostles wrought miracles in attestation of their Divine authority as teachers. (See Gal. iii.: 5; Rom. xv.: 18–20; 2 Cor. xii.: 12; Acts ii.: 43; xv.: 12.)

The biblical narratives of miracles, however, are denied by a class of learned writers. How can these narratives be proved to be true? The answer is: They are proved to be true by the character of the testimony adduced in their favor, and by the character of the teachings in favor of which the testimony is adduced. The teachings are in themselves excellent, and therefore plausible and probably true. They are worthy of a miraculous interposition in their favor. The external evidence for them is supported by the internal evidence for them. The two classes of evidence sustain each other. They are the two opposite sides of an arch, and the arch stands firm in consequence of the mutual relation of its sides. We understand that this theory in regard to the logical proof of a miracle is adopted by Professor Fisher. The external and the internal arguments are, in his view, braided together (see pp. 114–120, *et al.*) His lucid statements lead us to draw the following inferences:

This whole discussion in regard to miracles lies at the basis of the discussion in regard to the trustworthiness of the Bible as a rule of faith and practice. Were the miracles actually wrought? Yes. Then the Bible is entirely trustworthy. God sanctions it, declares it to be His word. Did not the writers of the Bible mistake error for truth, sin for holiness? If they did, then God sanctions their mistake. May they not have made a mistake, here and there, occasionally? If they did, then God endorses their mistakes occasionally. How can we determine when he endorses their mistakes? We cannot determine except by our own judgment. Then our own judgment must decide on the truthfulness of the statements made by inspired men. The judgment of one critic will decide against the morality of the biblical imprecations; of another critic, against the moral principles enunciated in the ninth of Romans; of another critic, against many of our Saviour's teachings. Every student of the Bible must judge for himself whether John was not imposed upon by his imagination; whether Peter was not led by his impulsive spirit into mischievous error.

The Bible, then, as an authoritative book is of comparatively little use. The cravings of the human heart for an authoritative teacher are rebuffed. Besides, how can we prove that the biblical miracles were actually wrought? The internal evidence for the teachings which they were designed to attest is important, if not essential, to this proof. But these teachings are said to be false here and there. So far as we believe them to be false, just so far is the argument for the miracles refuted. The proof for the miracles is firm, if the Bible is a perfect rule of faith and practice. If the Bible is in any degree an erring guide of faith and practice, in that very degree is the proof for miracles infirm and doubtful. But the miracles of the Bible are some of its most prominent characteristics. In its prominent characteristics, then, the Bible is a treacherous guide. If it be a treacherous guide in its prominent characteristics, it is yet more treacherous in its incidental instructions. At any rate, every man is left to his own judgment whether he may accept or reject the opinions of Paul and James, as he is left to his own judgment whether he may accept or reject the opinions of Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Hegel, Schelling.—*Bibliotheca Sacra.*

1. THE CHILD IN THE MIDST, by Rev. W. M. Leftwitch, D. D.
2. OUR YOUNG PEOPLE, by Rev. R. H. Rivers, D. D.
3. CALIFORNIA SKETCHES, 2d Series, by Dr. O. P. Fitzgerald.
4. MISSIONS OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH, by A. W. Wilson, D. D.
5. CHRISTIAN GROWTH, by Dr. O. P. Fitzgerald.

All these books are published at the Publishing House of the M. E. Church, South, Nashville. They were sent some time ago to the writer by the venerable Book Agent, Dr. McFerrin, notices of which we published in the *Christian Guardian* and *Methodist Magazine*, Canada.

Several years ago, the writer became acquainted with the late Rev. Dr. Sargent, through whom he was induced to become the Canada correspondent of the Nashville *Christian Advocate.* While the late Dr. Summers was editor, the writer received several communications from him, the last of which was among the last letters which that sainted man wrote. We have received the *Advocate*

regularly, and always peruse it with more than ordinary pleasure. We have thus become greatly impressed in the work of the M. E. Church, South, and have great pleasure in beholding increasing evidences of its prosperity.

The books named above are creditable productions and cannot well be too highly commended. We have read them all with great interest, and cannot remember a sentiment which they contain that we could not heartily endorse. The first might be termed a Review of the Sunday-school of to-day, and consists of three parts, which are divided into several chapters, each, all of which are full of valuable suggestions, deserving of the careful attention of Sunday-school workers in every part of the Christian Church. Children are the hope of the Church and the world. Every means should be adopted to secure their spiritual welfare. The chapters relating to preaching to children would greatly help the pastors to gather the children to the fold of Christ.

"OUR YOUNG PEOPLE," by Dr. Rivers, is just the kind of a book suitable to put into the hands of the young folks at the most critical period of their history, when their characters are being formed. The chapters are not long, but all are written, more or less, in a graphic style, abounding with incidents with which the author has become acquainted, either during his travels, or in the course of his extensive reading. The career of Joseph and that of Daniel, though well known to all Bible readers, are detailed with a freshness which will cause them to be read with great zest. The chapter entitled "Redemption Made Plain," is a fine model sermon to children, founded on the text, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," etc., Acts xvi.: 31. We would particularize still more, but it is difficult to do so when every portion of the book is so deserving of commendation. If the young men especially would read the last chapter of the Prodigal Son, we venture to believe that they would not be likely to bring down the gray hairs of their parents with sorrow to the grave.

Dr. Rivers has acted most wisely in adapting so much of his little book to the girls. They are worthy of the attention and care he bestows upon them. It is well known that their influence over their brothers, and others of the male sex, is powerful. "The

Model Girl," and "The Beautiful Queen," are not the least interesting portions of the book, and should be carefully read by the young ladies of the land.

"CALIFORNIA SKETCHES" and "CHRISTIAN GROWTH," are from the facile pen of the talented editor of the *Christian Advocate*, which is the organ of the Church, South. The former is introduced in a most graceful manner with an introduction by Bishop Pierce. A steel portrait of the author is also given, which, to us at least, greatly enhances the value of the book. Dr. Fitzgerald was, for many years, a resident in California, and, both as pastor and editor, he had numerous opportunities to become acquainted with the heterogeneous population of that wonderful land. The two volumes which he has written entitled "CALIFORNIA SKETCHES," are evidences that he did not allow his opportunities to pass unimproved. We have not seen the first series, but the second series, which we now notice, is one of the most lively, picturesque little volumes which we have ever read. Sometimes we have shed tears as we have read how some have suffered in that land of gold, and then, again, we have been filled with laughter as we have had brought before us some of the more pleasing scenes of human life. Such books, written by authors on whose veracity you can rely, give a truthful description of the state of mankind in various positions of life, and are sure to command the attention of some of our young people who are so often led astray by means of books which are of an immoral tendency. It speaks well for the South that a "Second Series of CALIFORNIA SKETCHES" were called for.

"CHRISTIAN GROWTH" is a book for the heart. A prefatory note is added from Bishop Kavanaugh, who read the book while in manuscript, or in its 'germ' state, and we presume had the venerable Bishop expressed an opinion adverse to 'the germ,' the book would not have been published, which would have been a great loss to the Church. Christians in general, but especially young Christians, or those just entering the heavenly pathway, would do well to peruse this little volume. It is certain that many professing Christians do not grow. Their religious experience is far from satisfactory. They are little better than dwarfs, when they ought

to be stalwart Christians. Methodists profess to believe that they may become perfect in love in this life, but there is reason to fear that many of them come short of it. If all would follow the 'counsels' here given, they would come to the full stature of Christians, and would not be tossed about with every corrupt notion that many are so zealous to spread. The reading of "CHRISTIAN GROWTH" has done the writer good, spiritually, and all who may read these lines are earnestly recommended to peruse it without delay.

"MISSIONS OF THE M. E. CHURCH, SOUTH," is by Dr. Wilson, who has since been elevated to the bench of Bishops. The little brochure is graced with an introduction from the pen of Dr. Summers, written when that sainted man was Book Editor of the Church. The volume contains twelve chapters detailing the Missions of the Church among the People of Color; Indian Missions; German Missions, etc. etc. The last chapter is a brief sketch of the Woman's Missionary Society. It will be seen, from this brief resume, that the volume is one of more than ordinary interest, and is well adapted to give to all inquirers an account of what the Church is doing in the great work of evangelising the world. The author was himself a missionary in his younger days; for many years he was President of a Missionary Board, then became the Secretary of Missions, and, though now a Bishop, he finds time to fill a page every month of the *Advocate of Missions*, from which it will be seen that he is well qualified to write on the subject of Missions. We presume that many in the M. E. Church, South, are like some with whom we are acquainted in other Churches; they require line upon line, and often give occasion to have their minds stirred up by way of remembrance. This little book is well fitted for this purpose, and its perusal would be likely to increase the missionary spirit, and it should, therefore, be circulated as extensively as possible.

Thanking Dr. McFerrin for the gift of the books now mentioned, the writer ceases his notice of them.

Canada. E. B.

A HISTORY OF THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF THE LIFE OF THOMAS CARLYLE: By Froude.

LETTERS OF JANE WELSH CARLYLE. By the Same.

In reading recently the Carlyle literature, for so the many books concerning him and his writings may not unaptly be styled, my heart at the still remembered scenes and places of my childhood, so often reverted to in these books, went back to them in fancy and not a youthful haunt, but, in age, I revisited it again—"Solway," "Cuffel" and "the Nith"—for, with the great men to whom Dumfries has given birth or a home, I also have climbed Cuffel, waded in the Nith, and beheld the wonderful tide of the Solway come booming up along the carse at Kelton.

Near what was called "Barnkin," the large farm of my maternal grandfather, was Caerlaverock castle, and its towers and turrets attracted no doubt with reverential admiration, daily, "my young eye." Near the neighboring town of Thornhill, was Boatford, the beautiful estate of Laird Maxwell, my paternal grandfather. At Thornhill, were spent some of the happiest early days of Jane Welsh, whose history later in life as Mrs. Carlyle, has excited the deep interest of the literary world. The road, of a few miles, from Boatford to Thornhill, is very beautiful. Hedged on either side by the Hip, the Hawthorne, the Sweet-briar and Wild-rose, often, when a wee wean, have I, like Jane Welsh, pulled there, the orange, cranberries and the black sloes and the over hanging hazelnuts. At Closehun, mentioned in her letters, not far from Thornhill, lived the paternal ancestors of the Empress Eugenie, (the Kirkpatricks.)

But to return to Dumfries. Burns, although born in Ayeshire, must be mainly accounted a Dumfries man, much of his life being spent there; there he died, and there, in old St. Michael's churchyard, he lies buried, (in which old church the writer may be pardoned for stating, she was baptized.) The remains of Burns in the year 1815 being removed from their original place in the burying ground, in order that there might be obtained a more advantageous site for the present handsome monument erected over them. At the reinterment, an immense procession escorted the remains of the poet to their new place of sepulture; proceeding

through the principal streets of Dumfries. I, then, being a wee lassie, was held up by my mother to a window in order to view the procession, and "now," said she, "be sure and remember that lame man that I point out to you, for he is *Walter Scott!*" Nearly threescore years and ten have passed since then, and yet it comes to my heart with a deal of delight, that I have laid eyes on the "great unknown." But Scott has drawn me from Burns, as Burns from my theme, Carlyle. The world has been recently made well acquainted with Carlyle's history, domestic, social and literary. Froude and others have given it to us minutely—almost too minutely, for in viewing a mountain, we don't care to have our attention directed to the rifts and scars on its sides or to the ill weeds and brambles growing out of its fissures. That Carlyle was one of the grandest of his species, intellectually, and recognised by the world as such, none will deny, and that he made himself so by his own indomitable will and persistent efforts by "scorning delights and living laborious days," should not in any wise detract from his greatness, all will allow. How severe his daily struggles for daily bread, for employment, for recognition! On his torturous path and steep did he ever pause or falter? Never, once! The goal he ever kept so steadily in view, he at length attained. The prize he so with almost his hearts' blood contended for, at last, he won. Is it not generally so? Even "Jacob had to wrestle all night before he won the blessing, at the break of day." "Work is prayer," is one of Carlyle's maxims. Ah! had he toiled for the spiritual, in like measure, as for the intellectual, what a grandly proportioned man he might have been! As it was, we admire but mourn. In marrying his wife, he did gain indeed a helpmeet; in culture, taste, and love of literature, they were counterparts. Mrs. Carlyle, from some idea of duty, but with Carlyle's full consent, made a renunciation in favor of her widowed mother, of all the fortune left her by her father, she being an only child. This, of course, limited to the narrowest bounds, the means of the young couple. By his daily work he must toil for his daily dread; that, she felt obliged to help him in this bread-winning, can throw no reflection upon Carlyle, as some of his critics are disposed to do, or that she was left so solitary and alone, when he was trimming the midnight lamp of literary toil, as she has humorously said for thirteen years,

"when sitting under the shadow of Frederick the Great," must not be said to his discredit, as has been done, any more than it should be said to that of any professional man, who, at home or abroad, must work to live. Doubtless her menial work was as distasteful to him, as to her, but they must live, and so in their early married life, there was no help for this continuous strain on both. When Carlyle's wife married him, she was perfectly aware she was choosing a life of poverty and privation, but, there ever was the hope of fame and fortune in the end, and we all know, they came at last. Mrs. Carlyle, the day she died so suddenly, had left her own handsome home in London, to take a drive in her own carriage, but not before she had heard the whole world reverberate the sound of her husband's fame.

Both husband and wife were nervous and dyspeptic. They were not blessed with those harmonizers of the domestic lot, children, but their home was not without its delights to them, even that one, Aaigenenputtock, so utterly divested of all outside attractions, was not to them without the internal attractions of quietness and entire suitability to their peculiarities and pursuits. The father of Carlyle, though only a stone-mason and farmer, to a limited extent, was a man of high character and purpose, and his mother was a woman of faith and prayer. Though his boyhood home was a poor one, yet its poverty was altogether removed from squalor and coarseness. The Scotch, however poor, have generally a desire for learning and a taste for reading. In poor huts in Scotland are often found volumes of some of our standard authors, especially those on theology and poetry. "The Pilgrims Progress" and "The Gentle Shepherd," Carlyle had, no doubt, conned over by the peet-fire at his father's ingleside, and discussed their merits with his father on their leisure Saturday nights. Carlyle, the elder, then might have made the discovery of the mind-gem that scintillated from beneath the hodden-gray suit of his son, or had not been so stimulated to make every sacrifice for his education. Carlyle reverenced, always, his parents; in fact, his filial piety is one of the most beautiful traits of his character. When he stood, surely, on the topmost round of the ladder, which had so toilsomely led him to the height where "Fame's proud temple shines afar," his love and reverence for his plebeian parents

suffered no abatement. As soon as he had a house in Edinburg, he must have his father, who had never seen the city, to pay him a visit, which was followed by one from his mother and sister. His letters to his father and mother, long and frequent, are affecting in their tenderness and humility. He ever seemed to wish to sit at their feet and learn. A Socrates might have so wished, for their native wisdom was more than that learned at "the schools." He often tried to assure his mother that he was not an unbeliever, as has been alleged against him, telling her that her religion and his differed not as much as she supposed. Yes, it is to be hoped that in spite of many aberrations from God's truth, the faith that dwelt in his pious mother, if even no larger than a grain of mustard seed, in the end, proved, through the infinite compassion of Christ, sufficient to save his soul. He was often led astray by German mysticism, by the influence of his friend Emerson, and may have been, as was Burns, injured by the severe Calvinism inculcated then by the creed of the Church of Scotland, but as an offset to some sceptical and rash utterances, there are the many grand words for the truth of revealed religion, and the good deeds whereby to judge his faith. How many of the fruits of the spirit were shown by his life? Filial piety; yes that must be placed first in the category, it was his crowning virtue. Then generosity; see his education of his brother for one of the learned professions, even sending him abroad for advantages, when he was toiling and moiling at his tread-mill work at home. See his loving kindness and tender mercy for the poor maimed miner, to whose necessities he not only contributed himself but incited others to do the same. Then we might cite his love of truth, his honesty, his forbearance, his industry, his sobriety. Yes, for these fine offsets we must judge him leniently, and above all, fervently hope that his mother's prayers for him were answered. Carlyle was blessed with the possession of a friendship pure and disinterested and life long, in that of the renowned Edward Irving. He admired, loved and pitied his gifted but eccentric friend, and while differing from him so essentially in hallucinations, adhered to him when the world, that had so run after him, gave him the cold shoulder. No doubt the splendid genius of that early friend had been to him an inspiration, as was to him that of Burns. When the reinterment of the remains

of Burns, already adverted to, took place, Carlyle, a mere youth, was one of the spectators. His father thinks the honor done to the memory of Burns, on that occasion, made a powerful and lasting impression on Carlyle, creating in him aspiration to that excellence which he attained, though in a different species of literature from that of the poet. Carlyle has been charged with envious and splenetic criticism, especially of contemporary writers. Well, he was a plain spoken man, honest even in speech, and "called a spade, a spade." Campbell, Lamb, DeQuincy, and others, *we* know only as writers, *he* knew them personally, and the reigning vices of that day, especially that of intemperance, he not only severely eschewed himself, but openly denounced in others. What he despised he made no secret of, so that with more candor than politeness, he said to the fop who was pestering him as a gnat pesters an elephant, "Y'ere just a puir miserable creature!" There is no denying, as the old woman said, that he had "a terrible tongue," but as some condonement for it, we must think of his kind, good heart, that what the tongue rasped was so ready to heal, and also we must not forget that foe to amiability, the corroding, gnawing dyspepsia, to which he was, through life, a martyr, and "which," as Dorothy Fox, with her Quaker goodness says, "*explains much.*" That so severely trying to the best temper, dyspepsia, with its horrors, was of course greatly aggravated by his sedentary life, his night vigils, his day in and day out at the desk, but then the necessity was upon him, it was this work or no other—he could not be an "uncalled preacher," he failed as a teacher and farmer, so the pen was his only resort for an honest living, and the world of letters, that he has so enriched and Dumfriershire, that Burns and he have made "a Mecca to the world of mind," will be grateful that it was so.

Mrs. Carlyle wrote poetry; Carlyle seldom, if ever, but, that the germ was in him, we must believe, as it is in all high nature. Yes, within its rhythmic music, as to Burns, sang not to him in vain, for his life was a poem true, a didactic one for the most part, of rough and rugged numbers oft, but else, smooth and mellifluous, as if set to the music of the harp of Orpheus. Sweet, strong, rough, gentle, persistent, conscientious worker, thou dost rest from thy labors! After life's long fitful fever, mayst thou sleep well!

Of the portraits of Carlyle and his wife, which are given to us, that of Mrs. Carlyle, taken, however, never later than the prime of life, is always beautiful. She was a reputed beauty, as well as a *bel esprit*. That of Carlyle, especially in old age, is so repulsive, as certainly to be a caricature. Misrepresented, as he has been in character, hardly dealt with, as his memory has been, wounded, as it were, "in the house of his friends," his *personnel*, I am confident, has not escaped without insult, being added to injury, or else, how reconcile the low, grim, old man, given to us in engravings of him in his old age, with the lovely, refined, poetic looking young man, that his portrait gives us when he was about the age of twenty-four. But, I have been so often disillusioned by the portraits of authors, especially of late years, of those of Bryant, Longfellow, Tennyson, and others, that I begin to mistrust them all, for giving to my natural eye, what my mind's eye had conceived of them, as I begin to mistrust much of the catch-penny biography of the day, written more to gratify the prurient curiosity that would pry into domestic details, that should never be public property, than to give the man's true mind, and heart, and soul-history. For instance, for sensation, catches at some "trifle light as air" to make market of it and food for scandal, to any who are fond of the nauseous condiment. But with much that has been extenuated, of that greatly gifted couple, Carlyle and his wife, take them all in all, we will scarcely know their like again, so like-gifted, so lifted above the level of their kind, in all that lifts "the living, moving, breathing being" above the level of the inert, dull, dead clod.

Columbia, S. C. M. M.

BIBLICAL STUDY: ITS PRINCIPLES, METHODS AND HISTORY. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Union Theological Seminary, New York City. C. Scribner's Sons. 1883. Price $2.50.

The Scribners deal very largely in religious books; and they have added another very excellent work to their catalogue.

It is superfluous, almost, to say the mechanical work is finely done. The volume contains nearly five hundred pages, and has a copious index, an indispensable appendix to a valuable book. Dr. Briggs, the author, is a learned professor in a leading Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church, and is one of the main

writers for the *Presbyterian Review*, (Northern.) The treatise is dedicated to Drs. Hitchcock and Dorner, two of his tutors; the last is one of the leading theologians of Germany.

One of the most striking features of this volume, every way so admirable, is the ample catalogue of books given, referring to the varied topics discussed by our author. Nothing is much more perplexing to a young student of Theology than how to supply himself with the best books in the various departments of the science. This want is fully met here in the annexed catalogue.

The first chapter is on the "Advantages of Biblical Study," in which, of course, the writer has much to say obvious to all, and much that is potential in leading to such studies. Dr. Briggs devotes fifty pages to Exegetical Theology, the most general term to represent the range of Biblical investigations. Included in this we find Biblical Literature, Biblical Canonics, Textual Criticism, the Higher Criticism, etc., etc.

Passing from the Canon of Scripture wherein the author discourses of the Old and New Testament canons, giving a learned insight to that complicated subject, the author deals largely in the matter contained in what is now called the *higher criticism*.

Dr. Briggs views the Reformation as a great critical revival, and herein he is undoubtedly correct, as it is very manifest that the Reformation proceeded from the revival of letters which preceded the religious awakening under Martin Luther. There were several distinct stages of Biblical criticism beginning with the Reformation period, and extending and varying for a long time subsequent. The higher criticism has culminated in our era as in the writings of Kuenen and others, who are at present agitating the theological world with their free and bold utterances. Very little concern was felt at the opening of the critical day as to the authorship of particular books of Scripture; traditional views were accepted or followed without much inquiry as to facts of history, or the truth of the claims of alleged authors. Resting in the long established belief as to these matters, especially as to the divinity of the Scriptures as commonly received, there was very small attention given to any merely literary and chronological questions concerning the Bible. But Lowth, Herder, and others, started new questions, springing easily out of the revival of learning which

embraced the classics and oriental literature. Here came "the battle of the books," waged between Bentley and Boyle, in which Bentley was the victor. Our author says:

"We have found that the results of textual criticism are in conflict with verbal inspiration, but not with the symbolic doctrine of inspiration. If it should be found that the results of the higher criticism are in conflict with other school doctrines of inspiration, it is important that these school doctrines should be changed as soon as possible to accord with these results. If it should be found that they are in conflict with the Biblical or symbolical doctrines, it would place the critic in an embarrassing situation where he would be forced to reject either the authority of Scripture or his critical results. The critic, as, indeed, every thinker, must confront this dread alternative. It is one of the perils of scholarship."

Our author remains firm in the conviction that while this higher criticism will invalidate and make null much of traditional theology, it is not likely to impair intelligent acceptance of the inspiration of the Bible, and, hence, its divine authority. As to the authorship of particular books of Scripture, this higher criticism has much to say. We do not think a great deal is involved in such questions, certainly the divinity of the word cannot depend on the mere instrument—the man—that reduced it to form, still less on the editing and copying of subsequent dates. It is a common usage, as Dr. Briggs remarks, to represent a book as speaking by the name by which it is known, even if a pseudonym. Persons who insist on opposing higher criticism by traditional views, and the supposed authority of Jesus Christ, do not seem to comprehend the situation. It is this, as our author affirms: "Evangelical critics are forced to choose between scholarly research and truth on the one side, and tradition on the other."

The author has a chapter on the Literary Study of the Bible, which is a fruitful theme. Such a study of Scripture has not engaged the attention it deserves. Here he treats of the Literary Forms of Scripture—History, Oration, Epistles, Fiction.

The Hebrews were quite a poetic people, and their sacred writings show fine specimens and productions considered as mere literature. Chapter X., on Interpretation of Scripture, deserves special reading: no where else is the young preacher more likely to err. He is too apt to make his text teach whatever it may seem to teach, or be made to teach to suit his purpose.

On the whole, we consider Dr. Briggs' book worthy of reading, and, even study, by all theologues. Older minds will find in it profitable instruction in regard to every phase of Biblical study.

MARTIN LUTHER: By Julius Köslin. New York. Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This is a large, handsome volume of about six hundred pages. The four hundredth year since Luther first saw the light has brought forth a fresh discussion of his life and times. It would seem that the world had learned all it was possible to know of this great man; but fresh treatises will revive attention, and attract readers whose knowledge of Luther is quite meager, notwithstanding his preëminence in the history of the church. After the order of German minds the author is very full and minute in facts of biography and history; and everything in regard to this wonderful man is a matter of interest. Of course we have a deal of theological discussion and religious reflection interwoven in the thrilling narrative. There are numerous engravings in the book; pictures of Martin Luther at various periods of his career: these add much to the pleasure of reading the volume. We even have casts of his face as it appeared after death, looking much like a sleeping lion that might be aroused still to roar to the consternation of all the papal tribe.

Advanced as we are in knowledge, and so long freed from papal superstitions, we sometimes wonder that Luther did not go farther as a reformer since he went so far as he did. But we fail to consider the venerated authority of an ancient and powerful religion; and we do not duly estimate the intrinsic difficulty of throwing off the shackles of early religious teaching. The world was in a stagnant state, religiously speaking—learning was not much diffused, and was confined mainly to ecclesiastics, whose interest was in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the church. Impediments like these always exist and are obstructive of the truth, and to a good degree conservative. Many a man in high position has not the courage to follow his convictions; many there are who, though dissatisfied with the existing order of affairs, fear their ability to make them better, and hence submit quietly to the continuance of what they cannot mend.

Luther was one of those courageous souls that act upon Solomon's words: "Buy the truth and sell it not."

Viewed comprehensively, we may say Martin Luther is the most illustrious name in history since the era of the Apostles.

HYMNS OF MARTIN LUTHER.—In addition to the above, we have a beautiful volume entitled "Hymns of Luther," from the press of the Scribner's. Price $2.00.

These venerable songs, as matter of mere curiosity and literature, deserve to be read, nay even sung. Some of them are in the original German, (but translated also,) and are set to music. Thomas Carlyle wrote of Luther and his love of music as follows:

"The great Reformer's love of music and poetry is one of the most significant features of his character. The poem entitled *Ein Feste Burg*, universally regarded as his best, jars upon our ears; yet there is something in it like the sound of Alpine avalanches, or the first murmur of earthquakes."

We close this brief notice of the great Reformer by saying he had his imperfections of temper; and we do well to remember the vast progress made in theological knowledge and in spiritual religion during the four hundred years that have passed since Luther was born. Much of what he taught is now mere theological rubbish fit only to be consumed in the fire of criticism.

GAMES AND SONGS OF AMERICAN CHILDREN: By Wells Newell. New York: Harpers. 1883.

The Harpers have issued a very attractive book, and possessing merit in its line of no ordinary measure. There are songs and games appropriate to the age of childhood, which are serviceable as affording innocent sport and exercise of body and mind. Many of these songs and games will furnish entertainment, too, to parents whose happiness is much dependent on the happiness of their children. Mr. Newell has collected a large number from various sources, and spreads them before our children in a lovely volume of nearly two hundred and fifty pages. Some of the songs are set to appropriate music, thus giving mothers and older sisters some employment at the piano, or melodeon; and by so doing heightening the pleasure of all concerned. This Editor was never

much of a child, but he now thinks life might have been happier *to him* had there been more childish diversion in his earlier life; besides he might have added somewhat to the pleasure of his own children by having more knowledge of this kind.

THE KINGDOM OF ISRAEL: By. J. P. Philpott, Mexia, Texas. Southern Methodist Publishing House, Nashville, Tenn. 1883.

Mr. Philpott's book is very well made by Dr. McFerrin; contains over five hundred pages wider than usual. This volume has had fair success, as the author announces the second edition, though only a small edition was at first issued. This is an enlargement of the work, and a great expansion of the writer's views. He treats of the Kingdom of Israel from its inception under Joshua to the second advent of Christ. Hence there is much mingling of historic and prophetic teaching. Much of the discussion is of a political cast, which is made to bear on the character and destiny of this country—United States. While the author admits that he is an unpracticed writer, yet evidently he has studied his subject with much care before venturing before the public. We do not undertake to discuss his themes, not having given sufficient attention to the topics treated, but we invite our readers to a book elaborate in its treatment of very great and momentous questions.

TWELVE AMERICANS: By Howard Carroll. New York. Harper & Brothers. 1883.

A book about "Twelve Americans" is calculated to excite inquiry at once: What *twelve*, and why twelve? It is fairly to be presumed these are preëminent names—a sort of constellation arrayed for our view. The list is the following, and in the order of the author: Horatio Seymour, Charles Francis Adams, Peter Cooper, Hannibal Hamlin, John Gilbert, Robert C. Schenck, Frederick Douglass, William Allen, Allen G. Thurman, Joseph Jefferson, Elihu B. Washburne, Alexander H. Stephens. Corresponding to these names, are twelve wood-cut engravings intended to impart some idea of the personal appearance of each magnate described more elaborately by the pen portraiture. Well, it is quite a jumble, considered in every point of view. Of the statesmen it may be said the first and last named—Seymour and

Stephens—have just claims to fame; and so it may be said of Thurman; the others of this kind are only successful politicians. Indeed, we ought to except from this distinction, low as it is, Mr. Adams. Judge Thurman is a very able lawyer, and a man every way admirable for his traits of character. 'Twas a high compliment paid him in the Senate by Roscoe Conkling, who, by his manner in a certain debate, his bearing towards Senator Thurman, excited inquiry of Thurman why such direct attention to him? Conkling proud to the last degree, yet, on this occasion, condescending, replied: "When I discuss questions of law in this body, I instinctively turn to this Senator as the needle points to the pole." Mr. Thurman's political career is about closed. Defeated by his opponents first, he has just been laid aside by his own party when it had a fine opportunity to exalt him to the Senate. His career has been honorable, and, in a fair measure, brilliant.

William Allen was an uncle of Mr. Thurman, and took, of course, great interest in his sister's honored son. Mr. Allen figured prominently in politics forty years ago, especially during the Polk administration. He belonged to that little squad in Congress whose ultraism on the Oregon dispute made them, for the day, very famous. Mr. Polk had said: "Our right to the *whole* of Oregon is clear and unquestionable;" and so thought and said Mr. Allen. When this high claim was denied, and a settlement of the embroglio was proposed on the forty-ninth parallel North latitude, then Allen roared and said 54° 40′ or fight was his motto. No matter, the lower line was adopted after much debate. He was a bold, vigorous man, stern and inflexible in his adherence to principle. After a long silence in political obscurity he emerged again into public life, and his stentorian voice was heard like the roar of thunder all over Ohio. He had been so long quiet, most people thought he was dead; and he was usually called "Old Bill Allen." The truth was, that he began political life so early that when he made his second advent he was only about sixty-five years old.

Horatio Seymour is called by the author "The Farmer Statesman." He is a very brilliant speaker and writer, and has a record of which all his friends may be justly proud. Now quite old, his day is about closing—the sun is setting without a cloud. We do

not call to mind any Northern statesman, except Franklin Pierce, so true to all constitutional law.

In early life, Mr. Seymour was of a very delicate frame; that fact directed the course of his education. To give physical expansion and endurance, he was sent to a military school which yielded the desired result.

We care not to make special allusion to the actors, Gilbert and Jefferson. The last named has won fame, probably fortune, by playing Rip Van Winkle.

Gen. Schenck deserves no eminence, and he has achieved none that brings honor to himself or his country. His career as a soldier was not brilliant: his diplomatic service not creditable, indeed, scarcely honorable.

Hannibal Hamlin is portrayed at large in this book. That Mr. Hamlin is a man of ability, cannot be well questioned in view of his long extended political career. Young men of parts will not tolerate an indefinite occupying of high places if they can forbid; indeed, an ordinary man, whatever his merits otherwise, must soon subside willingly or unwillingly.

Mr. E. B. Washburne is generally known as Gen. Grant's man—his first, fast, and last advocate. The Washburnes all seem destined to Congress. Mr. Elihu is, perhaps, the most distinguished of that numerous tribe.

Frederick Douglass, the fugitive slave, is made very conspicuous in this narrative. That he is a sort of prodigy among his race, may be conceded, though it is easy to see how Douglass arose to his present distinction. He was aided, in every possible way, by the public sentiment of his section. He is great among Africans because he is an African, and, hence, great, comparatively. His early life, his escape from slavery, are told with fine effect, but with intemperate execration of slavery.

Alexander H. Stephens is portrayed at length by the writer, and with fairness and justice. We care not to dwell on the character and career of this unique man, so recently carried to the grave. His physical weakness excited every man's pity, and, in view of his labors and success, wonder. Mr. Stephens was distinguished as an advocate, and was even more famous as a popular orator.

His shrill, feminine voice, turned loose on a vast assembly, was like an electric stream that made every nerve to quiver.

Honesty and courage were striking features of his nature. He was never defeated before the people, though, at some periods, he seemed to defy public opinion.

Mr. Carroll has made up a very racy volume by bringing into prominence much of the lives, the speeches and doings of these notable men. He is too much of a partisan to be a candid critic: we distrust his judgment, and would reject much of his work if we did not know enough of these men to say, in the main, they are fairly presented in these sketches.

1. THE LIVING CHRIST: By W. P. Harrison, D. D.

2. GLIMPSES OF TRUTH: By O. P. Fitzgerald, D. D.

3. THE CORAL BRACELET: By Mrs. Florence E. Howell, Dallas, Texas. Nashville, Tenn.: J. B. McFerrin, Agent. 1883.

The above small volumes have recently been issued by our Publishing House in good style as to binding and typography. Some years ago a good deal of complaint was made about the *binding* done at Nashville, but of late there is no room for objections, indeed there is much ground for positive praise.

Dr. Harrison not only discharges well his duties as Book Editor, but finds time to give the public some of the treasures of his well stored mind. We believe this is the third volume he has issued, as an author, since his connection with the Publishing House. The present book contains about 300 pages, and is priced at $1.00.

Jesus, the Christ, is the theme—certainly the grandest on which man ever wrote, thought or spoke. Christ is presented in a great variety of views: I. As the Christ of Promise. II. The Christ of the Hebrews. III. The Christ of History. IV. The Christ of Theology. V. The Christ of the Church. VI. The Christ of the Gospel. VII. The Christ of Gethsemane. VIII. The Christ of Calvary. IX. The Physical Cause of the Death of Christ.

All these chapters are written under the general head, "The Christ of Yesterday."

Section two of the book treats of the "Christ of To-day." In this division are sixteen chapters, giving ample scope for the author

to exhibit Christian truth in its doctrinal, preceptive and experimental aspects.

Dr. Fitzgerald's book is made up of editorial matter in the *Christian Advocate* of the last five years. It is chiefly a collection of the sententious paragraphs which characterize him as an editor, and which make a very marked feature of his paper. These pithy writings are of a dogmatic and preceptive cast, inculcating in a very condensed form the principles and practices of Christianity. The paragraphs may be read like a chapter in Proverbs, one or more at a time, as there is no connection between them. The *Advocate*, at Nashville, has had marked prosperity since Dr. Fitzgerald took the helm. Hence, it is fair to infer that this great advance is largely due to the skill and ability of the editor. Both author and publisher must have had strong evidences of the probable success of this peculiar book, for otherwise it must be deemed a singular venture in literature.

Mrs. Howell's little book, 215 pages, is endorsed by Dr. Cunnyngham, Sunday-school editor; and we do not fear to follow where he leads. The volume is religious in its cast, well adapted to readers in Sunday-schools somewhat advanced, and it would furnish entertainment to older minds as well. We have before called attention to the fact that Texas is showing quite a literary growth. This is exhibited in the production of books, and in a fondness for the highest class of periodical literature. This State has always given a good patronage to our REVIEW; the same was done for Dr. Bledsoe. Texas, already great, is destined to higher distinction in everything that ennobles and refines humanity. Georgia is called the "Empire State of the South:" assuming the title as well bestowed, it is not impossible that the sceptre may depart and be wielded by the Western Queen—Texas.

LIFE OF JAMES BUCHANAN: By G. T. Curtis. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1883.

Mr. Curtis has produced two large volumes, which the Harpers have done up in good style, in giving us the Life of President Buchanan. This very extended biography has been possible, even easy, by a free use of Mr. Buchanan's speeches, letters and public documents relating to affairs running through this statesman's long

career. Very few men will have the patience to read through these volumes—the age is two busy; time too short for such employment. But statesmen and politicians will find it an admirable work of reference to which they can easily resort for facts and arguments in political campaigns. Mr. Buchanan was nearly always in public life, and was somewhat conspicuous even in the days when there were giants in the land. Though fond of office, and an aspirant for the highest places, it does not appear that this passion ever led him into dishonorable conduct toward a rival. Indeed there are evidences of much self-abnegation in his course; he preferred to bide his time rather than to push himself into prominence. There are some very touching, delicate matters in his early life bearing on the question of his celibacy, which the author gives in such way as to excite a desire for more knowledge of this kind. It is passing strange to find a man of Mr. Buchanan's make indifferent to matrimony. He was not morose, nor was he a recluse, wedded only to books and consumed in his tender affections by the fires of his ambition. It appears from this history that he did once love, and so intensely, that he could never love again. Engaged to be married to a charming young woman, for a reason unexplained, save that objection was from the father in a very decided way, the matrimonial alliance came to a sad end. Soon after this breaking of the engagement the young lady suddenly died. Mr. Buchanan was greatly distressed, and prompted by his tender sympathy, he wrote to her father a letter of condolence. It was returned unopened, and was found among Mr. Buchanan's papers after his death.

He henceforth tried not to love nor marry, contenting himself with lavishing his affection on his female relatives, especially Miss Harriet Lane, his niece. This lady did the honors of the Executive Mansion when her uncle was President.

Mr. Buchanan appears to us a very flexible politician, not always consistent in his course. This, however, is not a peculiar case; it is the common history of most of our public men. Beginning in politics before the Federal party was wholly dead, he had some affinities for this rapidly dying system of government which was brought into being by the splendid genius of Alexander Hamilton, and sustained by him as a powerful organization until Aaron

Burr's bullet ended his brilliant career. For the most part, Mr. Buchanan ranked as a Democrat, and though not overly rigid in his tenets, he was decidedly so as a party man. He was honored in the diplomatic service at the capitals of Russia and Great Britain. His attainments and his tact eminently fitted him for such position. His personal appearance and dignity made him a noticeable character at any Court, even minus the trappings of royalty, which he cordially despised. When James K. Polk was elected President he felt indebted largely to Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan's State) for his triumph over the great Henry Clay. Polk had adroitly, in the Kane letter, so expressed himself on the tariff question as to effectually rob Mr. Clay of that important State.

We call to mind a speech made by the late Hon. Charles J. Jenkins, of Georgia, who detested all duplicity with all the strength of a noble nature, in which he severely castigated Mr. Polk for taking Mr. Clay's thunder. Then a boy, it was the first time we ever heard the word "plagiarize"—it was made to do duty on said occasion. Democrat then, as now, we did not enjoy the speech, but we did enjoy hugely Polk's triumph, which came soon after this discussion. Mr. Buchanan was almost, as a matter of course, invited into the Cabinet, and as a matter of course, he accepted. The main events of Polk's administration were the settling of the Oregon dispute—the boundary—the adjustment of the tariff in accord with Democratic doctrine, and the Mexican war, its incidents and consequences. Tyler and Calhoun had just finished, before Polk's accession, the annexation of Texas, though the new President was elected chiefly on that platform. The acquisition of California and New Mexico by the treaty of Gaudalupe Hidalgo introduced into American politics a strife which culminated in secession, and which, in some form, is even yet continued.

It took a skilful man in such days to so manage as to keep in popular favor and keep to the front in politics. Mr. Buchanan was equal to the emergency, defeating Fremont for the Presidency, the first candidate of the new party (Abolition) brought into vigorous life by W. H. Seward—the "higher law" apostle.

But the reign of Buchanan was stormy—all his strategy could not avert the coming catastrophe. That he was a thorough Union

man cannot be questioned—all his measures looked to its preservation in a constitutional and peaceful way. He did not believe in what was called, South, the right of secession, though he did believe with the South that the Union could not be maintained if abolition passion ruled the day. Everything he wrote or spoke in regard to these fearful times, shows him to have been both a patriot and a statesman. In his last message, just before secession, he declared that a State had no constitutional right to secede, but if the deed was done, the Federal Government had no constitutional right of coercion. And, paradoxical as this seemed, he was clearly right in both propositions. The case had not been provided for by the framers of the government; indeed, after attempting to pre-arrange for such a contingency, the dispute, by common consent, was adjourned to the generation of grand-children. We do not care to re-open this vexed question—it is settled by the *ultima ratio regum*—the last argument of kings. Let it remain settled. If discussed at all, let it be for the purpose of allaying asperities which largely result from not understanding the whole of this complicated problem. Mr. Curtis' book is well written and deserves attention on account of its literary merit, in addition to the interest which belongs to the name of James Buchanan.

MOSAICS OF BIBLE HISTORY: By Marcius and Robert P. Willson. Two volumes. New York. Harper & Brothers. 1883.

These volumes furnish about nine hundred pages of reading, which cost $3.00. The publishers have executed their work well—the books are in neat, not flashy binding.

Beginning with Genesis, which is the Greek name for the first book of the Hebrew Scriptures, these authors follow the line of Scripture history in its long extent and many ramifications. They hold that although there were writings anterior to Moses and the Exodus, yet the Pentateuch is the most ancient history reduced to record. The authorship of the Pentateuch is ascribed to Moses, not without much denial and dispute among Biblical critics as to dates, etc., involved in this question. Concerning the creation of light, it is held by these writers that light is not an entity, not a substance, but an effect: Light, they say, exists as a force, not as a material agent. Hence, the *creation* of light is denied; but whether

the subtle fluid (a mere hypothesis) supposed to produce it was eternal, they do not say, nor the contrary. The corpuscular theory of light has been generally abandoned, though it has the endorsement of Sir Isaac Newton. But the prismatic decomposition of light into several distinct colors would seem to teach that it is a substance; for how can a force be analyzed and divided into colors? We get no "light" on this subject, much as it is needed. Our authors dwell on the order of creation, drawing on the Bible, on Science, and largely on John Milton. Next, they present and discuss geological views of creation to which they subscribe. We have quite a mixture of Scripture, science and poetry in the wide survey which is made. In fine, the reader will find in these volumes, a discussion of nearly every matter found in Moses and the Prophets.

Volume II. is devoted to New Testament history—Christ and the Apostles. It is not easy to characterize a book like this—it is a sort of kaleidoscope; every turn you make shows new pictures and combinations. There is this advantage in reading such books: you are not obliged to fatigue yourself by pursuing a continuous theme. We can rest or refresh our minds by selecting such matter for the time as may furnish the most entertainment or information most needed. Messrs. Willson have shown very much research in preparing these Mosaics of Bible History.

KADESH-BARNEA: By Henry Clay Trumbull. New York. Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Mr. Trumbull is well known as the Editor of the "Sunday-School Times," the first paper in merit of its class in America. He is a man of immense research, a very grave-digger among antiquarians. This book is portly as to bulk, containing nearly five hundred pages; and it is printed in a very attractive style. As to binding it is a thing of beauty. Our readers must not conclude because the author is a noted Sunday-school writer, that this volume is intended for a Sunday-school library. Teachers in Sunday-schools, if possessed of the requisite faculty of curiosity and appreciation, will find the book full of much instruction of its kind.

Kadesh-Barnea is the name of a place famous in the Bible and

often mentioned in sacred history. It was noted as the chief camping-ground of the Israelites during their long journey to Canaan. Mr. Trumbull thinks the commonly received view of perpetual wandering in endless confusion for forty years is absurd and untrue. His opinion is that thirty-seven years of this time were spent at Kadesh-Barnea, and near there; and he believes the Israelties were engaged as other people in providing for their physical necessities. After Sinai, no place in the Exodus of Israel is so famous as Kadesh-Barnea. But where was this place? Great obscurity rests on the question. Mr. Trumbull undertakes to settle this matter, and hence writes a very elaborate book for that purpose, though not for that object alone. The author thinks he has made original discoveries, of which we have full account in this work. But as the merely fixing a locality, abstractly viewed, can be of no great moment, Mr. Trumbull discusses with great minuteness every event and incident related to the place and bearing on the history of the Jewish race. In a large measure, this is a book of travels; and the travels of a man full of curiosity thoroughly awake in observation; and he is so well read in the literature of the subject that he cannot fail to entertain and instruct. We suppose the book would be peculiarly interesting to Hebrews, and not much less so to Christians.

The Scribners have made a job highly creditable to them as publishers. Their catalogue of religious books is very large, and is constantly augmented by fresh additions.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH: By Philip Schaff. New York. Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This is the second volume of Dr. Schaff's Great Church History, which traverses the period from A. D., 100, to A. D., 325. The volume contains over eight hundred pages, including a very full index.

Dr. Schaff is known as an erudite theologian of Union Theological Seminary, New York. He is a voluminous writer; indeed, his literary labors are simply wonderful, if not marvelous. He is noted as the head of the American Committee who were engaged in the revision of the New Testament that was issued in 1881. A man qualified by extensive learning and research to write church

history, he has succeeded in giving to the world a book replete with knowledge and literary excellence. Like all Germans, he is very minute and elaborate in his investigations and discussions: his authorities are given with such copious notes, that when he has delivered himself on a matter we may rest in the conviction that but little more could be said, and nothing to advance our knowledge of the subjects discussed. Dr. Schaff gives a vivid picture of the rapid progress made by Christianity in the first three centuries. During this period the religion that went insulted and forlorn from Calvary to the tomb of Joseph soon arose and spread its banners over the citadel of the Cæsars. When it was weak, then it was strong. When, by its victories over idolatry and Pagan philosophy, Christianity became great in its followers and dignities, then was it enfeebled as to its propagating power, and soon was unable to withstand the aggressions of Mohammed. The feuds and heresies that originated after its first great achievements destroyed its efficiency as an agency for good, really placed Christianity in the category of comparative religions; it was neither much better nor much worse than philosophy or superstition. If Christianity had maintained its early simplicity and fervid spirit, the world would have been converted to God by the Sixth century, for as early as the Third, the disciples of Jesus numbered at least ten millions. Dr. Schaff's History far surpasses in interest Neander's great History of the Christian Church. The style of Neander—a translation from German—is repulsive, while Dr. Schaff, though a German, is master of the finest English. We most cordially commend this work to all ministers and laymen who are seeking knowledge of early Christianity.

QUEEN VICTORIA: HER GIRLHOOD AND WOMANHOOD: By Grace Greenwood. New York. Anderson & Allen, 66 and 68 Reade Street. 1883.

"Grace Greenwood," as a writer, has been before the public for more than a generation. This is a new and rather bold venture, which she seems to feel, and acknowledges in a semi-apologetic way. Queen Victoria is portrayed in a lovely volume of near four hundred pages; it is superbly bound. Among exemplary women she deserves a high place, and considered as a Queen, she

deserves preëminence. Victoria's reign has been long, happy and prosperous. Born in 1819, she is now nearly sixty-five years of age; she has reigned since 1837. Everything the authoress could gather from books or glean otherwise she has utilized; but being an American, and having no friend at Court to aid her in collecting facts, anecdotes, etc., she has not written as fully of the girlhood of Victoria as she desired. Enough, however, is given to make a highly entertaining narrative, and to show that Victoria was fortunate in her parentage and surroundings, every way well trained and educated. She did not much like Latin, but woman-like was fond of the fine arts, and became proficient in music, especially in singing. The royal girl, we are told, was a good rider, a good dancer, and an excellent hand at archery. Well, she was very much like other young ladies, though superior to most in her exalted position. Her cousin Albert paid her a visit at the proper time, and with him she was so charmed that he had no trouble in becoming the husband of the noble woman. We are told there is an etiquette which does not allow a matrimonial proposition to a Queen of England, and she was now enthroned. No matter about this—Albert's love was very evident, and Victoria's so entirely reciprocal and full, that she proposed herself. On being asked by Victoria what he thought of England, the reply was of course favorable, notwithstanding Albert was a German. Here was the critical point. Victoria said, "Would you like a residence in England?" That was enough—loving looks told more than words. Presenting him with a bouquet of talking flowers, the manly Prince opened with his knife a slit in his coat, and placed them on his breast as a pledge of love as pure as ever existed since Eden bloomed. We do not find this incident in the book, but we have read it elsewhere.

Of course much is said in this volume of their married life, domestic felicity, and of their numerous children.

Several engravings of the Queen at different ages adorn the book, and add much pleasure to its reading. There is also a likeness of Albert, which shows him to have been a man of surpassing handsomeness. His face is about as attractive as Bishop Bascom's, as seen in steel engravings, when in his prime. Being a man of splendid moral qualities in addition, it is no wonder Victoria loved

him. Victoria, as a girl and young lady, no doubt was passably fair to look upon; but as she now appears, fat and chubby, her personal charms are very small. Her mother was a beautiful woman, (Duchess of Kent.) Victoria must have inherited the features of the Georges who were not much to be admired in any point of view. The authoress treats largely of the Queen as wife and mother, presenting her in a very commanding aspect in these womanly relations. Grief-stricken beyond consoling in the death of her adored Albert in the prime of life, the Queen still possesses physical vigor and vitality that give promise of a reign as long as her grandfather's, George III. Fears have at times existed of that mental malady which fell on some of her ancestors. Victoria will not be as famous in history as the Virgin Queen, Elizabeth, but her position will be high in the records of England.

CLASSIC MYTHOLOGY: A TRANSLATION OF PROF. C. WITT'S GRIECHISCHE GŒTTER UND HELDENGESCHICHTEN: By Frances Younghusband. 8vo. pp. 268. New York. Henry Holt & Company. 1883.

GREEK MYTHOLOGY SYSTEMATIZED! By S. A. Scull. 8vo. pp. 397. Philadelphia. Porter & Coates. 1883.

We place these two books together, because, being on the same general subject, they can be best noticed in this way. The first is by a German and a man; the second by an American and a lady. The Germans have the reputation of doing everything more learnedly than other people, but in a way which frequently lacks interest. An examination of these books will show that, in this instance, precisely the opposite rule prevails. The German's book makes no great pretense to learning, but is full of interest; while the American's book, excellent in the first respect, is as dry as a treatise on Mineralogy—to us the driest of all dry books.

The translator of Witt's work would have done well to give the original title rather than the one assumed, which is misleading; the book being, in fact, not a complete treatise on classic Mythology, only thirty or more legends concerning the Greek gods and heroes. Among these we have accounts of Phæthon, Bellerophon, the labors of Hercules, the Argonautic Expedition, and all of the

prominent stories of Greek Mythology, all told in simple language so as to prove interesting even to young children. We agree with Mr. Arthur Sidgwick, the writer of the preface, when he says: "From the teacher's point of view, as well as the child's, there seems to be every reason in favor of presenting to them at an early age the stories of Greek Mythology. There is first the obvious fact that such reading trains and cultivates the imaginative faculties, and that it is good to vary the 'Arabian Night' and the German and Norse fairy-tales with such totally different material as the Greek stories." * * * "All children will get pleasure from these stories, and that is much. Many children will, perhaps, get the elements of culture, and that is more. And some may get at once pleasure, culture, and a little real preparation for severer studies." It is true, that as elements of a system of religion, all these mythical beings have passed away, but they never will drop out of literature.

No one can understandingly read poetry, even modern poetry, without having some acquaintance with Greek Mythology. We will repeat here the beautiful lines of Coleridge:

"The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
The fair humanities of old religion,
The power, the beauty, and the majesty,
That had their haunts in dale, or piny mountain,
Or forest by slow stream, or pebbly spring,
Or chasms and wat'ery depths; all these have vanished;
They live no longer in the faith of reason!
But still the heart doth need a new language, still
Doth the old instinct bring back the old names,
And to yon starry world they now are gone,
Spirits or gods, that used to share this earth
With man as with their friend; and to the lover
Yonder they move from yonder visible sky
Shoot influence down: and even at this day
'Tis Jupiter brings whate'er is great,
And Venus who brings everything that's fair."

We would rank Witt's book along with Kingsley's, "The Heroes, or Greek Fairy Tales for my Children," and with Cox's "Mythological Tales." For the student, a more comprehensive work is needed. We have this in Miss Scull's "Greek Mythology Systematized." It would be difficult to find any name omitted

which ought to go into a treatise like this. The book is well named. It is systematic, as systematic as the tables in a manual of botany, and about as dry reading. All life is systematized out of the book. No child after reading one page would be tempted to read a second. As a clear, comprehensive, orderly, *reference* book, it is a decided success; considered in any other respect it is a failure. J. C. H.

Middle Georgia Military College.

THE CONFLICT OF CENTURIES: By C. W. Miller, D. D. Nashville, Tennessee. J. B. McFerrin, Agent. 1883.

THE CONFLICT OF AGES: By Edward Beecher, D. D. Boston. Philips, Sampson & Company.

DISCUSSIONS IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY: By Prof. GEORGE P. Fisher, D. D., of Yale College. New York. Scribner's Sons. 1880.

We have grouped these books together because they discuss much that is common to them all, though varying greatly in scope and methods. Dr. Miller's book is new, one of the latest issues from the Nashville Publishing House. It is not large, containing only three hundred and eight pages—priced at $1.00. The author is well known in the ranks of Southern Methodism as a reputable preacher, a writer of books, and a contributor to periodical literature. He is at home in polemical theology; indeed, as a controversialist he has made a high mark. Dr. Miller enters into the "Conflict of Centuries" to aid in settling what seems to be an endless dispute. President Polk originated the phrase "conquering a peace" at the period of the Mexican war. Polk succeeded despite all armies and guerillas; whether Dr. Miller is to end a long strife we must wait to see. What is the "Conflict of Centuries?" Let the author answer in his brief preface: "In all ages and lands, men have been confronted by the appalling fact of sin. As a great disturbing force, it has been seen and felt by every tribe and race. Naturally enough, the question has everywhere been raised, What is it? Whence is it? What is its nature? What escape, if any, from it? These questions have been asked by the savage as well as by the civilized, and the answers rendered have

been legion in number and almost infinite in contrariety. Around these questions the hottest battles of this life have been fought—battles which have projected themselves across all the centuries. And still the conflict goes on. It was thought, therefore, that the title 'Conflict of Centuries' was not an inappropriate one for a book, the sole object of which is to place in a true Biblical light the great questions of *Sin* and *Regeneration*."

Dr. Harrison, the Book Editor, has heralded this book with a pleasant introduction. The volume is a treatise on "Sin and Regeneration." Dr. Miller discusses the theories of sin which have had most vogue in the Church, giving special attention to Augustinian views which have ruled with such potent sway since the day of that very eminent father. The doctrine of hereditary depravity—called original sin—had been broached by Tertullian: and growing in favor with theologians it finally reached such a form of statement as to produce a revolt under the lead of Pelagius, who went to the extreme of denying the dogma entirely. Augustine was the most noted champion of what was supposed to be the teaching of the Pauline Epistles—the corruption and guilt of mankind by reason of Adamic transgression. This early "conflict' has continued to the present day, not at all diminished in its intensity. There are evidences—this book is one—of increasing hostility to this ancient dogma of original sin—opposition to it is more pronounced, and with less hesitation. Henry Ward Beecher has said in his pulpit, and in his published writings that orthodox Christianity, considered as a system, could not live a day with a denial of the doctrine of hereditary depravity, or original sin. And he denounces the dogma with fiery impetuosity; hence he no longer professes to be an orthodox Christian.

The philosopher, poet and theologian (though a layman) S. T. Coleridge, has distinctly said, ORIGINAL SIN and REDEMPTION are reciprocals, implying each other in biblical teaching and logical thinking. And such has been the tenor and trend of thought among all Calvinistic and Arminian divines. Seeing that the moral state of mankind is not in accord with moral law, that native corruption is a fixed and universal condition, very few have been bold enough to deny that this constitution of man is the result of Adam's sin; indeed, such is the plain assumption and

assertion of Scripture: the *facts* are hardly matter of contest. The 7th Doctrine of Methodism is an open avowal of hereditary depravity; and it is termed "Original or Birth Sin." This dogma is in terms a protest against Pelagianism without any theory as to *how* the corruption stands related to Adam, except as our natural progenitor. Wesley and his contemporaries, though fiercely engaged in debate with Calvinistic theologians, held as sternly as they, the universal and total depravity of mankind. And they called this condition sin, birth sin, original sin. If we had not Wesley's Sermons, Watson's Institutes, Fletcher's Appeal, the Hymns of Charles Wesley would furnish irresistible proof of how strongly this tenet was intrenched in their thinking and sentiment. Sin was considered as presenting two forms or phases, a moral state, and moral action. They, especially Fletcher, account for man's evil conduct by considering it as an effect proceeding from a sinful nature as a cause. We do not call to mind any thing more explicit than Wesley's statement, that by reason of Adam's sin all have incurred every penalty of the law of God. Calvinists have attributed this posture of affairs to a legal ordination in creation whereby Adam was made to stand for his whole posterity—thus, when he became guilty, his descendants were equally deemed guilty in law. Inasmuch as this wholesale cursing of endless millions would seem as unjust as the slaughtering a whole army for the treachery of a chief, men of philosophic minds, without denying the facts, sought a vindication of God in a metaphysical unity of the race of Adam. When he sinned they were really present and consenting; hence, the guilt is not by imputation and a legal fiction but is real—all men are sinful and sinners by an original transgression in which they simultaneously engaged. Inconceivable as this process is, yet to avoid the charge of injustice against God, in holding man responsible for a corruption he did not produce, and guilty for conduct that was simply in the order of effect from a cause of Divine origination, this subtle hypothesis has had many advocates from Augustine down to our own era.

Dr. Miller's book deals with these abstruse matters. He does not deny inherited depravity, but he does deny that this state is properly called sin. Sin, he says, is an act, not an entity—a conduct, not a state. The book is very full of quotations touching

these questions, exhibiting much research. Our writers (Methodistic) are not always consistent with themselves or each other, as could be easily shown, when discussing these dogmas. The Calvinistic theologians, it always seemed to us, give a more coherent system, allowing them the truth of their premises. But premises involving such monstrous conclusions must be false, however plausible the support found in a few dogmatic utterances of Scripture.

It is a strong feature, a crowning excellence of the Arminian Creed, to make man's remedy equal to his malady. Theologians of this school do not so much inquire *how* man came to his present miserable estate, but finding him there, they make haste to offer an infallible remedy—a panacea for all earth's woes. "Where sin abounded grace hath much more abounded." Our author treats of Regeneration—its nature and necessity, discussing acutely and learnedly this great dogma. He shows no quarter to the oldest heresy of the Church—baptismal regeneration—and he holds no diluted views on this subject. Regeneration is the product of the spirit, a radical change of man's fallen, alien nature. We expect Dr. M's volume will create some stir in the various schools of theology for he is not fully in accord with any of them. As to Dr. Beecher's book we shall have but little to say. The author is the eldest son of Dr. Lyman Beecher, the father of a tribe of Levites, the chief among them being Henry Ward Beecher, of Plymouth Church. Dr. Beecher became so overwhelmed with the difficulties in current theology, concerning original sin and partial redemption, he entirely revolted from the standards. Agreeing with the most pronounced statements as to the actual moral depravity in the world, yet denying that such a condition could proceed from a just and honorable God by creation, or decree, he seeks an explanation by holding to the *pre-existence* of man. In some former state each person appearing on earth had existence, and each one sinned on his pure spontaneity. Adam is only the *physical* progenitor of his kind; he came into the world a sinner himself as all others do—his act corrupted no one, each human being having corrupted himself in some anterior state. Dr. B. holds that it is impious, if not blasphemous, to impute such moral character to God as must be implied in the whole theory of imputation. The strong point of his book is the fearful array of

authorities whereby he shows in all ages good and great men have wrestled with this tremendous problem of sin, confessing their inability to meet and solve objections. There is almost no attempt to sustain his "Pre-existence" theory by Scripture, though there is some philosophical and logical argument. He argues *ex necessitate rei* to his conclusion as the only conceivable solution of difficulties. And he holds that there is but one single passage of Scripture in favor of the accepted doctrine of hereditary depravity and imputed guilt; this is Paul's famous verse, Rom. v.: 12: "As in Adam all die;" this he contends Augustine wrongly translated, and the dogma having thus been established, the faulty rendering has been maintained. Therefore, as the *Scriptures* do not teach the doctrine in question, their silence leaves us at perfect liberty to devise any scheme of thought which will "justify God's ways to man."

It is a curious thing we have found in our reading that Aristotle, the greatest of philosophers, holding to the doctrine of transmigration of souls, says of himself, that he was at the seige of Troy several hundred years before he was born.

We dismiss this treatise with one remark: it only furnishes another proof of the deep thought and trouble which exist in regard to the origin and fact of sin.

Dr. Fisher's "Discussions" are by far the most learned and elaborate we have seen concerning "Original Sin." He presents and explains critically several theories which have obtained among theologians. We wonder at the nice distinctions and acute reflections that have attended this investigation. Dr. Fisher's object is not to establish any theory of his own, but to develop what minds of compass and penetration have to say on the "Conflict of Ages."

It will scarcely pay one to read such discussions; but it might serve to moderate the excessive confidence sometimes exhibited by young men in treating of these profound mysteries.

NOTE.—The kindness of Publishers is hereby gratefully acknowledged for their many favors. All books intended for the REVIEW should be directed to the Editor, postage paid, at an early day in advance of the date of issue. Notices of books not signed are all written by the Editor.

J. W. HINTON, Macon, Ga.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE: OUR QUARTERLY REVIEW.

The *Methodist Quarterly Review*, (Dr. Whedon Editor,) for January, 1884, came to our table a little in advance of our own issue; and by reason of this fact, we are able to notice the January number at this time. The venerable editor opens the number with a contribution from his own pen on "Prayer and Science;" it is written with his characteristic ability; no doubt it will be extensively read as it discusses one of the problems in theology deemed most intricate; and earnest Christians, as well as devotees of science, alike feel deep interest in the discussion. Then Dr. Warren, President of Boston University, (Methodist,) follows with a vigorous protest against the prevalent teaching that the earliest religions were polytheistic; and that monotheism is a result reached after a long groping in the dark. Dr. Warren believes, on the contrary, and seeks to sustain that view, that polytheism is a degeneracy resulting from a deterioration of character by a failure to accept the teachings of monotheism, the original religion of mankind. A very agreeable, well written article on Mrs. Jane Welsh Carlyle by a young friend of ours, M. Callaway Jr., is contained in this issue. A pen that could produce such an essay as this should not be allowed to rust from idleness. Passing over several other contributions of merit, we are specially attracted by Bishop Hurst's article on "Periodical Literature." Bishop H. is a man of extensive learning, a distinguished author, and a laborious worker in literary mines. He says:

"In no department of our modern literature do we find a larger or more vigorous and healthy growth than in that of the periodical. To measure its full magnitude we must recognize the fundamental difference between the serial and the finished volume. In a work which re-appears at regular intervals, the purpose is to speak again, and still again with a view to the new demands that come with each oscillation of the pendulum. But with the formal book the purpose is very different. The writer proposes to begin, continue, and have done with his undertaking, and then let it go out on its mission to the world. He may improve his work, and prepare new additions, but it always contains an element

of finality as a store-house of his thoughts. The periodical takes note of the passing currents, and expects immediate results from its work. It is the lance which the Knight proposes to use in rapid gallop, not the heavy arms which must stand him instead in an all day encounter."

Periodical literature, from a very humble beginning in the United States before the revolution of 1776, has grown in magnitude almost beyond conception. There are one thousand daily papers issued, having a circulation of millions of copies. Of monthlies, there are about the same number, with a total circulation of hundreds of thousands of copies. There are fifty-nine quarterlies representing science, literature, theology and philosophy. Bishop Hurst dwells on the utility and force of the periodical press as offering to the public the means of information on many topics, important, too, on which nothing can be found in formal books. He tells of what service they have been and are in the training of authors for productions of larger build and of more permanent duration. He says: "There is hardly any American poet, and many of the Victorian poets belong to the same category, who has not gained immensely from the advantages offered by these periodicals." Macaulay, himself, developed into the grand literary luminary that he became by a free use of the pages of the *Edinburg Review*.

The good Bishop tells of the early demise of many periodicals with a sort of funeral tone in his words; but draws consolation, as preachers are wont to do, from the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. These failures have been succeeded by periodicals that have prospered by reason of the very sad experience furnished by their predecessors—mistakes have been avoided that were fatal. "There is not a periodical now existing in Europe or America that is not built up on the graves of the dead."

Dr. Whedon's Review, now so firmly established, proceeded from the old Methodist Magazine that endured for ten years and died—from 1818—1828. Bishop Hurst thinks it would be nearer the truth to seek its parentage in the earlier magazine of John Dickens, which perished in 1798, after only two volumes were issued; and the still more remote ancestors of said Quarterly may be found in the Arminian Magazine of Asbury and Coke, which lasted only two years and closed its career in 1790.

Well, our own Quarterly has endured five years, and it starts on its sixth with cheerfulness and hope in the spirits of its first and last director. We have learned something, too, from experience: one lesson especially; it is not an easy task to conduct such a print with entire satisfaction to the editor's own mind; certainly we did not need to learn the impossibility of doing this to the universal satisfaction of its readers. We verily believe that we have come nearer meeting the desires of our patrons than our own. Tokens of appreciation have been enough exhibited to greatly encourage us to continue our labor, which has been mainly a labor of love. It has been our aim to present as great a variety as possible, in the topics discussed, feeling the absolute necessity of doing this in view of the comparatively small class that read Review literature; and this class subdivided into several others of distinct tastes and affinities. Look, for instance, at the present number: "Greek Mythology and Philosophy," is a very attractive subject to men of either poetic or philosophic cast of mind. Theologians and metaphysicians will read with a relish the article on the "Soul," proofs of its existence, and character of its attributes.

Certainly the sombre theme of "Suicide," needed discussion, and a better understanding among all classes of mankind. Our preachers and our members are invited to a great practical question by the treatment of the topic—Methodist Church Membership. That there is a wide variance of opinion is clearly shown by the article reviewed and by the criticism itself. Our Philadelphia lawyer, Dwight M. Lowrey, brings to view the writings and opinions of a venerated name in religion, literature and philosophy. He could not have pleased the editor more than he has by the selection of any other subject for review.

Lovers of poetry will learn something of Mr. Hayne, our gifted Southern writer; and they will thank Mr. Walker for the introduction.

Was ever a grander theme discussed than Mr. Jackson, of Canada, has chosen when he writes of the Conservative force of the Atonement? Substantially agreeing with Bishop Marvin in his leading view, no doubt his article will be read with delight by all our clerical patrons, whether agreeing or dissenting. Our lady contributor has arrayed in very pleasant attire two of the noble of

her sex, and presents them for admiration and as models for imitation.

Lastly, our New Jersey philosopher, Mr. Gill, will wake to thought every mind fond of metaphysics, and capable of appreciating such speculations.

The venerable man who writes from Wee Willie Cottage will be loved all the more after the reading of his short poem—Mary of Bethany.

Thus have we briefly surveyed the contents of this number, except in our own special department, without invidious praise or editorial favoritism, to evince what a feast we have to place before our readers. If you do not relish every dish, act as you do at the table, politely decline some diets and feed more heartily on such food as may be most palatable.

THE PULPIT: ITS PROVINCE AND POWER.

Our solid contemporary, the *Reformed Quarterly Review*, among its able and excellent articles, furnishes a fine contribution on the above topic. Men are frequently heard flippantly disparaging the pulpit as if it was an antiquated and decaying order destined to wane into a virtul extinction. As the supposed diminished estimate of preaching the gospel is taken as proof of the decline of Christianity, we consider it well to weigh the evidence for these assertions to form opinions after a more careful survey. The preacher is not now an emperor of public thought as he was when nearly all learning was found in the ranks of the clergy; but where the pulpit is adequately represented and filled, the force of preaching is still exhibited by the multitudes who are attracted to the assembly of Christians, and are brought under the sway of the gospel as a divine creed and code. *The Reformed Quarterly* says:

There never was a period in the past history of the world when Christianity was so widely diffused among men as it is now. The followers of Christ have virtually encompassed the earth. There is scarcely a land on the face of the globe any longer where the glad tidings of salvation are not proclaimed to men. Everywhere in heathen lands the work of Missions is going bravely on, and throughout Asia, Africa and the islands of the sea large numbers are steadily being won to Christ. Some there are, indeed,

who deny all this, and boldly assert that missions are a failure, and that in all Christian lands believers are rapidly decreasing, but trustworthy statistics, as has lately been very conclusively shown, prove the utter groundlessness of their assertions. Many there are, we freely admit, in all Churches, who have a name to live but are dead, but so it was already in the Apostolic times, and there is reason to believe that, proportionally, there are no more such now, than perhaps, with rare exceptions, there ever have been, so that no argument can be properly drawn from this fact that Christianity is becoming obsolescent. As in ages past, so still the Gospel of Christ "is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth" (Rom. i: 16;) and so it will continue to be until "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of His Christ; and he shall reign forever and ever." (Rev. xi: 15.)

There is no reason therefore for despairing of Christianity. It is no waning faith and never will be. Neither is there any danger of the pulpit ever being supplanted by the press. Great as is the power of the latter, it can never take the place of the former. That the press has been, and still is, a great help in furthering the cause of the Lord, there can be no question. By multiplying Bibles and religious books of all kinds and placing them within the reach of the people, it has done a great and glorious work in the way of enlightening them on the subject of religion. But men need not only to be enlightened as to what is their duty but also to be inspired to do it. It is when a man speaks face to face with men that he is best able to fill them with his own spirit, and incite them to deeds of noble daring, or to holy living. The pleading voice, the flashing eyes, the beaming countenance, the appropriate gestures of the speaker, add potency to thought and make it far more real and impressive than it is upon the printed page. Hence, the pulpit must ever be mightier than the press as a means of awakening men to a realizing sense of their lost and perishing condition and of their need of a Saviour, and of leading them to the cross of Christ as the only refuge of safety, the only fountain of life and peace. If anywhere, therefore, the true power of the pulpit is waning, it cannot be due to the taking of its place by newspapers and books, as is sometimes asserted, but must be

owing to some other cause. But in reality, the true power of the pulpit is not waning. This is evident from the fact already noticed, that Christianity is being more widely diffused than ever, and is exerting a greater influence on the lives of men than at any previous period in the world's history. Outside of this proper province it is, perhaps, true that the pulpit no longer exerts as much direct influence in the affairs of men as it did when nearly all the learning of the world was monopolized by the ministry, and Church and state throughout Christendom were united; but in its own proper province there is reason to believe that it has been a gainer by this loss, and will continue to be a gainer. For there can be no doubt that it is always better that truth should be accepted for its own sake, than that it should be accepted merely as a means to secure something else, as it is apt to be when those who teach it have power to confer temporal benefits on those who profess to follow their instructions; since in reality truth received for any other purpose than itself, is not truly received at all, and can exert no real saving and sanctifying power on the life.

IMPORTANCE OF ORATORY IN A REPUBLIC.

We present below a brief essay on Oratory as related to Republics. It was written as a college exercise (Mercer University, Macon, Georgia,)—written in the presence of the Belle Lettres Professor at one sitting, the theme being given by the professor at the hour of writing. It was a competitive prize essay and won a fine golden medal: EDITOR.

Why is it, the student often asks, that some nations have far outstripped others in the race towards political and social perfection? Why is it that Greece and Rome, for instance, attained such enviable superiority over their rivals; that "the glory that was Greece, and the grandeur that was Rome," should attract the admiring gaze of all times and all men? Why was it that the Roman people were welded into such a strong, almost invulnerable nationality? Why, that the Roman eagles led the Roman legions with uniform and glorious victory? Why is it that our own country, separated as it is by a wide belt of watery waste, from the century-perfected civilization of Europe, already has builded for

herself a nationality as strong as adamant, a character as bright as Sirius?

These questions may be answered in ways as numerous as they are satisfactory. But to the close observer of the inmost lives and character of these republics, we think it is entirely evident that not a small part of their success is due to the cultivation and extensive use of the powers of oratory. While this power is of great importance among all people, for its influence must be felt by every human being with a spark of human fire in his existence, it is especially valuable and, hence, necessary in a Republican government.

Between an Oligarchy and Democracy there is a wide difference. In the former, the government is vested in the few, while in the latter it is vested in the whole people. In the former the administrator of the government is supreme. Kings are accountable to no one. Hence it is a government of caprice. Above the reach of the subject, the monarch is not impelled by any feeling of obligation to rule with mercy and justice. The orator can have but little effect upon such a government. His eloquent appeals for right must fall upon leaden ears.

Not so in a Democracy. Here the people themselves are their own masters. They make their own laws and their executors of those laws. These officers of the state are, therefore, directly accountable to their masters, the people. They are impelled by all considerations, be they selfish or be they patriotic, to rule with fixed principles of right. Being a part of the people, and responsible to the people, it is eminently logical to suppose that an attentive ear will be given to the cause of the wronged and distressed. Even the meanest subject, if he come with the power of truth and of conviction, may receive the fullest measure of justice.

In such a government, it is the people who rule. If the government is not administered according to the principles of right, the people must be to blame. It follows, therefore, that they should be fully informed of the duties, the responsibilities, that are expected of them by mankind and by the Supreme Ruler. And yet the people have not this knowledge. The vast majority are utterly ignorant of all that adds prosperity, dignity and happiness to a nation. For ages the government has been carried on by

the few. The greatest lovers of human freedom have believed that a good and secure government cannot be vested in the many. Only of late has it been demonstrated that government as stable as it is advantageous can be secured by the people. The principles that lie at the foundation of government, are most difficult to comprehend or to master. They are the life-long study of the greatest statesmen and philosophers. It is not surprising then that the vast numbers of people who enjoy the privilege of suffrage should utterly fail to comprehend the subtle questions that constantly arise in the body politic.

Such being the case, the people need some method by which to be informed upon the questions of State. For the correct administration of government, this is indispensable. There are but two ways in which this instruction may be imparted. It must be done either through the press or the rostrum. Both are powerful and indispensable. The press I would be the last to under-value—surely it is very mighty. It holds largely within its spacious folds the destinies of the world for good or for evil. But there are advantages for instruction and persuasion possessed by oratory, that the press cannot claim. Oratory is the more useful in that it is the more potent. We are told that—

> "Orpheus tuned his matchless lyre,
> To make the sweetest symphony;
> While earthward bent the heavenly choir,
> To catch such harmony."

And that trees, under the magic spell of his lute followed to hear the marvelous melody. So many a modern Orpheus among his fellows, with eloquence almost divine, has thrilled the hearts of men and held them captive at his will. The people have a peculiar love and admiration for oratory, as the more cultivated for music and for painting. This admiration of the oratorical powers makes them susceptible to its persuasive influence. There is a magnetic thrill from orator to listener, a thrill productive of the keenest pleasure—an influence which the true orator never fails to produce, and which is most irresistible in its effects. Hence oratory is capable of so blending appeal to the sensibility and intellect, as to completely captivate both. The writer must depend in a great measure upon his power of persuading the intellect. If the latter,

when accomplished, is more satisfactory, the former is more frequently obtained. If the latter is more unchangeable, the former is more powerful.

The tremendous power of the perfect orator cannot be estimated. Demosthenes, with his trumpet-tongued appeals to Athenian pride and Athenian patriotism; Cicero, with his terrible invectives, scourging Cataline from the crowded forum; Patrick Henry, rousing the people of the colonies from one end to the other, by his call to arms; Daniel Webster defying the Boston mob and hurling in their faces their narrow minded prejudices; Toombs speaking down a howling tumult in the halls of Congress; Yancey, facing a scowling throng of New Yorkers, and carrying them into enthusiasm by his manly avowal of his position, all show the God-like influence of this power of speech.

These are examples of oratory where we all acknowledge it was arrayed on the side of truth and justice. But where the question is one of doubt, for the full and clear exposition of it the employment of the powers of oratory is productive of the best results. When the champion of each side appears in its defence and the attack of the other, it is then that the glamour and the aspersions of each are torn from them, and the question for decision is held up in the clear light of truth.

It is an unfortunate fact in human affairs, that our greatest blessings can, by abuse, be turned into the most malignant curses. It is thus with oratory. In the hands of the man of purity, it is the strongest weapon of truth. In the hands of the unscrupulous it is most dangerous in its influence and damaging in its effects. But it has been the corrector of its own evils. Where it has brought disaster, sooner or later, in the hands of the greater man, it has brought the antidote for its own poisons.

Thus have we examined one of the causes of Republican prosperity. We have found it to be most powerful and most salutary. That such a beautiful art should be cultivated in a Republic, in that form of government where it is most distinctly useful, goes without saying. In the present time, in the day of the press, of the telegraph, of the telephone, of bustle and blunder, oratory is likely to be neglected. Let such a tendency be looked upon with dismay. Let the college and the school, the teacher and the scholar, and

above all, let the irresistible public sentiment place upon it their lasting quietus. E. F. H.

Macon, Georgia.

MATERIALISM.

The Universalist Quarterly Review, (Boston,) for January, 1884, has a very trenchant article on "Materialism," by Wm. Tucker, D. D. We give a lengthy extract as apropos to the discussions of the day. Dr. Tucker says:

The materialists have always assumed that the existence of matter was positively known, while they have contended that the existence of mind was only a matter of inference. Modern physiology has changed all this by showing that matter is only a permanent condition of sensation. We have no knowledge of its existence at all as an entity, nor as a sensation, but only as a condition of the sensations of which we are conscious. In fact, the Idealism of Bishop Berkely has been revived, if not in form in substance, as the result of recent experiments in the physiology of sensation. D'Alembert distinctly doubted the possibility of knowing real objects. Lichtenberg, who in all his philosophizing never forgot that he was a physicist, declares it to be impossible to refute Idealism. When we believe we see things we see only ourselves. We can only know ourselves and the changes that take place in us. When anything acts upon us, the effect depends not only upon the acting object, but also upon the subject acted on. We know our sensations, but we do not know there is anything answering to them external to ourselves by which they are produced in us. Let the materialist assume that there is in the body a physical mechanism which produces the conclusions of the understanding and the senses, then we stand face to face with the questions: What is the body? what is matter? what is the physical? And modern physiology, just as much as philosophy, must answer that they are all our ideas; necessary ideas, ideas resulting according to natural laws, but still never the things themselves. "This means, of course, that no materialism of any kind is any longer maintainable. The struggle between mind and body is ended in favor of the former, and only thus is guaranteed the true unity of all existence."

It is thus seen that in the light of modern science a rational materialism is no longer possible. The question may be asked,

Why have we so many materialists? It is the result of scientific specialism, narrow culture, and one-sided development. The error in the reasoning of materialists is found in this—they confound conditions with causes. This is both unscientific and unphilosophical. Conditions are only the circumstances under which causes operate, but are in no rational sense causes themselves. This error runs through the reasoning of all writers who advocate the doctrines of materialism. Another error common to this class of writers is to confound the method with the agent, and to assume when they have discovered the method in which a thing has been done that they have discovered the agent who did it. They also use the term law in the sense of cause, and agent, and are thus led into great logical confusion of thought. Matter conditions the manifestation of force, and materialists say it is the cause of force. Matter and force condition the manifestation of life, and materialists conclude they are the cause of life. A brain organism conditions the manifestations of mind in man and animals, and materialists infer it is the cause of mind. The body conditions the action and manifestations of the soul in our earthly state and under our material relations, and materialists hold that it is the cause of the soul. The environment conditions human progress, and the materialist assumes that it is the cause of all advancement and civilization among men. We can trace this logical defect in all their reasoning. It is the great error in the logic of materialism, and accounts for the strange and absurd conclusions that form so large a part of this system of philosophy.

I have thus shown that the doctrines of materialism are untrue, and have pointed out the defective logic by which these erroneous conclusions are reached. The doctrine of materialists, that nothing is true that cannot be tested by the senses, is the fruitful source of many of the errors of their system, and underlies much of the bad logic and confused thought to which we are treated by this class of thinkers. A moment's reflection will show its utter fallacy. There are very few things the truth of which can be tested by the senses. We do not know matter, mind, thought, force, or life by sensation. These are all beyond the reach of the senses. Our knowledge of their existence depends upon consciousness and inference. Many truths

are self-evident and are known by our intuitions. It is this class of truths that underlie all our scientific and practical knowledge.

The practical application of the dictum of materialism would make all knowledge impossible, and end in the paralysis of all thought. A principle of reasoning so revolutionary and destructive cannot be true. The attempted defense of materialism based upon the likeness of the brute to human intelligence will not stand the test of scientific investigation. The intelligence of the brute is instinctive, the intelligence of man is rational; the intelligence of the brute is stationary, the intelligence of man is progressive; the intelligence of the brute is unconscious, the intelligence of man is conscious; the intellect or instinct of the brute acts under a law of necessity, the reason of man under the law of liberty. The difference between instinct and reason is so wide that we cannot infer that it is a difference in degree and not in nature, or in quantity and not in quality of intellect. The brute is not an undeveloped man. Nor is this difference between animals and men owing entirely to the fact that man has a larger and more complicated brain than the animal creation. The fact is, the horse, the elephant, and the whale have brains that in size, and the number and depth of their convolutions, are equal to the human brain. This shows that the difference between men and animals intellectually is not simply a question of anatomy. Nor is it a question of physiology alone. It belongs to the higher department of psychology. Men and animals are not identical in nature as materialists assume, and it is, therefore, not logical to infer that because brutes are mortal men must be. Thus the last stronghold of materialism is demolished, and man's spirituality and immortality are vindicated. Man is a spiritual child of the spiritual and divine Father, and is destined to an immortal life of holiness and happiness.

RITUALISM.

We are debtors to our Canada friends for some admirable pamphlets containing lectures delivered in Victoria University on Theology. One is entitled "Sin and Grace," by Rev. James Graham—an elaborate discussion of this profound subject. Another pamphlet of one hundred and thirty-two pages is by Rev. H. F.

Bland, entitled "Soul-Winning." From this able lecture we take the following extract bearing on Ritualism. Mr. Bland says:

A tribe that Livingstone met with in Africa, and to whom he preached Christ and peace, said, wearily and yearningly: "O that is what we want; we are tired—we want rest and peace." When the African said that, he represented humanity. Man everywhere, whatever his complexion or social position, needs rest of soul. Christ only can give that; and the more clearly, convincingly and attractively the preacher puts Christ before the world, the more thoroughly does he serve "his generation by the will of God." The Poet Laureate uttered substantially the cry of the African, when he wrote—

"I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the world's great altar stairs
That slope through darkness up to God;
I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all."

"We want rest and peace," said the one. "I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope, and gather dust and chaff," said the other. In their need of Christ, and in their deep yearning for that which Christ only can give, the aboriginal savage and the cultured Poet Laureate stand on the same platform.

Ritualism cannot meet this want. A certain preacher, in a dedicatory service, enlarging upon the "beauty of holiness," said that one element of this beauty was a due, regular and apostolic ordination. Another, was ecclesiastical architecture; and then he proceeded to enlarge upon the Gothic curve, the "storied window," the "dim religious light," the "pealing organ," the "service high and anthems clear," and all that is deemed necessary to charm the sense and elevate the soul. The millinery of the altar-table and the surplice, and the mummery of bowing and intoning may be lifted into channels of grace, and regarded as indispensably necessary to purity and spirituality of worship: but the chaff feeds not the flock—the remedy touches not the disease.

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THE WITNESS OF THE SPIRIT.

Chapter X., from Bishop McTyiere's Centenary Book, on Methodism, soon to be issued.

It is not the truth, but the personal apprehension and application of the truth, that saves. The concrete doctrine, as embodied and illustrated in experience, is of at least equal practical importance with the abstract doctrine, as stated in books. Methodism puts emphasis on experience. St. Paul more than once told how he was converted. The subjective aspects of Christianity, as presented in his epistles, are as striking as the objective. Experimental religion is not a cant phrase; it expresses a real and a great fact.

The doctrine of conscious conversion, and of a direct witness of the Spirit testifying to the heart of the believer that he is a child of God, was the doctrine which exposed the founder of Methodism to the opposition of the formalist of the Church, and the ridicule of the philosophists of the world. His personal experience connects itself with this doctrine. He has made the full disclosure; and according to an eminent authority, "it is the only

true key to his theological system and to his public ministry."† It would be difficult, he thinks, to fix upon a more interesting and instructive moral spectacle than that which is presented by the progress of his mind, through all its deep and serious agitations, doubts, difficulties, hopes and fears, from his earliest religious awakenings to the moment when he found that steadfast peace which never afterward forsook him, but gave serenity to his countenance, and cheerfulness to his heart, to the last moment of a prolonged life. This critical passage of Wesleyan biography is thus defended by Watson against the solution or cavils of men whose treatment of the subject is as unjust to Christianity as to Methodism:

"If the appointed method of man's salvation, laid down in the gospel, be gratuitous pardon through faith in the merits of Christ's sacrifice, and if a method of seeking justification by the works of moral obedience to the Divine law be plainly placed by St. Paul in opposition to this, and declared to be vain and fruitless; then, if in this way the Wesleys sought their justification before God, we see how true their own statement must of necessity have been—that, with all their efforts, they could obtain no solid peace of mind, no deliverance from the enslaving fear of death and final punishment, because they sought that by imperfect works which God has appointed to be attained by faith alone. Theirs was not, indeed, a state of heartless formality and self-deluding Pharisaism, aiming only at external obedience. It was just the reverse of this; they were awakened to a sense of danger, and they aimed at—nay, struggled with intense efforts after—universal holiness, inward and outward. But it was not a state of salvation; and if we find a middle state like this described in the Scriptures—a state in transit from dead formality to living faith and moral deliverance—the question, with respect to the truth of their representations as to their former state of experience, is settled.

"Such a middle state we see plainly depicted by the Apostle Paul, in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. There the mind of the person described 'consents to the law that it is good,' but finds in it only greater discoveries of his sinfulness and danger; there the effort, too, is after universal holiness—'to will is present,' but the power is wanting; every struggle binds the chain tighter; sighs and groans are extorted, till self despair succeeds, and the true Deliverer is seen and trusted in: 'O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord.' The deliverance also, in the case described by St. Paul, is marked with the same characters as those exhibited in the conversion of the Wesleys: 'There is now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit; for the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death.' 'Therefore, being

†Watson's Life of Wesley.

justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.' Everything in the account of the change wrought in the two brothers, and several of their friends about the same time, answers, therefore, to the New Testament. Nor was their experience, or the doctrine upon which it was founded, new, although in that age of declining piety unhappily not common."

Southey, against whose callous and flippant criticism Watson more especially wrote, thought Wesley's feelings might have been accounted for by referring to "the state of his pulse or stomach." But it does not appear that his health was at all disordered. Fanaticism and enthusiasm are terms in plentiful use. Coleridge, in a marginal note, explains the phenomenon of Wesley's conversion as "a throb of sensibility accompanying a vehement *volition* of acquiescence." The world has not ceased to wonder why Southey—the *ci-devant* Socinian—should write the life of John Wesley. Total want of sympathy for the best parts of his subject rendered him as incapable of laying down the geography of the moon as of giving the moral portraiture of Wesley." His incompetency for such a task was aptly expressed by one of Wesley's early biographers: "Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep."*

That so devout and self-denying a man should be a stranger to the full salvation—only an "almost Christian"—offends the formalist. On May 24th, 1738, John Wesley, "received such a sense of the forgiveness of sins as till then he never knew." This was his steadfast testimony. The place and the hour—"about a quarter before nine"—he circumstantially and minutely recollects. His testimony is: "I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given me that he had taken away *my* sins, even *mine*." This must be accepted as the time of his conversion—meaning, by this term, his obtaining the conscious forgiveness of his sins, and the witness of the Holy Ghost to his adoption as a child of God. In the primary sense of conversion—a turning from sin to God,

*Southey purposed making the *amende honorable* in a third edition, for his misconception, and accordingly his misrepresentation of Wesley, "that the love of power was the ruling passion of his mind," but this modification of the work was suppressed by his son, a bigoted Churchman, on whom the responsibility of its publication was devolved. See "Smith's History of Wesleyan Methodism," page 635.

with some measure of faith—the "good work" seems to have been begun in him before. Referring to the past, he testifies:

"During this whole struggle between nature and grace, which had now continued above ten years, I had many remarkable returns to prayer, especially when I was in trouble; I had many sensible comforts, which are indeed no other than short anticipations of the life of faith. But I was still under the law, not under grace—the state most who are called Christians are content to live and die in. For I was only striving with, not freed from sin; neither had I 'the witness of the Spirit with my spirit.'"

He had been long a subject of gracious influence; and while writing bitter things against himself and condemning his spiritual state, he had much to be thankful for. Consequently in his later ministry, and in the final revision of his journal, we find certain expressions of a former date guarded and qualified by his own hand.* Returning from Georgia, he wrote:

"It is now two years and almost four months since I left my native country, in order to teach the Georgian Indians the nature of Christianity; but what have I learned myself in the meantime? Why (what I the least of all suspected,) that I, who went to America to convert others, was never myself converted to God. (I am not sure of this.")

The concluding parenthesis was added afterward by himself.

Recounting, in the same meditation, what he had done and suffered in the cause of Christ, he said:

"Does all this give me a claim to the holy, heavenly, divine character of a Christian? By no means. If the oracles of God are true, if we are still to abide by 'the law and the testimony;' all these things, though, when ennobled by faith in Christ, they are holy and just and good, yet without it are 'dung and dross.'"

This foot-note was subsequently inserted to the last sentence: "†I had even then the faith of a *servant*, though not that of a *son*."

In this searching meditation he expressed a severe opinion:

"This, then, have I learned in the ends of the earth—that 'I am fallen short of the glory of God;' that my whole heart is 'altogether corrupt and abominable;' and, consequently, my whole life (seeing it cannot be that an 'evil tree' should 'bring forth good fruit;') that 'alienated' as I am from 'the life of God,' I am 'a child of wrath,' an heir of hell."

The final foot-note is short but expressive: "‡I believe not."

*Wesley's Journal: In two volumes. From the latest London edition; with last corrections of the author. New York edition: 1887.

His journal, before quoted, has described an interview of memorable consequence, which occurred in March of this year:

"Saturday, 4. I found my brother at Oxford, recovering from his pleurisy; and with him Peter Böhler; by whom, (in the hand of the great God,) I was, on Sunday, the 5th, clearly convinced of unbelief, of the want of faith whereby alone we are saved. (With the full Christian salvation.)"

The concluding parenthesis was added afterward by himself.*

These last touches to his journal are noteworthy. Without withdrawing Wesley's good confession, they give his maturest views and self-interpretation, in tenderness and charity to those in whom is a spark of grace, or faith as a grain of mustard-seed. He would not break the bruised reed or quench the smoking flax. Against Molther, who held that no man has any degree of saving faith before he has the full assurance, the abiding witness of the Spirit, Wesley maintained the thesis that, "There are degrees in faith, and that a man may have some degree of it before all things in him are become new; before he has the full assurance of faith, the abiding witness of the Spirit." None called more loudly and constantly than he, "Let us go on to perfection;" yet none was more tender and careful of the "weak in faith." Five months after his conversion, being asked by his brother Samuel what he meant by being made a Christian, John replied: "By a Christian, I mean one who so believes in Christ as that sin hath no more dominion over him; and in this obvious sense of the word, I was not a Christian till the 24th of May last past. Till then sin had dominion over me, although I fought with it continually; but from that time to this it hath not. Such is the free grace of God in Christ. If you ask me by what means I am made free, I answer, by faith in Christ; by such a sort or degree of faith as I had not till that day."†

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*At this period [about the time of their conversion] both the brothers undervalued the grace which they had previously received, and which led them to do and suffer many things for the glory of God, and the benefit of mankind. It is, nevertheless, undeniable that until they received and exemplified the doctrine of present salvation from the guilt and power of sin by faith in Christ, they had neither of them attained to the true Christian character, as it is described in the apostolical epistles.—*Jackson's Life of C. Wesley, page* 228.

†Life and Times of Rev. John Wesley, M. A.

Three years later, preaching before the university on "The Almost Christian,"‡ he allows to such a character sincerity and many other excellent qualities—"a real desire to serve God, a hearty desire to do His will. It is necessarily implied that a man have a sincere view of pleasing God in all things; in all his conversation; in all his actions; in all he does, or leaves undone. This design, if any man be *almost a Christian*, runs through the whole tenor of his life. This is the moving principle, both in his doing good, his abstaining from evil, and his using the ordinances of God." But this is not enough. If any should inquire: "Is it possible that any man living should go so far as this, and, nevertheless, be *only almost a Christian?* What more than this can be implied in the being a *Christian altogether?*"—the preacher boldly meets the question, speaking where his life and conversation had been well known:

"I answer, first, that it is possible to go thus far, and yet be but *almost a Christian*, I learn, not only from the oracles of God, but also from the sure testimony of experience. Brethren, great is 'my boldness towards you in this behalf.' And 'forgive me this wrong,' if I declare my own folly upon the housetop, for yours and the Gospel's sake. Suffer me, then, to speak freely of myself, even as of another man. I am content to be abased, so ye may be exalted, and to be yet more vile for the glory of my Lord. I did go thus far for many years, as many of this place can testify; using diligence to eschew all evil, and to have a conscience void of offense; redeeming the time; buying up every opportunity of doing all good to all men; constantly and carefully using all the private means of grace; endeavoring after a steady seriousness of behavior, at all times and in all places; and God is my record, before whom I stand, doing all this in sincerity; having a real design to serve God; a hearty desire to do His will in all things; to please Him who had called me to 'fight the good fight,' and to 'lay hold on eternal life.' Yet my own conscience beareth me witness in the Holy Ghost that all this time I was but *almost a Christian.*"

After commending to his hearers that "right and true Christian faith"—"a sure trust and confidence which a man hath in God, that, by the merits of Christ, his sins are forgiven, and he reconciled to the favor of God; whereof doth follow a loving heart, to obey His commandments"—the university sermon concludes: "May we all thus experience what it is to be, not almost only, but altogether, Christians: being justified freely by His grace through

‡Sermon No. II.

the redemption that is in Jesus; knowing we have peace with God through Jesus Christ; rejoicing in the hope of the glory of God; and having the love of God shed abroad in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost given unto us!"

That the meaning of a foot-note, before quoted, may be understood—"I had even then the faith of a *servant*, though not of a *son*"—we give an extract from one of Wesley's sermons:*

"But what is faith which is properly saving, which brings eternal salvation to all those that keep it to the end? It is such a divine conviction of God, and the things of God, as, even in its infant state, enables every one that possess it to 'fear God and work righteousness.' And whosoever, in every nation, believes thus far, the apostle declares, 'is accepted of him.' He actually is at the very moment in a state of acceptance. But he is at present only a *servant* of God, not properly a *son*. Meantime, let it be well observed that the 'wrath of God' no longer 'abideth on him.'

"Indeed, nearly fifty years ago, when the preachers commonly called Methodists began to preach the grand scriptural doctrine, salvation by faith, they were not sufficiently apprised of the difference between a servant and a child of God. They did not clearly understand that even one 'who feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him.' In consequence of this, they were apt to make sad the hearts of those whom God had not made sad. For they frequently asked those who feared God, 'Do you know your sins are forgiven?' And upon their answering 'No,' immediately replied, 'Then you are a child of the devil.' No; that does not follow. It might have been said (and it is all that can be said with propriety); 'Hitherto you are only a *servant*, you are not a *child*, of God. You have already great reason to praise God that he has called you to his honorable service. Fear not. Continue crying unto him, 'And you shall see greater things than these.'

"And, indeed, unless the servants of God halt by the way, they will receive the adoption of sons. They will receive the *faith* of the children of God, by his *revealing* his only-begotten Son in their hearts. Thus, the faith of a child is, properly and directly, a divine conviction, whereby every child of God is enabled to testify, 'The life that I now live, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.' And whosoever has this, the Spirit of God witnesseth with his spirit that he is a child of God. So the apostle writes to the Galatians: 'Ye are the sons of God by faith. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father;' that is, giving you child-like confidence in him, together with a kind affection toward him. This, then, it is that properly constitutes the difference between a servant of God and a child of God. 'He that believeth,' as a child of God, 'hath the witness in himself.' This the servant hath not. Yet let no man discourage him, rather, lovingly exhort him to expect it every moment."

*Sermon CV.: Text, Heb. xi.: 6.

From the hour of his adoption as a son, Wesley was another man, and his preaching another preaching. That was the genesis of Methodism. Before, he worked *for* salvation; now, *from* salvation. Before, his word was unfruitful, and his few converts fell away without his presence and support; now, his word is spirit and life, and the fruit abides. Before, he sought to save himself; now, to save others. Before, he coveted solitude, and declined the responsibility of two thousand souls at Epworth; now, the world is not too wide for him, nor the care of all the Churches too heavy. When the sun passes meridian, there is no noise; but from that supreme moment, all the shadows fall the other way. Every tree and tower and spire of grass casts its shadow in the opposite direction.

Distinguishable from justification, but closely connected with it, is the doctrine of the direct witness of the Spirit. To this, Methodism has borne an emphatic testimony. It is not a Wesleyan dogma in the sense of having been discovered by Wesley, or of being exclusively held by Wesleyans; but they magnified it; they claimed it as the privilege of all believers, and they urged all to seek the full salvation. The doctrine of the Trinity is called Athanasian; but Athanasius only formulated what others accepted and what he intensely believed. In all the controversies which arose respecting the religious tenets of the early Methodists, it was invariably maintained that theirs was "the old religion;" "the religion of the primitive Church." With respect to the doctrines which refer to the Divine Being, the great catholic faith of the trinity in unity, and also the fall of man, original sin, the eternal duration of rewards and punishments, and other topics, the Methodists hold opinions in common with all orthodox Churches. Those doctrines which were made the subject of frequent conversation in the early Conferences and of discourse in their sermons, and about which opposition and controversy arose, pertained mainly to experimental religion, and might be characterized not as new, but as neglected or lost sight of.

None were more offended at the Wesleys than their eldest brother. That High-churchman was scandalized at a clergyman preaching to "tatterdemalions on a common," and "never once reading the liturgy." In his anger he went so far as to wish that

those "canting fellows," as he called the Moravians, "who talked of *indwellings*, *experiences*, and *getting into Christ*," had never obtained any followers. Late in the year 1738, Samuel Wesley wrote to his mother, complaining of the course of his two brothers, and especially denouncing their doctrine of assurance. Her letter in reply so far gratified him and favored his view as to take this ground: "If, upon a serious review of our state, we find that in the tenor of our lives we have or do now sincerely desire and endeavor to perform the conditions of the gospel-covenant required on our parts, then we may discern that the Holy Spirit hath laid in our minds a good foundation of a strong, reasonable, and lively hope of God's mercy through Christ. This is the assurance we ought to aim at, which the apostle calls 'the full assurance of hope.'" Dr. A. Clarke remarks upon this, as proof that her knowledge was "by no means clear and distinct" on the point. In the same letter she says:

"You have heard, I suppose, that Mr. Whitefield is taking a progress through these parts to make a collection for a house in Georgia for orphans and such of the natives' children as they will part with to learn our language and religion. He came hither to see me, and we talked about your brothers. I told him I did not like their way of living, wished them in some place of their own, wherein they might regularly preach, etc. He replied: 'I could not conceive the good they did in London; that the greatest part of our clergy were asleep, and that there never was a greater need of itinerant preachers than now.' I then asked Mr. Whitefield if my sons were not for making some innovations in the Church, which I much feared. He assured me they were so far from it that they endeavored all they could to reconcile Dissenters to our communion."

As soon as she conversed with her sons, and heard them speak for themselves, Mrs. Wesley was convinced that their doctrine was both rational and scriptural; and she waited on their ministry with delight and profit to the end of her life.*

Six months after his conversion, John Wesley and his brother Charles waited upon Dr. Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, to answer the complaints he had heard against them, to the effect that they preached an absolute assurance of salvation. The two

*Samuel's last letter to his mother had this lament and protest: "It was with exceeding concern and grief I heard you had countenanced a spreading delusion so far as to be one of Jack's congregation. Is it not enough that I am bereft of both my brothers, but must my mother follow, too?"

being introduced, Gibson said: "If by assurance you mean an inward persuasion, whereby a man is conscious in himself, after examining his life by the law of God, and weighing his own sincerity, that he is in a state of salvation, and acceptible to God, I don't see how any good Christian can be without such assurance." The Wesleys meant more by "assurance" than this; but the doctrine, so far as it went, was one which they preached. The next point was the charge that they were Antinomians, because they preached justification by faith only. To this they replied: "Can any one preach otherwise who agrees with our Church and the Scriptures?"

The first few years of Methodism were prolific of anti-Methodist literature. The clergy began to bestir themselves, and the war of pamphlets, expostulatory letters and books, preceded that of clubs and stones, which followed. Vicars, deans, curates, rectors, chaplains, and bishops issued forth with sermons and pastorals and tractates, abusing the Methodists, and warning the people against them, as "restless deceivers," "babblers," "novices in divinity," "teachers of absurd doctrines," "modern enthusiasts," "solifidians," "papists in disguise;" and things not only false, but monstrously false, are asserted of them. One of the most temperate productions was from a doctor of divinity, a royal chaplain, and preacher to the Honorable Society of Gray's Inn, who published "A Caution against Religious Delusion," in the shape of "A Sermon on the New Birth; occasioned by the pretensions of the Methodists." They are charged with "vain and confident boastings," with "gathering tumultuous assemblies to the disturbance of the public peace, and with setting at naught all authority and rule," with "intruding into other men's labors, and encouraging abstinence, prayer, and other religious exercises, to the neglect of the duties of our station." Before the end of the year this sermon reached a sixth edition. Another sermon on "The Doctrine of Assurance," by the chaplain to his royal highness, Frederick, Prince of Wales (with an appendix,) was published (8vo. 39 pages,) and had an extensive circulation. The preacher argues that assurance "is given to very few, and perhaps only to such whom God calls either to extraordinary services or to extraordinary sufferings." He further argues that to profess to have received such an assur-

ance savore of spiritual pride, and cannot but produce bad results. The Bishop of London published his "Pastoral Letter to the People of his Diocese; by way of Caution against Lukewarmness on one hand, and Enthusiasm on the other" (55 pages.) Two-thirds of this pamphlet are leveled against the Methodists.* Thirteen days after the "Pastoral Letter" was published, Whitefield wrote an answer to it, and in a firm but respectful way replied to all the Bishop's allegations. He concludes by charging Gibson with propagating a new gospel, because he asserts that "good works are a *necessary condition* of our being justified in the sight of God." He maintains that *faith* is the only necessary condition, and that *good works* are the necessary fruit and consequence. "This," he writes, "is the doctrine of Jesus Christ; this is the doctrine of the Church of England; and it is because the generality of the clergy of the Church of England do not preach this doctrine that I am resolved, God being my helper, to continue instant in season and out of season, to declare it unto all men, let the consequences as to me privately be what they will."

Without loosing time or temper in answering their accusers, the Methodist preachers kept on their way, urging upon small and great not only salvation by faith, but the witness of the Spirit. Susanna Wesley had long been a Christian woman; but this doctrine was one of which she had scarcely ever heard. At the age of seventy, and only three years before her death, she obtained the blessing for herself, and obtained it under the ministry of her son-in-law. Wesley writes:

"September 3d, 1739. I talked largely with my mother, who told me that, till a short time since, she had scarce heard such a thing mentioned as the having God's Spirit bearing witness with our spirit; much less did she imagine that this was the common privilege of all true believers; 'therefore,' said she, I never, durst ask it for myself. But two or three weeks ago, while my son Hall was pronouncing those words, in delivering the cup to me, 'The blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was given for thee,' the words struck into my heart, and I knew God, for Christ's sake, had forgiven me all my sins." I asked whether her father (Dr. Annesley) had not the same faith, and whether she had not heard him preach it to others? She answered: 'He had it himself, and declared a little before his death, that for more than forty years he had no darkness, no, fear, no doubt at all, of his being accepted in the Beloved, but that, nevertheless

*The Life and Times of Rev. John Wesley, M. A.

she did not remember to have heard him preach—no, not once—explicitly upon it; whence she supposed he also looked upon it as the peculiar blessing of few, not as promised to all the people of God."*

As taught by the founder of Methodism, the witness of the Spirit was not the assurance of *eternal* salvation, as held by Calvinistic divines, but the assurance given by the Holy Spirit to penitent and believing persons that they are "*now* accepted of God, pardoned, and adopted into God's family." It was a doctrine, therefore, which invited to no relaxation of religious effort, and no irregularity of life; for, as the person who is now justified was once condemned, so, by falling into sin and unbelief he may in future come again into condemnation. And further, as this justification, with its evidence, may be forfeited, so it may be recovered; "our backsliings" mady be "healed," and the favor of God be again restored. Few divines, says Richard Watson, have ever denied the possibility of our becoming assured of the favor of God in a sufficient degree to give substantial comfort to the mind; since the more sincere and earnest a person is in the affair of his salvation, the more miserable he must be if there be no possibility of his being assured that the wrath of God no longer abideth upon him. "Their differences have rather respected the *means* by which the contrite become assured of that change in their relation to Almighty God, whom they have offended, which in Scripture is expressed by the term justification." The question has been, By what means is the assurance of Divine favor conveyed to the mind? Some have concluded that we obtain it by inference only; others, by the direct testimony of the Holy Spirit to the mind. Wesley held that both direct and indirect testimony were the privilege of believers. His most used and favorite text is: "The

*In confirmation is the following from a sermon published by Dr. Annesley, in 1661: "There are believers of several growths in the Church of God; fathers, young men, children, and babes; and as in most families there are more babes and children than grown men, so in the Church of God there are more weak, doubting Christians than strong ones, grown up to a full assurance. A babe may be born and yet not know it; so a man may be born again and not be sure of it. Sometimes they think they have grounds of hope that they shall be saved; sometimes they think they have grounds of fear that they shall be condemned. Not knowing which might be most weighty, like a pair of balances, they are in equipoise."

Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." (Rom. viii.: 16;)* on which he remarks:

"None who believe the Scriptures to be the word of God can doubt the importance of such a truth as this—a truth revealed therein not once only, not obscurely, not incidentally, but frequently, and that in express terms; but solemnly, and of set purpose, as denoting one of the peculiar privileges of the children of God. It more nearly concerns the Methodists, so called, clearly to understand, explain, and defend this doctrine, because it is one grand part of the testimony which God has given them to bear to all mankind. It is by his peculiar blessing upon them in searching the Scriptures, confirmed by the experience of his children, that this great evangelical truth has been recovered, which had been for many years well nigh lost and forgotten."

Proceeding to expound "this joint testimony"† to the great fact that "we are the children of God," he shows what is this witness or testimony of our spirit, and what is the testimony of God's Spirit. The foundation of the former is laid in those numerous texts of Scriptures which describe the marks of the children of God. One may reason thus: First, the Scriptures say, by St. Paul, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God," into all holy tempers and actions, "they are the sons of God." Secondly, I am thus "led by the Spirit of God." Thirdly, he easily concludes, "therefore I am a son of God." Again, by St. John: "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." One examining himself, says: I love Christians because they are Christians; I love the brethren; therefore, I "have passed from death unto life." Or, again, in this way: He that now loves God, that delights and rejoices in him with a humble joy, a holy peace, and an obedient love, is a child of God. But I thus love, delight and rejoice in God; therefore, I am a child of God. The disciple is often and usefully thus employed, searching and trying his ways and thoughts, and comparing his experience with the Bible standard. "Yet all this," says Wesley, "is no other than rational evidence, the witness of our spirit, our reason, or understanding. It all resolves into this: Those having these marks are children of God; but we have these marks; therefore, we are children of God."

Love, peace, gentleness, and other "fruit of the Spirit," may

*Sermons X., XI., XII.

†Note the Greek verb Summarturei.

be found in the heart and life; also hatred of sin and jealousy for God's honor, and strong desire for conformity to God's will. These are wrought by the self-same Holy Spirit in every one that hath them, but they are not to be confounded with His direct witness. A peculiarity of this "testimony of our spirit" is, that though yielding a degree of comfort and hope, it never rises to certainty. It is cumulative, but no accumulation of it amounts to full assurance. Probability is its result and doubt its companion. The humble-minded disciple is aware that the heart is deceitful and wicked, and may easily magnify what counts for, and extenuate what weighs against its hope. Many discoveries are made in the hidden recesses of the soul, as well as in the outward life, that raise the painful question: Can all this consist with a gracious state? Am I indeed a child of God?

"Now," continues Wesley, "this is properly the testimony of our own spirit." And he proceeds to give his most important definition: "But what is that testimony of God's Spirit which is superadded to and conjoined with this? How does He 'bear witness with our spirit, that we are children of God?' It is hard to find words in the language of men to explain 'the deep things of God.' Indeed, there are none that will adequately express what the children of God experience. But perhaps one might say (desiring any who are taught of God to correct, to soften, or strengthen the expression:) The testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God."

Twenty years afterward, preaching on the same subject, he repeated this form of sound words: "After twenty years' further consideration, I see no cause to retract any part of this. Neither do I conceive how any of these expressions may be altered, so as to make them more intelligible. Meantime," he adds, "let it be observed, I do not mean hereby that the Spirit of God testifies this by any outward voice; no, nor always by an inward voice. But He so works upon the soul by His immediate influence, and by a strong, though inexplicable operation, that the stormy wind and troubled waves subside, and there is a sweet calm; the heart rest-

ing as in the arms of Jesus, and the sinner being clearly satisfied that God is reconciled."

Of this "meridian evidence," Wesley further speaks:

"The manner how the *divine* testimony is manifested to the heart I do not take upon me to explain. Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me; I cannot attain unto it. The wind bloweth, and I hear the sound thereof; but I cannot tell how it cometh, or whither it goeth. As no one knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man that is in him, so the *manner* of the things of God knoweth no one, save the Spirit of God. But the fact we know, namely, that the Spirit of God does give a believer such a testimony of his adoption that while it is present to the soul he can no more doubt the reality of his sonship than he can doubt of the shining of the sun while he stands in the full blaze of his beams."

Wesley points out the error of those who, while admitting in words, the testimony of the Holy Spirit, mean only the inferential evidence derived from the fruit of the Spirit; who, though speaking of joint witnesses, yet "swallow up" the testimony of both in one:

"But the point in question is, whether there be any *direct* testimony of the Spirit at all; whether there be any other testimony of the Spirit than that which arises from a consciousness of the fruit.

"I believe there is; because that is the plain, natural meaning of the text: 'The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.' It is manifest, here are two witnesses mentioned, who together testify the same thing; the Spirit of God, and our own spirit. The late Bishop of London, in his sermon on this text, seems astonished that any one can doubt of this, which appears upon the very face of the words. Now, 'the testimony of our own spirit,' says the Bishop, 'is one, which is the consciousness of our own sincerity;' or, to express the same thing a little more clearly, the consciousness of the fruit of the Spirit. When our spirit is conscious of this—of love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness—it easily infers from these premises that we are the children of God. It is true that the great man supposes the other witness to be 'the consciousness of our own good works.' This, he affirms, is the testimony of God's Spirit. But this is included in the testimony of our own spirit."

A few extracts from the writings of the older divines may help to set forth the distinction and the doctrine:

"It is the office of the Holy Ghost to assure us of the adoption of sons, to create in us a sense of the paternal love of God toward us, to give us an earnest of our everlasting inheritance. 'The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us.' 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God are the Sons of God.' And, 'because we are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father.' 'For we have

not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but we have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.' As, therefore, we are born again by the Spirit, and receive from him our regeneration, so we are also assured by the same Spirit of our adoption.—*Pearson on the Creed.*

"The Spirit which God hath given us to assure us that we are the sons of God, to enable us to call upon him as our Father."—*Hooker on Certainty of Faith.*

From Dr. Owen "On the Spirit," (Rom. viii.: 16:)

"'The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the sons of God;' the witness which our own spirits do give unto our adoption is *the work and effect* of the Holy Spirit in us; if it were not, it would be false, and not confirmed by the testimony of the Spirit himself, who is the Spirit of truth. 'And none knoweth the things of God but the Spirit of God.' (1 Cor. ii.: 11.) If He declare not our sonship in us and to us, we cannot know it. How doth He then bear witness to our spirits? What is the distinct testimony? It must be some such act of His as evidenceth itself to be from Him, *immediately*, unto them that are concerned in it—that is, those unto whom it is given."

From Poole, "On Romans" (viii.:16:) "The Spirit of adoption doth not only excite us to call upon God as our Father, but it doth ascertain and assure us, as before, that we are His children. And this it doth not by an outward voice, as God the Father to Jesus Christ; nor by an angel, as to Daniel and the Virgin Mary; but by an inward and secret suggestion, whereby he raiseth our hearts to this pursuasion, that God is our Father, and we are His children. This is not the testimony of the graces and operations of the Spirit, but of the Spirit itself."

Having stated a vital truth, more at large and more clearly than others have done, Wesley turns attention to objections, and shows how this joint testimony of God's Spirit and our own may be distinguished from presumption and delusion. That fanatics can abuse it is not sufficient reason for "denying the gift of God, and giving up the great privilege of his children." Justification by faith, as taught by St. Paul was objected to in his day as leading to licentiousness. Divine truth must not be surrendered or retired because human weakness or wickedness can pervert it.

The direct witness is never referred to in the book of God as standing alone, but as connected with the other; as giving a *joint testimony*—testifying *with our spirit* that we are children of God. The "tree is known by its fruit;" hereby we *prove* if it be "of

God." No man's word can be taken for this inward witness whose outward life does not answer to the profession:

"By the present marks may we easily distinguish a child of God from a presumptuous self-deceiver. The Scriptures describe that joy in the Lord which accompanies the witness of His Spirit as an humble joy—a joy that abases to the dust, that makes a pardoned sinner cry out: 'I am vile! What am I, or my father's house? Now mine eye seeth thee, I abhor myself in dust and ashes!' And wherever lowliness is, there is meekness, patience, gentleness, long suffering. There is a soft, yielding spirit—a mildness and sweetness, a tenderness of soul, which words cannot express. But do these fruits attend that *supposed* testimony of the Spirit in a presumptuous man? Just the reverse. The more confident he is of the favor of God the more is he lifted up; the more does he exalt himself; the more haughty and assuming is his whole behavior. The stronger witness he imagines himself to have, the more overbearing is he to all around him; the more incapable of receiving any reproof; the more impatient of contradiction. Instead of being more meek and gentle and teachable, more 'swift to hear and slow to speak,' he is more slow to hear and swift to speak."

"French prophets," in Wesley's day, brought this doctrine of Divine assurance into discredit with some who did not consider its limitations. Later, "Millerite prophets" in America claimed this sanction for their calculations and predictions that the world would come to an end on a certain day—now past. Such pretensions were unwarranted. This assurance is a joint testimony, and it is promised on only one subject, and that the most important in the world to every man—"Am I a child of God?"

Reference is made to the test of experimental religion—"the experience of the children of God; the experience not of two or three, not of a few, but of a great multitude which no man can number. It has been confirmed both in this and in all ages, by a 'cloud' of living and dying 'witnesses.' It is confirmed by *your* experience and *mine*," says Wesley. "The Spirit itself bore witness to my spirit, that I was a child of God, gave me an evidence hereof; and I immediately cried, 'Abba Father!' And this I did (and so did you) before I reflected on, or was conscious of, any fruit of the Spirit."

The application of this strong and comfortable doctrine, in such hands as John Wesley's, may be foreseen:

"To secure us from all delusion, God gives two witnesses that we are His children. And this they testify conjointly. Therefore, 'what God hath joined together let not man put asunder.' Beware, then, thou who art called by the name of Christ, that thou come not short of the mark of thy high calling. Be-

ware thou rest not, either in a natural state, with too many that are counted *good Christians*; or in a legal state, wherein those who are highly esteemed of men are generally content to live and die. Nay, but God hath prepared better things for thee, if thou follow on till thou attain. Thou art not called to fear and tremble, like devils; but to rejoice and love like the angels of God. Well, then, mayest thou say, 'Thanks be unto God for His unspeakable gift!' Thanks be unto God, who giveth me to 'know in whom I have believed;' who hath 'sent forth the Spirit of his Son into my heart, crying, Abba Father,' and even now 'beareth witness with my spirit, that I am a child of God!' And see that not only thy lips, but thy life, show forth His praise."

To the material truth as set forth by Wesley—the direct testimony of the Spirit for every believer—all Methodists agree. As to an incidental or secondary point, whether or not this testimony always precedes the testimony of our own spirit in the new birth, there is not equal uniformity of opinion. Some experiences which Wesley himself has published, with implied if not express approval, can hardly be reconciled with the theory of the invariable precedence of the Spirit's testimony. The persons in question were doubtless real Christians, walking in the best light and comfort they had for months, it may be years, before receiving the "meridian evidence." In the case of "sudden conversions," undoubtedly the first notice is from above, before the soul has opportunity to perceive or reflect upon any fruit of the Spirit, in regeneration, as manifested in the realm of consciousness.

There is such a witness, and all may have it. After this fashion Wesley presses home the truth, in conclusion:

"Let none rest in any supposed fruit of the Spirit without the witness. There may be foretastes of joy, of peace, of love, and those not delusive, but really from God, long before we have the witness in ourselves—before the Spirit of God witnesses with our spirits that we have 'redemption in the blood of Jesus, even the forgiveness of sins.' Yea, there may be a degree of long-suffering, of gentleness, of fidelity, meekness, temperance (not a shadow thereof, but a real degree, by the preventing grace of God,) before we 'are accepted in the Beloved,' and consequently, before we have a testimony of our acceptance; but it is by no means advisable to rest here; it is at the peril of our souls if we do. If we are wise, we shall be continually crying to God, until his Spirit cry in our hearts, "Abba, Father!" This is the privilege of all the children of God; and without this we can never be assured that we are his children. Without this we cannot retain a steady peace, nor avoid perplexing doubts and fears. But when we have once received this Spirit of adoption, this 'peace which passeth all understanding,' and which expels all painful doubt and fear, will 'keep our hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.' And when this has brought forth its genuine

fruit, all inward and outward holiness, it is undoubtedly the will of him that calleth us to give us always what he has once given; so that there is no need that we should ever more be deprived of either the testimony of God's Spirit or the testimony of our own, the consciousness of our walking in all righteousness and true holiness.

The great fact and force in the Methodist revival was the experience and the preaching of this witness of the Spirit. Justification by faith had been stated in the homilies and articles of the Church of England with the precision and frequency that might be expected concerning the dogma on which the Reformation rested. Though lost sight of, and even opposed, it was there; and the first Methodists appealed to those standards. Not so with the doctrine of the Spirit's testimony. It was obscurely and inferentially supported from that quarter, while for obvious reasons Calvinistic dissent dealt with it feebly and infrequently. For if "once in grace always in grace" be true, then *present* assurance becomes the assurance of *eternal* salvation; and consequences follow which practical morality hesitates to accept. It was for the Methodists, standing on the evangelical, Arminian platform, to proclaim the fact that the plan of redemption in its completeness made provision not only for the forgiveness of sin, but that men might *know* that their sins were forgiven.

The effect upon the preachers was inspiring. Embassadors of God must be confident of their commission and of their message. They are empowered to comfort his people, and in such a message there is comfort. The personal experience of evangelists must be clear: "We believe, and therefore speak." Otherwise their preaching may be entertaining, instructive, and, under great earnestness, even awakening; but the lament to the prophet of Israel is applicable to souls brought into salutary distress by such a ministry: "The children are come to the birth, and there is not strength to bring forth."

After the personal experience of this doctrine by Wesley and his co-laborers, their word was in power, sinners trembled, and great numbers were converted. "From this time," is the declaration of a leading Wesleyan, "They began properly to preach the gospel." They had labored with all their energy and ability to establish the righteousness of the law, but neither knew nor preached the doctrines of the new covenant, and its comforts. Like

all men destitute of personal and experimental faith and hope and joy in the Lord, they never thought of offering pardon and peace to the guilty through the alone merits of Jesus Christ; and nothing short of this is the gospel.

What they had felt and seen, with confidence they told, and men listened to them as men in danger and trouble always will listen to those who show them the way of salvation. This witness of the Spirit was the key-note of their ministry, the burden of their songs, and the secret of their success. The weary and heavy-laden were offered *rest*—rest for their souls. Those who had been taught that chronic doubt was a sort of Christian virtue heard gladly of a more excellent way. Happy converts testified and shouted. The joy of the Lord was their strength. The voice of praise was in their tabernacles. The fervor of their devotions and the zeal of their evangelism—while defying the worldly and stirring up the lukewarm—drew to Methodism the most earnest elements, and gave it a place with the foremost in the Church militant.

METHOD AND AIM OF MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS.

BY W. B. SMITH, PH. D.

In this article it is proposed to develop but one thought: The aim of Science is, not to explain, but to describe, to picture the processes of Nature; to tell, not why, but how they take place. We have a right to require of Science that this description be simple and exact, that this picture be life-like and faithful. To accomplish her aim, Science must make certain assumptions: either notions, concepts or hypotheses, principles. These concepts are the frame-work of the picture Science would paint; these principles define the manner of its execution. In a certain degree they are and must be arbitrary. A discussion of the nature of some of the more important of them is reserved for another article.

Physics means primarily *science of Nature*. By *Nature* is meant the whole body of things that affect our senses. But of the word Physics, as of most words, usage has limited the primary meaning in more than one direction. The first ground for this limitation is

found in the meaning of the word *science*. This is a pet of the Nineteenth century. What does it mean? Answer: All science is knowledge, but not all knowledge is science. Science is *knowledge of Law*. This term *law* is another favorite of our age. Upon whomsoever the modern spirit breathes, into his mouth it puts the word *law*. Would that at the same time its meaning were put into his head! Three hundred years ago Hooker, in a passage of lofty eloquence, declared: "as for Law, her seat is in the bosom of God, her voice is the harmony of the world." It is the just boast, the undisputed glory, of modern thought to have established the truth of these words in a higher sense than even Hooker gave them. None the less is it true that to very many the term law, as used in physics, suggests but vague if not wholly erroneous notions. Some, taking their ideas from Blackstone and Kent, confounding a law of nature with a law of a State, attempt, by a play on words, to reason back from the existence of laws to the existence of a law-giver. With others, law means some mysterious power, working in a certain way. They speak of law doing this and that; they tell us that the law of gravitation wheels on the earth about the sun in the ever-rapid race of the spheres; that the law of heredity transmits the qualities of the parent to the child; for them any phenomenon is finally explained when it is ascribed to some law; yea, in the name of law God is discharged from the government of the universe. What, then, is a law of nature? It is an unvaried order of sequence or of co-existence, or, more simply, if less precisely, it is the *fact* that one thing always follows another, or goes along with another. To illustrate: It accords with all our observation, so far as our observation extends it is a fact, that any two bodies, free to move, more directly toward each other with speed at each instant quickened at a certain rate; directly as the product of the two masses and inversely as the squared distance between the bodies. The famous law of gravitation is naught more, naught less than this naked fact. Notice, it is a fact of sequence; the motion follows, each stage of it the preceding stage, and in a certain definite way. Again, it is a fact, a bare fact, that horned animals, so far as known, chew the cud, and this fact forms a law in zoölogy. Notice, this fact is not one of sequence,

but of co-existence. Chewing the cud neither goes before nor follows after having horns; they go together, side by side.

Thus the laws of Nature fall into two grand classes; uniformities of sequence and uniformities of co-existence. The whole body of the latter as yet discovered make up the so-called Natural Sciences. By a strangely ludicrous misnomer they are more commonly called Natural History. But as is clear at once, the notion of time, and hence of history, is wholly absent from these sciences. The whole body of uniformities of co-existence, and hence the whole body of natural sciences would be the same, were there no time and hence no history.

There remains the whole body of uniformities of sequence, to which the term Physics is properly applied. These themselves fall into two grand classes: physical sequences and chemical sequences, whence the two sub-divisions of Physics in its wider sense: Physics strictly so-called, and Chemistry. The difference between a physical sequence and a chemical one is this: the former is expressible, theoretically at least, in terms of mass and motion; at the present stage of science the latter is not so expressible. Thus any physical change in a piece of iron, even its magnetization or demagnetization, may be thought simply a change in the number or position of its particles; that is, it may be stated in terms of mass and motion. But a chemical change cannot be so thought. We cannot at present conceive the rusting of iron as a change in the number and position of its particles; that is, we cannot now state the sequence in terms of mass and motion. But because we cannot now so state it, it by no means follows that we shall never be able so to state it; in fact, the distinct goal which the prevailing mechanical theory now at last consciously sets before itself, is to state every physical sequence, from the rush of the planets to the aëration of the blood in the lungs, in terms of mass and motion; to describe every physical change as a re-arrangement of homogeneous masses—masses different only in place, in the fact that one is here and the other there. Accordingly, this sub-division into Physics and Chemistry is artificial, having its basis (or principle) not necessarily in any inherent and eternal unlikeness in the things divided, but it may be in our own ignorance of their real likeness. If future research shall reveal

such likeness, then this artificial sub-division will fail and Chemistry will be merged completely in Physics; if future research shall reveal no such likeness or a real unlikeness, then will this sub-division stand as Natural, Physics and Chemistry remain independent and co-ordinate. Only with Physics in its narrowest sense have we now to deal; that is, with uniformities not of co-existence but of sequence, and with such only of these as may be stated in terms of mass and motion. A discussion of these concepts themselves must be reserved for another article.

Thus far I have spoken very complacently of uniformities of sequence, as if they certainly were. I have, in fact, tacitly assumed their existence; and it is plain from the definitions given, that their existence must be either assumed or proved, if there is to be any talk about Physics at all. But the question still claims our attention: Are we sure that there are any uniformities of sequence? In other words, are we sure that any one thing, state, or condition, always follows another? For instance: We have seen many heavy objects unsupported in the air, and have noticed that, without exception, they fell toward the earth; we have often seen the sun go down, and have noticed that, without exception, it has risen again. Are not these uniformities of sequence? Not quite; to make them such, we must be sure that the next heavy thing, and the next, left unsupported, will fall earthward, that to-morrow the sun will rise, and so on. But are we not sure of this? Certainly no one doubts it. One and all, we believe the sun will rise, and believe it with a belief that no reasoning, however cogent, could, for a moment, shake. Still the question presses us: What ground, what rational, logical ground, have we for this unshakable belief? We believe it: yes! but why? Is it because the sun has risen so many times? This ground is but sand; this reason is no reason at all. The mere fact that a thing has happened a million times in a certain way, is no reason at all for believing that the next time it will happen in the same way. Suppose we notice the first issue of any event, as the cast of a die, and suppose we know no reason why it should happen this way rather than that, should be *a* rather than *b*. If it turn out to be *a*, and not *b*, and we know no reason why it turned out so, then when we come to notice the second happening we are exactly as we were at first: we know

still no reason why the second time it should fall out *a* rather than *b;* and so on forever. Continued observation might beget in us a belief that the next issue would be *a* and not *b*, but it could never supply the least reason for that belief; as the ages rolled by that belief might grow fixed immovably, but it would remain as irrational as at first. Accordingly, from the fact that a thing has always happened a certain way in the past, we cannot rationally infer that it will ever happen so in the future.

The past and the future lie very close to each other, closer than any two plates of finest polished glass; yet there is a chasm between them, a chasm narrower than thinnest film of subtlest ether: narrow, but impassable. The strongest-limbed reason can never o'erleap it, the most ingenious logic can never span it. From the frequency of the repetition, then—I repeat it—we can conclude nothing at all. Looking closer, we see that in point of fact, the frequency or infrequency of the event, of the sequence, has naught whatever to do with our belief in the uniformity of the sequence.

Eclipses occur but rarely, yet we expect them quite as confidently as we expect the rising of the sun. The experiment to illustrate conical refraction in aragonite has to my knowledge been performed but once, yet no physicist any more doubts the uniformity of the sequence than he doubts the waning of the coming moon. What, then, again I ask, is the ground of this irresistible and involuntary belief in the uniformity of a sequence observed, it may be, but once in the history of the race? Perhaps some one may answer: These events, sequences, were effects; they had exactly adequate causes, and like causes always produce like effects. To this answer there is much to object. How do we know that these events were effects and had causes adequate? Even if it were so, how could we know it, be sure of it? The most that we can ever know about any two events is that one followed or accompanied the other. The order of the events we can observe, but that is all. To say that one is cause and the other effect, is only another way of stating the bare fact that one goes before, the other after. Any causal link or relation between the two events is not a link observed and known to be there, but a link imagined in the mind and arbitrarily thrust in between by the mind itself. A man is sick, he takes a pill, he gets well; but whether his taking

the pill causes his getting well, that we can never know. I press against the book, it moves; so far all is clear; but did the pressure cause the motion? Was there any other relation between the two than the observed relation—that one accompanied the other? This is not only unknown, it is also unknowable. For the thing is done, and cannot be undone; we cannot go back and test whether the book would have moved, had I not pressed it.

But suppose it granted that we do know there is a causal link, the argument is not advanced an inch; for we have no means of knowing that like causes will always exist or will produce like effects if they do exist. Granted that the revolution of the earth is caused by the attraction of the sun; how do we know that the sun may not at any instant cease to attract, or that the earth may not at any instant cease to be attracted? We do not, we cannot, know it at all. What shall we say, then? The fact that we do, and must believe in uniformities of sequence, must believe that if any event *b* follows any other event *a* under any set of circumstances, the like event *b* has followed and will follow the like event *a* under a like set of circumstances at any other time,—this fact is wholly undeniable and wholly unaccountable. No hand can pluck this belief out of our minds, no eye can find a basis for it in our reason. But the fact is not the less valuable because we cannot explain it; farther on we shall see that neither can we explain any fact in nature.

If now we make, as make we must, this one wide reaching assumption of the existence of uniformities of sequence, the task of finding them would seem to be a simple one. We have merely to note the conditions under which *b* follows *a* once; then, assuming that the sequence will always be like under like conditions, we have a law of nature. Such would be, such is, experimental physics without the help of theoretical, mathematical physics: a simple thing, but a worthless one. For just here confront us two difficulties: (1) It has been said we must note the conditions under which *b* follows *a*. Now to note some of these conditions is very easy, but to note all of them, as we must, is very hard, yea, impossible. This difficulty inheres in the nature of the subject and can never be quite removed. It is the advantage of experimentation, as distinguished from observation, that it isolates, in a measure, the

phenomenon to be observed, sets it aside from other phenomena that usually go with it. Thus, the phenomenon of the quickened fall of heavy bodies toward the earth is ordinarily bound up with many very complicated phenomena of atmospheric resistance; but Atwood's machine very simply, yet ingeniously, parts the phenomena and leaves us to study the first by itself. Yet the utmost ingenuity can never effect a complete isolation of any phenomenon, can never loose every tie that binds it up with others; nay, the sharpest scrutiny can never so much as detect and number all of these ties, much less can ingenuity dissolve them. Hence the fullest statement of any process or sequence in nature must always be incomplete, and no law discovered by incomplete observation can claim to be more than nearly exact, an approximation. But (2) suppose this difficulty overcome, suppose we succeed in finding out and describing accurately all the conditions under which b follows a. We then assume that what happens once under these conditions must always happen under like conditions and proclaim as a law: under a sum total of conditions C, the state of things called b follows the state of things called a. Now mark: any change, the slightest in the sum of conditions C must change C to C' say, and hence b to b'. So we should have to have a second statement of a second law, and so on without end; and as in no two observations exactly the same set of circumstances meet, we should have to have exactly as many different laws as there were different events observed—an indefinitely great number. Thus, knowing accurately the path of a cannon ball fired at an elevation of 30 degrees, we should still know nothing accurately of the path when fired at an elevation of 40 degrees. Accordingly, depending on observation and experiment alone, we could never rise in knowledge above special cases, we could never know the path of the cannon ball fired at *any* elevation. What shall we do, then? Invoke the aid of theory. Only on her strong wings can we rise to higher views; only her compelling voice can call order from this chaos. Observation may supply us in limitless number with rough stones from the quarry of nature; the cunning chisel of experiment may shape them into a thousand curious and beautiful forms, but only beneath the soft persuasion of the magic Amphion-flute of Theory will they order themselves into the symmetric temple of

Science. What, then, is this Theory to which are ascribed such supreme functions? There are few finer words in the language, still fewer more abused, less understood.

To many, a theory is but a plaything of the mind, for which a sober, full-grown intellect has a pitying contempt, as well as for the visionary, the theorist himself. That matchless master of majestic English prose, DeQuincey, has told us that a theory is "an organic development to the understanding of the relations existing between the parts of any systematic whole." This definition has the merit of being precise and nearly accurate; it has the fatal defect of being unclear: it leaves the average reader as deep in the dark as it finds him. More simply, then: a *theory* is a *view*. This is the first word about it, it will also be the last. When you look at any number of things as connected, the way in which they seem to you connected, the *view* you take of them as connected, is your *theory*. Clearly now your view will, at least may, depend upon your *point of view*. This point of view is called an hypothesis, a supposition. But I prefer the simpler word *principle*, a word also bandied about with little care and less knowledge. What, then, coming to closer quarters, is an hypothesis, a principle, in the scientific sense of the terms? Answer: It is an *assumed* fact, itself inexplicable, in terms of which may be stated many other inexplicable facts. With respect, then, to a principle, please to note (1) that it is an assumption. It is not observed, it cannot be. No experiment can prove it, though an experiment may disprove it. It is, then, unverifiable, strictly speaking. (2) It is inexplicable. The assumption may be, indeed, is apt to be, far from self-evident' and we cannot take the first step towards proving it. Yea, I dare say, the assumption may be inconceivable even, yet will its value as a principle be not impaired. If, then, a principle is or may be unprovable, unaccountable, improbable, inconceivable, our choice of a principle would seem to be wholly at pleasure. Why not assume one thing just as well as another? Look once more at the definition. A principle is an assumed inexplicable fact, in terms of which may be stated many other inexplicable facts. Ah! there is what limits our choice, so limits it that only the acutest and profoundest intellect can assume a principle, can imagine a fact in terms of which may be stated many other facts. Just here I

am very glad to prop myself on the words strong and clear of the Columbus of the heavens, Nicolas Copernicus. In the preface to his epoch-making work on the revolutions of the heavenly bodies we read: *Neque enim necesse est eas hypotheses esse veras, imo ne verisimiles quidem, sed sufficit hoc unum, si calculum observationibus congruentem exhibeant.* We may translate: For it is not necessary that those hypotheses be true, nay, or even probable, but this one thing is enough: that the calculations based upon them agree with the observations. If this be correct, it follows that the physicist does not explain the processes of nature at all, he merely describes them concisely and accurately. For an explanation is a statement of the unknown in terms of the known; but the hypothesis or principle of the physicist, in terms of which he states whole bodies of natural phenonema, is not only unknown, but also unknowable. A most striking and brilliant illustration of what has just been said, is afforded by the best known and most completely developed and most thoroughly tested and most generally accepted of all physical theories: the Galilei-Newtonian theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies. This theory is the most imposing structure yet reared by human thought. Let us walk around it; mark well its bulwarks, and examine its foundations. A ball is thrown upwards, in any direction; it rises, more and more slowly, stops, begins to fall, falls more and more rapidly to the earth. Physicist, explain the motion of that ball, neglecting, for simplicity, the influence of the air. He answers: The path of the ball was a parabolic arc; questioning him more closely, we find he can tell all about the motion; exactly how long it lasted, what was its exact speed and direction at any moment of time. There is no question that you can ask him about it that he cannot answer with absolute exactness. His knowledge of the motion is both perfect and complete. But why, sir, was that path parabolic? He answers: It was due to two things: the laziness of the ball and the attraction of the earth. The ball was lazy; it would not change its state of motion or of rest except as made to do it, and the earth drew this lazy ball toward herself. Had the ball not been lazy, and the earth not attractive, we cannot say the blow would have had effect at all; had the ball been lazy, and the earth not attractive, the ball would have moved off in a right line at a constant rate, and forever;

had the ball not been lazy, but the earth attractive, immediately after the blow, the ball would have fallen straight to the earth; but the ball was lazy and the earth attractive, and so the ball moved in a parabolic path. Good! But why, pray, was the ball lazy and why did the earth attract it? What! No answer? Our physicist, that but now talked so glibly, is dumb! Not only can he suggest no reason why the ball should be lazy and the earth attractive, he cannot even take the first step towards proving that such is really the case. We indeed are so familiar with the notions of the inertia of matter and the attraction of the earth that we find nothing strange in them at all. But the secret of philosophy is to treat the unfamiliar as familiar, and the familiar as unfamiliar, and when we look narrowly at these notions we find them altogether incomprehensible.

Think of it! Suppose some survivor of the Jeannette polar cruise should tell us he found girding the pole an open sea peopled with icebergs, which were shouting to each other, "Hither! Hither! To me, you there, ten feet closer, and you, six!" and suppose he should add that each heard distinctly the shouts of all the others and obeyed their commands one and all instantly and exactly. What should we say? Either the man is crazy, or he thinks we are. Such a thing we should unhesitatingly pronounce wholly impossible.

But this is precisely what the famous law of Gravitation says is now going on throughout the solar system. Each particle of matter is continually calling to every other particle: "hither! to me!" with voice unheard by our ear of flesh and each call is obeyed at once and exactly. Such is the amazing hypothesis of Sir Isaac Newton. If it does not seem to us in the last degree absurd, it is because we have grown familiar with it, and no longer think to look it squarely in the face. But to the contemporaries of Newton it looked utterly absurd. Hear the words of Huyghens, himself on the pinnacle of science of that day, the champion of the now accepted wave-theory of light against Newton's corpuscular theory. I translate from his letter of November 18, 1690, addressed to Leibnitz:

"As for the cause of the tide, which Newton assigns, I am not at all satisfied with it, nor with any of his other theories which he bases on his principle of

attraction, which appears to me absurd, as I have already testified in the appendix to the discourse on gravity. And I have often been astonished that he could take the pains to make so many researches involving difficult calculations, which have no other foundation than this same principle."

Such was the opinion of a man of genius, an opinion at which we may now smile, seeing that the principle has maintained itself so brilliantly, has solved the riddle of the heavens and exorcised the universe. But in itself the principle remains and will probably always remain wholly unintelligible, yea, absurd, even as Huyghens pronounced it. For it is simply and eternally inconceivable that any particle of matter can draw another to it, or indeed work on another in any way at all. True, Le Sage and many others have attempted to deduce the principle of gravitation (or mutual attraction of particles,) but not only have all such attempts thus far failed, but against them all, in every form, the criticism of Ampére seems decisive. What shall we say, then? That the Newtonian principle of attraction and the Galileian principle of inertia give a complete and perfect description of the phenomena of moving masses, so far as these phenomena have as yet been observed; but of these phenomena these principles yield no explanation at all, for they themselves cry out for explanation forever and in vain. But is it after all not an objection to the Galilei-Newtonian Theory that its structure, splendid and imposing and firmly-knit as it certainly is, yet reposes thus on two pillars whose bases are laid in impenetrable darkness and wrapt about by eternal night? Assuredly not, if the words quoted from Copernicus be true, words for which I enter the list of contention here. It is not the purpose or function of a theory to explain the processes of nature; its sole function is to describe them, to tell exactly and in the simplest way how they take place. In giving us this description, simple and exact, the physicist may make any assumption, may use any principle, that he will; we can never object that his principle is improbable, inconceivable, absurd; for, firstly, he does not claim that his principle is true, or probable, or conceivable—all he says, is this: "My point of view, my principle, may be removed a thousand miles from the real scene of action—I know not, I care not, how that is—but this one thing I do know, if you will but assume this point of view, then shall you see clearly, not indeed

why events take place, but how they take place." Secondly, it can not be said of any transcendent hypothesis or principle, asserting something beyond the range of possible experience, like Galileo's or Newton's, that it is either probable or improbable, true or false. For any such principle must declare something about the nature or mode of being of the thing in itself, apart from its relations to us as thinking beings. But of the thing in itself, the unrelated thing, we can know nothing, it is to us zero. To illustrate: to say that, left to itself, the rest of the universe annihilated in thought, a ball would move in a right line or in a curve, with uniform velocity, or with varying velocity, or remain at rest, all these propositions mean the same, for each means nothing at all. The thing is to us what it is, not by virtue of itself, but by virtue of its relations to other things. These relations vanishing, the thing itself vanishes for us. Of transcendent principles we cannot, then, say true or false, probable or improbable, but we can say whether or no, the calculations based on them agree with our experience. Once more: Is this not after all a very unsatisfactory result? Granting that the present accepted principles of mechanics are such arbitrary assumptions, may we not yet hope that the future has something better in store for us? May we not in years to come discover some necessary, self-evident, self-explaining principle, by whose aid we may then not only simply and accurately describe the phenomena around us, but may also fully explain them all, thus satisfying every demand of the human mind? Well, let us suppose this possible; granted we have found such a principle. What does that mean? It means we have found some reason, some necessity, why the world, the whole system of things, should be as it is and not otherwise.

Now, does any such necessity exist? If not, if the world might have been something else than it is, then the matter is ended: we cannot find such a principle, for there is none to find. But if so, if the world could not be other than it is, if there exists some necessary self-evident ground of its being as it is, then where does it exist? Either in God, or not in God, in the nature of things themselves. But the nature of things is simply the fact that they are as they are, and not otherwise. Therefore, to say that the reason why things are as they are, is found in the nature of

things, is to say they are as they are, because they are as they are, which is meaningless. We turn to the alternative: the necessity, self-evident reason, is in God. If so, clearly it cannot be aught else than the very nature of God; that is, God himself, without being independent of God, hence higher than God, or at least co-equal with him: both which suppositions gainsay the notion of God. Accordingly, to know it, we must know God himself; and knowing him, we must know all that depends on him, that is, the universe itself. In fact, it is at once clear, that knowing the final self-evident reason of all things, we should know all things implicitly, and by a mere logical process we could reconstruct the universe in thought. Now, it is beyond the purpose of this metaphysical digression, for which I must ask pardon, to discuss the question whether it be possible to know God without being God; that purpose was merely to set forth this result: to discover any self-evident principle in physics would be to fathom to its depths the being of God; it would be to transform knowledge of one thing into knowledge of all things; Science (as yet but patch-work) into Omniscience. Accordingly, until the finite shall equal the infinite in knowledge, it must content itself with knowing *how* things happen, nor hope to know *why* they happen; and in seeking to tell how they happen, it is quite free to assume its point of view at pleasure, to propound any principle it sees fit, probable or improbable, rational or absurd, provided only it be capable of exact statement and lend itself readily to calculation. Of two rival principles, the question will not be which is most probable or natural, but which enables us to describe the events concerned most accurately and most simply. It follows that the last, the most, the best that can be said of any scientific theory, of any body of scientific knowledge is: (1) It is free from internal contradiction, self-consistent throughout; (2) It is free from external contradiction—so far as observed, the facts as they are, consist with the facts as they ought to be according to theory. A second obvious corollary is that, since the conceivability or inconceivability of a principle effects not its value, it is quite possible that some genius may yet apply some of the higher modern mathematical concepts to the description of physical phenomena. Thus a space of four dimensions is for us inconceivable; yet the doctrine of such a space admits of

mathematical statement as precise as the doctrine of our tri-dimensional space. Accordingly, it seems possible that the notions of gravity, magnetism, chemical affinity may yet be united under the notion of some one mode of action in a space fourfold extended. At least it is well to bear in mind the purely, arbitrary character of our fundamental principles, if we would shun a petrifaction of physical theory and a consequent stagnation of intellectual progress.

One more remark, and what I have to say of method in science, is said. We hear a great deal now-a-days of the worthlessness of Deduction and the paramount value of Induction in the sciences. Indeed, the most distinguished champion of the Inductive method, the especial philosopher of the man of science, John Stuart Mill, has written a great work on Logic, the aim of which is to show that we never reason in syllogisms; that our reasoning is from particulars to particulars, and which further seeks to establish certain laws or tests by which we may mount in our reasoning from particular facts to general laws. Now, I would not undervalue experiment and observation in scientific research. They are invaluable, but their value must be rightly understood. Be it said, then, that Mr. Mill's reasoning from particulars to particulars is simply no reasoning at all; no such reasoning ever did have, ever can have the shadow of a claim to validity or convincing power. As to the famous four methods of discovering laws of nature, they were admirable, if they could be applied with vigor, but with vigor they can never be applied. Take the first: "If any instance in which any phenomenon occurs and an instance in which it does not occur have *every* circumstance, in common, save one, that circumstance occurring in the former instance; then that circumstance in which alone the instances differ is the effect or the cause or an indispensable part of the phenomenon." Undoubtedly! but how can we know when two instances have "*every* circumstance in common but one," without knowing *all* the circumstances of the two instances? and how can we know all the circumstances of any instance without knowing the condition of the whole universe at that instance, that is, without being omniscient? Clearly, we cannot at all. To illustrate: I throw a piece of chalk — what are all the circumstances of that throw? Some of them I know, but all of them I cannot know. For aught I know, something at that

moment happening on the dog-star Sirius may have essentially determined the course of the chalk. Indeed, according to the Newtonian hypothesis of universal Gravitation, which Mr. Mill accepts, it is certain that not only the dog-star, but every other star in the whole heavens had a voice in determining the course of that chalk.

I repeat, then, the rough practical worth of Mr. Mill's method may be very great, but its rigorous logical worth is absolutely zero, for it can never be applied. But if Mr. Mill has failed to show the validity of the Inductive method, has he not at least shown the invalidity of the Deductive method? A deductive reasoning or Syllogism is of this form: Henry is a man; all men are mortal; therefore, Henry is mortal. Now objects Mr. Mill,—and the objection is hailed as a great logical discovery by Bain and Herschel, yea, in the light of it Spencer pronounces syllogistic reasoning a psychologic impossibility;—Mr. Mill objects that we cannot thus reason from universals to particulars, since we cannot know that all men are mortal until we know that Henry is mortal; consequently, says Mr. Mill, in our premise we assume the very thing we prove in our conclusion, and such reasoning is void and worthless. At first blush this objection seems decisive. The defenders of the syllogistic method have in the main contented themselves with showing, what was easy enough, that Mill himself used a syllogism to prove the worthlessness of the syllogism; that consequently he was like a man who would cut off from a tree the very branch himself was sitting on. But this *argumentum ad hominem* is not very satisfactory. It is hoped that what has been said of the province of hypothesis in science may set the matter in a clear light. First, then, let us admit, what is plain, that the major premise does assume the conclusion, or that we cannot know the major premise to be true without knowing the conclusion to be true. We cannot know that all men are mortal until we know that Henry is mortal. So far, Mill is right. Were it otherwise, indeed, the syllogism would have no cogency. But the question whether we know the major premise to be true, or no, has naught whatever to do with the reasoning of the syllogism; yea, more, the question whether the major be true, or no, has naught whatever to do with the reasoning. In fact, Logic itself has naught to do with

the correctness or incorrectness of the premises; its sole duty is to examine the connection of the premises and the conclusion, x is y, y is z; therefore, x is z: that reasoning is the same, whatever x, y, z may be. Mr. Mill's objection is simply this: we can never be certain of our general premise. True, and so we can never be certain of our conclusion; we can never be sure that Henry will die until he dies. But this by no means hinders us from reasoning on the supposition that all men are mortal. Logic vouches for the validity of the reasoning, but not for the correctness of the premises. It says, if your premises be this, your conclusion will be that. It is thus seen that all deductive reasoning is hypothetic. Expressed or implied, there is always an if. It is equally clear that all hypothetic reasoning is deductive; from some assumed general statement we draw out a number of particular statements. Now we have seen that all scientific interpretation or construction of nature proceeds upon some unproved and unprovable assumption of whose correctness we can never be sure, but in terms of which we can state an intelligible, simple, exact, and consistent view of the world around us. Against this assumption, then, and all the reasoning based on it, Mill's objection falls with full force: we cannot know it to be correct. But that full force is *no* force; for the principle was not assumed as true and must not be judged by the standard of truth: we cannot properly ask, is it true? But only do the results that flow from it agree with observation. These results we can find out only by deductive reasoning. We thus reach the conclusion that so far from all scientific reasoning being inductive, none of it deductive, as Mr. Mill and his school maintain; the case is exactly the reverse: all scientific reasoning is deductive, none of it inductive. In fact, to my mind Inductive reasoning is simply impossible; certain it is, I have never yet seen an example of an Inductive argument. What, then, is the province of observation and experiment? Not, assuredly, to demonstrate or discover law; that, no amount of either can do. But one thing they may do: to a keen intelligence they may suggest guesses. The guess made, the principle assumed, Physics calls upon her elder and mightier sister, Mathematics, to follow out that guess in all its consequences, to draw a map, a picture, of the world (as far as concerned) on the scale of that guess. This Mathematics does

and says: Here is a description of so much of the world in the language of your guess, a picture of how it must look through the spectacles of your principle, from the point of view of your hypothesis. If that picture be life-like, that description exact and simple, then is that guess accepted for the time, to be replaced at any moment by any other that will yield a clearer picture, a better description. Thus it was that the observations of Tycho Brahe suggested to the unwearied mind of Kepler, guess after guess, the consequences of which he compared with the facts in the case, and not until the eighteenth guess did he find consequences agreeing with the facts. Then at last he succeeded in describing the planetary motions in his famous three laws. But his description, though tolerably exact and far simpler than any hitherto given, yet in both simplicity and exactness left something to be desired. It was reserved for the genius of Newton to make a still bolder guess, to enounce a still broader principle, from which the laws of Kepler were but deductions. This guess we all know; it described the planetary motions thus: They take place as if every particle attracted every other particle in the direct ratio of the product of their masses and the inverse ratio of the squared distance between them. So far as our observations have as yet reached, this description seems absolutely exact, and it could hardly be simpler. Note especially the words *as if*. The mutual attraction of the particles is not asserted as a fact; it is assumed as the basis of a description. This principle was a guess, it is a guess, it will ever be a guess. Not even the splendid verification (so called) in the discovery of Neptune, that hermit star, far withdrawn from all society of his brother-spheres into the secret depths of space, that for ages had eluded the closest search of observation, but which the piercing eye of theory, armed with million-fold telescopic power, espied, nor the yet more brilliant discovery of the invisible companion of the dog-star, Sirius, at which for twenty-eight years the unerring finger of theory had been pointed, but which not till 1862 could the farthest-sighted telescope discern—not all can make the principle of Newton more than a sublime guess. From this principle the whole science of astronomy is but a deduction, and I repeat, no induction has ever proved or can ever prove it; observation but suggested it as a guess. So again, it was his observations and

experiments as a pigeon-fancier that suggested to Mr. Darwin, the second great organizer of thought, the guess that all the phenomena of the genesis, development, divergence, and extinction of species, of animals and vegetables might be described as the occurrence preservation, transmission, and accumulation of minute variations favorable to the individual in the struggle for life. If this guess, this so-called principle of Natural Selection, should ever be generally accepted, it will be, as with Newton's principle, because it yields a description of the phenomena of the world of life, a description simple and exact. But no more than Newton's guess can it yield an explanation of any phenomenon at all; for even when supplemented by the theory of Pangenesis it leaves its assumptions: occurrence, transmission and accumulation of minute variations wholly unexplained.

By dint of much repetition I hope now to have made one thing clear: Science may describe, but only through the assumption of arbitrary principles, and, therefore, Science can never explain. Hence flow two obvious corollaries: (1) Scientific theories are not mutually exclusive; because a certain principle yields a simple and exact description of a class of phenomena, it does not follow that some other very different principle may not yield a description equally simple and exact. (2) After Science has done her utmost, after, let us say, she has described all phenomena of Nature in terms of one single principle, in other words, after the consummation of science, there will yet remain untouched by her triumphant feet the still higher realm of the explanation of phenomena. Within the charmed circle of description her steps are hemmed; over the enchanted border into the vast outlying realm of explanation she may not cross. That realm belongs not to Science, not to knowledge; it belongs to religion, to faith. It will always be competent to religion to posit as the ultimate ground, reason, explanation of all things such a highest Somewhat, such a God, as involving in its notion no metaphysical contradiction shall yet satisfy the demands of the heart of man. Let us suppose, then, the extremest case: let us suppose that the tendency of all the Natural Sciences, which, as Kirchhaff says, is to resolve themselves into Mechanics, has been realized, let us suppose adapting the words of Hæckel, that the general theory of Evolution shall suc-

ceed in presenting all Nature as one great, unital, continuous, and everlasting process of development, and in expressing all natural phenomena, from the flight of the spheres and the slow-toiling march of the glacier up to the growth of the plant and the consciousness of man, in purely mechanical terms, as changes in the configuration and motion of a mass-system, than, which description, says the lamented Clerk Maxwell, "we cannot conceive any further explanation to be either necessary, desirable, or possible"—let us suppose all this; what then would a man have to say to Science thus victorious over the whole realm of Nature—a man in sympathy with Science, rejoicing in her conquests as his own, and gladly conceding the justice of her claims, yet a man to whom the claims of the heart were as sacred as those of the head, who was like pledged to obey the laws of his intellect and to satisfy the demands of his soul? Such a man, methinks, might speak on this wise: Glorious art thou, O, Science, with inalienable glory. Not even the faithful undeceiving sunbeams can paint a picture so exact as thou dost trace of the illimitable world. Thou dost lend me eyes that pierce to the uttermost recesses of infinite space and behold outspread and clear in minutest details the endless universe. Yea, with hand of might thou dost lift for me the impenetrable veil of the future and the still darker curtain of the past, and I behold unrolled the gorgeous panorama of eternal time. I look back and see the endless procession of the ages gone; I look forward and see the ceaseless march of the ages to come. With thee as mentor I know how all things have happened, how all things do happen, how all things will happen forever. Grand and awful is the scene! I thank thee, O! Science, for the glorious view. But yet my eyes are not content. They strain insatiate to pierce through behind the veil, to see beneath the glowing colors of thy canvas the eternal truth that animates it, to find for thy manifold *how* one final soul-satisfying *why*. Dost thou answer: that is not a vision for human eyes, that Gœthe has put words of truth into the mouth of the Earth-Spirit:

> "Through Time's whirring loom so the shuttle I drive,
> And weave of the God-head the garment alive,"*

*So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.

and that man may indeed know the form and semblance of this garment, but never the God-head that wears it? True, O! Science, but thou that dost confessedly, yea, professedly rest all thy sublime descriptions on unproved and unprovable assumptions, whose sole justification is that they yield clear and consistent description of the facts of Nature, least of all canst thou object to my assuming as an object not of knowledge, but of faith, a God glorious beyond epithet, in whom centres all of worth in the world of worlds, in whom the enigma of the universe finds its full and final solution. And dost thou ask me to justify this assumption? In thy own words I answer: This assumption, this faith, while it involves no contradiction, alone can satisfy the cravings of my soul; alone can harmonize the facts of my moral being, alone can reconcile me to myself and to the world. While, then, I cannot see the God-head through his garment of life, it is my faith, religious, philosophic, and not unscientific that He is there.

As the veil of broidery fine
For the temple wrought of old,
Dropped before the awful shrine,
Bloomed in purple, gleamed in gold;

So the broidered earth and sky,
Ever present, always near,
Charm the soul and fill the eye—
Marvelous, matchless, beauteous, dear.

While the veil our God hath wrought,
Hangs before the holy place,
It must reign o'er sight and thought,
Drawn between us and his face.

When the veil is rent in twain
Shall the present God appear;
We shall see him then full fain—
Matchless, changeless, beauteous, fair.

WOMEN OF SHAKSPEARE.

LUCIA PORTER LANDER.

The introduction to this short study of Shakspeare's women offers an opportunity for a few remarks on women in general that no merely human talker can afford to let pass. This is a subject on which nobody hesitates to give an opinion. From the time when the author of the Pentateuch shows her to us as the prime actor in the world's first tragedy, down to Mr. Ruskin's latest vagaries on the subject, has woman's case been discussed. Philosophers have theorized her into the realm of pure abstractions; the nobler poets have gifted her with all the graces; sentimentalists have celebrated her in sighs; libertines have dragged her name through the slime of sensuality; cynics have annihilated her with a curl of the lip; satirists have laughed her outside the realm of dignified discussions; religionists have rhapsodized over her piety; infidels have scoffed at her weakness; everybody has ventured to give his theory of her purposes and motives, and nobody but Mr. Lowel has seemed to realize that

> "To say why gals act so and so,
> Or don't 'ould be presumin."

And yet it still remains to pluck out the heart of its mystery from womanhood.

Like all great and vital questions, this one of woman's nature and capacity changes its base with every advance of humanity. In attempting to solve it once for all, we find ourselves like travelers on the mountains. We gain some long desired eminence only to have revealed to us a peak that towers still above us; or like visitors to some Gothic cathedral. Point by point the structure rises, each spire serving to lead the eye to a higher one. "This work that never ends, still climbing, luring fancy still to climb," until it becomes the most beautiful expression of "aspiration incomplete;" the perfect type of those heaven-scaling desires that lift the souls of those who worship within.

As long as the race moves upwards, gaining as it goes, broader views of its own life, and at the same time expanding that life, so long will there remain something unsaid of womanhood.

In order to arrive at a just appreciation of Shakspeare's treatment of woman, we should know something of her position in life and literature, in his own times and in the times which he inherited in England and in the many countries whose blood flowed in English veins, and whose thoughts lingered in English minds. In a paper of so limited length as this, it is possible to give only the merest glance at this, a subject that has exhausted volumes and engaged the attention of the profoundest philosophers.

Among the Northern races, in a stern climate, amidst rugged scenery, women grew calm, intellectual, self-controlled. In most cases prevented by physical weakness from engaging in the fight, the only honorable occupation of a nation in the earlier stages of its growth, the same influences that made the warriors bold, hardy, stubborn in battle, made her at home brave, thoughtful, self-helpful. Consequently with these people we find her honored, recognized as a member of the tribe, a factor in the national life, oftentimes as a ruler. So great did the reverence for her intellectual superiority become, that Tacitus tells us the Germans paid her divine honors, regarding her as an oracle.

Of course we find this feeling reflected in the Northern literature. In the Mibelung Saga, the great Norse epic, Brunhild, the loving wife, appears first as the unhesitating avenger of her murdered husband, and then as the unshrinking immolator of self, in his honor. In the Béowulf, the first heroic poem of our Teutonic ancestors, the hero finds his most difficult task in the destruction of Grendel's mother, after the monster himself had fallen an easy victim; and Hrothgar's queen bids Béowulf welcome to the feast with a certain stately grace and sincere dignity that might well become a more modern banquet hall.

What figure in history more picturesquely vivid than that of Boadicea, the strong, yellow-haired queen, as "standing loftily charioted," she dashes into the field, and rouses her fierce Britons to the bloody extinction of the Roman conquerors of this, "their isle of blowing woodlands, isle of silvery parapets." And a little later, Ethelfleda, the warrior-queen and woman-ruler, directing the affairs of her own kingdom of Mercia, and at the same time dispatching her armies to the conquest of the Welsh in far Strathclyde, and checking the inroads of the barbarous Picts.

But time fails, in which to give all the examples that go to prove, that amongst the Northern European races, woman bore no inconspicuous part in life and action.

On the contrary, the woman of the South, perhaps wrought upon by the gentle climate, reared in the midst of the tenderer aspects of nature, grew, in some degree, weak and thoughtless. As with her Northern sister, physical incapacity debarred her from the chance of honorable action in arms, and the same causes that made the men of this land quick, fiery, aggressive, yet withal skillful in the field, made her in the house, frivolous, petty, moodful, yet cunning. So she came to be regarded as a trifler, a joke. And thus for the most part she stands embalmed in their literature.

In the great epic of Southern Europe, the Iliad, though we see in Helen the prime motive of all the action, we see her only as the exciter of passions which she is powerless to control or subdue, and in the dash and fury of which she is carried hither and thither, the plaything of fate. If these poems embody the early thought of the Greek race, certainly we cannot regard Helen as altogether an intellectual abstraction. She meant something more to this poet, or these poets, than an embodiment of the Beautiful. There must have been something of the flesh-and-blood woman in her to make her tangible to this young race. And though we can feel no reproach for this "daughter of the gods divinely fair," and even young, still it is interesting to note this Southern type of womanhood.

Andromache, the noblest woman in the poem, according to our modern judgment, appeals to us only through her helpless grief.

In the later periods of Grecian history, woman was regarded as a very unimportant factor in life. You know that at Athens, in its best days, she was permitted no part in the training of her sons after their fourth year. Of course she gets a corresponding estimate from the writers.

Italy takes her social and literary fashions from Greece, and here we find women occupying substantially the same position and gaining the same depreciation. Virgil gives us no earnest woman. True, he shows us the Carthaginian queen capable of dying for love, but the circumstances tempt us to say that the "widow Dido,"

at her time of life ought certainly to have known better. Horace laughs at her as an idler or sighs over the pains she gives as a coquette.

To be sure, in the best days of Roman civilization, she attained to no inconsiderable degree of respect as a wife and mother. Yet, even then, Metellius Numidicus, a Roman censor, dared to say, "Had kind Nature allowed us to exist without the help of woman, we had been delivered from a very troublesome companion." There is one picture that glows like a star in this dark waste of neglect. Tacitus gives it us in his mention of Julia Procilla, the mother of Agricola, controlling and guiding the studies of her ardent boy, in their cultured retreat at Massilia.

But though this state of affairs shows some improvement on her former condition, still in her own proper person, she wrought no appreciable effect on history or literature, and she seems soon to have lost her crown. For of her status, mental and moral, in the literature of the later Italian period, who will have the courage to speak?

Now, it was just this Southern literature that gave England her first models. When first the din of barbarian battles began to grow faint, and the clouds of the middle ages began slowly to give place to the returning sunlight of thought, English students found occupation only in these Southern tongues. As is very well known, every particle of a serious education had to be derived through the Latin, while the Italian and, to some extent, the French furnished all of Belles-lettres.

To be sure, then, our early English writers drew their inspiration and type from a source whence we could expect nothing very flattering to women.

We are tempted to think that the women who appear in our literature prior to Shakspeare must have been imitations of copies that never had an original. Our English authors perhaps adopted the traditional woman as they learned of her from their Italian masters, instead of studying her from the original in England.

Then there was another influence which we must not undervalue—that of the Church as it existed in the middle ages. This it was that was most powerful in fixing and maintaining a low estimate of womanhood. The monasteries were almost the only

schools in England, and we may be sure the monks did not fail to inculcate, among the other lessons, the one that made their pupils regard woman as a vessel of wrath, a snare and a tempter.

One other consideration. Before Shakspeare's own century, the upper classes as a general thing, do not appear as producers of literature. They were exclusively occupied with the study of manners and arms. It was considered proper for the sons of tradesmen, youths from the middle classes to exercise their brains in the tedious pursuit of learning. These, then, became the authors, and since they knew so little of the better class of women from association, their attempts to depict them resulted in caricature. And in those early days the women whom they met in their own social walks were scarcely desirable acquaintances in books or in life.

In Chaucer we find woman either absurd or disgusting. His coarser types may have been original studies, but they were not his serious work. And who can believe in such creatures as he gives us when he would embody feminine attractiveness? Weak, weeping, lack-a-daisical, with not an inch of good Northern backbone in their anatomy.

Spencer, "the poet's poet," gives us creatures far "too bright and good for human nature's daily food." One of his idealized characters bears about the same relation to a real, live woman that one of Raphael's cherubs does to a genuine healthy, laughing, crying, loving, teasing, darling of a baby.

But when Shakspeare, the poet, (the maker) came, he gave us human creatures who lived and loved, hated and died, before our very eyes. Saying it in all reverence, he does seem to have possessed the attributes of the creative soul. He made his characters, but he could not or would not control their actions.

We find him to be the first of our writers, who gave women uniformly just and honorable treatment. The explanation is doubtless found in two considerations: the circumstances and the man. He belonged to that Teutonic stock whose women, as we have seen, were ever held in that high regard, which they in a measure deserved, when no outside influence cast discredit on them. He lived at a period when the empire of force began to weaken, and the reign of ideas to be inaugurated; so he could not fail to

see the increased influence of women in such a state of society. His age saw, for the first time in many centuries, a woman on the throne who thought and acted for herself. The policy of Henry VIII., and Elizabeth, in regard to the reformation, had done much to throw off the supremacy of Rome, and had almost abolished monastic life; so that women were free from the slights hitherto put upon them by the religious party. Then Shakspeare's own genius rose above all traditional, literary and masculine prejudices, and gave his women scope to display their real characters. It has been said that he created five heroines for every hero. And one has very gallantly added that this is about the proportion in real life. As he holds the mirror up to nature and her long procession moves past that flawless sheet, notice among the reflections the varied forms of women. Lady Macbeth, brilliant, unscrupulous, eminently active, and Ophelia, rose of May, dying from shear lack of will. Portia of Belmont, calm, wise, self-contained, and Juliet, the passion of whose love brooked no reservation. Cato's daughter, Brutus' Portia, having "the mind of a man," indeed, but such a womanly heart, and rustic Audrey, uncouth, untaught. Goneril and Regan, stupid in vice, and the admired Miranda, impersonation of innocence. Beatrice, a bit of a shrew, who will still be talking, and Cordelia, the silent maiden, pure and sweet as the works of Grecian chisel. Desdemona, the model of wifely tenderness and constancy, and Gertrude of Denmark, who, within a little month, could forget the husband on whom

> "Every God did seem to set his seal
> To give the world assurance of a man,"

for the sake of a "king of shreds and patches." Perdita, dainty and sparkling as the early dew drops, and Juliet's nurse, chuckling in coarse good-nature over her own rude jokes. Rosalind, the falcon-hearted,

> "With daring fancies of her own,
> Fresh as the dawn before the day,
> Fresh as the early sea-swell blown
> Thro' vineyards from an inland bay,"

and Hero, rare vision of sweet clinging girlishness.

The characters whose names are included in this catalogue, which is by no means exhaustive, separate themselves easily into

two classes; group themselves on each side the line that runs through the whole race. On one side the bad, the representatives of the negative side of life, on the other, the good or positive characters. We have passed the age of negation in the world's history, and shall find our lessons in the positive, the assertive phases of life and character. I shall attempt no further classification of personalities so numerous and so varied. Such an attempt seems as hopeless of success as an attempt to include under any small number of heads the infinite peculiarities of our own circle of feminine acquaintances.

A word just here: It has been said that women are naturally averse to classifying; that they know not how to generalize; seem unable to put two and two together and make four, but insist upon dealing with the two's separately. Now if this be true, and it is not the result of that lack of genuinely scientific training from which the sex has always suffered, but is a peculiarity inherent in the feminine mind, it opens the way to what might prove an interesting question of morals. Those who have studied human nature and who speak sincerely, have said that women have naturally a finer moral perception than men; that the shades of right and wrong seem more clearly marked off in their minds than in those of their brothers. In the world of men and action, it is often bewildering to observe how, in affairs of any extent, right and wrong so blend that it is impossible, looking at the whole, to tell where one ends and the other begins. So that when one takes large views and watches the working of the world through long periods, he comes at last to say: perhaps there is no wrong. How am I to decide that *whatever* is, is not the right? Now those who regard only the separate phases of action or of progress, do not encounter this danger. It is comparatively easy to distinguish right from wrong in a limited field. So if it be true that woman's vision is short, the shortness is more than compensated for by its clearness. If it be true that she is unable to perceive the greatest good for the greatest number, yet it is still true that she helps to bring about this general good by a fine perception of individual goodness. Perhaps this thought helps to explain woman's elevation in those nations in which Christianity is the accepted form of religious belief. The very spirit of Christianity, which is first of

all individual purity, personal uprightness, co-operates with and furthers this natural tendency of her being.

It must be that Shakspeare had some regard to this peculiarity of woman's nature; for we find he gives us no woman of "mingled sentiments." They have a single purpose, an intense, absorbing earnestness which carries them through to the end in view, or carries them till they are overswayed by the doubts and falterings of the men.

And this leads me to what I believe to be Shakspeare's highest conception of womanhood. It is the truly womanly element that remains most steadfast in the whole fabric of human society, as he saw it. In Henry VIII, that terrible record of the uncertainty of human greatness, Queen Katherine stands, in the midst of all her miseries, firm in the strength of conscious rectitude. Constance almost blasts with a torrent of burning words the kings whose inconsistencies give the lie to her fervent hopes. The gentle Isabel, in "Measure for Measure," never loses sight of her high ideal, "perpetual honor."

Hermione keeps, through all the long separation, a silent, unwavering love in her heart.

Nothing could turn Volumnia, the mother of Cariolanus, from her heroic purposes.

Amid the terrific convulsion of passion in Othello, our minds cling to Desdemona's devotion to her husband, as the only thing left us in all the world.

Imogen, through all her trials, remains unswervingly faithful to right and duty, and came forth from those trials radiant in the beauty of unsullied womanhood.

The wisdom and constancy of Portia, in "Merchant of Venice," liberate the whole company from seemingly inextricable difficulties, and lend a new grace to life and love. In King Lear, it is Cordelia who "redeems nature from the general curse," and saves us from despair. As subjects for more special consideration, I have selected the last two heroines named.

First, then, Cordelia: She is a type of that vast army of heroines, unsung, unhonored, who know to indure the ills of life and to teach endurance of them, without the ability to remove them. This inability may be no fault or weakness of their own.

The ills with which the story of Cordelia is entwined are such as might not be combatted. They were as resistless as the calamities in the Oedipus Tyrannus. So Cordelia shows us how the ills of life may best be borne. We like to think that Shakspeare found his most congenial work in portraying for us this "unprized precious maid." She belongs to his own race and possesses the finest qualities of that race in their perfection. Earnestness, dislike of ostentation, the highest regard for truth and honor, all tempered and brightened, by a ready cheerfulness, a delicate satire, and, heathen though she was, a gentle piety. The poet gives us in one other character the traits of his countrywomen as they appear in action. In Imogen in Cymbelene, widely different though she is from Cordelia, since she is, as Mr. Whipple says, the most fully expressed of Shakspeare's women, while Cordelia is the most reserved, we see the same directness of speech, the same seriousness of purpose, and uncompromising honor, and that ability to deal with emergencies which yet distinguishes the daughters of their race. Less self-conscious than Portia, she is quite as ready for action, and she confers an additional dignity on what she does since "what she well intends she does't before she speaks."

In the first scene, when the old king announces his intention of resigning his state in favor of his daughters, and says furthermore that he will bestow the highest favor where love most challenges it, the extravagantly insincere protestations of her sisters, seem so to disgust Cordelia, that her own answers at first glance show more than sincerity. They partake somewhat of bluntness. Aside from this reaction against the hypocrisy of her sisters, what answer could a true-souled woman make to the question of the childish Lear. "What! do you profess, to draw a third more opulent than your sisters?" She withrew from such a contest with loathing, and answered, "Nothing, my lord."

But before this, when Goneril and Regan were making their wordy affirmations of devotion, Cordelia had two significant asides. While Goneril declares that her love makes "breath poor and speech unable," Cordelia asks herself "what shall Cordelia speak," and determines to "love and be silent." And when Regan professes herself an enemy to all other joys but her father's love, Cordelia says again:

"Then poor Cordelia,
And yet not so, since I am sure my love's
More ponderous than my tongue."

So with obstinate truthfulness she persists in her reply: "Nothing, my lord."

"Nothing will come of nothing," says Lear. "Speak again." "Unhappy that I am," protests Cordelia.

"I cannot heave my heart into my mouth. I love your majesty
According to my bond. No more, no less.
You have begot me, bred me, loved me. I
Return those duties back again, as are right fit,
Obey you, love you, and most honor you.
Why have my sisters husbands if they say
They love you all? Haply when I shall wed
That lord whose hand must take my plight, shall carry
Half my love with him! half my care and duty.
Sure, I shall never marry like my sisters,
To love my father all."

She had probably made up her mind on this subject; for did there not now stay at her father's court two noble suitors rivals for her hand? and those who read what Cordelia does *not* say, know which way her choice had gone.

"But goes thy heart with this?" asks Lear. "Ay! my good lord; so young and so untender," moans the disappointed old father. "So young, my lord, and true," she answers, insisting on the true. "Thy truth then be thy dower," flashes the angry king, and casts her off with a curse, bidding her lovers be called, that they may decide who shall take the portionless princess.

We have a touch of captivating humor in her reply to the Duke of Burgundy, when he makes his regrets to her that he cannot marry her without a dower:

"Peace be with Burgundy!
Since that respects of fortune are his love,
I cannot be his wife."

But she does get just the wooing she deserves. Hear the manly declaration of the king of France:

"Fairest Cordelia! that art most rich, being poor,
Most prized, forsaken, and most loved, despised;
Thee and thy virtues here I seize upon, ...
Not all the dukes of waterish Burgundy
Can buy this unprized, precious maid of me."

So she gives him her hand and disappears for a time from the play; though throughout the terrible scenes we feel her pure influence, as if in the midst of the sights and sounds of a burning city, we should remember some quiet country spot, where the trees whisper in the moonlight, and the voices of a sweet summer night fill the air.

When she does re-apppear to save her child-changed and crazed father, then we see how she can love. To Shakspeare himself she now "partook of divineness," and he hallows the very tears she sheds for her father's misery.

> "She shook
> The holy water from her heavenly eyes."

She knows no daughter ever has a truer, tenderer, more self-sacrificing lover than her own father; and now she "returns those duties back again as are right fit."

In accordance with her character we learn of her always from what somebody else says of her. So we could not have spared that exquisite touch conveyed in the loving words of the poor old king, when after the battle he and his daughter are prisoners:

> "Come, lets away to prison.
> We two alone will sing like birds in a cage.
> When thou dost ask me blessing, I'll kneel down,
> And ask of thee forgiveness. So we'll live;
> And sing, and pray, and tell old tales, and laugh
> At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues
> Talk of court news. . . .
> Have I caught thee?
> He that parts us shall bring a brand from heaven,
> And fire us hence like foxes."

When she has been treacherously strangled in the prison, and Lear appears carrying her dead in his arms, "compassion and awe so seize upon all our faculties, that we are left only to silence and to tears." Then is added just the stroke to complete this perfect portrait. When Lear is straining his whole being in the hope of hearing a stir of breath from her lips, he says:

> "Her voice was ever soft, gentle and low,
> An excellent thing in woman."

But that soft voice nevermore stirs the truthful lips, though her father dies in the tender fancy that she speaks to him again.

When we contemplate the character of Portia, the heroine of "Merchant of Venice," we are filled with that inexpressible pleasure which possesses us when we listen to the Moonlight Sonata. It is so finished, so completely rounded in every detail that we despair of ever making our impression of it known. We could justly say of her what Ferdinand says to Miranda:

> "Thou, so perfect and so peerless, art compounded
> Of every creature's best."

In a few master strokes the poet leaves upon us at the very first mention of her in the play an indelible impression of her golden-haired beauty and the various other extraneous attractions that cluster about her:

> "In Belmont is a lady richly left
> And she is fair and fairer than that word:
> Of wondrous virtues . . .
> Her name is Portia. Nothing undervalued
> To Cato's daughter Brutus' Portio.
> —And her sunny locks
> Hang on her temples like a golden fleece
> That makes her seat at Belmont Colchis' strand
> And many Jasons come in quest of her."

In the inimitable dialogue which introduces her to us, the lighter graces of character find their fittest expression. Notice her cheerfulness, which is not dimmed for a moment even by the uncertainty attending the trial of the caskets. Her witty description of her suitors is perennially fresh. A loving acquiescence in the order of things makes her believe that the result of her father's test will be what she wishes.

Next, the quieter beauties of womanhood delight us in her. Notice with what gentle charity she receives and dismisses her unsuccessful lovers, the charming, elegant hospitality with which she welcomes and entertains her guests; the princely generosity of her assistance of her husband's friend; the modest frankness with which she confesses her love to Bassanio before he goes to his choice of the caskets, in those unequaled words: "I pray you tarry," etc., and then the womanly dignity with which she controls her feelings. Yet, the deepest and highest feelings of which the human soul is capable are hers. Look (reverently) at the fullness and completeness of self-surrender in her speech to Bassanio

when he claims her love as the fulfillment of the promise contained in the casket: "You see me Lord Bassanio, where I stand," etc. A beautiful appreciation of the sacredness of friendship helps her to understand the obligations of her husband to Antonio.

A pure, fervent religion guides and controls her every thought and act. Only a sincere religious experience could have taught her the famous plea for mercy.

To her belongs intellectual acuteness and vigor in a remarkable degree, with an eloquence that might have distinguished her in any court. Besides, she has the imagination of a poet which gilds with its "heavenly alchemy" everything it touches. With this we find united the sublimest traits of human character; an unflinching firmness of purpose, a chivalric sense of honor, and an unselfish devotion to the good of others. Only Shakspeare could have added another beauty to such a character. But he does it when he permits us to see the loving content, with which, after all her triumphs, Portia come back to Belmont, and her life's quiet happiness.

Thus imperfectly have I given you some thoughts of a few of the immortal beings that people the magic world of the poet's fancy. How unworthily it has been done, you who have studied his own pages know very well. But if any word of it begets or strengthens a determination to learn of them for yourselves, I shall not have failed of success. I can do no better than to direct you to such a teacher.

There will you find the eternal beauties of human character expressed in words and actions that befit the thought. You will learn of him how truth, and honor, and right are permanent and abiding, surviving the "wreck of matter and the crush of worlds;" how in all circumstances, ages and climatures the excellences of a noble woman support and guide the destinies of the race; that it is the truly womanly element alone that is stable in the whole fabric of human society. For this seems to be the central lesson we must gather from Shakspeare's women. As Goethe after traversing the realms of nature, knowledge and legend, closes his sublime tragedy with the words of the mystic chorus: "The ever-womanly draws us above," so Shakspeare seems to conclude the ever-womanly sustains us below. So he will teach you

something of your own dignity. But prophet though he was, in some sense, even he scarcely foretold the dignity to which our modern womanhood was to rise. For truly all things are yours. As in Shakspeare's own times, the making or marring of society is in your hands. In our own day the priceless heritage of learning, to which our poet himself added unnumbered treasure, has fallen to you. When you shall have made this your own, where is the limit to your power.

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UNCONSCIOUS ORTHODOXY.

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Perhaps one of the most important and valuable of all the results, which the scientific, philosophical and theological investigations which have marked the present age have achieved, is found in the great lines or currents of thought which those investigations have laid open, and which are stated with more or less clearness in much of the scientific, biblical and skeptical literature of to-day.

It is found that when men of deep and earnest thought, working in apparently unrelated and antagonistic departments of human research, have broken through the outer crust of things, and as it were, peeled off the rind of visible surroundings and circumstances, that similar connections are finally reached, and already the promise and prediction of a grand ulterior harmony begins to fling its welcome dawn upon those fields, where the noise of conflict through many long and dolorous years has been heard again and again. It is becoming evident, yet more and more, that all truth is linked together by invisible relations and bonds of the most intimate and enduring kind; and though men in their short-sightedness, and fragmentary knowledge have endeavored to introduce alienations and discordant elements into truth's harmonious and peaceful domain, the prospect now is, that the divinely established connections and agreements through all her kingdoms and realms will yet be seen in such a manner, as shall fill all noble souls with admiring wonder, and put to utter humiliation and shame the boasted opinions of ill-instructed and prejudiced men.

From unexpected quarters, and from sources professedly hostile, a multitude of witnesses are constantly rising up to corroborate, in the most conclusive manner, the teachings and doctrines of that Book which has outlived ages of the most determined opposition and maintained its triumphant march across the storm-swept periods of the past—a past in which myriads of other books have found their utter overthrow and lonely graves. Many influential minds, though clad in the livery of unbelief, and whose visible attitude is one of pronounced antagonism to the Christian faith, are yet undesignedly and involuntarily bringing to light certain discoveries and principles which are ultimately to confirm the teachings of the Biblical revelation in the most wonderful manner. It is true that the banners which those men carry, the trumpets they sound, the armor they wear, and the phraseology they utter are different from that employed by the Christian theists of the age; but the ever multiplying evidences and acknowledgments point with irresistible logic to a final unity, which will be a theme of admiration and wonder to the generations yet to come.

The chief object in the present contribution, is to call attention to the fact that after the most earnest, patient and able investigations in the various fields of religious, scientific and philosophic enquiry, results have been gathered, which carry with them in many instances, the undesigned recognition of many of the fundamental principles and teachings of the biblical revelation, a revelation whose office and mission among earth's thronging multitudes, is to answer the deepest interrogations of the soul, and furnish such motives and explanations as shall prove sufficient to move the rustiest hinges of man's spiritual being; and inaugurate that age of peace of which the ancients dreamed and sung, and whose coming golden dawn, already gilds the Eastern sky and will yet flood a dark and troubled world with its welcome and glorious beams. Our first illustration of an undesigned and unconscious orthodoxy is found in

I. THE UNIVERSAL CONVICTIONS AND ANTICIPATIONS OF PAGAN AGES AND NATIONS.

Looking at the principal facts and ideas which have distinguished the general career, and given color and character to the

religious history of all races, it is now admitted by all who have made the various religions of mankind a matter of earnest and candid examination, that in and through them all, are great primary beliefs and convictions common to each, and standing through the long centuries of change, as foundation-stones in the immense religious fabrics which have been reared in the wide and gloomy fields of heathendom from age to age.

Sir John Lubbock in his "Origin of Civilization," page 115, recognizes these religious ideas common to Pagan peoples, and says: "Races in a similar stage of mental development, however distinct their origin may be, and however distant the regions they inhabit, have very similar religious conceptions." The profound ideas and inquiries respecting the invisible Being and of the existence of a state beyond the dark portals of the grave, have played an impressive and influential part in the religious career of nations which have made any mark or show in the strange and checkered history of the past. The universal consciousness of guilt and the felt need of some sacrificial atonement which will secure the required reconciliation; the profound necessity of a revelation of the Supreme Being, other and higher than nature supplies; the position occupied by man in the scale of being and the value of life in the present world, and the relations of that life to the unseen state beyond; the conscious want of, and belief in, an incarnation of God, and the piteous appeals for a richer consolation than earth can give in the trying and sorrowful experiences of life and death; the belief in the agency of good and evil spirits and the conditions of bliss and woe beyond time's fleeting years. These convictions, wants and expectations have been more or less the common property and possession of mankind in their various branches and ramifications; they have been deeply embodied in the annals of the past, have swayed the intellect and conscience of myriads with a tremendous and victorious power, and with a wonderful energy and persistence have prolonged themselves across the ages to the present hour.

Max Müller writes: "We may safely say that, in spite of all researches, no human beings have been found anywhere who don't possess something which to them is religion or, to put it in the most general form, a belief in something beyond what they can see

with their eyes." Professor Tiele, of Leyden, a thorough-going religious evolutionist, has also confirmed the belief in universal religious ideas. "The statement," he says, "that there are nations or tribes which possess no religion, rests either on inaccurate observations or confusion of ideas. No tribe or nation has yet been found destitute of belief in any higher beings. . . . It is legitimate, therefore, to call religion in its most general sense a universal phenomenon of humanity." And yet in purely Pagan lands, the ideas, convictions and expectations enumerated above, have never found the substantial and satisfying realization for which they crave; the long and weary search for some grand reply has never, outside of Christian teachings, been found, and all the inventions and provisions which have characterized the troubled and melancholy march of the heathen world have been only so many temporary expedients which are now failing to meet the larger demands which are broadening and deepening with the more enlightened and progressive years.

Are then these convictions respecting God, man, sin, guilt, sacrifice, atonement, incarnation, and the future world, as held by heathen peoples in all times, places and climes, mere legends which have blossomed in the fruitful imaginations of fanatical men, mere ghosts projected from savage brains, and like so many phantoms have pursued, mocked and tormented countless generations with their unsubstantial and delusive images and forms? Such an explanation of the primary and fundamental ideas of the religious history of the great majority of mankind, will not stand for a moment, and the most unbiblical thinkers do not attempt to account for the vast structure of heathendom in any such way.

Fisher, in his "Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief," has well remarked, that "effects imply adequate causes. The results of a movement disclose its nature and its power. A pool of water in the street may be explained by a Summer shower, but not so the Gulf Stream." The great, distinguishing, historic characteristics of all human religions refused to be pushed carelessly aside, or snuffed out like some insignificant candle, as if they were nothing more than so many surface and accidental consequences braided together by a mindless evolution, and continued from age to age as

the superstitious and melancholy remembrance of some far off, empty and troubled dream.

H. Spencer has said, that "entirely wrong as human beliefs may appear to be, yet the implication is that they germinated out of an actual experience. . . . More especially may we assume this in case of beliefs that have long existed, and are widely diffused; and most of all so in the case of beliefs that are perennial, and nearly or quite universal. The presumption that any current opinion is not wholly false, gains strength according to the number of its adherents."

Thomas Aquinas and John Fletcher have said that the noble seekers after truth in pagan-lands, had an "implicit faith—faith enough and light enough to overcome the allurements of the visible and the terrors of the invisible." Says Lessing, "ere there was a Bible there was a religion;" "all history is an articulate Bible."

Hooker gives expression to a generous and truthful statement respecting pagans, in saying that "their revelation was of a nature which was confirmed, strengthened, and extended, but not superseded by the written law of God."

There has evidently been the outstretching of the groping hand of earnest, heathen multitudes, and can we say that this hand has never touched the "hem of that garment" from which healing comes? Between natural and revealed religion there is no conflict; the difference is more one of words and degree, than anything else. The "Christianity of Nature," and the Christianity of Revelation, have many points of grandest harmony and the one is a mute but powerful forecast of the other. These positions are greatly strengthened and confirmed by the fact that all modern investigations in the department of Comparative Religions bring the assurance that, two thousand years before the coming of the Redeemer, every principle of Essential Theology was held with "striking uniformity throughout the civilized world."

Mackay has stated "that many Asiatic nations are known to have entertained conceptions not unlike the Messianic theory of the Hebrews, and there is no proof of plagiarism on either side."

Dorner, in conclusion, after the most lengthened and careful examination of the subject, remarks: "The opinion must seem well founded that the entire vast region of heathen religions

contains nothing that can impeach the originality of the Christian grand idea, whilst, on the other hand, *the whole of heathendom strains after this idea*, without being able, from its standpoint, so much as distantly to approach the conception of it in its truth. "The ancients," says another distinguished authority, "were as the eagle intently gazing on what it wants strength to reach."

As to the origin of the ideas, convictions and beliefs embodied in pagan religions, it is not necessary to dispute with any particular school respecting them. In the language of an able writer on Comparative Theology, we may say that—

> "It answers our purpose equally well to side with Malebranche, Schelling, Coleridge and Cousin, who pronounce these first truths of religion to be strictly and purely *intuitions*; or, with the early philosophers, the scholastics of the middle ages, and theologians of modern times who say they are *discerned by the light of nature*; or with Descartes, and his school, who assume that they are *connate* with the soul; or with Dr. Reid and the Scottish school who interpret them on the ground of *common sense*; or with Dugald Stewart, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, who account for them upon the ground of *experience and associations that cannot be overcome or separated.*"

However we may account for them, the principal fact is that they exist, and they must be traced back either to special original revelations or to certain fundamental and original elements of knowledge or belief.

Looking then at the "bottom facts" permeating and underlying all Pagan religious thought, with its dependence on higher powers and reverence for divine things, the voice of conscience, and a sense of guilt, the felt need of reconciliation with Deity by sacrifice, its dreams after an incarnation of the unseen, and its hands stretched out into the future, feeling for a life beyond—all this manifold variation of religious thought and feeling, expressed in unnumbered ways and forms, do we not find something strangely like unconscious prophecies and fleshly expectations of those Christian truths which are the crowning glory of biblical revelations, and which alone can explain this striking correspondence and satisfy the thirst and hunger of a sin-laden and weary world? "Is there not ample evidence to show that the Gospel has had its preachers in some form or other everywhere since the days of Abel?" And may not the earnest and sincere attitude of many who carried about with

them this unconscious orthodoxy, count for something in their spiritual destiny in that world into which we all hasten?

The principal aim, however, contemplated in this article, is to show that many writers connected with the rationalistic, agnostic, and thoroughly skeptical schools, though they call in question nearly all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, and fill the air with confusion and dust, yet in the works of those very men are found again and again, unintended and unconscious recognitions and acknowledgements of those doctrines which in many ways they endeavor to ridicule and oppose. The very doctrines of revelation which they reject in full when presented to them in a theological system, they in one way or other admit in detail when considering scientific, moral, political and philosophical questions. It is true that the language which they use, and the positions they occupy are very unlike those employed by the Christian apologist, but notwithstanding these differences of language and of dress, those anti-Christian writers, again and again, concede many of the truths and doctrines which form an essential part of that Revelation which has proved itself the foundation of the highest civilization and the ground and inspiration of the world's best hopes.

II. UNCONSCIOUS ORTHODOXY OF MANY OF THE POSITIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF MODERN UMBELIEF.

1. Our first proof of the unintended confirmation of biblical teachings, is found in the unanimous verdict of the physical sciences, and of all merely secular investigations, which declares in the most emphatic form, that man left to himself cannot find out God or solve the problem of the great First Cause. The claims of Deism which for long years maintained that the Divine Character was sufficiently revealed by the natural world around us, and upon this was built up an argument against the necessity of any further revelation, and strong attempts were made to invaldiate the professedly Divine Communications contained in the Christian system.

These teachings, however, about the sufficiency of nature to reveal God and His purposes and designs which characterized the Deistic literature of former times, have almost universally been

abandoned, and the Agnostic now fills the place made vacant by the vanished Deistic writers of a century ago.

It is everywhere confessed by the chiefs of scientific materialism, that it is impossible to affirm anything concerning the great First Cause. Mr. W. R. Gregg has said in his "Enigmas of Life," (page 6,) that—

"The question, when stated with the perfect unreserve which alone befits it, lies in a small compass. Of actual knowledge we have simply nothing. Those who believe in a Creative Spirit and Ruler of the Universe are forced to admit that they can adduce no proofs or arguments cogent enough to compel conviction from sincere minds constituted in another mold. . . . Neither doctrine (Deism or Atheism) can be proved or disproved—the votaries of neither are entitled to insist upon imposing their convictions on others, on the plea of its demonstration."

Herbert Spencer, in his "First Principles," (page 45,) states after the most lengthened examination of the matter from a purely scientific or philosophical standpoint, that "The power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." The reality underlying appearances is totally and forever inconceivable to us. (Page 98.) "The First Cause is an inscrutable fact or power behind all the intelligible phenomena of nature."

The same writer whilst he admits that "the assumption of the existence of a First Cause of the universe is a necessity of thought," yet in his "First Principles," (page 113,) he utters the painful acknowledgment that "By continually seeking to know, and being continually thrown back, with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom, and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as the unknowable." Professor Tyndall speaks of God as "The Inscrutable Power," "The Unknown Cause," "The Unseen Reality," "The Ultimate Existence," and "The Insoluble Mystery at once terrible and beneficent," "The conclusion of modern philosophy," G. H. Lewes affirms to be a "patient resignation to the Unknowable."

These quotations and admissions fitly represent the feeling and language of all schools of thought established and controlled by thinkers whose attitude is one of opposition to the teachings of the Christian revelation, The unknown God of the ancient Pagan world is the only power which our agnostic and materialistic

apostles care to recognize to-day, and the throbbing brain which would, unaided, remove the massive veil and solve the mighty problem, is doomed to disappointment of the bitterest kind. No matter how deep man's desire and need may be for a knowledge of the invisible, the heart and intelligence and effort of man and all the scaffolding and glories of the wonderful world around us, are unable to discover that manifestation of God which comes with peace and satisfaction to anticipations, perplexities and requirements of the finite mind.

All departments of modern unbelief and of purely secular investigations leave us, in reference to God, in a state of utter hopelessness and we are to pass our days like so many orphans,

> "Crying in the night,
> Children crying for the light
> And with language but a cry."

And yet in all the foregoing statements and confessions, is there not a great and solemn truth recognized by the Biblical revelation long centuries ago and reiterated in the sacred pages again and again? The language in the book of Job penned ages ago, on this very subject, shows that the positions and acknowledgments of our scientific leaders of this later age contain no new discovery, but simply repeat the teaching of inspiration and re-echo the wail of disappointment that has come moaning across the sea of years from the lips of many of the bravest and earnest seekers that the world has ever seen. Job says: "O that I knew where I might find him! that I might come even to his seat! I would order my cause before him, and fill my mouth with arguments. . . Behold, I go forward, but he is not there, and backward, but I cannot perceive him: On the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold him; he hideth himself on the right hand that I cannot see him."—(Job xxiii.: 3-9.) If we take the declarations of the New Testament, they only strengthen the wide-spread conclusion of the far off past and the admissions of more recent times that "Man by searching cannot find out God: cannot find out the Almighty to perfection." "No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."—(John I.:18.) "Philip saith unto him, Lord, shew us the Father and it sufficeth us. Jesus saith unto him,

Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Phillip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou, then show us the Father?"—(John xiv.:8-9.) The conclusions drawn from the long search of the past, and from the investigations of modern science and philosophy, as gleaned from their highest authorities, is that if we are to have any definite, satisfying knowledge of God, it must come to us through some other channel than the domain of the natural world around us and the unaided human understanding are able to supply; and to say that this verdict is in harmony with the Holy Scriptures is only to repeat one of the oldest declarations which the Book contains. Christ is the manifestation of the Eternal, the visible image of the invisible God, and Christianity is made radiant from beginning to end by this *supernatural* exhibition and conception of the Father, and its capacity to make known the "Unknowable," "Inscrutable' of the ancients and moderns is seen in the deep and lasting satisfaction it brings, and the imperial, indestructible hold it has upon the thought, affection and devotion of this the most progressive of all the periods in the annals of time.

Luther has stated the matter in the following true and noble words: "The world seeks in innumerable ways, with great industry, cost, trouble and labor, to find the invisible and incomprehensible God in His majesty. But God is, and remains to them, unknown, although they have many thoughts about Him, and discourse and dispute much; for *God has decreed that He will be unknowable and inapprehensible apart from Christ.*"

2. With reference to the origin and unity of the human race, it would not be difficult to show that the advocates of anti-Christian systems of thought, have pronounced the Biblical account of man's creation a fable and unworthy of reception by intelligent and progressive minds. It has been looked upon as absurd and not unfrequently treated with ridicule and scorn. But when those very individuals have drifted many a long league from the moorings of revelation, and have ransacked every other department of possible information, is it not a striking fact, that on the subject of man's unity especially, those teachers are Orthodox in a very decided and emphatic form. The old theories on which so much was built, drawn from the supposed different origins of mankind,

are now practically repudiated by the highest authorities on the matter now under consideration.

Professor Max Müller, though not accepting the Bible account of Adam and Eve as a narration of literal facts, has "come to the conclusion from inductive reasoning upon the internal evidence furnished by analyzing the roots and structures of all the various languages of the world, that they must have had one common origin."—(*Journal of Victoria Institute, p.* 192.)

Professor Huxley objects to the theory that mankind must have come from several centres; and holds that "from comparative anatomy, you have overwhelming evidence of the unity of the race."—(*Origin of Species, p.* 352.)

Sir John Lubbock takes strong ground in favor of man's unity, and Cheavlier Bunsen, with his immense learning, has, apart from the teachings of Scripture, come to the same conclusion.

"However insulated certain languages may appear," says Humboldt, "however singular their caprices and their idioms, all have an analogy among them, and their numerous relations will be more perceived in proportion as the philosophical history of nations and the study of languages are brought to perfection." Darwin and Wallace have also played themselves to the one-origin theory and are, so far, in harmony with the teachings of orthodoxy. Modern investigations are rapidly accumulating evidence, directly or indirectly, in support of Scripture truth. They point with an absolute inflexible finger to a common original centre or source of mankind: one blood, one family and one religion, received by inspiration, or developed by one common mind. Biological science in its highest and most authoritative and representative departments is also constrained to admit for life a supernatural beginning.

Among rationalistic and skeptical schools it has been common to ridicule and ignore the office, ministry and importance attributed to faith in the Christian system, and even at present there are some influential pens which would belittle this principle, when its far-reaching power in matters of religion is emphatically declared. And yet, on an examination of the theories and speculations so loudly advertized by the scientists of to-day, we find that a reliance on unseen, undemonstrated and unprovable hypothesis is absolutely essential to all progress in their various realms, and

without "faith" every attempted solution or explanation of life and of the universe, in which a certain class of men pride themselves, would fall to pieces, and, like some vanished dream, leav not a wreck behind.

Strange and paradoxical as it may seem, the distinguishe leaders of modern unbelief are compelled to live by faith, an without this principle many of their boasted positions would b inconceivable, and numbers of their books and speeches woul become humiliating spectacles of unbridled imagination, and vas iron bars of mystery would forever hinder those daring explorers i the realms of matter and of mind.

Let us notice the importance which anti-biblical writers attac to that principle in their own researches, which, when applied t theological themes, they at once repudiate and disclaim. It i well known that Christianity has been treated with a sneer, b many minds, because it asks for faith in its teachings and claim without giving us certain tangible and irresistible proofs. A unchristian science, not far distant, demanded on the part of th New Testament religion evidences and proofs capable of demon stration in the most severe and mechanical manner. Change however, have swept over this class of thinkers, and under partic ular, given circumstances, they admit and *demand* a faith wonder fully similar to that required by Christianity, only in man instances far more extraordinary than the most earnest Christia believer claims to possess. The present age is one which, i scientific circles, is marked by a widespread belief in dogma which lie in the realm of imagination or faith, and therefore i the ordinary sense unprovable. Nearly all the popular theories o life, matter, atoms, organisms, force, mind and the universe, a propounded by the high priests of physical investigation, are buil upon foundations and hypotheses which are utterly incapable o demonstration.

Professor Huxley speaks of his "philosophic faith" as playin an important part in the investigation in which he is constantl engaged. "Belief," he says, "in the scientific sense of the word is *a serious matter*, and needs strong foundations." He howeve believes that living protoplasm was evolved "from not livin matter," and that it was "endowed" with the power of determin

ing the formation of new protoplasm." This theory requires what he is pleased to call "a philosophic faith." Whatever may be said as to the proved absurdity of the claim that life came from death, or at least from non-living matter, the statement demonstrates the necessity of belief in the unprovable as the very basis of the so-called Evolutionist system, advocated by men around whose names no little fame has already gathered.

Professor Pierce, in his "Ideality in the Physical Sciences," (page 17,) has remarked that "Kepler was moved to his discoveries by an exalted faith anterior and superior to all science in the existence of intimate relations between the constitution of man's mind and that of God's firmament," and that such faith is at the root of the "prophetic inspiration of the geometrics which the progress of observation verifies."

Professor Morse, whilst acknowledging the mystery of life, and expressing a hope that it may yet be solved, says: "But whether or not, a true faith in science *knows no limit* to its search for truth."

Asa Gray has also said that "the proofs upon which biological and theological investigation have to rely are largely probabilities, some of a higher and some of a lower order, and much that is accepted for the time is taken on trial."

Professor Tyndall is led to believe in an ether, which he has never seen, or weighed, or touched, yet upon this unseen element he builds much, and in his Belfast address he says: "I prolong the vision backward, across the *boundary line of experimental evidence*, and discover in matter the promise and potency of every form of life." "The doctrine of Evolution derives man in his totality from the interaction of organism and environment through countless ages past." "*By that vision of the mind*, which authoritatively supplements the vision of the eye," he sees the cosmic vapor gradually cooling, and continually as it cooled into a molten mass, in which were found not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but the human mind itself; emotion, intellect, will and all their phenomena." "The strength of the doctrine," he tells us, "*lies not in the experimental demonstration*, (for the subject he says is hardly accessible to this,) but in its general harmony with science." Does Christian truth, in any of its teachings or demands put such a strain on our capacity of belief as the

theory referred to above? Men turn away from the unprovab in Revelation, but accept not only the unprovable in their spec lations in science, but apparently have little difficulty in believin in theories for which there is not a tittle of evidence. The impo tance of the faith faculty is, however, acknowledged by such stat ments as Dr. Tyndall's, and that is the point under consideratio

J. S. Mill, in his "Utilitarianism," (page 6,) recognizes t fact that "many of the great questions of life are not capable proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term." "Que tions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. . . . Considerations may be presented capable of determining the inte lect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine, and th is equivalent to proof."

Buckle, in his "History of Civilization," has shown that t scientists of the seventeenth century, by allowing their scientif imagination or faith to push its inquiries and investigations in the realm of the unseen, and "*rising above the visible world sense*, laid the foundations of great discoveries and movements, t effects of which remain and are felt to this day;" and he says, " is the duty of physical philosophers to themselves, their pursui and to society, to cultivate the imagination."

In the discoveries won by the distinguished scientists of t past—Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, Hayghens, Harvey, Lock Franklin, Dalton, Leverrier, Faraday and a long line of others, is a fact which cannot be denied that by their "prophetic assum tions," or faith, they found the instrument and inspiration of the greatest triumphs, and demonstrated to all coming time that refuse credence in some things, which refuse by their very natu to submit to actual experiment, would arrest all grand progressi developments in the physical and mental worlds, in a manner t most striking and complete. Is there not in "the imaginati faculty," this "vision of the mind" and "philosophic faith," no recognized as of such importance in all scientific investigations, powerful vindication (no matter how unwillingly and undesigned it may come) of the reasonableness of faith's mission in Chri tianity, and an overwhelming refutation of the old demand skepticism, which declared that what cannot be demonstrated an

proved in the common meaning of those words, ought not to be believed?

4. In the absence of any provision in the way of atonement, redemption and pardon in the physical universe, so emphatically taught by the leaders of scientific research of the present, we find another unexpected element of agreement with the teachings of that Book which have been ignored by superficial skeptical schools of the past in a manner the most bitter and persistent.

Many of the glowing and rose-colored pictures drawn by young, sentimental theologians and the deistic and rationalistic writers of the past century, respecting the beneficent character of nature in all her operations, have in these later days been sadly spoiled as the fragmentary views of the general course and constitution of the world around us disappear from time to time. The beautiful and sublime in the realm of nature is not for a moment denied, but the fact that there are some terrible things there as well, has pressed itself upon the modern scientific mind in the most emphatic and powerful way. Nature's remorseless insensibility to man in his sufferings and toils, and in the great overwhelming and destructive calamities ever taking place within her realm is now a theme on which much anti-Christian literature is enlarging in the strongest form. The "reign of law," and the ruthless, triumphant march of physical forces through all the years, is now presented as an argument against any doctrine which would countenance anything like atonement or pardon within the vast range of the material and seen.

The earthquake swallows up tens of thousands of living men. The jaws of the gulf that opened to receive them swing back to their places, and forthwith flowers adorn the ghastly scene, as if in mockery of the dead who are buried beneath.

A great ship founders in the ocean, freighted with a thousand living souls. As they go down they raise one shriek of horror and agonizing despair that it would seem should rend the very sky. But the cry of anguish is over and the waters roll over the place as smoothly as though those perished thousand lives were not sleeping in their watery sepulchre below.

By the mistake or negligence of some one, a collision takes place, and heart-rending sufferings and scenes are the result.

The driving hurricane or the deluging flood; the terrible famine

or the desolating pestilence march on their way with pitiless fury and multitudes of homes are left in awful ruin; presently the sun shines forth upon the terrible scene, the world moves on as before, but little or no explanation is given of the sad pictures of misery and woe which spread themselves far and wide! Modern science recognizes the terrible side of nature, and teaches that she is "red in tooth and claw."

Goethe has said that "all the course of Providence goes to show that the God of Providence is the same as the severe Jehovah of the Hebrews."

David Page, in a paper read at a meeting of the Edinburgh Geological Society, in 1866, maintains that "the doctrine of forgiveness is illogical and unauthorized by all the teachings and tendencies found in *the system of things* in which we live, move, breathe, and have our being. The more the idea of natural law can be made to pervade modern thought, the more will its influence be felt and appreciated in morals as well as philosophy. So long as the human mind believes in the efficacy of confession, humiliation and repentance, so long will it feebly resist the temptation to error; but let it once be convinced that certain consequences must inevitably follow from certain acts, and that there is indeed in the *order of creation* 'no variableness, neither shadow of turning,' and you provide it with one of the strongest incentives to reason and resistance. So far as confession and repentance concern the individual mind, the effect is undoubtedly wholesome; but so far as they relate to general law, which rules for the whole and not for the individual, it would be reversing all philosophical views of the enduring order of nature to suppose that they could be instrumental either in producing change or in procuring exemption."

Professor Huxley adds his testimony to the same fact and says:

"It is a very plain and elementary truth that the life, the fortune, and the happiness of every one of us, and, more or less, of those who are connected with us, do depend upon our knowing something of the rules of a game infinitely more difficult and complicated than chess. It is a game which has been played for untold ages, every man and woman of us being one of the two players in a game of his or her own. The chess board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws of nature. The player on the other side is hidden from us. We know that his

play is always fair, just and patient; but we also know, to our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. To the man who plays well the highest stakes are paid, with that sort of overflowing generosity with which the strong shows delight in strength. And one who plays ill is checkmated—without haste, but without remorse."

And again, he speaks of ignorant and lawless men as being "plucked in nature's University," and adds: "Nature's pluck means extermination."

The verdict of all the physical sciences is that the way of the transgressor is hard; and it would not be very difficult to show from the materialistic and skeptical literature of the age, that man, by his sins against natural law, may build for himself, even in this world, a place of perdition and doom of the most painful and awful kind. Nature has no message of grace, no gospel of redemption to proclaim to sinning men, but evermore speaks of penalty and retribution to the transgressor in all her departments; and the long history of past generations only tells how faithfully those penalties have been executed in the experience of millions we cannot name. If man, therefore, as a moral being, is to find a system which announces pardon for his transgressions, he must seek that provision outside of nature's realms, as no sound of redemption or forgiveness has ever come from her inflexible and stony lips. Do we not find in all these positions of present-day science and philosophy a most powerful vindication of the claims and announcements of the Christian revelation, respecting the doctrine of the atonement, a doctrine which, if found at all, must come from some other place or region than the visible creation around us?

5. With reference to the moral and providential government of the world, the Christian theist ever carries the sacred conviction that the world in which he lives not only had a Creator, but that amid all the seeming irregularities, contradictions and checkered career of the centuries, this same world is under the guidance and control of an almighty and moral Governor, whose administration and rule is evermore tending to the moral education and uplifting of earth's generations, and preparing them for that age and reign of righteousness which shall yet extend its beneficent sway over all the nations of the earth. No truth in the Bible is more fully or largely presented and insisted on than this, and it

has been a source of richest consolation to multitudes of noblest minds, as they have thought and toiled and struggled for the world's betterment in many of the dreary and unpropitious periods of the vanished and troubled past.

It is strange, however, to find in schools and ranks, professedly anti-biblical, acknowledgements and statements which sound like an echo of those teachings of revelation referred to in the above pages.

Matthew Arnold, with all his atheistical tendencies, cannot drag himself away from the idea of a moral administration operating in the world, and working out conditions and consequences of the most ennobling kind. He speaks of a "power or tendency, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." Surely on this point his orthodoxy cannot be questioned, no matter how unintentionally or unwillingly the admission may come.

The Dutch philosophers speak of religion as the "Moral Ideal,' ever coming to us. . . . . "The Ideal exists; it is not developed out of humanity, but impresses itself on the consciousness of humanity." And the confessed result of this "Ideal" by those foreign rationalists is the moral improvement of men wherever its operation is felt and seen.

James A. Froude has said that "the world is built somehow on moral foundations," and declares this to be "the one great lesson which history may be said to repeat with distinctness."

"The moral order of the world," is a term frequently employed by writers who are in many respects far away from Christian ranks, but from the very force of facts which confront them, and which they cannot ignore, are compelled to employ expressions which point to doctrines and truths which the Christian revelation alone fully and satisfactorily reveals.

Carlyle, though not very friendly to much of the ecclesiastical teaching and machinery of the age, and around whose theological thinkings and convictions there is much of uncertainty, ridicules the idea of those writers who would describe the world as a vast machine, and an "absentee God, sitting ever since the first Sabbath, on the outside of His creation, seeing it go."

6. If space permitted, we have abundance of material on hand, gathered from the most radical literature of the times, which, in spite

of the avowed antagonistic attitude of the authors to Christian belief and doctrines, presents most valuable contributions to, and recognitions of, the great vital teachings of Revelation; teachings, when arrayed in theological phraseology, these same writers repudiate and disdain.

When Herbert Spencer proclaims that "harmonization with our environment" is the great condition of human happiness, he is on orthodox ground; for that man who has not peace with his conscience, his past record and his God, and his spiritual environment, cannot find true happiness here, nor in the greater life and world beyond. The glad, solemn and abiding appeal of Christianity is ever directed to those who are out of harmony with their soul's environment; and Calvary, with all its sacrifice and weight of love, is the highest power that the universe presents, and its pleading, pathetic voice is ever speaking to the wayward millions of our race, and saying, "Be ye reconciled to God."

Christianity not only reveals the necessity of this "harmonization," but shows man the true extent and character of his "environments," and the means and power by which this needed reconciliation can be accomplished.

Professor Tyndall, in his Belfast address, recognizes the fact that man's surroundings do not consist merely of the material world around him, but there is something more which must be taken into account, if our true condition is to be fully realized or described. He says: "You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness. This is the rock on which materialists must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a complete philosophy of life." And again he says that, "no atheistic reasoning can dislodge religion from the heart of man. . . . The logical feebleness of physical science is not sufficiently borne in mind." And Huxley has said, to the astonishment of some of his followers and friends: "I individually am no materialist, but on the contrary, believe materialism to involve grave philosophic error." When the "environment" of Spencer has received its true extent and comprehensiveness, his declaration contains a truth which all Christians most earnestly believe.

If we take the doctrine of natural depravity, it would be easy

to show how this doctrine has been ridiculed by the skeptical writers, especially during the past century. But the delineations of human nature by rationalists and secularists of to-day have made sad havoc with the fairy pictures of human nature as drawn by the pens of unbelief in an age that is past. Some of those descriptions are as dark as any that can be found in the Sacred Scriptures, though the conditions in which men live are greatly improved since those Biblical documents were penned and given to the world.

And with reference to the hereditary nature of this natural depravity, is it not true that the Scripture statements have evoked the sneers and indignant protests of the infidel school respecting the transmission of evil from one nature to another? But what does science teach on this matter of "evil inherited from remotest ancestors?" The ablest investigations of philosophic minds in this department have arrived at the conclusion that "there is absolutely no limit to this law of material and immaterial heredity. The physical defects, the physical beauty; the meanness of spirit, the nobility of soul; all things that make us petty and despicable, all that make us wise and excellent, are alike to be derived through this channel." Mr. Gregg has spoken of "the fearfully rigid laws of hereditary transmission," and admits that "moral qualities are at least as transmissible by inheritance as physical ones." Much more on this point might be added, but the above quotations sufficiently indicate the orthodox position of much of the radical skeptical literature on the subject now under consideration.

The necessity of some deep change in man's nature is now admitted by many who have refused to listen to the doctrine of a spiritual regeneration as taught in the Word of God.

Requirements and needs which modern unbelief rejects when presented in Christian phraseology, it unwittingly admits when it confronts those deep necessities in the lines of thought and observation on which it prefers to travel.

J. S. Mill has said, in his autobiography, that "I am now convinced that no great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a *great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought.*" In nearly all the pantheistic and philosophical writers of to-day it is openly and constantly taught that a change of character is necessary, in order fully to

apprehend and appreciate the true, beautiful and good. That this character may be attained, they speak of a time when the soul must "bestir itself and struggle as if in the throes of birth;" that it must turn in loathing from the pleasures of sense;" have "irrepressible longings" for what is pure; pass through a "crisis of internal life;" come into "a noble and perfect manhood," that it may "feel around it the fresh breath of the open sky, and over it the clear smile of heaven." In harmony with these quotations is the saying of Plato. "To many minds," remarks that kingly thinker, "there must come a *moral improvement* before they can receive any intellectual enlightenment." On the subjects relating to man's limited knowledge; the pain in creation; the world's millennium; the final consummation of man's earthly abode, and other kindred themes, much has been said, in various ways, by pronounced unbelievers, but it is astonishing to find how their conclusions, reached in many and different ways, sweep into final harmony with the teachings and declarations of that Book laid upon the table of the world two thousand years ago.

CONCLUSION.

Looking, then, at the strange similarity of beliefs, convictions and ideas presented in the teachings of all merely human religions, as laid off in the authoritative summaries of those religions now accessible, and the unlooked for admissions scattered up and down much of the skeptical, scientific and philosophical literature of to-day, we cannot but recognize the existence of certain principles and truths which stand in their full-orbed existence, and find their true relations and significance in that Revelation of which the Pagan world has been ignorant, and which the free-thinkers of the past and present have affected to ignore and despise.

In much of Pagan thought of the past and in many of the positions and acknowledgements of science to-day there is something which very fitly may be called an undesigned and unconscious orthodoxy of the most emphatic and persistent kind.

Dr. Johnson has truly remarked that "when a man thinks deeply, he thinks religiously." He cannot stay his thoughts on that which is simply secular and material.

Newman Smyth, in his "Religious Feeling," (page 29,) truly

remarks that "physics lead us directly to metaphysics, as the shadow to the substance;" and no thoughtful mind can pursue any path of investigation far without coming in view of great questions in "theology." The world around us, and the nature and constitution of man are undoubtedly more or less religious structures, and it seems impossible for any profound thought to exist in either of those departments or realms without ultimately branching out into the domain of religious ideas or principles principles and ideas whose full significance, explanation and bearing it is the sublime mission of Christianity to make known or reveal.

All the great highways of human thought and feeling lead sooner or later, to common conclusions, and those conclusions find their happy and substantial realization in that Gospel which liveth and abideth forever.

There is many a Cyrus in these later times who does not know by what power he is guided, or the full extent and bearing of the mission in which he is engaged.

There can be no final conflict between science and religion Like ships bound for one common destiny, though far separated out on the broad ocean, and meeting with many a storm, will sooner or later, strike the great pathway which leads to the long expected port. So as race has gone sailing over the vast seas of profound thought and feeling, under the moral and intellectual leadership of mortal monarchs or kings, similar great currents have been struck which point, with irresistible logic, to that body of truth which has been the illumination of myriads of our fellowmen and the ground and inspiration of the world's best hopes.

The fundamental ideas and principles brought under review in the present contribution have always refused to be hushed into silence by any mandate of man; the very nature of things has always been compelling earnest thinkers to repeat them again and again. Strange and unfamiliar voices have been heard announcing those truths with more or less clearness. True, there has been a difference of position, of dress, of language and of sound; yet the evident harmony from all those widely separated witnesses, is becoming apparent as the years roll on and the work of investigation proceeds. The ultimate, universal, conscious, voluntary harmony is yet to come.

The toilers in search of truth, tunnelling in various directions, shall yet shake hands in the heart of the mountain, and the connections with all lines of thought will then be complete. The grand revelations of Christianity are now hung in the cathedral tower of the world, and, like so many clear and solemn bells, are ever ringing out their deep and sacred meaning, and amid the conflict, noise, and tumult of earth's strange babble, are calling men to that faith and worship which alone answer his deepest cries, satisfy his profoundest needs and crown his existence with possessions and benedictions which are lasting as the unending years.

Joseph Cook, who is undoubtedly one of the clearest thinkers of the age, has remarked that "it is more and more evident, as the training of the world advances, that everything fundamentally Biblical is scientific, and everything fundamentally scientific is Biblical."

Archbishop Whateley's testimony was to the same effect. "Any person," he says, "possessing real faith will be fully convinced that whatever suppressed physical fact appears to militate against religion will be proved by physical investigation either to be unreal or else reconcilable with religion," and the late Professor Rolleston has also justly said that "truth is one; all roads which really lead to it will assuredly converge sooner or later. Our business is to see that the one we ourselves are concerned with is properly laid out and metalled."

The great Swiss historian, John Von Muller, gives the result of his life-long labors, extracted, he says, from seventeen hundred and thirty-three authors, in seventeen thousand folio pages, in this striking confession: "Christ is the key to the history of the world. Not only does all harmonize with the mission of Christ; all is subordinated to it." "When I saw this," he adds, "it was to me as wonderful and surprising as the light which Paul saw on his way to Damascus, the fulfillment of all hopes, the completion of philosophy, the key to all the apparent contradictions in the physical and moral world; here is life and immortality. I marvel not at miracles; a far greater miracle has been reserved for our times, the spectacle of the connection of all human events in the establishment and preservation of the doctrine of Christ."

EARLY CHRISTIANITY—HOW PROPAGATED.

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The Early Days of Christianity: By F. W. FARRAR, D. D., F. R. S. Author's Edition; Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Company, New York, London and Paris; *The Companions of St. Paul:* By JOHN S. HOWSON, D. D., Dean of Chester; Strahan & Company, Publishers, 56 Ludgate Hill, London.

The histories and historical works that present the early days of Christianity are "legion" in number. They vary in value. The "good, the bad, the indifferent" are well represented. Many of them are composed mainly of crudities, superstitious tales, and guesses at real facts, while there are others that throw a brilliant light on the condition of the world, the propagandists, and the success of the system of doctrines taught. Among this latter class are the two books that stand at the head of this article. They are thoughtful, suggestive, and, in the major part, reliable.

This article is intended to call attention to two basal facts deduced from the above works. In the first place, the success of a system of religion, as far as human agency is concerned, depends mainly on the *"world's" condition—the state of morals and the religious wants of the people;* and, in the second place, *on the men engaged in its propagation.* Certain circumstances will favor or disfavor. If they favor, the weal of the cause to be advanced is insured; if they disfavor, its "doom is sealed." The question of questions is, "Is the set time come?"—the time to favor, to advance, to "draw all men?" Do the auguries plainly indicate that the system about to be spread abroad "is the one thing" needful. If it is not the "set time" and the "one thing" needed, its failure, shameful in the extreme, and harrowing to the feelings, is certain.

Trace the history of successful schemes of religion, whether they be false or true, and the truthfulness of this assertion will be clearly and unmistakably evident. The world was ready, waiting, longing for that very system. In advancing this idea, I would not disparage the system founded by the Divine Teacher, and propagated by His followers—far be it; but simply call attention to the fact that in the matter of its and their success, and the circumstances that contributed to this end, there is a beautiful and close analogy.

Trace the history of Buddhism as it is set forth by its most reliable historians. Tradition declares—with facts to favor—that its founder was born, near Nepoul, 620 B. C. The oriental section of the world at this time "was wrapped in time service." The "state of morals" was truly deplorable. The most grievous of all eastern sins were daily committed. Men and women, by fulsome flattery and wild licentiousness, struggled to sink deeper and deeper into the putrid sea of moral pollution, while their hearts sadly longed for some religious scheme that would change the current of affairs, and leave something real, substantial and beneficial in its place. The "heart suffering" was one of peculiar and sad anguish. Gantama and his few adherents came declaring:

"Ye are not bound! the soul of things is sweet;
The heart of being is celestial rest;
Stronger than *woe* is *will;* that which was good
Doth pass to better—best.

I, Buddh, who, with all my brothers' tears,
Whose heart was broken by a whole world's woes,
Laugh and am glad, for there is liberty!
Ho! ye who suffer! know—

Ye suffer from yourselves. None else compels,
None other holds you, that ye live and die,
And whirl upon the wheel, and hug and kiss
Its spokes of agony."*

The people by ones, twentys, hundreds, began to heed. Gradually his system began to firmly root itself into that fertile soil, presenting to the world many beauties of the rarest nature; for it "has in it the eternity of a universal hope—the immortality of a boundless love, an indestructible element of faith in final good, and the proudest assertion ever made of human freedom."

It is not strange that men in darkness heeded this light, so strangely kindled in their midnight of darkest gloom. It is not strange that after his demise his propagandists declared him God, and men gave "him fervent worship." Forest of flowers are daily laid upon his stainless shrines, and countless millions of lips daily repeat the formular, "I take refuge in Buddha."†

*The "Great Renunciation," page 30.

†The "Light of Asia," page 1.

Trace the history of Islamism. Trace it as it is presented in the most impartial histories written in connection with the Koran. Arabia was in a wretched condition. The posterity of "the wild ass man" seem to have been standing on the "crumbling edges of the pit of ruin." The "flower of hope" seemed to be fading, wilting, dying in the human breast. The state of civil affairs, morals and religious wants made the hearts of the thoughtful bleed. Mahomet comes in this critical hour. He tries, against tremendous disadvantages, to revive the dying hope, by pointing to something higher, grander and more sublime than anything that had ever crossed the mind of the men of *that* age. The struggle for success was long, severe, but ultimately it was "crowned with triumph." It was not "fire and sword," as men and writers vainly declare, that gave the system success. The reason lies deeper than such surface help. It was the "condition of things—men's need, and men's help" that gave it such a signal triumph. They truly were "the power of Mahomet unto success." Compare the first chapter of the Koran* with men's wants and the wants of the age. Place certain aspects in close comparison with each other.

Men praised self; it says: "Praise be to God, the Lord of all creatures." Men were cruel and heartless—unbelievers in a future judgment; it says: "The most merciful, the King of the day of judgment." Men worshipped self, and leaned upon their own understanding; it says: "Thee do we worship and of Thee do we beg assistance." The God that few, so very few, tried to worship, was not gracious; He favored no one; all alike were going astray; it says: "Direct us in the way of those to whom Thou hast been gracious; not of those against whom Thou art incensed, nor of those who go astray." The comparison could be carried further, but this is sufficient to show the point advanced clearly—that it was the system needed, the best, under the circumstances, to be presented. It was heartily accepted after years of wrestling, and a reformation truly grand in its results was accomplished.

The condition of the world in the very beginning of Christianity was extremely advantageous. The completion of the subjugation

*The Koran, translated by George Sale.

of "the world" by one power, by which all things temporal "circled round one centre." It does not lessen the strength of this point that this was accomplished by force of arms. "At the head of this stupendous empire a single man, Octavious Cæsar—now better known by his imposing title, Augustus—ruled as absolute lord. All nations bowed before him, all kingdoms served him. At the birth of Christ, this amazing federation of the world into one great monarchy had been finally achieved. Augustus, at Rome, was the sole power to which all nations looked. His throne, like the "exceeding high mountain" of the temptation, showed "all the kingdoms of the world and their glory," spread out around it far beneath, as the earth lies in the light of the sun. "No prince, no king, or potentate of any name could break the calm which such a universal dominion secured—a calm which, through centuries, continued to lave, as with the quiet undulations of summer lakes, the sacred footsteps of the Cæsarean throne. It *was in such a unique era* that Jesus Christ was born. The whole earth lay hushed in profound peace. All lands lay freely open to the message of mercy and love which He came to announce."*

The state of morals was truly debasing. The times were pregnant with all manner of evil, and hourly were bringing forth all manner of corruptions.

"The epoch which witnessed the early growth of Christianity was an epoch of which the horror and the degradation have been rarely equaled, and perhaps never exceeded, in the annals of mankind. Were we to form our sole estimate of it from the lurid picture of its wickednees, which St. Paul in more than one passage has painted with a few powerful strokes, we might suppose we were judging it from too lofty a standpoint. We might be accused of throwing too dark a shadow upon Paganism when we set it as a foil to the lustre of an ideal holiness. But even if St. Paul had never paused amid his sacred reasonings to affix his terrible brand upon the pride of heathenism, there would still have been abundant proof of the abnormal wickedness which accompanied the decadence of an ancient civilization. They are stamped upon its coinage, cut on its gems, painted upon its chamber-walls, sown broadcast over the pages of its poets, satirists and historians."†

The rich reveled in terrible midnight bachanals—drinking, feasting and making a mock of that which was pure, lovely and

*"Life and Words of Christ," by L. Geike, pages 26-27.

†The "Early days of Christianity," page 1.

god-like, while the starving poor passed their days in visiting t "sights," and when night came, they crept into garrets or unde neath steps, and slept the "gnawing sleep of hunger."

The Judaic system of religion—the only true system—ha "waxed old like a garment, and was ready to vanish away." Ma thinking men had been driven by the hypocrisy of the leaders religious thought into skepticism, and were then walking upon i cold, barren rocks of absolute despair. There was darknes great, so cold, that it could, like the darkness of Egypt, be felt.

"Then we see the light of Christianity dawning like a tender dayspring am the universal and intolerable darkness. From the first the new religion alli itself with the world's utter feebleness, and those feeblenesses it shares; y without wealth, without arms, without anything to dazzle and attract, the religic of outcasts and exiles, of fugitives and prisoners, numbering among its conver not many wise, not many noble, not many mighty, but such as the jailor Philippi and the runaway slave of Colossee, with no blessing apparently upon save such as cometh from above, with no light whatever about it save the lig that comes from heaven; it put to flight kings and their armies; it breathed new life and a new hope and new and unknown holiness into a guilty a decrepit world."*

Strongly does Neander stress this point when he writes:

"The image of human perfection concretely presented in the life of Chri stands in manifold contradistinction to the tendencies of humanity in that perio no one of them, no combination of them, dead as they were, could account f it. Whence, then, in that impure age came such a picture, the contemplatic of which raised the human race of that and following ages to a new developme of spiritual life! The study of this picture has given a new view of the destir of humanity; a new conception of what the ideal of human virtue should be a a new theory of morals."†

In the strictest sense of the word rival—there was but one sy tem of religion that struggled to rival Christianity, and that w Stoicism. It was base in its ideas, badly conceived, and inad quately planned. There was in it nothing that would draw suffe ing humanity; neither could it promise certain rest.

"It was unfit for the task of amelioration of mankind because it looked o human nature in its normal aspects with contemptuous disgust. Its marke characteristic was a despairing sadness which became specially prominent in i most sincere adherents. For wretchedness it had no pity; on vice it looke with impotent disdain. Thrasea was regarded as an antique hero for walkin

*Farrar's "Life of Christ," page 95.

†Life of Christ, by A. Neander, page 4.

out the senate house during the discussion of some degree which involved a servility more than usually revolting. He gradually drove his few admirers to the conviction that even for those who had every advantage of rank and wealth, nothing was possible but a life of crushing sorrow, ended by a death of complete despair. St. Paul and St. Peter, on the other hand, were, at the same epoch, teaching to a few Jewish hucksters and a few Gentile slaves a doctrine so full of hope and brightness that letters written in a prison with torture and death in view, read like idylls of joy. While the glimmering taper of the stoic was burning pale, as though amid the vapors of a charnal house, the torch of life, upheld by the hands of the Tarsian tent-maker and the Galilean fisherman had flashed from Damascus to Antioch, from Antioch to Athens, from Athens to Corinth, from Corinth to Ephesus, from Ephesus to Rome."*

Truly this was the age of all ages to propagate the new faith. The condition of the world, the state of morals and the religious wants of men, declared in no uncertain language that the time, the *vital time, had dawned with* the greatest brightness. There was needed no hesitating, no halting, no doubting, no murmuring, no complaining, but simply pressing on to success. The circumstantial help, so far, was all that the heart of the founder of Christianity, or his most ardent and loving admirers could desire. The Founder lives a life of unsullied purity, dying to save all, that would believe, from their sins; rising from the grave, promising to them eternal life beyond its dark, cruel shadow. Only one thing more was needed, as far as human circumstances were concerned; that was, secondly, the *right kind of propagandists*. Without them, the system of doctrines to be established would vanish like a "dream unreturning away." Men, of like passions with the world, must be engaged, must become thoroughly enlisted, must carry the tidings to men. To guarantee success, they must be of two classes in society—learned and unlearned—educated and uneducated. A moment's thought will reveal the reason. To speak in broad terms: two classes must be reached. The high and the low, the rich and the poor. The "oxygen and the hydrogen" of the world have to be united; this could only be accomplished by the two named classes uniting and working in a certain harmonious union to bring about this result.

Reverting to the analogy used in the opening of this article, these two classes of men did their work in the establishing of

* The Early Days of Christianity, pages 9, 10.

Buddhism and Islamism. No real valuable success was achieved until these two classes were engaged. Strong efforts were made by Gantama and Mahomet, but they proved futile, until the latent forces of the high and the low were aroused in its favor; then was success clearly seen.

In the propogation of Christianity these two classes were not wanting. They acted and reacted—systematized and formulated—until the grand end in view was reached. It is customary to talk of Christianity as having been solely propagated "by ignorant and unlearned men." This idea has become deeply rooted in the mind of many who should know better. They have accepted a "half and incomplete truth." All honor to "the ignorant and unlearned men"—for truly they did a "work" that startled humanity, and was wildly termed, "turning the world upside down." In "season and out of season" they worked, struggling to do for the cause, all that was truly necessary. Prisons, scourges, stocks and even death left no impress on their zeal. They were "the irrepressibles" of the Roman world. Did they do all the work? Were they the sole propagators? Is all the debt of gratitude owed by a redeemed world due them? These are pertinent questions. In the negative they must be answered. The history of its "early days" declares plainly that educated men did their part. Herein is seen the wisdom of the Founder. He engages thoroughly two classes in the work.

Paul, the son of a Pharisee, of the tribe of Benjamin, trained to a certain age at Tarsus, then carried to Jerusalem and brought up at the feet of the erudite and thoughtful Gamaliel. Gifted with a mind of peculiar logical bias, with an inward love for this kind of reasoning, brightening the gift and making it more keen by whetting and using it in contact with men similarly prepared by nature and close training, he was a controversalist of "no mean order"—a man of mark.

Apollos, an Alexandrian Jew, with a mind of great brilliancy, well trained in the Philonian philosophy and the Rhetorical schools of the Nile.* Every passage of Scripture that throws any

*Life and Epistles of St. Paul: By Conybeare & Howson. Companions of St. Paul: By J. S. Howson.

light on his life and work reveals him a "burning and shining light." He is "an eloquent man," "mighty in the Scriptures," "convincing all," and unintentionally the cause of schism in the Church. His reputation in the Church was extraordinary. Few were his equal, none his superior.

Luke, "the beloved physician," with a valuable medical and literary training. A preacher, above ordinary men, and a writer who wielded a facile and trenchant pen. His fondness for medical terms, and his poetic insight into the significance of certain words, throw a peculiar charm about the man and his writings. His gentle, manly, sympathetic and self-denying character, causes a halo of beauty to gather about his name.

These three were truly representatives of the educated men of the propagandists.*

Then we have their opposites. Peter, born of poor parents, reared in poverty, surrounded by scenes of squalor, called from a fishing smack, and from near a fish market, to be an apostle; he enters the work with no hesitancy. He was a "rough-and-ready man"—the man to meet the lowest stratum of society.

John was a degree above him, in the fact that his parents seemed to own some property and were familiar with the use of hired servants. Quiet when not aroused, but a veritable "son of thunder" when stirred. The apostle of love in age, but a man of "fiery hate in his early years.

James the Less, strongly gifted by nature, a man of deep and benign gravity; ready to advance any good work, but strongly partial to the idea of grafting Christianity on Judaism.

These were the representatives of the uneducated men among the propagandists. These two classes of men were deeply engaged in the work. Their lives were wrapped up in the Founder and their mission. Death only translated them to realms of bliss. They looked not to earth for reward.

"All question of success or failure they were content to leave in the hands of God. Their one desire was to be utterly true to the best they had known. That God seemed to be careless of their individual happiness, they would be the last to complain; "though he slay me," yet would they trust in him. They

*See "Companions of St. Paul," by J. S. Howson.

knew that to fail, or seem to fail, in the cause of God was to succeed beyond the dreams of earthly ambition."*

These are the circumstantial helps in the propagation of early Christianity. To them much is due. It does not weaken the argument to assert that Christianity met with strong opposition; that from the "wild, reckless, weird spirits" that walked the palace of the Cæsars to the roughs of Jerusalem that cried "crucify, crucify" its Founder, were found its enemies; that its course was tracked through years by bloody signs, and human torches only reveals how tenaciously men clung to that which met fully their needs.

God the Omniscient works by natural means. No miracle is wrought where human agency can accomplish the same purpose. The circumstantial helps in the propagation of early Christianity were utilized because they were natural agencies, and as such they accomplished the same end in which supernatural agencies might have been employed.

It is not stressing the point too strongly to declare that in the mission of Christianity they did more for its success than could have been done by any continued series of miracles.

QUIXOTISM IN PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. W. C. BLACK.

What is the human soul? This question constitutes the great philosophical battle-ground of this age. Here hostile armies confront each other in battle array. Let us survey the ground, inspect the forces and ascertain their respective resources, in order that we may be enabled to prognosticate the issue of the conflict.

First, then, we are to survey the ground; or, dropping the figure, we are to ascertain what is the precise question at issue, what are the positions maintained by each of the antagonists. It is hardly necessary to say that as regards the reality of psychical phenomena there is no issue. Materialists do not deny the exist-

*"Life and Works of St. Paul," by F. W. Farrar.

ence of thought, emotion, volition, or any one of those multitudinous phenomena which it is the province of psychology to investigate; nor do they question the fact that there is a world-wide difference between these phenomena and those that belong to inorganic matter. Hence, the labor which has been expended in emphasizing the immateriality of mental phenomena has been wasted. The materialist concedes all that his antagonist contends for at this point. But when we go a step further and inquire whence come these phenomena? what is their originating cause? what is the substance in which they inhere, or by whose activities they are produced? then the conflict begins. The materialist asserts that these phenomena are products of the brain. He denies the existence of the soul as an entity. True, he uses the terms soul and mind, and other synonymous terms, but he does so to express functional and not entitative existence. With him soul and body are not two substances different in their nature and properties, but merely terms expressive of different functions of a common substance. Soul is merely a term used for convenience in speaking of certain peculiar activities of the brain. In other words, soul is body, (*i. e.* brain,) exercising thought, feeling, volition. This position dualism antagonizes. The dualist believes that, as all psychical phenomena are immaterial in their nature, they are also immaterial in their origin. He holds that it is impossible for the brain, a material thing, to exercise thought, memory, volition, or perform any other psychical operation. Hence, he asserts that within man's physical organism there dwells an invisible, immaterial substance called the soul. Thus the issue is clearly defined. Is the soul an entity? Dualism affirms; materialism denies. So much for the grounds.

Next we are to inspect the forces. Numerically, there is a wonderful disparity. This fact is presented very strikingly by Dr. Gould, in the January number of the REVIEW. He shows that in all ages a vast majority of the human race have been anti-materialistic.

We are lastly to consider the resources of the respective combatants. It must be borne in mind that the vast numerical disparity, already spoken of, goes far towards determining what weapons may be employed by either of the hostile forces. On a logical

battle-field, both armies may not use at pleasure the same weapons. This needs to be remembered just here; for the materialist usually seeks to take advantage of his opponent by dodging the burden of proof. And, strange to say, although this dialectical trick is as old as the logician's art, yet it is, in this case, often played with success. This ought not to be tolerated. In controversy, the very first thing to be done is to locate the *onus probandi*. A disputant weakens his cause immeasurably by assuming the burden of proof when it belongs legitimately to his opponent. And there are certain great principles which are a safe guide in the determination of this question. For instance, who does not know that in law the burden of proof rests upon the accuser, not the accused? "Every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty." To presume a man's guilt and then require him to prove his innocence, is a method of procedure which violates the fundamental principles of jurisprudence. And, as in law, so in every other department of human investigation, there are principles which show, with unerring precision, where the burden of proof lies. Science and philosophy, no less than jurisprudence, have their sure criteria for determining this question. Among other principles, this is, on all hands, conceded to be of universal application: *The onus probandi rests upon him who would overturn the faith of the world.* To illustrate: When the Copernican system of astronomy was first promulgated, did not the world demand proof of its truth? And Copernicus, Galileo and other advocates of the new system recognized the justice of the demand. They admitted that the world was under no obligation to receive their theory without proof. Now, suppose that Copernicus, instead of proving his own theory, had called upon the world to prove the truth of the Ptolemaic theory; would he ever have gained a disciple? At the present day, the Copernican theory commands the faith of the world. Now, suppose some one should promulgate a new theory antagonistic to this, and then, instead of offering proofs of his own theory, should call upon the world to furnish new and additional proofs of its theory; would he not be regarded as a lunatic? Unquestionably, a new theory which is utterly subversive of the faith of the world must furnish proofs of its truth. In this case, bald assertion goes for nothing. The innovator must shoulder the *onus probandi*. To seek to

transfer it to the world's shoulders is like trying to flee from one's shadow. And yet this is exactly the role which materialism seeks to play. The world is to-day anti-materialistic, and has always been so. In all ages, and among men of every order of intellect, and every grade of culture, a belief in the existence of the soul as a separate and independent entity has been well nigh universal. The exceptions are few and far between.

Even in this age, when materialism is far more blatant, and far more pretentious and boastful than ever before, the number of materialists is probably much less than the number of blind men. And yet, every now and then, we see a small specimen of the *genus homo*, whose only title to distinction is his ability to make a noise and to "darken counsel by words without knowledge," who, after attitudinizing for a while with all the airs of a peacock, calls out in stentorian tones: "Listen to me. The world is all wrong. I have found the truth; there is no such thing as the soul; soul is merely a term which we philosophers use for convenience in speaking of the activities of the molecules of the brain." Call upon him for proof and, with the air of injured innocence, the poor imbecile replies: "Oh! no, you must not call on me for proof. You must furnish that yourself; you must prove to me that you have a soul." A proposition which has commanded the faith of the great masses of mankind, learned and unlearned, through all ages, must furnish proof of its truth; but a nonsensical notion that originates in the brain of some crank, who chances to call himself a philosopher, must be excused from dealing in a thing so prosaic! A very modest demand indeed! So long as reason dominates the councils of dualism, all such demands will be contemptuously ignored, and materialism will be required to disprove the entitative existence of the soul.

Forced to admit the paucity of her votaries, materialism seeks to redeem herself by parading before the world a few great names that adorn her annals. This is a method of procedure equally as silly and almost as audacious as that above characterized. Concerning such a question, authorities are of no value. There are questions concerning which a specialist's opinions are worth a great deal. The astronomer's opinions concerning any astronomical question are worth vastly more than are the opinions of a man who is totally ignorant

of astronomy, and the same may be said of the opinions of the geologist, the chemist, the physician, the lawyer and many other characters. But it is obvious that the question, whether man has a soul, is not one of those questions concerning which any specialist has a right to speak *ex cathedra*. The materials out of which a judgment is to be formed do not lie hidden in some lofty region of thought, accessible only to the adept in science, but are open to the observation of all, and the process by which a conclusion is to be reached is one which all are capable of performing. Hence, to ask us in such a case, to bow to the authority of any name, is to ask us to stultify ourselves. By such a method all doctrines can be proved true. Was there ever an *ism*, however absurd, that had not a few great names enrolled in the list of its advocates? Why, idealism with all its absurdities can boast of a few great names, and the same can be said of every other nonsensical *ism* that ever disgraced the annals of human thought. Against the dogmatic assertions of a handful of materialists, however lionized by their votaries, we posit the sentiments of the great majority of mankind in all ages.

The materialist often seeks to impose upon the unwary by representing dualism as *a mere theory*. He says: "We know that matter exists, but we do not know that mind exists. The existence of mind is a mere hypothesis, plausible it may be, and popular, yet not a matter of knowledge, but only an inference." Now this is of a piece with all other materialistic attempts at argument. It is unmitigated sophistry. We do not know that matter exists any more certainly than we know that mind exists, and the process of cognition is the same in both cases. Certain phenomena can be accounted for only on the supposition that matter exists; certain other phenomena can be accounted for only on the supposition that mind exists. It is hypothesis in both cases. Matter cannot be directly cognized any more than mind. While we are perfectly familiar with the properties of matter, its essence as certainly eludes our scrutiny as does mental substance. We infer the essence from the properties. Perceiving several material properties—hardness, roundness, roughness, yellow color, acid taste, etc., which seem to be mutually related to each other, we infer that there is a substance in which these properties

inhere, and we call that substance an orange. Is it possible to know the existence of the orange otherwise than through its properties? No one, who is not an idiot, will contend that it is. Now, in precisely the same way we know the existence of mind. Perceiving certain correlated phenomena, such as thought, memory, imagination, sensibility and volition, we infer the existence of a substance which is their originating cause. The inference is as legitimate in the one case as in the other. Just here it should be borne in mind that it does not always invalidate a doctrine to show that it is only a hypothesis. A hypothesis which is sufficient to account for all the correlated facts and which is not inconsistent with any known fact or any well established theory is universally accepted as true. Hypotheses make up a large part of our stock of knowledge. The Newtonian theory of universal gravitation, the Copernican system of astronomy, and many of the accepted doctrines of the various physical sciences are only hypotheses. And yet of the truth of many of these hypotheses we have no more doubt than we have of any fact of which we are eye witnesses. Now, then, bearing in mind the fact that we have just as good evidence and the same kind of evidence of the existence of mind as we have of the existence of matter, let us proceed to consider briefly a few specimens of materialistic logic.

Materialists sometimes attempt to found an argument upon the fact that mental phenomena are always manifested through a material organization. They say: "If the soul has a real entitative existence, why is it that we do not see it, or in some way cognize it, or witness its operations, otherwise than through the body? Show us a disembodied spirit, or at least let us behold its phenomena, or contemplate its achievements, and we will believe." Than this, nothing is more absurd. Matter and mind are utterly antipodal in their essence and properties. The properties of matter are extension, figure, inertia, etc. The properties of mind are thought, sensibility, volition. Now, suppose I should assert that I will not believe in the existence of matter until I shall see it manifest mental phenomena; suppose I should demand that a stone shall construct a syllogism, that a clod shall manifest strong emotion, or that a planet shall exercise a virtuous choice, would I not be regarded as a lunatic? Yet, is it one whit less absurd to

demand that mind disembodied shall manifest material phenomena? True, the Scriptures teach that the soul exists after the dissolution of the body, and in this disembodied state exercises activities of a most wonderful character; but these activities we cannot witness unless a miracle be performed in giving us a new sense. To demand a miracle is certainly unscientific. To demand sight without eyes, hearing without ears, or flight without wings, is not more senseless than to demand that a disembodied spirit shall be manifested to us through our organs of sense. It is but just to say that such logic is repudiated by the better class of materialists at the present day, though it is still wielded as an *ad captandum* argument by certain brainless infidel lecturers.

Another materialistic argument is, that soul and body must be identical, because they are developed together. During infancy and childhood, while the body is immature, the mental powers are but partially developed; usually physical and mental vigor come together in manhood's prime and together take their departure in the decrepitude of age. Here, again, we admit the facts, but deny the conclusion. Two things which are developed together are identical in substance: than this, is there anything more puerile? The bones and the muscles of the body grow together, are they therefore identical? Is the body all bone or all muscle? If mind and body did not develop together, if the new born babe had a mind fully developed in all its power, would not this be the greatest anomaly in the universe? Would it not be out of harmony with the Creator's handiwork everywhere else? That the body and the soul should grow together is only what we have a right to expect, and to argue from this that the soul has no existence is the sheerest nonsense.

Another argument (so-called) is based upon the fact that there is a correspondency between the grade of material organization and the character of mental manifestations. Animals of a very low grade of mental power are exceedingly simple in the structure of their physical organism. The oyster, almost destitute of mentality, has a body that is almost without parts or organs. On the other hand, man, whose psychical activities are incomparably more exalted than those of any other animal, is correspondingly above them in the complexity and perfection of his physical organism.

This fact is unquestionable, but does it sustain the conclusion that mind and body are one? Is it not reasonable to expect that mental and physical perfection shall march hand in hand? Suppose this were not the case; suppose the oyster had the mind of a man; and suppose the beautiful, highly organized human body were tenanted by the stupid soul of the oyster; would not this state of things be a disgrace to the Architect of the universe? The mental nature is fitted to its environments; its endowments are proportionate to the work it is expected to perform. Is this a proof of its non-existence? It would be as reasonable to assert that there is no such thing as a steam engine, because steam engines vary in size and capacity, according to the work they are expected to do.

Again, the materialist talks learnedly and grandiloquently about our psychical states being conditioned by our bodily affections, and seems to deceive himself with the idea that his fine rhetoric will pass for argument. When the body is sound and well, the mind is active and vigorous; and when the body is diseased, the mind is usually more or less disordered. When the digestive organs are out of repair, it is impossible to fix the attention as closely, to perceive as clearly, to remember as accurately, to reason as correctly, or to comprehend as thoroughly, as when the digestive functions are properly performed. And this influence reaches not only the intellect, but also the emotions and the will. Who has not seen a sweet temper made sour by the demon of indigestion? Who does not know that one-half the disgraceful quarrels that rage around the domestic hearthstone have their origin in a torpid liver or a weak stomach, or a shattered nervous system? Who has not seen the Samson of a strong will shorn of his locks by the Delilah of physical indulgence, and then turned over, bound hand and foot, to the tender mercies of the whole Philistine horde of evil passions? And there is imagination, the fairy of the soul, robed in celestial splendor, and bearing a commission from above to fill the world with enchantments, to "give to airy nothings a local habitation and a name;" to transform prose into poetry, and to evoke melody from discord; to elevate the low and dignify the common-place; to paint upon terrestrial skies the rainbow hues of heaven; to scatter the bloom and verdure and fragrance of Eden along every pathway of earth; in short, to crown the world's head

with gladness and irradiate its heart with heavenly joy. This, I say, is the proper function of imagination. Yet, who has not seen this fair angel, under the influence of disease, or drug, or strong drink, transformed into a demon from the bottomless pit, filling every chamber of the soul with images of terror more appalling to contemplate than any picture of hell to be found in the pages of poesy or the galleries of art? Yes, the same power which regales us with the flames of rhetoric and the variegated beauties of poetry and art becomes, under the influence of a bodily affection, the source of all the indescribable horrors of delirium tremens. And who does not know that insanity, mental imbecility, and even total unconsciousness, are often produced by some comparatively slight derangement of the physical organism? Instances like these the materialist brings forward by the legion, and having arrayed them in the most gorgeous apparel that nineteenth-century rhetoric can furnish, he parades them before us, and exclaims with an air of triumph: "Don't you see that mind and matter are the same, that mind is the result of organization, that what we call mental phenomena are only certain peculiar activities of the brain? Is it not clear that the brain secretes thought, emotion and volition just as the liver secretes bile?" And he calls this argument. He seems actually to think that these facts prove his theory. His facts all admit. The effort which has been expended just at this point in accumulating facts might have been saved for some more profitable employment. No one denies the influence of bodily states upon mental conditions. To save his time, we are willing to concede to the materialist in advance that he can accumulate facts of this kind by the million.

But what do all these facts prove? Do they prove that there is no soul? Because the carpenter cannot work as well with old, broken or worn-out tools as with good ones, do we therefore conclude that there is no carpenter? Because the musician cannot produce as good music from a dilapidated instrument as from one that is in perfect order, do we therefore assert that there is no musician? Yet this is exactly the position which the materialist must take if he is willing to accept his own logic. The soul cannot work as vigorously through an old, diseased, rickety body as through a sound, healthy one; therefore, there is no soul! Beautiful logic.

Did it never occur to the materialist that such logic is a boomerang that comes home before it stops whirling? While it is a fact that the body affects the mind, it is none the less a fact that the mind affects the body. A hungry man, just sitting down to a luxurious repast, receives tidings of heavy pecuniary losses, or of the death of a loved one; instantly his hunger is gone, and he finds it impossible to partake of the food before him. The mind has affected the body. Again, you are looking in the face of a fair one, when suddenly her cheeks of marble whiteness assume the ruddy glow of the rose. Whence that blush? What is its originating cause? Who does not know that it had its origin in the mind? It was shame, confusion, or some other mental state that spread those crimson hues upon that face of lily-like fairness. And who has not seen a sick, ematiated invalid, under the influence of some powerful mental excitement, put forth physical exertions which, without such excitement, would have been impossible? Who has not known dyspepsia and other diseases of the physical organism produced by grief or some other mental affection? Who does not know that death has often been produced by excessive grief, or joy, or other strong emotion? Who needs to be told that certain psychical states, when of long continuance, leave an indelible impression upon the countenance? Behold yon unlovely looking female. Her countenance, her walk, the flash of her eye, the intonations of her voice, her whole appearance and bearing, all combine to leave upon the beholder an ineradicable impression of unloveliness. Yet that countenance was once as bright and cheery, as indicative of good temper and amiability, as most of those we meet. Whence the change? What has wrought this wondrous transformation? Ah! go and read the secret history that spans the intervening years. Read the old, sad story of matrimonial infelicity—a husband coarse, selfish, brutal, violent, dissipated; read the almost endless catalogue of indignities and barbarities heaped upon that fair one, and you will not wonder that she is fair no longer. You will not need to be told that the cause of her changed appearance lies not in the body, but in the mind.

A thousand instances like these might be adduced to show that bodily states are largely determined by mental conditions. Now, if the materialist has a right to deny the existence of the soul,

because our mental states are affected by our bodily conditi
have we not an equal right to deny the existence of the b
because bodily states are affected by our mental conditions?
course the man who would present such an argument to disprove
existence of the body would be at once set down as a simplet
Is not the argument equally silly in the mouth of a materiali

Now, of all those so-called arguments which we have examin
I ask in all candor, is there one that is worthy of the nan
And yet these are the very best weapons materialism has in
armory. If these are the best, is it worth while to examine
rest? No; time is too precious to be thus wasted. The v
treasure-house of materialistic literature is well filled, but not w
arguments. Fine rhetoric there is in abundance; bold assertio
they are as numerous as the stars in the sky; wit and hun
sparkle on the skeptical page like dew-drops in the morning su
shine; analogies, far-fetched and pointless, stand marshalled
great armies; but logical arguments are entirely wanting.

Not only is this the case, but materialism involves some of t
greatest absurdities imaginable. Let us contemplate a few of th
very briefly: Materialism teaches that all mental phenomena
produced by the particles of matter composing the brain. N
the matter in the human body is precisely like the same ma
elsewhere. The iron, lime, sulphur, phosphorus, etc., in the hun
body are endowed with precisely the same properties which
same elements have wherever found. Now, can any man in
senses believe that by mere arrangement, collocation or chem
combination, atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, or phospho
can become capable of producing mental phenomena? Arra
them and combine them as you please, can hydrogen atoms thi
reason, remember, imagine, love, hate, hope, fear, put forth voliti
be happy, sad or angry, practice virtue or commit sin? If hydro
atoms cannot, then can phosphorus atoms do any better? Can
element in any possible form or combination exercise thought, f
ing or volition? Common sense cries, no! The highest instinct
humanity reply, no! Mental phenomena being immaterial in th
nature, must be immaterial in their origin. That which thir
feels and wills is not a mass of hydrogen, nitrogen and phospho
atoms, but a something wholly immaterial in its essence and pr

erties. We instinctively feel that this must be so, and this instinctive belief is reinforced by a thousand converging lines of proof.

Reflect for a moment upon the phenomena of consciousness. I am conscious that I exist now and, also, that I existed last year, ten, twenty years ago. Now, what is it that is conscious? Is it the phosphorus, hydrogen or nitrogen atoms in my brain? Why, every school boy knows that these atoms are constantly changing. The old ones are carried away and new ones take their places. There is not a single atom of matter in my brain that was there seven years ago, and there are very few that were there one year ago. The matter composing the substance of my brain has changed several times since my infancy. Now, in the midst of this constant efflux and influx of atoms, how is it possible, on materialistic principles, for consciousness to remain? I am conscious that I am the same being that I was last year and at every other period since my birth. How can this be accounted for? Do the outgoing particles deceive the incoming particles and make them believe that they have always been lodged in this brain? How can I believe that I am the same being I was last year? I am not the same, so far as my body is concerned. Whence comes this consciousness of personal identity? Here materialism is as silent as the grave. Common sense, however, is ready with an answer. The *I* which is conscious of present and past experiences is not a mere collocation of constantly changing atoms of inert matter, but an immaterial substance as far above matter and its properties and powers as heaven is above earth.

Materialism is equally perplexed when confronted with the phenomena of memory. Since the substance of the brain is constantly changing, how can past experiences be remembered through long periods of time? The atoms of matter which composed my brain twenty years ago have all taken their departure from within my cranium. The atoms which now compose my brain were, twenty years ago, lying in the soil, growing in the grass, floating in the air or waving in the forest. Yet, somehow or other, the new atoms have come into possession of all the secrets of the old. How did this come about? Did the old atoms, as they took their departure, whisper all their experiences to the new, and then make these new comers believe that they have always been possessed of these expe-

riences? What but "the capacious credulity of an infidel" can swallow this? Common sense affirms that that which treasures up for intelligent use the experiences of many rolling years is not the constantly dissolving brain, but an immaterial something whose identity is unaffected by the vicissitudes of time.

The absurdity of materialism may also be shown by attempting on its principles to explain a process of reasoning or to account for the phenomena of imagination.

Again, inertia is one of the essential properties of matter. Place a stone in the street, and it will lie there forever unless acted upon by some extraneous force. It has no power to put itself in motion. Now, this property belongs alike to all chemical elements in all possible combinations. A piece of phosphorus or a particle of hydrogen gas is just as inert as a stone. Yet the materialist would have us believe that when one of these atoms finds its way inside a human skull, it instantly loses its inertia, and becomes capable of originating and communicating emotion; it suddenly acquires power to lift the arm, turn the head, move the feet and exercise a complete control over the entire body. Yea, it becomes capable of exercising the highest, the most God-like prerogative that can belong to a created intelligence—the prerogative of volition, the power to choose between two alternatives; the power to practice virtue or become the votary of vice; the power to give a loose rein to earth-born passion, or to enthrone heaven-descended conscience as the queen of the soul. Is it possible for matter, under any circumstances, to exercise so high a prerogative? Can an atom of phosphorus, by a little manipulation, become capable of choosing between duty and pleasure, between heaven and hell? Can hydrogen gas, by combining with other elements become capable of saying yes, or no, at pleasure to Him who wields all the resources of omnipotence? Against such a creed the reason, the common sense, the instincts and impulses of universal humanity rise in all the majesty of an invincible rebellion. Yes, it is the dictum of reason and the creed of the world that that which exercises the high prerogative of volition is not an atom or a mass of atoms of matter, but a thing which eludes the vigilance of the chemist and escapes the scrutiny of our sensual organs—a thing immaterial, "made in the image of God."

This faith of universal humanity we have a right to adhere to until materialism does something more than howl and rant and dogmatize. When we ask for the bread of logical argument materialism persists, in offering us instead the stones of mere *ex cathedra* speech, we have a right to refuse the gift.

Materialism is thus characterized by Figuier:

"Philosophy, like geometry, has its axioms, its self-evident truths. The existence of the soul is one of these axioms of philosophy. If we may ignore altogether those fault-finding mathematicians who amuse themselves by contesting the axioms of geometry, we may do likewise with those sophists who desire to dispute the axioms of philosophy, especially the existence of the soul. Let us give their say, and proceed on our course."

In other words, we are to regard the materialist precisely as we do a noisy canine by the road-side—with silent contempt. And this from Figuier, a scientist whose renown is world-wide, and who is entirely free from what Spencer calls "the theological bias." We sum up our estimate of the resources and prospects of materialism by saying that it is a second Don Quixote, making war on the world.

Natchez, February 13, 1884.

RATIONALE OF CHRISTIAN ATONEMENT.

BY R. ABBEY, D. D.

Any subject may be examined profitably from different points of observation. Viewed from a single direction, it is not always well understood. Man's moral and social condition is certainly abnormal and unhealthy. This is self-evident. How he got into this out-of-gear condition need not now be inquired into. The vital question just now is:

What is the matter with mankind? What is man's disease? In what respect is he out-of-gear with his Maker and with himself? To say that he is a sinner does not specify. To say a man is sick does not indicate the remedy needed. To say man is corrupt, degenerate, prone to evil, and the like, these are general complaints. Wrong actions, as well as wrong dispositions, have names. *What* is the matter with him?

A full and complete answer is easy in a single word. DISOBEDIENCE is his malady. He is disobedient to the commands of his Maker. That strict obedience to the commands or will of the Maker is the normal and only proper state and relation of an intelligent creature, is self-evident, and, therefore, needs no proof. Being disobedient, man's moral condition is abnormal, causing friction, conflict, loss, and more or less destruction throughout every department in nature, moral, mental and physical, wherever he touches it. Is anything else the matter with man but disobedience? Nothing else. Cure this one thing and the world is well. All sins and wrong of every kind flow from disobedience. But we must remember that an act of obedience, or ten thousand of them, do but slightly, if at all, even tend to cure the spirit of disobedience. The act is but the fruit. Disobedience itself is the stiff neck, the self-will, the fleshly demand; this disobedient state is universal, infesting every condition of man from the womb to the winding sheet. It is innate. In the cradle it relates indirectly and mediately to God, through the parent. But it is equally potent, and if possible, more destructive in its consequences, and a hundred times more easily controlled than in after life.

Obedience is affectionate obedience. That which is not moved by the affections is a cheat and a mockery. The mere external performance of an act formally commanded, may or may not have affectionate regard to the rightful authority. It may be done in contempt of it. It is the affectionate regard moving to it that makes an act obedient.

Now, the question of what we call salvation, is the question of restoring man to his primal condition of obedience. Is that possible? We must try to ascertain. This is the only question pertaining to human religion that is vital and fundamental. So we may suppose that when God, in great condescension set himself about the great enterprise of salvation the question arose: How can man be restored to obedience to rightful authority? That was the only question.

And right here is an important principle in Divine Government that must be kept prominently in view. Whatever God may have done in or about human salvation, this one thing he has not done, either in whole or in part. He did not in the slightest degree

interfere with or change, or modify man's constitution. He adopted such measures, and such only as were adapted to him in his present peculiar circumstances, condition and surroundings. We may suppose a philanthropist undertaking the civilization of a people on an unknown island. He would first ascertain what sort of people they were; what their character, besetments and other peculiarities were. Otherwise, very suitable measures for others might be quite useless in their case. So God saw that disobedience being the only disorder, that is the only thing to be cured. And the question arises: How?

It might be supposed that God being absolutely supreme in authority, his command not being subject to doubt or question, let him put forth his command that men shall love and serve and obey God. We are well enough acquainted with human nature to know that this would not meet the case. The affections are not subject to, nor can they be reached by mere authority. No human person loves another, either divine or human, merely by being commanded to do so. This may be seen at a glance by looking at ourselves.

Then it might be said: Let the infinitely good and righteous character of God be presented to man in a favorable light, as a motive to love and obedience. This, while it would not be entirely useless, could by no means avail as a controlling power. Our affections are by no means always fixed on the best and most worthy objects. There is a principle that controls them, but this is not it.

To ascertain in what way or by what processes man may be moved to obedience to the commands of his Maker, we must pause here long enough to note carefully the relation of the parties. Different motives might avail among parties differently related. Our inquiry touches the particular relation of these parties. God is infinitely powerful, infinitely happy, and independent in himself, and in need of nothing. His ability to do is unlimited. Man is helpless, wretched and ruined. Without immediate help, destruction is inevitable. Self-support is impossible. Destruction, deeper and deeper, stares him in the face.

Now, the inquiry recurs: How is man, in this condition, to be moved to affectionate obedience by the commands or other acts of such an independent superior? This is now the practical question

of salvation. And it must be solved, if at all, on rational principles. Man is natural.

To this it might be replied: The way is open for the exercise of divine power and goodness. Let God from his abundant fullness, put forth his hands and supply human wants and remove man's dangers and difficulties.

This, so far as we know, was possible, but it would by no means reach the case. It would not be salvation. How or to what extent it would change or modify the constitution of nature or of man, we do not know; but with his present nature and endowments, mere benefaction could not restore him to affectionate obedience. This is apparent. The benefaction might be necessary, but this alone, however great or necessary, can but very feebly move the affections. The question raised a little may be put thus: How, and under what circumstances or conditions, may the largest and most needed benefactions be bestowed on a helpless and suffering mendicant so as to fix his grateful affections in the largest measure on the benefactor? Mere relief will not do it. Let us try it.

Mere relief from distress and danger, however great or small, would tend to produce a compliant feeling towards the producer of it, but of itself could not possibly bring out any deep, strong, life-long feelings of affection and gratitude. A person may be starving, and without relief will perish, and a wealthy man throws him a dime or a loaf. His life is saved, but the benefactor cared so little about the life or sufferings of the sufferer that he did not even look to see the effect of his gift. He would have done the same thing and perhaps much more for a dog. The gift cost him nothing, and so he felt no interest in the matter, or next to none. A house is on fire, and several persons must perish without assistance. A passer-by, seeing the danger, lifts a door-latch and passes on. The service saved the lives of the people, but their thanks for the benefaction must be small. Others would despise the action as mean and heartless. To throw a rope or a piece of board to a drowning man so that it saved his life would cost but little, nor could it produce more than the smallest feeling of thankfulness. Gratitude would not be a proper name for the product of such help.

The enterprise of salvation, we have seen, was the undertaking by the Almighty to restore man to his primal state of affectionate obedience to God; and the question of salvation is *how* to do this without in the least disturbing to constitution of man or his social susceptibilities. We have seen that the exercise of mere authority could not reach the case, nor could mere didactic teaching, nor the exercise of power by the Almighty in relieving human distress. Man's constitutional nature is such as to render it impossible to reach his affections in relieving him from distress otherwise than by the exhibition of voluntary suffering and self-denial in doing so. We will keep this great principle in mind, and look at it again.

Then suppose man to be informed that God, in relieving man from his perils and dangers, was moved thereto by the purest, most disinterested benevolence for mankind; that God so loved the world that He was moved in pity thus to exercise His power in man's behalf; would not that meet the case? It most assuredly would not. All the ordinary channels of information full to overflowing could not convey such information to man so as to make him feel the force of it, or to produce in him any large measure of gratitude to God.

We are now approaching the culminating point in this inquiry. To reach the feelings, as well as the sober judgment of man, so as to fix his heart, up to the largest measure, in affectionate obedience, upon God, seeing the peculiar relation of the parties—infinite power and wealth on the one hand, and the deepest poverty and distress on the other—and the end to be accomplished, the only possible approach to man is for God to put *himself*—not another—in the position of man's *benevolent Benefactor*. Benefaction is never relief, and is easy enough, for God is all fullness and power; but how is divine *benevolence* to be shown? Right here hinges the great question of possible atoning salvation. Seeing that man has the constitution, the nature and character we plainly see in him, the possibility of salvation does by no means follow from the unlimited power and fullness of the Almighty. The fullest exercise of all this cannot show divine benevolence in reference to man in his distress.

How is Divine benevolence to be manifested? *How* is it, or

can it, be made to appear? By what proofs is it to be proven? How can it be shown? I answer this question in reference to God just as I would answer it in reference to man, or any being because, abstractly, there is, within the wide realm of thought but one test by which benevolence can be known, manifested or tested. How benevolent God may *be* in himself, is not the question. The question is, how is Divine benevolence to be made to appear to and be powerfully impressed upon us?

The nature of benevolence shuts up the proof of its existence to a single point. Sacrifice and self-denial actually and voluntarily undergone in relieving the distresses of the distressed, is the only proof it is capable of receiving. No theories, reasoning or elucidations can set forth either the existence or the degree of benevolent feelings in any being, either God, angels or men. Quite likely there may be such a thing as latent benevolence, but there is no proof of it. To be known it must be seen in the actualities of benevolent performance. The angels may be benevolent; some more so than others, but we have no proof of it, for we have no seen them in the actual, voluntary endurance of pain and suffering in relieving human woe. Small sacrifice proves small benevolence. A single dollar from the pocket of plenty proves infinitesimal benevolence, if we have no better word for it, and larger acts in proportion. Mere benefaction has no benevolence. Its bestowments prove pride, ostentation or something of the sort. Benevolence feels the pressure of bestowment, and feels it keenly.

Atonement, or reconcilement by benevolence is the active, working principle of love. We saw some persons rescued from fire at small cost of the benefactor; and we saw a rich man's loaf save a man from starvation. A rope that cost nothing, and the smallest amount of labor, with no risk to the benefactor, saved a man from drowning. Let us see these sufferers rescued by means different in some respects. To make the escape of the persons in the flame available, it was necessary for the benefactor himself to climb a flaming stair-way, subjecting himself to equal peril and even greater suffering. The man whose loaf saved the starving man, was himself in equal suffering and danger, and divided with a fellow sufferer his last morsel, subjecting himself to the extremest peril and danger. To make the rope avail in case of the drowning man, it

was necessary for the man himself to plunge from a position of safety, into the surging ice and billows, encountering the most threatening danger, suffering and peril. Here was substitution, or vicarious suffering, if these terms be preferred.

In both these sets of cases, the benefaction was available and saved life, but in only one was there any evidence of benevolence. Benefactions that cost the donor but little, give no evidence of benevolence, and therefore cannot stir up no deep feelings of grateful love to the donor. There must be personal and willing sacrifice, self-denial and suffering. It is not the benefaction that arouses that deep gratitude, but the benevolence that instigates it. To challenge the admiration of the rescued, there must be large sacrifice and unmeasured self-denial. There must be a suitable field and a suitable occasion, and these must be embraced and occupied without stint, scant or calculation of loss or economy. Most of the so-called benevolence among us is of the stinted, costless, infinitesimal kind, giving evidence more of covetousness than of even social liberality. Did the donor imperil or sacrifice his own life?

Now this is the natural and the actual relation of those parties—the Almighty with boundless power and fullness on the one hand, and man with indigent suffering and helplessness on the other. And this natural relation is to remain undisturbed, while the great end sought for is the restoration of man to his former state of affectionate obedience. And we have seen that in order to produce this work on man's heart he must *see*, and *feel*, and understand his rescue to be the result of voluntary sacrifice and self-denial on the part of his Divine Benefactor. And the question is still unanswered. How *can* this be done? How can Almighty God manifest himself, not another, as a personal, suffering benefactor of the largest degree conceivable in the actual rescue of man from his perilous condition?

An insurmountable difficulty at the outset is, that *God is a Spirit*. No man hath seen God at any time. Being a Spirit, and not a corporeal being, it is impossible He could show himself to us a suffering benefactor. He could, in many ways, relieve an instance, or any number of instances, of suffering, but that would not meet the case. It is the *benevolence* in the benefactor, and that

alone that reaches the heart and does the work; and benevolence can be shown, not in mere benefaction, but solely and exclusively in personal suffering and self-denial in bestowing it. So, where is the suffering? What is suffering or pain, applied to God?

The question of divine suffering has been raised or suggested by some. But it is impossible to conceive such a thing. If told so, we would be told nothing conceivable. The words would not convey to us an idea, and so would not help the case before us for two reasons: first, it could give us no information that we could understand or appreciate. Suffering implies corporeal existence. We can attach no meaning to pain, either mental or physical, apart from bodily form and being. Secondly, suffering is pain endured, uneasiness, distress, loss, sorrow, lack of happiness in either body or mind, and implies weakness. It is never wholly voluntary. It is sometimes submitted to, or endured, in order to attain ends that cannot be otherwise reached. The hungry man who shared his last morsel with a fellow-sufferer had as much repugnance to starvation as if he had been deprived of food by force. The burning heat was as painful to the man who ascended the flaming stair-way to save others, as it would have been if he had been tied to a stake by savages. He did not choose it. Being weak, and therefore unable to save the sufferers otherwise, he submitted to the endurance. This, if applied to God directly, would deny almightiness to the Almighty.

Thus we have seen that the only avenue of approach to man's feelings, by which his affectionate obedience to God could be aroused into action, is through the Almighty as a benevolent benefactor, or through the benevolence of his benefactions, and that personal benevolence can be shown in no way but by sacrifice and self-denial voluntarily undergone, in relieving human distress; and that painful suffering supposed of God in his essential spirituality or thus applied to him, is not an idea cognizable by the human understanding, but is, to our apprehension, an impossibility; what, then, is the hope or outlook for salvation? *There is no hope!* Despair covers the horizon on every hand! Salvation is a natural impossibility! Stern necessity closes the scene. The inquiry is traced to its source, and Nature's resources are exhausted. Her last utterance, be it wail or fiat, is pronounced—Impossible!

So proud Nature gives it up—with all her means, measures, men and merits, surrenders to inexorable fate. Whether, far beyond our mental vision, there are, can be, modes of being under which what we call pain might be predicatod of Almightiness, is not the question. We can neither affirm nor deny beyond the walls of our enclosure. It is enough for us to know that such pain or suffering could not be manifested to us.

Our own social acquaintance gives us abundant information as to the only mode of controlling human affections. The means are social and reciprocal. We may have fondness for an animal, but it is not affection. We love things, money, or property, but it is not affection. We are impressed with *quasi* respect and reverence for angels, but it is not affection. They do not reciprocate. They show to us no sympathy. Affection supposes and refers to fellow-creatureship. This is the sympathetic cord which binds kindred; like to like. Even the love we bear to our Maker is necessarily indirect. There can be no direct communication between spiritual and sentient beings. They cannot see each other. No man hath *seen* God. There must be media in order to reciprocity. And, *God is a Spirit!*

The natural impossibility of a direct divine approach to human affections is apparent. But is everything in this world natural? Some things are, and so far as we know, but a very few things. Maybe most of the things in this world are what we would call supernatural. Certainly some of them are. God is a Spirit, but is He absolutely confined to this one mode of existence? If so, then He is not infinite in power. We know but little about *modes*, different modes of existence, though we know very well that the same individual person sometimes exists in modes essentially different. We know very well that we ourselves exist in different periods in different modes. The embryonic, the current life, and the final state, are entirely different in the mode or manner of being. And we know, too, that God does not always exist in the same way, manner or mode. He is a Spirit, and is also *in the flesh.* This fleshly mode, or manifestation is to meet, or accommodate his being to us in our condition. We insist on the Divinity of Christ. This does not mean that the man Jesus was invested, or endowed with divine power. It might be, so far as we can know, that

divine power was conferred upon the man. This is modern Unitarianism. God did not clothe a man with full divine power and authority. *The humanity of God*, is, perhaps, a better expression. Can Almighty God himself exist and appear in human form, mode, manner and nature? The question of human salvation is narrowed down to this inquiry. Can God himself exist physically, sentiently, fleshly, humanly? Then in this attitude, mode, capacity or condition the divine approach to man is open and easy, for it is the approach of a symphathizing fellow-creature. Right here lies the plan of salvation, or atonement.

Much inconclusive and illogical argument has been expended in discussing supposed individual and personal relations and dealings between the Father and the Son. Here we grope in total darkness. There are no such separate individual dealings and relations known to us. When we see the Father in or through the Son, we do not see another individual person, but the same Person in another aspect. So when we see, or seem to see, independent negotiations of a countervailing nature between the Father and Son, such as demands requisitions, penalties, acceptance and the like, we must not understand it as we would similar things between an earthly ruler and subordinate. The Father and Son are *one*. The Son is, to us, the expression, the word, the manifestation, the visibility of the Father. It is infinitely beyond our little province to undertake the adjustment of real or supposed dealings, in the nature of severalty of interest in the High Court and Council of the triune Godhead. To speak of the "satisfaction of justice," in atonement is not a first-rate use of language. Literally there is no such thing. A person may or may not be "satisfied" with some thing done or not done by another person. Justice is a quality or principle, not a person, and supposes dealings between two or more individual persons, whose rights or interests countervail with each other. We must be very careful, therefore, how we introduce Christ as a third party in the atonement. He is not a third party absolutely and independently, but rather in the sense of a trinitarian aspect of the one undivided Deity. Much misunderstanding just along here arises oftentimes by insisting too rigidly on a stiff etymology. The subject is so highly and exclusively unique that the words, frequently, which will describe human relations, must,

in their employment here, be modified, or at least mollified a little to bring out the true shade of meaning. Illustration sometimes serves better than didactic exactness.

This system or method of salvation may be likened to a vine that had fallen from the branches of a tall oak. There it lies prone and prostrate on the cold ground with no ability to rise, and for lack of better associations its tender claspers have clung hold of the weeds and brambles of earth, which hold it more and still more firmly in its degradation. Now, the question of its restoration is the question of possible physical intercommunication. And this question addresses itself exclusively to the branch. *Can it let itself down?* Then let it remain there but a little while until the vine can fasten its tendrils in secure hold of the solider substance and then let the branch *raise itself* with its rescued possession to its wanted position of safety.

Here is the beginning of atonement. God himself, not another, took on human form and human frailty. "I and the Father are one;" or, I and my Father, is virtually repeated a hundred times. Our dealings are with God. We must not, in order to accomodate an easy mode of thinking, place God in personal and especially in individual or countervailing relation to another in the enterprise of salvation. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." That is, in seeing me, understandingly, you see the Father. We must not create or suppose a severalty of interest and of dealing in the personality of the Godhead. No reconciliation is needed there. All is harmony there. The needed reconciliation is between man and his Maker.

To this end Almighty God, creator of heaven and earth, cared not that He, himself, should, as it were, resign his high throne for a season. He cared not that He should wrap up his conditions in the frailties and uncertainties of manhood. He cared not that earth should be his exclusive dwelling place, nor that in it, its lowest and meanest condition should be his condition. He cared not that hardship and opposition, cold, cheerless charity, buffeting and false accusation should be his daily experience; that death should be his portion and the grave his abode. No, nor did He care that amidst his fiery trials his Father should veil his face and withdraw his countenance from him and leave him to tread

the wine-press of sorrow alone and roll his garments in his ow
blood. O, to think that the Creator should become a creatu
dwelling on the ungrateful earth which He made, in want of
morsel of its bread and a cup of its water to satisfy his hunger a
his thirst, and denied even these. To think He should be se
here calling on the ungrateful creatures whom He formed and f
for their charity, for their pity, nay, for their justice, and deni
even these! But when He left his high courts of glory and can
down here on this great embassy of mercy, there was one attribu
of the divinity He laid not aside when He laid aside the rest. E
would not part with his mercy; no, nor with so much of his pow
as might be useful to accompany, to assist and to satisfy his merc
But saving so much power as might be needed for others, reser
ing nothing that could be appropriated to his own benefit, He la
all aside and brought himself not only within the narrow precinc
of manhood, but into manhood's lowest and most melancholy co
dition. The power that could have humbled his foes He was wil
ing to forego; the power that could have avenged his man
wrongs He was willing to forego; the power that could have mini
tered some comfort and solacement in his sufferings He was willin
to forego; the little power that could have sheltered his unhouse
person, that could furnish a pillow for his weary head, and a me
to strengthen his weary limbs, all this power He was willing t
forego; but that power which could heal diseases, which could p
to rights broken and disabled limbs, which could satiate the hu
ger of famishing multitudes, which could command the winds an
the sea; that almighty power which could open the grave's mout
and draw forth its withered and decaying victim and bid him stan
and go and snuff the morning air and mingle with his friends an
live and be happy, all that power He gave not up, but brought
down here with him, where, alas! it was called upon so largely an
repaid so shamefully. He was derided, buffetted, insulted, spitte
on; his name was cast out as evil; his almightiness was the spo
of titled fools and dignified criminals; He was beset with spies an
informers and carried about in the bosom of his confidence a ven
traitor. There was not room for him in the inn, and to mak
room for him on the cross it became necessary to release a mu
derer, which was actually done. This was the consummatio

God was *in* Christ and *was* Christ, "who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation."

Thus it is seen that in order to meet and correspond with us, on our ground, God shifted his attitude toward us, changing his mode of being, as seen by us, from essential spirituality to common manhood. This change in the mode or manner of God's being, while it looks strange to us, merely because we do not frequently see it, is inexplicable only as a thousand other things, known to be true, are inexplicable. Now the Deity meets the humanity on a common platform of full sympathy and fellowship, kind answering in kind. Without the shedding of blood there is no remission, because the voluntary shedding of blood in sacrifice and self-denial is the highest and most appropriate exhibition of benevolence in a benefactor in relieving the distresses of the distressed. The necessity for the sacrifice is found in the peculiar relation of the parties. It is not needful, therefore, to suppose the Father and the Son in the relation of individual severalty, with opposing interests of demand, acceptance and satisfaction of a *quasi* commercial character with adjustment of equivalents. Infliction and endurance is one thing; voluntarily sacrifice and self-denial is another.

But we are told that Christ is not the real, veritable Jehovah, but a created being of superior dignity and worth, occupying a position far above ordinary manhood, but finite. This is Unitarianism. An improvement on this is the supposition that Jesus was endowed with a miraculous birth, and invested with divine attributes and powers, so as, in this respect, to be equal with the Father. This is semi-unitarianism, and supposes an individual severalty. The Word *was* God.

It is historically true that Jesus did, in his own person, voluntarily suffer and deny himself in a scheme of consummate wisdom, the only plan possible, in accordance with human nature, calculated to win the gratitude of man so as to fix their hearts in affectionate obedience on himself. So, then, if Christ was an endowed person, and not the veritable deity, He is an usurper. He appropriates to himself the allegiance due to God alone. By his own well planned act He has secured to himself the gratitude and submission of millions, and will finally rule mankind. And if

God has assented to this arrangement, He has assented to rebellion against his own government, and is willingly supplanted in the allegiance and affections of his people. For it was Christ, and not God, on this plan, that did the suffering. It is the sufferer himself, and not another, in an arrangement of rescue and relief, that secures the homage of the rescued. It is impossible for one person to suffer voluntarily and deny himself in furnishing relief to the distressed, and that another should receive the homage due thereto. The homage and fealty are drawn to the personal sufferer, and because of the voluntariness of the suffering.

Moreover, if God appointed his subaltern to suffer and die in order that He, himself, might secure and enjoy the affectionate obedience of his revolted people, the act was not only unwise, but dishonest and tyranical. It is the tyrant, and not the righteous ruler, who thrusts his minister forward to the point of danger in order that he, the ruler, may enjoy advantages the price of which he is unwilling to pay.

It is this sensible, ocular, physical exhibition of the great Unseen on the forum of the world, this supernatural, hypostatical union which gave to each and to both that exclusive peculiarity which lays the foundation of our faith. It is this union which identifies the humanity with the Divinity. Thomas touched his very flesh, and in the ecstacy of inspired devotion cried out: "My Lord and my God!" It is this which gives to his teaching that mysterious and inexplicable power. The lips of the man do but speak forth sentiments of the enshrined Divinity. It is this union which gives that soft, persuasive influence to his example. That example was, indeed, human, or how, otherwise, could it be an example to us. It is this, and this alone, which brings the divine sympathy within the scope and purview of man, and in his sight mingles it with suffering humanity. Without a practical sense of bereavement there can be little, if any, sympathy with bereavement. Sympathy implies fellowship, equality, companionship.

It has been supposed necessary that there be just so much suffering, by measurement, as a recompense or equivalent for a given amount of sin. This reduces the matter to a sort of commercial arrangement. It is not the relative proportions of sin and suffering in supposed equivalents that is needful, but the character of the

suffering. It is not stipulated pain offered to God by another to appease the divine displeasure, that He might condone the punishment. There is no condonation of sin. Atonement is the end to be reached. This to be found, not in something that operates solely upon the Almighty, but in something that will move the sinner to atonement with his Maker by or through repentance and pardon. Personal negotiations between the Father and the Son are matters far too high for our reasoning powers. They relate not to the atonement itself, but to the instrumental means by which it is accomplished. It inquires *how* God can assume flesh.

As to the agency of Christ in this great enterprise, we are very plainly and very fully informed, so far as human ability can comprehend the subject. He redeemed us from the curse of the law. He bore our sins in his own body. He laid down his life for us. He gave himself a ransom for all. Christ died for the ungodly. By his stripes we are healed. These expressions are, of course, figurative in a high degree. This must be so because they relate to things so exclusively unique as to have no parallel in human affairs. We should be very careful, therefore, in insisting rigidly on applying to them, always, such rules of terminology as we would to common worldly matters.

We have seen that the salvation of man in his peculiar condition of degradation and helplessness, means his restoration to his former condition of affectionate obedience to the will of the Maker, and that this restoration to his former condition must be brought about necessarily, if at all, by means congenial to his human and fallen state; that is, they must be human means. The exercise of these humans in divine hands, or by divine agency, is what we technically call *atonement;* or varied a little in pronounciation—at-one-ment. The estranged parties—estranged by man's disobedience—are at one again. Man, under this influence, no longer opposes the divine will. His gratitude has been reached through a natural, that is, a human channel; that is, by a Mediator; that is, by a divine Creator in the form, manner and earthliness, suffering, homogeneity and true manliness of manhood. We must not confound atonement with the means of affecting it. Atonement is the joint work of God and man.

We have seen that God is a Spirit, shrouded in ineffable glory,

infinitely removed from manhood and from any of its infirmities but we have not seen that he was shut up to that one exclusive mode of existence. So far as we know, he may assume many different modes of being. Two have been plainly shown to us, viz. an essential spirituality and physical manhood. Nor have we any reason to presume that either one of these is more natural or more in harmony with the constitution of the universe than the other. Neither does the existence of the one mode suppose or necessitate the non-existence of the other. Some men seem to consider it hard to believe in a divine manhood, or what is the same thing, a human godhood, that for the word to become flesh is a wonderful exploit not to be believed. But if we reflect a moment we can but see that any mode of divine existence is utterly inexplicable to us; how then can any one particular mode be more strange than another? To say that the Word became flesh, is the same as to say that omnipotence assumed a fleshly form or mode of existence, or that God, for a reason entered into brotherhood or homogeneity with us. Nor have we any reason to suppose that in all this there is anything absolutely new, incidental or even chronological, though it seems so to us. Divine being is eternal, not merely continuous or indefinitely extended, but absolutely and constitutionally in and of itself eternal. Mere chronological extension seems an attribute of finite existence.

Sonship must, therefore, be eternal because it is divine. Without such a relation between man and the Maker there can be no atonement. Once estranged they are forever alienated. This possible development or manifestation of homogeneity of divine and human character, is the means by which atonement is brought about. Hence a Mediator or days-man between the divine and human, which to be practical and efficient, must occupy the high court of heavenly power and the helpless frailties of human nature. How else could we see, feel and be moved by his sufferings in our behalf?

And so we see that God did and does exist in this two-fold mode or manner. Besides the mode which we may call essential spirituality, he condescends to dwell in full and natural humanity. Here is at least possible atonement, and all that is necessary to make it complete and effective is for God in Christ, that is, in humanity to

manifest himself a practical benevolent benefactor in voluntary suffering and self-denial. The natural effect of this voluntary suffering and self-denial is the return to obedience of all who gratefully appreciate this greatest of all conceivable benevolence put forth in relieving the distresses of a revolted world.

Those who find large benevolence exhibited in the miracles in which Christ healed the sick, fed the hungry, and raised the dead to life, are content with cheap benevolence. These acts of mercy cost the Saviour nothing, or but little, so far as we see. They show to us no voluntary suffering. In this respect what are these in comparison with the scenes of the garden and the cross? His miracles showed an unseen divinity; his sufferings showed a divinity in our own form, carrying our own infirmities and susceptibilities. So we have a High Priest who *can* be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; one who *was* in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.

God was manifest in the flesh; then atonement is possible. In that he suffered, being tempted, He is able to succor them who either suffer or are tempted; then atonement is accomplished.

MANLINESS IN THE PULPIT.

BY REV. F. M. EDWARDS.

The pulpit has always been a power in civilization. Its history has been marked by triumphs as remarkable as important. The good that has been done to man by the teachings, encouragements and warnings of a means of grace, instituted by Divine wisdom, though carried forward by human instrumentality, can hardly be computed by the dwellers upon earth. As no means of influencing men have equalled the pulpit in the past, so nothing can ever take its place in the future. Whatever power may be attributed to the press (and it is undoubtedly very great,) it is not equal to the task of becoming a substitute for the voice of the living sympathetic herald. The art of printing has given evidence of great capability for usefulness. It deservedly commands the attention of the best philanthropic workers. As an aid to the functions of the sacred desk, it

can scarcely be overrated. But the Christian philosopher that can suppose the pen to be the coming agent for man's elevation, that is to render comparatively useless the activities of the tongue, has studied the peculiarities of earthly society to very little practical purpose. The truth is, there is an abundance of work for both pen and tongue. Both are needed in the struggle against vice; and each requires the characteristic of industrious manliness in order to the achievement of real success. There is no wisdom in unholy rivalry; nor can the one boastingly say to the other, "I have no need of thee." Hence, what may be said in this paper about manliness in the pulpit, will, with propriety, *mutatis mutandis*, be applicable to the religious press. False religions have not employed a regular system of gathering the people together to receive systematic instruction and exhortation. The heathen countries of old did not, so far as we know, employ anything like religious propagandism. Each locality had its gods, and was content that every other locality should differ from it in creed. This fact is consistent with the idea of polytheism; but the notion of having no care for the moral condition of others, cannot be consistent with the teaching of Christian theism. The crime of the man who asked, "Am I my brother's keeper?" has been recognized by all pious men. The prophets under the Jewish, and the preachers under the Christian dispensation, give, when history has recorded fidelity to the Master's commission, the true idea of beneficence. Man informed, is to benefit his neighbor uninformed. Man ordered by his God to go on an errand of good, has no right to refuse. Christianity in its demands, is peculiarly an exemplification of this principle. The ascending Jesus gives to his astonished, but now thoroughly convinced, disciples, no less a task than that of reaching "every creature" with salvation's proclamation. Duty on the part of the Christian Church will not allow a cessation of effort so long as a single individual can be found who will truthfully say "nobody ever has told me before" of the great plan of redemption From this it will be seen—

> "'Tis not a cause of small import
> The pastor's care demands;
> But what might fill an angel's heart
> And filled a Savior's hands."

The dignity and worth of the pulpit are seen also from the annals of its actual working during the more than eighteen centuries of its employment. Its failures, no less than its successes, have contributed to strengthen the argument for its value. If a system fails by its own inherent error as to principle or doctrine, it deserves to be abandoned; but there is a vast difference between such a system and one whose very failures are proofs of its power, as we find to be the case in institutions that fail of their proposed good by lack of consistency and perseverance in those commissioned to carry forward their design. A soil is proved to be worthless only when faithful and skillful tillage fails to get a reward; we cannot consistently charge the poverty of a crop upon the soil or the weather, when we know that gross error or criminal inactivity has constantly characterized the plowman. If we scan the narrative of the pulpit, we must criticise according to these principles, and not imagine the institution unwise or worthless because the corruption of the dark ages, and the excesses of the crusaders under the fanatical leadership of Peter the Hermit, followed in the wake of erratic preaching.

On the subject of the greatness of the preacher's work, Hoppin says (Homiletics, page 29):

"The greatness of the preacher's work appears from its results. These would be seen negatively were the pulpit stricken out of existence; or by the comparison of Christian lands with heathen lands, or even with countries where the pulpit is chiefly an engine of hierarchical and political power. A superior condition of morality, education and civilization, is never found in lands where the Christian pulpit is not found; and wherever, even, the pulpit has been shorn of its power, there is to be seen a corresponding moral deterioration among the people. Chalmers complained of the dormancy of the Scottish popular mind; and we know the degraded character of the Scotch when he first entered public life; and this same dulness and moral stupor were seen across the Tweed in the popular mind, when the English pulpit, had, in a great measure, lost the power it possessed in the days of Howe, Owen, Baxter, Leighton. The quickening influence of the pulpit upon the American mind is too obvious to be denied. Daniel Wester said that he first learned how to reason from the preaching he heard in his native village. Dr. Wood, the minister of Boscawen, fitted him for college, and his tribute to the American ministry in his argument on the Girard College case, is a proof of his intense convictions on this subject. The preacher goes deeper than the books in molding the intellectual habits and tastes of his people; for he begins earlier than the author and exercises a more vital sway upon the mind. Almost the only true eloquence that now reaches the popular mind in Germany, is the eloquence of the pulpit, and where are the men

in any other profession who may be compared with those spiritual sovereig in our own land, who, from their thrones, send forth a life-giving, shapi influence far around them?"

All manner of reasoning goes to show the importance (the plan adopted by Him who "spake as never man spake," fo the evangelization of the human race. *A priori* and *a posterio* arguments alike establish the truth we claim. If we reason fro what we might expect to occur in the history of intellige creatures, or from what has actually occurred, our conclusions w be very nearly the same, in principal characteristics identical, as the philosophical and religious grandeur of the pulpit. If a part a thing is by axiomatic truth less than the whole, if the greater m be able to contain the less, then there can be but a brief period doubt in any one's mind on so plain a subject. The teacher infancy, who shows the best manner of holding a spoon, is an i portant character, but important only as to the body of the chi The instructor who leads the child into the mazes of science, the elegances of literature, is more important, but only more i portant because mind is regarded as more essential to existen than the body. The preacher who moulds all the faculties of m to the great end of permanence in happiness and glory, must still greater in importance, because without this moulding, t human being, whatever his temporary excellence, is destined to doom of despair. Man is not a material entity alone; he is n only a rational spirit; he is a moral agent accountable for electi between right and wrong; his rationalism was given for the pu pose of ability to make this choice; his future condition is depe dent upon the proper use of this rationalism; then it is plain seen that the process which reaches to the grand end of answeri the question—"what must I do to be saved?" is of more digni and worth than anything which merely answers the interrogatio relative to temporary physical or mental enjoyment. The unhap loneliness of the most thorough scientist, when he reaches t terminus of his possible investigation of facts past, present, prospective, must be burdensome; unless relieved by the exerci of faith in some power that can order coming events. The mo powerful the mind of the scientist, the more is its demand for soc basis of credence. It is the dictum of science that experiment

the test of truth. This dictum applied to human history, shows that death is inevitable. What comfort then to the aged scientist to know how many stars of the first magnitude shine in the constellations of the heavens, when his tottering limbs, his failing sight, his decaying powers, indicate that he must soon enter the narrow house into which his infidel theory can admit no possibility of telescopes or observatories? The sciences, then, which only render man proud of his rationalism, without affording any consolation as to the great event so rapidly approaching all the members of the human family, can claim no such dignity as that science of eternal truth which, while allowing the temporary gratification arising from the legitimate pursuit of scientific investigation, gives the happy answer to the question—"if a man die, shall he live again?

The Christian Scientist is the highest style of man. When he reaches the terminus to which we alluded above, his faith in the God of science makes him feel that he has as yet only occupied the vestibule of his grandeur; the great audience chamber of truth is before him in which he is to revel in truth's discovery. The shepherd that leads his flocks into green pastures and by the side of the still waters, during the day, but gives no basis of hope for protection when darkness comes, and leaves them exposed to howling wolves, or to rapacious lions, as soon as night arrives, is an exponent of that system of science which makes man grand while he is in his tenement of clay, but brings no ray of hope to illumine the dark caverns of decay into which man knows he must enter. Evidently, if there be a science that can take away the gloom of the tomb and can enable man to exclaim, "Oh grave where is thy victory?" its claims upon man are primary. Why, then, should the occupant of the pulpit be regarded as having a profession to be despised by great intellects? If Newton's intellect was shown to be great by his successful searching into nature's arcana, it is not minified by his discovery that nature's Author was greater than nature itself; as the inventor is greater than the invention; the Creator greater than the creation; the cause greater than the thing caused. The teaching of natural philosophy and chemistry can be useful to man, because he is thereby enabled to reach desired results in his work for this world, with more rapidity and

ease; is the teaching of such truth, as will certainly enable a man to provide for his immortality in laying up a store-house of eternal wealth in the temple not made with hands, of less importance and hence of less dignity? To give an affirmative answer would be to offer an insult to man's position as a thinker.

Having clearly seen the great importance of the pulpit from the nature of its work, let an additional thought be given as to its history, which may give force to what shall afterwards be said relative to the manliness required in its functions. It is that found in the indisputable fact that Jesus Christ was not only the introducer of this great plan of missionary exertion, but himself was about the best exponent of its activities. He was *the* great preacher. His circuit embraced all the regions of Judea, Samaria and Gallilee. His ministry was as thorough as his doctrines were peculiar. He gave to after preachers the plainest examples of reproof, rebuke and exhortation. He wept over Jerusalem, but sternly rebuked the crimes thereof. He exhorts all that are heavy laden to come to him for relief, but warns the unwilling of outer darkness, "where shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." He gives in his own history, the idea of manliness which his followers are to keep in view in their practice. He, though "by him were all things made, and without him was not anything made that was made," faithfully and industriously engaged in preaching his own gospel and in teaching his disciples how to preach, until the fulfillment of his benign mission, by submission to the tragedy of the cross. Can any professional work which has for its object those things only which add to man's comfort or convenience during his earthly stay, equal in importance and dignity a profession whose aims are so high that the God-man becomes its first devotee? Is there any work that can approximate in authority and grandeur that which derives its authority from him who bade defiance to death and the grave and ascended to the skies to become pleader for those who should yield to the invitations of mercy? Can any work other than that of preaching the Gospel, claim the promise of the Saviour, "Lo I am with you always, even unto the end of the world?"

This discussion of the inherent power and dignity of the pulpit brings up a serious but unpleasant inquiry: Why has not more

success attended the pulpit's work? The rapidity with which Christianity made conquests, in Apostolic times, was encouraging to its adherents. Had there been no check to its advance, long ago "the heathen would have been given to God's Son for an inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession." Why was there a check? Did the promise of God become of none effect? Was there falsity in Omnipotence? Was the destruction of the reign of Paganism such a disaster to the earth that Christianity must adopt its principles in making image worship and outward display of gorgeous trappings the substitutes for primitive simplicity and sincerity in Church service? Did our Lord prove delinquent as to fidelity to his promise "Him that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out," and make it necessary for absolution to be given by a human priest; or otherwise not to be given at all? We cannot reply affirmatively; but must seek for the cause of declension resulting in corruption and outrageous crimes under the cloak of a professed ecclesiasticism, in the lack of that manliness in the pulpit which the example of the Saviour inculcated.

The great reformation under Luther, Zwingle and others taken in connection with subsequent events, will show that moral cowardice on the part of the adherents to a cause, is a fatal worm at the roots of its genuine prosperity. Nor is the history of more recent great revivals, such as that under Wesley and his coadjutors without similar instruction. The teaching of orthodoxy is to the effect that the arch-enemy of human souls is as shrewd and cunning as industrious and active. Now, if this be true, it is reason to suppose, his measures will partake largely of the strategic. A military commander that can induce his enemy to adopt a course which must in its very nature, prove destructive to him that adopts it, will, of course, use his best skill to secure that adoption. We are only rational when we imagine that the tactics of our great enemy will be similar. The success that has attended temptation in our world to lower the standard of religious virtue and make the unholy attempt to join together what, by God's plainest laws, have been put asunder—gives encouragement for continued repetition of the experiment. Hence manliness is imperatively demanded to keep the Church in its proper position for attack upon, or defense against the enemies of her cause. The giant of reasonable piety

now and then roused to activity by the logic of truth, and using for a time, with tremendous effect, the powerful artillery of gospel warning becomes, after awhile inactive, because dormant from the taking of moral narcotics. The ever changing phases of ecclesiastical influence, the backslidings and revivals of historic narrative, are accounted for upon this principle: That an inactive Church will inevitably lose its influence, and an inconsistent Church will forfeit the respect of men. To refuse the moral narcotics is the demand of heroism. Let it now be our humble effort to define manliness and point out some of the things in the present day in reference to which its exercise is needed to prevent the danger of religious narcotism.

Lexicographers make a shade of difference between manfulness and manliness. "*Manful* points to the energy and vigor of a man; *manly*, to the generous and noble qualities of a man." The first is opposed to weakness or cowardice, the latter to that which is puerile or mean. We speak of manful exertion without so much reference to the character of the thing for which exertion is made, but manly conduct is that which has reference to a thing worthy of a *man*. In this writing we shall use the term *manliness* as that bravery or heroism demanded for the defense of right against wrong. Man is in the world to do good. He is a responsible moral agent. His Creator has a right to order his conduct. It is unmanly, that is, unbecoming, a true man to be wanting in firmness of principle, and such principle as obedience to God requires.

That the pulpit must have this manliness in a world like this, unless it proposes to forfeit its worth and dignity, needs no argument. In order to the exercise of it in the wisest manner, there must be a *manful* exertion for the attainment of knowledge. A preacher must not be an ignorant man. To admit an ignoramus to orders is about as sensible as to put a landsman on ship-board as captain, or to set a man that never saw an artery to perform a difficult surgical operation. The fact that the Saviour selected humble fishermen to be apostles is no proof that ignorance in the modern pulpit is without blame. The Man of Nazareth *schooled* his twelve followers for about three years and then ordered them to tarry at Jerusalem until imbued with power from on high before going out on their great work. As illiteracy is no necessity in an age when

the contrary is attainable by manful exertion, it is unmanly to be unable to give a *reason* for the hope within us. It is clearly a duty to know some things, and as many things as we can, by a right use of our powers, acquire, in order to be thoroughly furnished for the delicate and difficult task of persuading men to be reconciled to God. The abuse of education is no argument against its employment for the high purpose of human good; any more than the invention of ingenious modes of theft or murder should prohibit the employment of ingenuity to improve household comforts. The employment of illiterate fishermen by our Saviour, (if they were illiterate,) shows that no class distinction as to birth or circle of association is to be the criterion of judgment as to fitness for the sacred desk; his careful education of these fishermen before giving them a commission, indicates that he regarded preparation of the first importance. Even to admit instantaneous qualification in the days of miracles, proves nothing in the days when, as is commonly agreed, miracles have ceased, since Christianity can sustain itself in the arena of argument.

A Spiritual Christianity is far from being a nursery of ignorance and superstition. What pious protestant accepts the motto, "ignorance is the mother of devotion?" True manliness in the pulpit, will not allow infidels to claim a monopoly of rationalism. Nothing that skeptical scientists can bring forward need be accepted as a refutation of the dogmas of Christianity, if the pulpit will claim its proper enlightenment and manliness; for, if it is a system of truth, there are means of showing that no real scientific fact is inconsistent with the facts of revelation. Scientific facts are far different from the speculations of men concerning those facts. It will be seen that the improved speculations of infidel thinkers, falsely called science, not the actual discovery by crucible, telescope, or spade, are the things that antagonize the teaching of Holy Writ. What right has the philosopher to dictate a theory to the scientific world? He has a right to give the facts discovered in the laboratory, in the observatory, in the bowels of the earth; but if those facts are as easily accounted for upon the hypothesis that revelation is true, as upon that of its untruth; and revelation be proved by other and indisputable facts, as is the case with New Testament narrative, surely a reasoner will not be long in deciding

which is the most rational doctrine. We boldly assert that t manliness of the pulpit will not allow anything like a truckling greatness in supposed science, or in political authority. It w not permit a self-constituted literary or scientific "upper tendon to think itself free from the warnings of gospel law. The Darwi the Huxleys, the Mathew Arnolds, the Renans, the George Elio the skeptics, are criminal for not making a proper use of th great powers; if Christianity be provably true, they have failed make the discovery, and hence have not given the obedience of t heart as well as the service of the head, to the demands of tru That occupant of the pulpit, who gives a sort of "thank you, si to the patronizing philosopher or the great statesman, wh "*respect*" for religion seems to say about this, "we, 'the upp ten,' will not interfere with your teaching, so long as you confi it to the classes beneath us in intellectuality, but you must n expect us to do anything your theory calls for in the way of duty does not show manliness in silently admitting the irrational, t presumptuous claim. To call an ungodly President of the Unit States to the preacher's stand and an unconverted citizen to t altar, is a discrimination unwarranted by the proprieties of t case. All due respect to office, or to warlike or literary serv for the country, can be made without compromising the manlin of the Saviour's herald.

God is no respecter of persons; nor should his ambassador l Religion is for the high and the low, the rich and the poor, t famous and the obscure; the preachers of the gospel must ha the courage to declare its impartiality. It is, however, clear th this requires a willingness on the part of the clergy to work ha in study to bring out of this treasure-house things new and o Hoppin says, "a preacher should be ashamed not to have a th ough knowledge of the philosophy and literature of his profession even as any well educated lawyer or physician has of his prof sion." And, again:

"One is not only to write sermons, but he is to write better sermons, to m continual improvement in preaching. . . . He is always to be learning n methods of communicating truth. He is never to give himself to an indol repose. He has entered on a warfare from which there is no dismissal. has consecrated himself, soul and body to this work. If he does not study, mind loses its invention, and its resources are exhausted."

All this, too, is consistent with what the same author elsewhere says, viz:

"The sermon should not have the tone of learning, for learning deals with the past, and knowledge should be turned into life. The divinely *practical* element in a sermon should sweep everything along with it. One should not stop to exhibit his learning; and of what great importance is it, after all, to one who has a higher end in view, who has to gain his hearer and persuade him to serve the Lord?"

The herald of the cross must try to know enough to conquer a fear of the learned men he may chance to meet; he must have humility enough not to show his audience that his main design is to boast of literary attainment. His manly course must intimate that his one aim is to save souls; and this is best done by having such aim really and truly. Fraud is unmanly.

2. The condition of human society presents another thing, in reference to which there is a great demand for manliness in the pulpit. The influence of wealth in Church councils is almost unavoidable. If it is exercised in the interest of the spread of truth, the promotion of piety, the restraint of crime, the salvation of men, what can be said against it? To be rich is not, by necessity, to be criminal. God has honored some rich men, because they were pious and obedient; yet Christ says: "how hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven." These things are matters of record in the inspired word. There is a possibility of having the control of this world's goods in very large amounts, and yet of holding fast the Christian's faith and the Christian's integrity; but the Saviour, not obscurely intimates that wealth is an increase of difficulty in the enterprise of salvation. Why is this? It is simply because money is power in a world where nothing for man's comfort or elevation can be done without money; and hence there is such danger to rich men to consider their opinions, often arising from their desires, as law to the enterprizes they are asked to support. An unreasonable clamor against the rich, merely because they are rich, is as wanting in piety, as is a prejudice against the poor merely because they are poor. That both the rich and the poor should receive the attention of an honest pastor, is the demand of every true idea of the clerical calling. The poor ought to have constant, loving, sympathetic attention; but it is

equally true that the peculiar danger of the rich should call for the untiring thought of a minister of Jesus. To pray and work for the poor and needy is always a mark of the true man; but why should the rich be neglected? The soul of one is as important as the soul of another. To do exactly right toward all men of all classes and conditions is the dictate of a pious and rational view of our holy religion. To say that there is a preponderance of influence with the wealthy, so far from showing that, as a class, they may be neglected, shows that to influence the influence of such men, and enlist it in the cause of humanity, is true wisdom. To go into the hut of the humble when the temptation is to be elsewhere; to be by the bedside of suffering when carnal desire calls to another locality; to make a sacrifice of congenial associations to be among the humble or the afflicted—these duties call for firm heroism. They will be so met by the servant of God as to afford satisfaction; but a still more difficult task is found in the inquiry, how shall the rich man be so taught as to show him that his money makes no difference in the terms of salvation, but increases his responsibility. To deal faithfully with the opulent is perhaps the preacher's most trying task. And this arises from the known power of the rich over the income of Church funds. If it was heroic in Rogers to march steadily to the stake, rather than admit the demands of a powerful hierarchy, it requires no less heroism to give up a place of comfort and go into prospective poverty, perhaps to starvation. Martyrdom is not more attractive because its processes are those of hunger rather than those of fire and fagot. Nor is the case relieved of its unpleasantness by the assertion that in this world, the reason of the poverty will never be known; and, hence, blame, instead of sympathy, will be meted out to the sufferer.

There is an unholy view frequently taken by good business men, which, applied to the ministry, takes away all the sympathy of the outside world when a case of disagreement arises between pulpit and pew. It is that found in the supposed dogma that the pew-holder is employer and the pulpit occupant employee, in the ordinary business sense. That as no harm is done a drayman—certainly no injustice—when you pay him for his day's hauling, but prefer to employ another drayman for the next day, so no injustice is done to

the minister when he is paid his year's salary and coolly informed that for the next year another's services will be sought.

This whole theory of employment, applied to the ministry, is as unscriptural as it is devoid of honest piety. The rebellion found in its assertion is equalled only by the stupidity of its assertor. To make it true, the Divine Being must resign his authority and change the whole policy of calling his heralds. Is the shepherd the employee of the flock or of the owner of the flock? Is the herald the employee of the persons to whom he proclaims, or is he the employee of the monarch that sends him, and who has authority over both the herald and those to whom the herald is sent? The minister is *sent;* he, if honest, dares not lower the standard of truth. To displace him for doing his master's will, is to do a great wrong, as it is a great wrong not to testify against him when he devours, but does not feed the flock over which he is made overseer. Even the business world recognize that there is injustice in discharging an employee that has been industrious and faithful, for no other reason than that of his fidelity to truth, when by that procedure an injury is done to his reputation and by consequence there is a prejudice against him in the minds of other employers. How much greater is the injustice when an effort is made to displace a worker, contrary to the wish of the proprietor of the work? The story told in one of the secular papers, of a youth who was discharged from a store, because he refused to say the calico would *not* fade when he thought it *would* fade, is, without exception, received as an illustration of wrong; would the wrong be less, if the proprietor had concealed the true cause of dismissal, and yet sent the clerk away on the plea of want of adaptation? He had added that he was not unjust to the boy because he paid him for all the time he worked in the store, the average jurist would pronounce it insult added to injury. The truth is, the humblest person in the employ of another, has some rights which an upright and honorable employer is bound to respect; and among them are found those things which relate to reputation and future prospects.

A lady teacher was employed by a rich parent. She worked hard for the real good of her pupils. One of the pupils was persistently indolent and disobedient. The teacher persistent in effort

for the securement of study and improvement, used persuasion and authority. In the very crisis of the struggle, the parent suggests that the teacher lacks adaptation—gives encouragement to the pupil's errors, pays the month's salary, causes the teacher to leave, and says there is no wrong, as the time was paid for. What fair minded person does not see a very grievous wrong in making the public believe there is incompetency where it is not? What lawyer would not regard himself unjustly treated, if, after a positive engagement, he should be asked by his client to give up the case altough he had, up to such request, conducted the proceedings with honest ability, but would not yield to the desires of his client to employ unfair tricks in his practice? Has the client the right, upon the principles of honest fairness, to injure the lawyer's reputation, simply because he has a right to use his money as he pleases?

Now, if the honest thinker sees wrong in these cases, *a fortiori* does he see great injustice in displacing, or threatening to displace a minister of the Gospel of Christ for reasons other than those arising from physical, intellectual or moral incompetency. To hold over the true man of God a rod *in terrorem*, impliedly saying to him "We have your support in our hands, we employ you not to make us feel uncomfortable about those things that lead to vice, if we are engaged in them; you must seek to know our practices and opinions, not to condemn, but to approve; you are not *adapted* to the place we give you if you seek to elevate the standard of piety by preaching contrary to our wishes;" to do this, we say, is unworthy of the true notion of a Church. Nor does the *modus* of getting a supply for the pulpit, whether that of congregationalism or itinerancy, change the principle involved in pulpit fidelity. In both modes there is an implied consent to the idea of Christ's supremacy, and to the agreements that each party, (the pew or the pulpit,) is to be governed by the principles inculcated by him whose claim to lordship makes the Church a possibility. How great, then, is the shame to that man, or that set of men, who because of money power will force the resignation of a pastor, or compel him to be silent in regard to things about which Christ has, in the Holy Bible, ordered him to warn his people! We have thus placed, in a strong light, some ideas of right and wrong

what must be done by the manly preacher if ever such cases of wrong occur? Must he give place on the ground of a prudent policy? "No," says St. Paul, "not for an hour." Prudence is a valuable virtue when it calls for such action as will gain men to your side without lowering the standard of Gospel purity. The Apostle gives an idea of his prudence, in various ways, when he says, that: "If possible, he might save some," but never that he might save *himself* from toil and privation by allowing others to be eternally lost, in consequence of remaining in criminal inconsisteny. A cardinal's hat or a bull of excommunication offered to Luther, caused but little hesitancy in the heroic reformer. A silent Luther would not have been a persecuted Luther. The Arno would never have been enriched by the martyr ashes of Savonarola had that eloquent man consented to employ his eloquence in pandering to the vices of Lorenzo de Medici and those of the equally wicked papacy, instead of using his attractive speech for the behests of virtue, the exposure of corruption and the vindication of a pure type of religion.

Who cannot see that the world has been largely advantaged by the heroism that secured the great boon of freedom from papal tyranny? All this is very readily seen, but not so quickly are we able to discover the germ of wrong in a modern official body of a church, when that body fails in its action relative to the pastorate to measure up to the grade of piety demanded by a Christianity as pure as aggressive. It seems next to nothing to say "we do not want such a *person*," or we do want such a preacher." The idea of giving the funds requisite to support, without having a control over the utterances of the pulpit, is repugnant to that idea of business which claims for an employer, entire control over the choice of means to be used by employees. When, however, we study the origin of Churches and of the Christian ministry, we will perceive that true virtue in an official body, forbids any other motive of action than that of securing the services of a herald to proclaim according to the Master's original commission and not to carve out a theology suited to depraved tastes. It is equally plain that no minister can, either without guilt or with a proper respect for himself as the messenger of Jesus, yield to requests for accommodating the deliverances of the sacred stand to the wishes of an

official body, unless those wishes accord with the high standard of excellence found in Holy Writ. The pusillanimity of the orator or preacher that will fail to invite to the highest style of religious virtue, or to warn of the vices most prevalent, or to try to keep the Church up to a proper standard of discipline, is equalled in unworthiness by the wrong of the congregation that threatens a withholding of support if it be not done. The position here advocated is altogether consistent with affectionate affability and the absence of all bluntness.

3. There is still another temptation to the pulpit which, without a manly resistance, may result in large detriment to vital godliness. It is found in the supposed honor of crowded houses. If we add to the estimate the public puts upon a crowd, the fact that councils and conferences, synods and conventions, perhaps bishops and elders, frequently ask as to the size of a congregation in order, apparently, to judge of the usefulness of a pastor, we will be able to see how peculiar is the matter referred to. Nor will the fact, that the press, religious and secular, will always have complimentary notices of the speaker *attracting* large audiences, make the temptation any the less worthy of study. Of course every pious clergyman desires to have an appreciative audience. He wishes to do much good as possible; and hence he is anxious for the people to come to the house of God. He will use all proper means to fill the pews. He knows that his toils are largely lost if he does not reach the masses. He sighs when he sees the multitude careless about attendance on the means of grace. He is willing to plead with men and for men, on the great subject of the soul's salvation. He seeks to do good by visiting from house to house, by the circulation of good literature, by fostering Sunday-schools, and other means of training the young for a life of piety. He hopes that his sincere and honest efforts for man's highest good will bring the desired result, that of building up the Church by the true method of proclaiming the plan of salvation. But what is he to do, when his knowledge of human nature assures him that to rival the scenic representations of the stage, or the clap-trap oratory of the mere sensationalist, will bring the crowd; the crowd will bring newspaper fame; and this will bring a certain kind of appreciation from his Church authorities? Must he dare to imitate his Master in

honesty as exemplified on that occasion where an offended audience left, and Jesus turned to his disciples and asked: "Will ye also go away?" Must he bear in mind that not selfish vanity, but the good of souls is his object? that to secure a crowd by something which does not benefit the crowd, is very far from meeting obligation? It is not difficult for an honest man to answer these questions. But they show that only a hero can meet the true demands of pulpit dignity. To advertise deceptive or mysterious or queer themes has often been the resort of weakness. The public sentiment that makes it probable that a crowd will go to hear a discourse on "Jacob's hip-joint disease," or on "the mission of a whale's stomach," rather than one on the most vital and plainly expressed themes of our holy religion, deserves not to be pandered to, any more than the minister who resorts to such tricks, deserves the appreciation of an enlightened country.

Again we find it appropriate to quote from Hoppin. He says:

"Preaching sermons addressed to the fancy and nervous sensibilities, is a fault. This is what Shakspeare would call 'taffeta-writing.' It is not dealing with plain thought from which true ideas are evolved, and true principles brought out; but it is striving to rival brilliant and popular lecturers, who by continually working upon their lectures, have made them polished gems, and have taken everything out of them which is not brilliant and immediately effective. It is also what is commonly called 'sensational preaching,' since it is determining to produce a sensation on the nerves by words, rather than on the conscience and heart by thought and feeling. It is writing from the motive of exciting men for the moment and of catching their attention by novelties, rather than of doing them good for eternity. And it is also appealing to a lower class of motives, leaving men's higher nature untouched. It is true that the mass of men will be attracted by this style, and perhaps encourage it; yet sooner or later, even they will tire of it; for it is turning the sanctuary into a lecture hall or theatre; and the results of this kind of preaching are indeed as superficial as those of the popular lecturer or player; for if there are conversions, they are of a doubtful sort, it being poor seed sown in bad soil. In the words of another, 'this whole business of preaching and hearing for entertainment, may be told in these two words, 'deceiving and being deceived.'' We do not say a preacher should not attract his audience, nor if he has anything original in thought or powerful in imagination, or moving in truth, that he should repress it; on the contrary, let him be himself; let him use every power that he possesses; let his thought be fresh and let him make a sensation if he can; but let him not preach with the especial purpose of making a sensation of captivating, exciting, drawing. How wasteful the efforts of such a preacher! How terrible the responsibility he incurs! If the objection be urged the sermon of an opposite character fails to interest an audience, it springs probably from

other reasons. The preacher has, perhaps, failed to inspire a true and manly taste in his congregation; he does not put genuine thought, feeling or spiritual earnestness into his preaching, there is nothing to attract in it; there is no unction; he copies his ideas, and feigns his emotions, and how can he create a legitimate interest in this way? The preacher should, therefore, resist the temptation (which is one of the first to assail him) to make a fine, attractive sermon."

We only add, true manliness is not opposed to true pulpit eloquence, or to making a sensation for good; but it is only opposed to the sham eloquence, the bombastic rhetoric, the tricks which may for a time bring a bubble reputation.

4. The last thing we shall mention as demanding heroism in the Lord's herald, is something which may not often confront him, but when it does, it is very powerful to discourage. It can hardly be better named than to call it the unwitting resistance of good men. Melancthon and Luther were both of great value to the reformation. Some have charged Melancthon with want of courage. We rather take the opinion of Schaff, that the charge was false; but had it been true, so that he had, by indifference *to* Luther's work, encouraged Luther's enemies, he might have been charged with what we have here named.

But for the wisdom of Mrs. Wesley, John Wesley would have opposed Maxfield's lay preaching. Southey has no doubt done great harm by his misunderstanding, and hence misrepresenting the spirit of Wesley. Very good men in the Eighteenth century thought Wesley a fanatic. Indeed, every grand effort to elevate man in religious morals has had to meet the charge of fanaticism, hobbyism or some such basis of discouragement. The charge of imprudence is as specious as mischievous. Because it can be so often truthfully charged upon human actors, it becomes, in the hands of the shrewdly wicked, a powerful means to array the good against the good, the Christian against the Christian. A sincere, but *weak* Church official, a pious and intelligent but misinformed *Episcopos*, may, by yielding to the charge of imprudence, pull down what it has taken stern courage and suffering to build up or at least to inaugurate. The question is, must the worker cease, because he is discouraged by the indifference or neglect of his official superiors? Every valid idea of the preacher's commission gives a negative reply. Only spiritual cowardice can reply

affirmatively. The *Nashville Advocate* gave an instance of a reply from an English preacher, (when his parishioners desired him to cease his opposition to certain prevalent vices or resign,) that deserves honor. He told them that he had rather break rocks on the street than give up his right to speak the truth. His brethren in the ministry honored themselves in coming to his relief with a purse, and thus saying to the wicked, you cannot find us aiding your nefarious designs by indifference to our brother's welfare.

It is proper to close this paper by a brief consideration of the trend of the times. What are the signs of need? Who are guides in the army of our Saviour's hosts? There is no pulpit more conspicuous than that of New York. What does it tell? In the February number of the *Homiletic Monthly*, there is an article from Robert Bonner in which he seems to take the ground that tastes must govern. He says: "We have good old orthodox sermons from Dr. Hall and Dr. W. M. Taylor. On the other hand I have heard Dr. Paxton advocate going to the theatre. He *attracts* large audiences, and may be said to be a man ahead of the times. He would not suit Dr. Hall's people, and Dr. Hall's preaching would not suit all classes." Have not all classes souls to be saved by obedience to God? Mind you, this suiting is on a moral question, not that of manners on the part of the clergy. The pulpit is both cause and effect in the process of retrograding. The normal story is about this: the pews make a demand; demand creates supply; then the pulpit proceeds upon the principle of consulting taste, and this increases the taste for that which is only pleasant to a vitiated palate. In some cases, the process may be reversed, with equally bad results. Now let the pulpit rouse itself to an assertion of truth at any cost, though observing all the behests of genuine prudence, along with those of a high standard of virtue.

FUTURE MISSION OF METHODISM.

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The Methodist Episcopal Church was organized a hundred years ago, and has been successful. As a system of thought, of life, and of Church polity, it has conclusively demonstrated the fact, not only of its right to exist, but also of its power to save men and bless the world. During this time, it has conquered opposition, overleaped older Church organizations, and now counts its followers by millions. What has been its movements, and what its object in the future? are questions that naturally arise in this centenary year.

There are two propositions that, if true, will answer these questions; and it is to their consideration that I shall devote this article: (I.) That the inner life of Methodism has been spiritward, and, as such, has been in harmony with the world's movement; and (II.) That the future mission of Methodism lies in the same direction—that is, towards a still better conception of God as a Spirit, and a life still more in harmony with the Divine nature. These we will consider in their order:

I. We seek, then, the truth of our first proposition, that the inner life of Methodism has been spiritward, and, as such, has been in harmony with the world's movement. Its believers, by its use, have sought to transform the lower into a higher life, teaching that "without holiness no man can see God," and having as its grand object the spread of Scriptural holiness over the world. The world has been in earnest, full of works, of progress, and Methodism has been denominated "Christianity in earnest."

This is true on a general statement; but let us particularize: The world's trend has been spiritward. Every mind that thinks at all will be found asking the visible universe whence it came and whither its end? No one may absolutely know the whence or the whither, but every one may know its onward course. The Bible first reveals God as Creator. The Saviour unfolds God as a Spirit. Between the concept of God as Creator and God as a Spirit lie the struggles of four thousand years—years full of toil, of labor, of tears. The struggles of human life have been its greatest benefactions. The idea of God as Creator has in it the possibility of the

second, and the development of the possible has been the work that binds the two concepts together. From this point of view it requires no great philosophical acumen to determine the trend of the Bible. Revelation after revelation is made to the growing capacity of man—the Eternal Father feeding his own children on food suited to their growth and development, until when the "fullness of times had come" it was no longer a tabernacle in the wilderness, nor a temple at Jerusalem, but a living temple in the "Word made flesh," and dwelling among them, that He gave to man. Rising higher still, the grand thought was unfolded that man could worship God as a Spirit, commune with him, live in him, and feed on him. So that, under the power of this concept, he is elevated to where he realizes himself a co-worker with God, owner of all things, and the heir to an "inheritance undefiled, incorruptible, and that fadeth not away."

As simple as the Great Teacher made his doctrines by his words, and as clearly as he illustrated them in his life, still it was not long before the Church was plunged into a gross materialism, the remains of which are felt to the present time. And especially was this true when Mr. Wesley commenced his remarkable career as a Reformer. Ceremonies and Salvation were almost synonymous terms. Formality was the curse of the Church, and religion but a cloak to wear a-dying. Morality was made up of outwardness, instead of inwardness. This was sadly true with a great portion of the Christian world. All this needed a reformation—needed purer ideas and purer lives—needed a broader, deeper, more spiritual conception of the life and work of Christ. Methodism was this reforming power. This could not be done in the Church of England or any other Church, for Churches are reformed, not from within but from without. This is a principle well established from Ecclesiastical history. Hence, the existence of the Methodist Church is in harmony with the nature of spiritual life, as well as God's law of progress.

At this time, also, the world was losing sight of its antiquated methods, and was utilizing and employing such as were incident to the inventions and discoveries that gave men better ideas of science, of philosophy and business. Mr. Wesley fell into line with this movement and made all things subservient to his will in saving

men. His true followers have pursued the same method. They have sought to know the signs of the times and thus render themselves able to put the gospel into every channel of human thought and life. The course has ever been the same. Its song has been—

"Nearer, my God, to thee,"

and its faithful ministers have ever declared the same thing, seeking higher and broader views of God in his relations to men, until her institutions to-day are open to the halt, the lame, the sick and the blind, the ignorant and erring, the widow and orphan. Every true man feels related to every other human being and rejoices in the glories and the sufferings of the race. Hence the extension of our borders, the missionary movements, the Church Extension Society, the flourishing schools, the endowment of colleges, and, above everything else, the power under God to save the lost and lift up the fallen. These things clearly show us what the movement has been in the past; but is this also true with every other department of life? Has the world's movement been in the same direction? Is the trend the same?

Is this true in the labor question? What sort of forces are being employed now by laborers to do their work as compared with former times? The power of gravitation grinds our corn, spins our cotton, keeps our time; steam-power carries our produce to market, saws our lumber, runs our machinery, transmits us from place to place. Electricity is the servant of our thoughts the transmitter of our words, and lights our cities. The more subtle the power employed, the harder to utilize, and the more marvelous the results. The course of labor has been and still is towards the employment of a pure force. We can see its trend.

The great question of Science to-day is, What is life? What is its essence? What is its basis? The world wondered as new planets and unknown systems were discovered. The circulation of the blood, the nerve centers, etc., were all marvelous when first known. The strata of the rocks have told their story, and the coal-fields have furnished their reward. The reservoirs of oil have lit up the world. The cave-dwellers have been unearthed from their long sleep and have furnished a romance of war and love in their crude implements. Suns and stars have suffered an analysis; flowers

have paid their tribute, while a universe of invisible creatures have been seen, and so each and all contributed to the world's fund of wonder and wisdom. The tide has swept on, until almost face to face we are brought before the marvelous weaver of us all and all things, and seem to look at this strange something as it furnishes warp and woof and weaves the primal cell. Is it life? If so, how far to the other life, that fuller life, which "fills all and is in all?" Has there not been movement from the gross to the refined? If so, does it differ from labor, or the onward sweep of religion in the past hundred years?

The dualism of Descartes resulted in a division of philosophical minds—some following one branch of it and some another. The sensationalism of Locke was the development of one side, while the idealism of Berkeley was the development of the other. Under the vagaries of each, many were driven from philosophy, and even denied it a place among the sciences. It is due to Germany that philosophy has been cared for and elevated above the vagaries of the English schools. We can trace the attempt to solve the Cartesian problem, through Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and down to Hegel, where all truth is lifted from antithetical propositions and centralized or unified in self-consciousness. From a perhaps, or an "I think," to "I know," is a long stride. Here, at last, philosophy reached a basis that has caused the thinking world to respect it, and made it the Science of sciences. The movement has been from gross misconception, from doubt and ignorance, to certainty, to truth, and, finally, to the spirit of all truth. For Hegel left it as the sum of all philosophy that "we must die to live." Here we see that philosophy is made to conform to our proposition. The movement is the same.

Theology, as a system of spiritual thought, contributes to the same end. We are well acquainted with its dark and false interpretations of the doctrines of the Bible, and how creeds have been antiquated and how forgotten. We know full well how the Roman Church had to call council after council to settle its opinions and establish its beliefs. The same thing is going on to-day in some of the older communions. We know the interpretation put upon the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper, and what is thought of it to-day. We know what importance was once attached to baptism, to

rituals, to festivals, and the light in which such things are regarded now. We know what gross symbols were once employed in the Church to give expression to its teaching, and what a transformation has taken place in this respect. The trend is always and everywhere the same.

What is true in all these departments of thought has been preeminently true in Methodism. Throwing aside its Prayer Book, it bid man ask freely the things he wanted, knowing no sacred places, yet always on holy ground. Having no pilgrimages, yet it has gone almost to the uttermost parts of the earth in search of a city "whose maker and builder is God." Ignoring the importance of rites and ceremonies as practiced and relied on in some Churches, it has taught, believed, lived and loved the "life of the Spirit." As electricity is greater than other manifestations of force; as revelation is mightier than mystery; as reason is more potent than ignorance, so Methodism is more powerful than any religious forces heretofore employed. Every Church has been touched by its influence, and blessed in the contact. By virtue of its Gospel of Spirit and a philosophy that is the true counterpart of its own experiences, Methodism has come into the world more as a necessity than an innovation—more as the fruitage of all time than the result of an accidental planting. The offspring of a revolution, and cradled in the world's tempest, she offered an olive branch of "peace on earth," and sang in her triumph of "good will to men." Her mission heretofore has not been to destroy, but to fulfill; not to tear away the old, but to endue it with new life; not to demolish Churches, but to enable them to feel that the world is the vineyard in which all are to labor. Its communion table is free; it "thinks and lets think;" it is the slave of no science, the servant of no philosophy, and the helper of that which is good in every religion. Its watchword is prayer, its movements onward, and its safe-guard, charity.

These are some of the facts connected with the mission of Methodism in the world. Now what truth can be formulated, what philosophical basis can be found, that will give us the thought that has made it successful, and enabled us to see its inner life, as well as its outward manifestations. I think it consists in the nearness of the concept to pure spiritual truth as compared with other

Churches. As the world became known and its laws and principles better understood, the mind was expanded and enlarged until, when applied to religion, it could contain a better view of it. Men were accustomed to look upon religious thought as a stranger, and were in the habit of dressing it up in strange apparel. They did not realize the fact that no one truly "understands a subject until he can play with it." Now it is different. Christ is our living, present friend. He speaks to us in spring-time and harvest, in summer and winter, in sickness and health, in laughter and sorrow in life and death, in earth and heaven, yea, all things fall into the eternal harmony, the sweetness of which fills the world with joy and gladness.

From every source we see that the inner life of Methodism has been in harmony with the world's movement, suiting itself to the varying capacities of men, and gaining victory among all classes. Let us now look into the future a little.

II. Our second proposition depends upon the truth of the first, and we shall only add, that Methodism will be successful so long as it maintains its primal method and the onward movement of human thought. We have shown that this is spiritward. Here thought projects itself into a boundless field. It is ever higher, ever onward; a present possession, and yet an eternal hope. To prophecy success along this line, in the future, would only be to draw a legitimate inference from facts that make up the history of Methodism.

There is, there can be, but one danger, and that is, materialism in some of its many forms. In the past history of Christianity we may see its damaging effects in the Church of God, and this, as a cause, has impeded the Church more than anything else. It may be that I cannot better close this article than by directing attention to some of its many forms.

1. The form of selfishness. This may be found in both ministerial and lay members. The Methodist Episcopal Church has had considerable discussion growing out of a limited itineracy, the opponents taking the ground that a man ought to have the privilege of "building for life." An easy pastorate, good salary, comfortable home, personal and social attachments, etc., furnish the basis of this claim. There is obliged to be more "loaves and fishes" than sacrifice, which is a contradiction of dying to live, of

losing one's life to save it. In the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, there has been but little difficulty in this respect. We have never interfered with a belief in a universal life, as well as an individual life. These two are correlative and co-dependents. The destruction of one would be the annihilation of the other. The more the individual comes in contact with the universal life and thought, and spirit, the more he will be able, as an individual, to contribute to that universal life. The frequent changes, and far removes of the itinerant preacher bring him in contact with much of the world's life, and by so much as he is able to reproduce this in the individual, by so much more will he be able to broaden extend and elevate the Church and the world. He loses his life in humanity, and finds that life reproduced in himself. This is the underlying principle of a limited itinerancy. It gives variety to both Church and preacher, thus guaranteeing the best life for each from the very nature of things. I am glad to know that the strength of itinerant Churches is a unit in this particular.

It is also true that danger may result from the members of a Church seeking to violate this rule by desiring the services of the gifted and the learned. There is no difference in the causes of the two. It grows out of what each thinks his or their special need may be, disregardful of everything and everybody else. Where this principle has play, there are no relations of kindness, much less a brotherhood, existing among different communities. It is selfishness that knows no wants but its own, and seeks no comfort but in its own ease.

2. The form of wealth. It is well enough for us to think sometimes in what true wealth consists. To the question, what is a man worth? we often hear the answer, so much land, or bonds, or money. We forget that a dollar is worth no more than the good character we are able to put into it. We may, then, conclude that true wealth consists, not in money, or anything else, but in true character. This form of materialism may show itself in the life of a Church. Ends may be sought to be gained by the influence of money rather than spiritual life and power. It needs no argument to show that a Church with a large membership, and strong financially, may exert no power as a reforming, civilizing, saving agency. But let these be backed by character, by the spirit of

Christ, then it will feed the hungry, clothe the naked, teach the ignorant, heal the sick, preach to the poor, and save the lost. This will meet the approval of God and man.

3. The form of hero and thought worship. The saint roll in the Roman Church, the historical, so-called, Apostolical succession in others, the baptisms, the rites, the creeds, the fathers, with the great importance attached to them, are in the nature of hero and thought worship, and are all of a materialistic tendency. Methodism has its history, its thinkers, its doctrines, and such, too, as are entitled to admiration and respect; but it will be a sad day in the Church if any one or all of these are elevated to that degree of reverence which blinds any one to their faults or closes them to free investigation. Apart from the Bible, an absolute standard is an absurdity, and will always produce contempt among those who see fit to oppose such a standard, and narrowness and littleness among those who would have every man's thoughts conform to it. Let us still "think and let think."

4. The form of Church pride. With Greece, the State was everything, the individual nothing. Some Churches are true and lineal descendants of this degrading principle. An ecclesiastical requirement, when absolute, makes a slave of the man that God made to be free. It should always be remembered "that man is greater than his institutions," whether they are civil or ecclesiastical. It is better for an institution to die than for it to become a cause of oppression either in its requirements or teachings. Such materialism as this gave the world a Luther, a Knox, and a Wesley. We may well ponder the thought that self-elevation on the part of a Church, because of its wealth or power, has, and will ever result in a downfall.

5. Materialism outside of the Church. In our own time an attempt has been made to build up a system of morals on strictly materialistic principles, but this, as well as all future attempts, will end in doubt and darkness, and finally in Atheism. From such, honest minds have and will turn away; for every system of thought or of religion that does not increase hope, is self-destructive. The danger is, that such a system may fascinate young and superficial minds; and the formation of character permanently with

an ungodward bent, result in loss to the Church, to society and the world.

While it is well for us to consider these dangers, yet our past history has established the fact that Methodism is able to conserve all the spiritual forces of man. This has largely been done by revivals and the preaching of Christ as a living presence. Defunct doctrines have been laid aside and men have been preached to just as they are. The pale plant has been taken from the dark, damp cellar and carried into the sun-shine where its strength is supplied and its life renewed. We care not how it was placed there or who did it, so the great work of Methodism in the future is not to save her doctrines or her institutions, or her organization, but to save men by carrying them into the light and life of God's spirit. Her doctrines, her institutions and her organization will remain so long as they are soul-saving agencies, and when they cease to be this, they will and ought to die.

Cartersville, Ga.

JANET'S THEORY OF MORALS.

BY THE EDITOR.

THEORY OF MORALS: BY PAUL JANET. New York: C. Scribner's Sons. 1883. Translated from the French.

Paul Janet is well known to students of philosophy by his treatise on "Final Cause," a work which has had due attention from the critics. It is a high achievement he has wrought at this time of doubt and denial in rescuing the doctrine of Final Cause from oblivion and placing it among the first and best maintained dogmas of natural theology.

Many years ago Janet printed a small book on "Morals," which at a later period, he expanded into the present large and attractive volume of 500 pages. Scribner's Sons have issued an American edition in the best style of typography.

It will be seen from the above statement that M. Janet is fond of abstruse themes; his readers will find that he discusses his topic

with fullness, clearness and power. In the outset of this review we propound the question: What is meant by a theory of morals?

We mean such a view of morals as will justify an ethical code by showing congruity in its teachings; it looks to the primary foundation of duty and obligation, seeking to bring the moral sense (existing in some degree in all minds) into accord with the rational understanding. Such a discussion must deal with the questions: What is right? and why? Especially the latter; for if there is no answer to the "why," there is no such thing as moral science at all. In that case, "right and duty" would be simply arbitrary terms, having no significance to thinking minds.

All men, atheists included, make a distinction in character and conduct; the words right and wrong, good and bad, are familiar terms in all languages, however diverse the ideas they are used to express. Much contrariety of opinion is found when the attempt is made to define duty and enforce obligation. While this discord confuses the whole matter of moral science, and tends to enfeeble the moral sense itself, yet there is enough agreement to furnish a firm basis for such a treatise as this of M. Janet.

There is no lack of attention to mere abstract opinions concerning right and wrong; every man is engaged daily in rendering judgments on the conduct of himself and his fellow-men. What we need is such coincident views as will serve the cause of moral improvement by acting as a corrective of moral evil.

Virtue and vice are not terms which might be transposed, being as arbitrary as x, y, z, in an Algebraic equation. They represent known and commensurable things; they are not vanishing, infinitesimal fractions in the complex problem of human destiny. M. Janet necessarily discusses diverse and contradictory theories, though always in conciliatory terms. His book, like Stillingfleet's immortal production, may with propriety be called an "Irenicum." Janet has no affinity with that order of mind which excels only in demolition; his mind is constructive in its aim and effort. Hence, he does not seek to differ that he may have occasion to array himself in contrast with an opponent rather than by a comparison of views, leaving his readers to estimate fairly which way the logical beam should descend. M. Janet thinks that in no other way can philosophy make any progress. Philosophers cannot dispense

wholly with the discoveries of predecessors no more than the Astronomer can discard the observations and calculations of his fellows engaged in similar pursuits. If this kind of mental work, confessedly the most difficult, is done in a spirit of conciliation, harmonies will be effected, increased to the greatest degree, and discords will be diminished in inverse proportion.

We cannot unfold the matter of this criticism without adverting to a large extent to rival and conflicting theories in Moral Science, but our purpose is mainly to present M. Janet's view of morals, with such comment as their importance demands.

Our author, agreeing with the liberal theologian, Schleiermacher, of Germany, resolves all moral ideas into three fundamental phases: The idea of *good*, the idea of *duty*, and the idea of *virtue*. In every moral action there is an *object*, or end to be pursued, an *agent* who performs the *good*, who acquires thereby a habit which is called *virtue*. Opposed in direct contrast to these conceptions are three fundamental ideas also, viz.: *evil*, *vice* and *prohibition*. Here we quote an expanded view of the writer. M. Janet says

"These ideas may be said to follow each other, and to be linked together the following order: good, duty, virtue. Virtue, indeed, according to the most generally accepted definition, consists in doing that which is one's duty. Duty, in its turn, consists in doing that which is good. Thus virtue presupposes duty, and duty presupposes good. If there were nothing good, there would be no rule of action to teach us to choose one object rather than another; there would be no duty. If there were no duty or rule of action, there would be no virtue—no enlightened choice between good and evil. Hence, an enlightened choice of good—that is to say, virtue—presupposes a rule of choice, or duty, which, again, presupposes a reason for the choice—that is to say, a good."

This is a very logical statement of Janet's basis for moral science. No doubt it will be objected that here, as usual, moral science moves in a circle, and has no logical coherence and consistency. What is *good?* is answered by saying: Doing one's duty. What is it to do one's duty? The reply is to do that which is good. Apparently, this is a specimen of circular logic which is only the resort of childish and feeble-minded people, but it is really not obnoxious to such opprobrium.

Moral good or virtue proceeds from the action of a free intelligence, and this must be differenced from the *object*, which is a good in another sense. By this latter good we mean that which is good

in itself, *i. e.*, inherently good. This distinction between good as existing in the agent—which is virtue—and that which is essentially good in itself, must be observed in the elucidation of Janet's theory. Really, it is only the familiar one in philosophy—the *subjective* as contradistinguished from the *objective* in thought and action.

Moral Science, then, needs a theory of good, *i. e.* a scheme of duty objective; and, in addition, a theory of virtue subjective. Taking the first as a starting point, we are led to ask: What is good? Mankind very largely respond in a word—*pleasure* is good. Nor is this only the sentiment of unlettered men; it has for its advocates minds of the largest mould and acutest penetration. No man desires pain—the opposite of pleasure—from whence it would seem that we have an instinct directing by unerring decision and impulse to pleasure as the highest object of human desire. This, however plausible, is but a superficial philosophy.

Epicureanism, in common thought, stands for that system which makes pleasure the chief good, the proper object of human effort. But even the Epicureans were forced to make a distinction among pleasures, calling some *transitory*, as of the appetites and passions; others were called *stable*, as repose, peace, and the like. The voluptuous theory of human good—called epicurean—needs an element of intelligence which, if admitted, leads to an abandonment of the theory by an essential modification. If intelligent choice, comprehensive and discriminating, be admitted, the scheme really becomes something else, and becomes nearly the same as the utilitarian scheme of thought. Broadly stated, it makes man the votary and victim of his carnal nature, and leaves him on a level with the brute creation which is destitute and incapable of virtue. Our moral sense revolts at the idea that we are only to seek good so far as there may be pleasure in the performance. Plato recognized the necessity of engaging in intelligent discrimination in our pleasures, and suggested a sort of Arithmetic for the purpose, which Jeremy Bentham, the great advocate of the "greatest happiness" dogma, has expanded into something of a science. But despite his great abilities, even re-enforced by the younger but mightier Mill, pleasures cannot be estimated in terms of mathematics with any approach to accuracy; but if they could thus be valued, the

varying estimates would be mere abstractions; for, as minds ar tastes differ widely, there could never be laid down a more prac cal rule than this: Every one must pursue that object which seer eth good in his own eyes. Pleasure to one is pain to another; a all controversy must end by each votary deciding to act in acco with his own appetences. It would avail nothing to urge Bentham classification as to greater and less pleasures; for, if this arithme cal valuation was not apprehended and appreciated as by the pl losopher, no duty would be imposed nor any sense of obligation.

Aside from this, and in addition, we may affirm this propositio The very demand of Bentham and Mill, to use discrimination seeking happiness as the object of life, is a sort of *felo de se*, logical suicide. If gratification, pleasure, happiness, considered objects of human conduct, constitute the basis of duty and the tr theory of right, there could be no sufficient reason given why o pleasure should be sought more than another; and if any reas should appear, it could only prove that pleasure as such was not t critical test, but something else found in one class not in the othe whence it would be evident that the highest good consisted in th peculiarity, and not in pleasure simply.

There is a close affinity between the dogma of the greatest ha piness and what is usually called Utilitarianism; for utility mu be understood as relating to the welfare of man, not to beings either higher or lower degree. Now, when the utility is careful and analytically considered, it will be found to terminate in t idea of producing happiness or pleasure. Since the days of D Paley, the advocates of utility as the true theory of morals ha had much sway. John Stuart Mill may be taken as the able advocate of that scheme of philosophy.

Let it be remembered, for it cannot be denied, that utility is n an end, but only a means to an end. This end is the good, t useful is the means of attaining it. If pleasure be the good, th the principle of utility is subordinate and not supreme. Takir pleasure as the good, whatever is conducive to this end is allow ble; and whatever this might be it would not be chosen for its ow sake—the utility would be gauged by the happiness afforded. No this would be so variable, owing to different dispositions and capac

ties, that no practical test of duty could be found in the assumed authority of utility.

Mr. Mill seeks to save his system by censuring some of its advocates for a failure to discriminate properly between pleasures, admitting herein that utility is measured by pleasure, only he would have a more discreet judgment concerning pleasure.

Utilitarians too often regard the *quantity* of pleasure as seen in *duration* and *intensity;* at the same time they fail to bring into view the *quality* as essential to right judgment and discreet conduct. Certainly this point is well made; and, if properly extended, it comes near the truth of a sound creed.

M. Janet's chief objection to the utilitarian philosophy is directed to the teaching of Bentham, which broadly and emphatically urges happiness in the *quantitative* view as the true object of human endeavor, and the criterion of human duty. Mill is considered a reformer who has exposed this error in the system; still the reformation is valueless unless it goes to the extent of subverting the pernicious dogma held in common by master and disciple—Bentham and Mill. Janet delivers this judgment which seems to us to be strictly logical:

"The quality of pleasure cannot be derived from the pleasure itself, but from the different causes which produced it; for among so many pleasures all must be equal unless they differ in quality. If they are not equal, if they contain more or less of nobility, of purity, of refinement, if it is in this way they should be distinguished one from another, then it follows that good is not pleasure, as such, but pleasure in so far as it is noble and refined; consequently, good is this something noble or refined which places certain favored pleasures above others."

We quite agree with Janet in his characterization of Kant's moral theory; it seems to us to be nearly identical with the theological dogma of decrees—the ultimate reason for moral law and action being the divine will.

To differ with Kant is, indeed, to show insubordination to the very emperor of modern philosophy; but no mind is sovereign in this realm.

This eminent thinker has very ably exposed the fallacies of the systems already presented; the partisans of pleasure and utility find in Kant an invincible and conquering foe. Duty implies law; and Kant has duly emphasized this: To make it possible

to judge actions morally, there must be a law which commands some things and forbids others. From this deliverance we make no dissent. But when we inquire for the *ground, reason* or *foundation* of the law of duty, we must seek it outside of authority; otherwise we make moral science impossible—a mere jumble of arbitrary regulations. If there are no justifying reasons for the law, satisfactory to rational intellect, the so-called duty is simply tyranny. Things, according to Kant, have merely relative value—they are good or evil, according to the use that is made of them. It is the good use which is good, not the thing itself. The sole, absolute good is good will; and when this idea is analyzed, we find Kant's conclusion to be that good will is only a will to do one's duty; to do this according to law and for the sake of the law. To this teaching Janet makes the following forcible reply:

"Let us assume, for instance, that there exists something which is good in itself, anterior to law; we could pursue this object for one of two reasons only. either because it might be *obligatory*, or it might be *desirable*. In the latter case, we have the philosophy of pleasure; in the former case, we have precisely Kant's theory; it would be the obligation which would establish the good, not the good which would establish the obligation."

Our author does not deny that *moral* good implies law, and that an action is only *morally* good when it is performed for the sake of duty, and not from such motives as fear, or personal interest. But he holds that there is a direct connection between *good* and *obligation*, that the latter is founded on the former as its basis; whereas, Kant takes the reverse position, and makes good consequent upon duty and conformity to law, which is its only measure. Goodness is intrinsic, inheres in many objects; is an inseparable element in excellency of character; instead of being merely a consequence of law it is the only conceivable foundation for a stable moral science. Hence, when seeking the principle of morality we can find no *absolute* duty unless it is based on the essential nature and difference in things. To draw this matter to a point, let us inquire of Kant, of a given action, whether it be good? The answer would be, yes, if it is our duty. A step further. *Why* is it our duty? To this there is no reply, according to his philosophy. Law is law. We submit that so far from this being moral science, it is its utter negation. If the law should be called uni-

versal, by way of increasing reverence, this would not in the least alter the case. An absurd law imposed on all mankind would be none the less absurd, as Janet has truly said—it would be only tyranny. *Might* is indeed the last analysis of law in human governments; but the Great Ruler of the Universe may be supposed to make *right* the foundation of his kingdom; and if so, then his commands are not arbitrary decrees of his will, but wise and good, because founded on an essential and eternal distinction between objects and actions.

We are painfully aware of the grandeur and awe belonging to such a subject as this under review. Philosophers should imitate the Cherubim and vail their faces in the presence of that "throne high and lifted up," but they should imitate them also in crying: "Holy, holy, Lord God of Hosts, the heavens and the earth are full of thy glory." Again we quote M. Janet:

"In so far as law is only law—a rule—not based upon reason, it is purely arbitrary, whoever the legislator may be, whether divine or human. If, on the other hand, law is enforced by some reason, this reason, which is anterior to the law itself, can be nothing but the intrinsic goodness of the act required; it is, then, *goodness* which is the basis of duty, not *duty* which is the basis of goodness."

The utilitarian philosophy justifies its persistence by the existence of Kant's scheme, supported very strongly by many of the most potent intellects among theologians. In our judgment, there is a better way than either of these schemes of philosophy, so directly antagonistic and mutually unsatisfactory.

In common parlance we say that God created all things; and so He did create all things that are entities, from the ethereal spirit to the highest world. But some things are not entities, are without substance—they are principles, ideas, truths. It is no irreverence to say of this class of things, God did not make them—they were and are eternal. Did God make the laws of mathematics? or could he destroy them? Verily not. These principles would be just as true if there were no God—they must appear to every intelligence in the universe capable of understanding them as necessary truths, immutable and eternal. It is the same with moral science, though it is a common mistake to suppose that its principles are less certain than the laws of mathematics. As a

matter of fact, the elements of moral science are constituents of the intellect; many of these elements are clearly apprehended, and approved; and there is reason to believe all of them would find acceptance in proportion to the enlargement of the understanding.

John Wesley once propounds the question: Does God command an action because it is right, or is it right because he commands? Wesley was little given to philosophy; no man ever had a more practical order of mind. He undertakes an answer; and offers this easy solution, as it seemed to him: The will of God is God himself; and hence God wills what is right because he is eternally right. Now, volition is not will, but it is an exercise of the volitive faculty—God's volitions, from whence come his laws, are no more God himself than are our volitions the same as our personality. In one view, Wesley was not far from accuracy, perhaps strictly correct, when he considered God's nature to be essentially and perfectly holy, so that his volitions must necessarily partake of his character. This, however, imports that there is a subjective necessity in God's nature which always allies his will with right, and of course forbids even the possibility of wrong willing on the part of God. But then the criteria of right must be *exterior* to the will of God, or else there is nothing taught except that a thing is right because God wills it—a mere *petitio principii*. The Almighty himself denies this shallow philosophy by asking: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"—a very unmeaning question, if there be no standard of right but his own will. *Sic volo, sic jubeo*, says the Kantian doctrine, and with this arbitrary decision and decree theologians may endeavor to be content; yet, the irrepressible instinct of humanity rises in revolt, asserting the essential and eternal distinction in conduct; and the chief of the Apostles affirms that "The law is holy; and the commandment holy, just and good."

Schopenhaur, the famous German pessimist, thinks the idea of duty should not be deemed a part of moral science; and this opinion is expressed for the reason that moral science is not practical but wholly theoretical. He says it deals with that which is, not that which ought to be; there are good and bad men, just as there are sheep and tigers. His principle of good is simply a sentiment of pity; the principle of evil is insensibility or hardness of heart.

Among men, some are born with humane sentiments; others, with selfish disposition. Denying the possibility of free will either in God or man, Schopenhaur finds no place for commandment or law in morals—a very just conclusion from his premises. The theory of sympathy, as insisted on by this eminent writer, is one of value in making a system of moral truth, but does not furnish a basis sufficiently broad for even a coherent theory of morals, and much more would it fail to sustain a practical ethical code. Adjusting thought on this centre, we make moral science entirely subjective, ignoring intrinsic good and objective morality, the idea of duty being completely nullified by the lack of will and choice, without which moral law is an absurdity.

We do not deem it important to dwell on this view longer; it is not so much a scheme of moral philosophy as it is an effort to show the impossibility of any such system. Very closely allied to Schopenhaur's theory of sympathy as the chief element in morals, are the teachings of Herbert Spencer in his Ethical Data of Evolution. The moral sentiments of a people will vary with their history and progress in civilization; in fact, they are evolved like man himself from something next to nihility. Our instincts and moral sentiments are not constituent and invariable elements of man's nature; these are all engendered by experience, which, being endlessly diversified, must cause the systems of morals among different people, or the same people at different stages, to be likewise varied. *Right*, according to such teaching, is not something determined by law, and arbitrary at that, much less is it a sentiment and practice founded upon good objectively viewed; indeed, it is nothing but the state of mind and character resulting from man's environment. Circumstances, conditions, make men what they are, whatever that may be. Scarcity of food will make one man a cannibal; better supplies lead another to abhor such diet; and the revulsion of the stomach becomes the revulsion of the brain. All agnostic philosophers are materialists, and on such a basis of course no coherent system of ethical laws can be erected.

But let us inquire if the historical evolution of duty (assuming its truth) invalidates the idea of duty by denying its substantial reality. It may be admitted that the first instincts of mankind in a barbaric state are near the level of inferior animals.

Admitting this, the fact remains that man is capable of rising superior to these mere animal instincts, and when a certain elevation is attained, the idea of duty, of law, prevails over the low elements of his being with a conviction of imperative oughtness.

Even conceding that the sense of duty under moral law is the result of a gradual process, and that having a genesis it has history, this does not make null the fact that duty *has* originated and that law is authoritative. Man, as a physical being, is, without his willingness, subject to all the laws of nature—these he obeys, in reality cannot violate. In this obedience, if it be properly so-called, to natural law, there is no sense of obligation, no sense of duty; there is really no option. In the domain of moral the matter is wholly different. The only differentia of moral action when viewed with action of a different order is found in the necessity of *choosing* our course; and to give virtue to the choice there must not only be a formal submission to law, but a cordial acquiescence in its demands and interdictions.

M. Janet devotes much space to the discussion of liberty, or freedom of the will; for any system to deserve the name of moral science it must recognize this basal and necessary faculty in man's constitution. Nor is there room for controversy here in regard to freedom of choice as a *sine qua non* in moral action. In some form it is recognized as a truth in every scheme of thought which discriminates between virtue and vice. The labor with thinkers has been to realize this necessary element in a moral code as something more than an implication, a hypothesis, to make it accord with other dogmas of philosophy with which it has always seemed incompatible. Causation being the basis of all reasoning, and accepted by all, except skeptics, and causation being conceived and conceded as universal, the problem is, how this can be true and yet the will be free. Sir W. Hamilton has gone so far as to say it is impossible for the mind of man to reason to any other conclusion than the doctrine of universal necessity. Absolute freedom *seems* to imply entire exemption from the law of causation. If the cause is taken out of the common category of antecedents and consequents, the invariability of which connection is the foundation of faith in causation, then will it be affirmed that the volition is the cause of the volition, *i. e.*, a thing causes itself, which is not

only inconceivable, but absurd.* We cannot discard the presence and the power of motives in human action; to do so is not only unthinkable, but leads to the doctrine of indifferentism, which, being accepted as true, the action of man is deprived of all moral character. The universal voice of mankind is that it is motive which gives moral complexion to character—a man is deemed good or bad according to his motive.

This criticism must come to a close for lack of space to deal with the problem of freedom. It has been discussed from the days of Plato to our own era, with very little progress towards a solution. Our own view has been before expressed in these pages. Fixed belief in our freedom is universal among mankind. No logic or philosophy can remove the abiding conviction of our freedom; this persistency of belief must be regarded as an ultimate fact that needs no other explanation than to assign it as a constitutional, regulative principle of the mind. M. Janet, however, enters very elaborately into this discussion, evincing great acuteness, whether he presents his own view of freedom, or animadverts on the fallacies of others.

He ascribes to Emmanuel Kant very great honor for his herculean labor in the discussion; nor does this expenditure seem to M. Janet as having been made in vain. Kant's teachings are expounded with much fullness and clearness, though it must be admitted we use the word "clearness" in the preceding sentence with hesitation. What the philosopher of Königsberg has not thought and said, when augmented by Janet, will hardly be worthy of search or refutation. Books like this are rare even in this prolific age. Quick writers might fill a book-case with lighter treatises while such a volume as this is being evolved from the philosophic deep. Pearls are not to be had by the mere raking of the ground; they are buried in oceans, and lie concealed in mountains; and much diving and digging are necessary to gain the treasure—it comes of toil but brings a rich reward.

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*This position, though taken by a master logician, does not seem to us correct. Mind is not volition—it is an entity, and may have a spontaneous causativity. Volition is not an entity—it is a choice or act, and proceeds from the mind.

LIBRARY TABLE.

AMERICAN STATESMEN: DANIEL WEBSTER; ALBERT GALLATIN. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

We open the discussion around the Library Table by inviting our readers to these two volumes in the American Statesmen series of the great Boston publishers above named. These volumes are of uniform size and make; all them together will be no inconsiderable political library. The book on Webster is by Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the best of the many authors employed in this important work. He can write a biography of even so great a man as Daniel Webster without showing idolatry. This exemption from Bosswellism may somewhat abate the ardor with which the ordinary reader peruses such books; but it invites a different class, those who are searching for facts and truth, and who demand a discriminating analysis of character. A man who is all praise or all censure in his estimates is wholly unreliable as a guide or aid in judging men.

Webster has been portrayed so often and so well that all readers, who are at all familiar with our public men and affairs, have come much to one conclusion. He is, by nearly all, considered the American Colossus, towering above others with a lofty pre-eminence. He is generally thought of as one of an illustrious trio—Clay, Webster, and Calhoun. If these great names have equal popular admiration, resulting from like commanding abilities, yet they were so unlike in many aspects that critical minds ascribe to them different merits.

Webster was devoted to the practice of law for the whole of his life; hence, in professional eminence he is above Clay, whose devotion to the law, though enough to give him prominence, was too intermittent to give him great distinction. As to Calhoun, his career was statesmanship from first to last. From the day when he held a debate in the recitation room at Yale College with his president, the great Dr. Dwight, we see in him the philosophical

statesman. His graduating speech was on the theme of Statesmanship.

Mr. Webster's fame is very large as a statesman, and not greater than his merits, but his eminence is greater as a lawyer; and his *pre*-eminence is in the field of oratory.

Mr. Lodge views him in all these aspects of his character, as well as in all the relations of life. He discourses at great length on his famous legal trials, especially of his part in the "Dartmouth College" case, and the "Girard Will" case. In the college case he met Pinkney and Wirt, at that time the most renowned lawyers appearing before the Supreme Court. Pinkney did not have a fair opportunity on that occasion to show his prowess, and to measure arms with Webster, as the cause had been once argued by the latter, and was held up by disagreement among the judges for a new hearing. Pinkney was called into the matter for this second hearing, but, to the surprise of counsel on both sides, the judges announced that since the previous session they had reached a conclusion. Hence, Pinkney could not discuss the cause on its merits, but only on some collateral issues. But, though the great Maryland lawyer still ranked as the first of his profession in popular apprehension, it was manifest that he could maintain supremacy no longer. Webster displayed not only consummate ability before the court in his argument, but exhibited no small tact in managing to turn the minds of the doubting judges in the vacation. John Marshall, Chief Justice, and Associate Bushrod Washington were with him clear through, but others wavered and doubted, and Duval dissented to the last.

Webster had many great days and occasions in the Senate, whereby he has won lasting fame. Of course the most renowned of his debates come under review in this volume. The Webster-Hayne discussion is amply portrayed; in this lofty debate Webster appears at his best. He was then fifty years of age, in the full maturity of all his powers, physical and mental. The occasion, the subject-matter, were precisely adapted to excite him to the highest pitch of logical and rhetorical effort.

The debates with Calhoun, about the same period and on the same topic, are among the most renowned in our parliamentary history. It was during this conflict of the gladiators that Randolph,

of Roanoke, listening and looking while the great Carolinian dealt his ponderous blows, said (somebody's hat being in his way): "Take that hat away; I want to see Webster die muscle by muscle." Did anybody ever see this?

Mr. Lodge is candid enough to admit that Calhoun beat Webster in the argument, because the *facts* in our political history, when marshalled by this master of logic, brought the mind irresistibly to his conclusion. We agree with this judgment. The biographer is also correct in the opinion that public sentiment had undergone such a change since the framing of the government that a complete revolution had been wrought that practically made the Websterian and Hamiltonian theory of the government to be more in accord with popular feeling and opinion than the theory of Calhoun. Hence, Webster's grand display in the discussion was not so much a refutation of his antagonist as it was a vivid portrayal of his own ideal of government as it should be, despite all historic facts in its formation. We think this criticism of Mr. Lodge acute and accurate.

But the self-possession and ease of Webster—his majestic attitudes, his sonorous tones given forth in emphasizing great principles, his slow, rolling thunder as he moved on in the debate, all these qualities excite the highest admiration of his genius for oratory.

It was a sage remark of a lady who, criticising Webster, gave this estimate of him: "The greatness of Mr. Webster appears in the ease with which he performs on any occasion. We are impressed with the idea that he is greater than the occasion, whatever it be—there is a conviction on the mind that there is a reserve force in Webster which no occasion has been great enough to bring forth." This very remarkable judgment we read about the time of Webster's death, and we think it the highest compliment he ever received.

Did not Solomon have a feeling somewhat like this when he said: "It is the glory of God to conceal a thing"? Most men do great things, if at all, with such difficulty that they seem overtaxed—their glory is in what they achieve, but a great genius, like Webster or Shakspeare, may reveal their wonderful resources with such ease as to indicate to the admirer that no one had ever seen them in the *fullness* of their glory.

One incident more, and we close this notice: It is a theory of some, very well supported by the experience of public speakers, that no speaking can be done with ease unless the hearers understand the orator. A failure to do this operates as a hindrance both to thought and language. It is said that during one of Calhoun's intricate arguments in the Senate, he became hampered by the listless appearance of the Senate. He made slow progress in the evolution of his thought, until he turned his eye on Webster and paused; Webster bowed his head, in token of his understanding, whereupon the flagging orator gathered inspiration to carry him forward with ease to the close.

ALBERT GALLATIN.—This eminent statesman was of foreign birth, a native of Geneva, Switzerland. Educated in the chief academy of the noted city, he became a respectable scholar before he came to America, which was just before the close of the revolution. As a resort for subsistence, he taught French, which was vernacular with him, in Boston; first in private, afterwards as a tutor in Harvard College. He came to America as an adventurer, seeking to make his way in the world by laudable efforts. Having some friends, and a prospect of some means when he should attain his majority, (which in Switzerland was at twenty-five years,) he entered into land trading, investing all the means he could command in the rich, cheap lands of the day. These purchases were largely in the vicinity of large tracts owned by General Washington. Soon after the war closed the General began to look after these great interests. On one of his expeditions he met young Gallatin, who was interested in the same matters. In a wild wilderness, with only an occasional and inferior house, they chanced to lodge at the same place. Young Gallatin surrendered his bed to the august man, and put himself on the floor in the same room. While they were together, the General was making some calculations and putting them on paper; but proceeding rather slowly, Gallatin, unasked, stated the matter as if he had been called to give aid; whereupon Washington gave him a peculiar look, possibly expressive of rebuke, but proceeded in his slower way to his conclusion, which being exactly in accord with Gallatin's statement, the General said: "Young man, you are correct."

Now, this was a small affair, but it brought Gallatin into closer contact with the great man than was common even to men of years and position. A small incident, no doubt, yet one often thought of when Gallatin became one of the famous men of the age, especially in affairs of business and finance. Mr. Gallatin was among the fiercest opponents of the Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1787. He was not concerned in its making, being quite young, but in every possible way he sought to defeat the ratification by Pennsylvania, his adopted State. In this he stood by Patrick Henry, Luther Martin, and George Mason.

But after the new government became established, he was early brought into prominent office and became one of the most potential men of his day. He possessed a capacity for ready speaking, and was a powerful debater.

He was among the most eminent financiers called to direct and protect public interests. As a Secretary of the Treasury, he exhibited extraordinary ability. Gallatin did honorable service in the diplomatic missions on which he was sent by his government. In connection with Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams, he was appointed by Madison to negotiate a treaty in regard to the war of 1812, which treaty was made at Ghent, in 1814.

QUOTATIONS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: By Prof. CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY, of Harvard University. New York: Scribner's Sons. 1884.

Here we have a volume of over three hundred pages, treating of the many "Quotations in the New Testament" from the Old. A book on "quotations" like this could be easily made, for the compass of the literature is small, and the citations sufficiently obvious in most cases to lead an editor at once to the source or authority. Such a volume would hardly be more readable than a concordance, and would serve only the same purpose. This book is not of that kind; it is filled with quotations, and much comment and criticism. One is surprised at the immense number of these citations from the Old Testament when they are brought together. The abundance of the quotations indicates in a general way the reverence for the old Scriptures felt and taught by Jesus and the Apostles.

Professor Toy, speaking upon the spirit and method of his work, says:

"No honest student of the Bible can object to a careful and honest sifting of its words, and no believer in God can fear that such a procedure will do harm. In the following discussions I have spoken plainly, but never, I hope, irreverently. My aim has been to state what I hold to be the exact truth; and I ask, from those to whom some of the views here presented may seem strange, a careful examination of the ground on which they are based. I believe that the ethical-religious power of the Bible will be increased by perfectly free, fair-minded dealing, and by a precise knowledge of what it does or does not say. As its friends, we ought not to wish anything else than that it should be judged strictly on its own merits; for to wish anything else is a confession of weakness. There is too much reason to suppose that the belief which is so prevalent, in the mechanical infallibility of the Bible, is seriously diminishing its legitimate influence over the minds and the lives of men."

These quotations may be divided into four classes; but it is held by the author that none of them are made immediately from the Hebrew—all of them being taken from the Greek, or Aramaic version. Some of these quotations agree both with the Hebrew and Septuagint; others agree with the Septuagint against the Hebrew, and, *vice versa*, with the Hebrew against the Greek version called the Septuagint; and some of the citations agree with neither. The frequent departures from the Hebrew make it unreasonable to suppose that the sacred writers had this text before them while writing. The Hebrew was virtually a dead language to these New Testament writers. Perhaps none except Paul was familiar with that language, and *his* quotations are nearly all from the Greek. Now, when there are deviations from the Greek version Professor Toy thinks they should be referred to the only other version of the Old Testament then in existence—the Aramaic.

The Septuagint version was begun in Alexandria, in Egypt, B. C., 275, and, according to Professor Toy, was finished after one hundred and forty-five years—slow work that, longer than Noah's time in building the Ark. This version became widely known in the great Roman Empire, and was nearly as much venerated by the Jews as the Ancient Hebrew, and far more generally understood by reason of the wide diffusion of the Greek language. Such was Augustine's veneration—four hundred years after the era of Christ began—he looked on Jerome's new Latin version as little

short of sacrilege. This version was honored abroad by Gentile converts as they knew no other; and it was accepted in Palestine where Aramaic was the vernacular, though Greek was generally understood. From these facts it is easy to see how the Apostles were led to quote so largely from the Septuagint; aside from their own familiarity with it as a reason, the fact that the people understood it furnished a stronger reason.

Professor Toy thinks that an Aramaic version of the Old Testament existed in Palestine in the First century, because the Hebrew having ceased to be spoken, the Jews would need a translation either from the Hebrew or Septuagint. Greek was much in use in Palestine, yet it was not the vernacular, household speech. An *oral* translation of the Sacred writings would naturally be made, which would become a source of authoritative quotations, in addition to the other sources. The variations in these quotations are explainable by reference to these several sources from whence the New Testament writers brought the cited text. These variations are numerous and not always unimportant. It is very plain that the New Testament writers used considerable freedom in their citations, using abridgment, condensation and combination; in either case there would be want of conformity to the original, whether Hebrew or Septuagint. This would result, even with the best intention to be accurate, from the habit of quoting from memory, owing to the scarcity of books in that age. But these writers are so often verbally accurate as to evince familiarity with the original text, whether they transcribed or merely drew upon memory.

Mr. Toy does not account fully for the variations and differences found between the Old and New Testament in these passages, by any of these reasons. He supposes that the idea of interpretation prevailing at the time led to frequent variations when quoting. Paraphrasing would be deemed allowable; indeed, they considered it proper to bring out of the words of the text any meaning the words might be made to bear. Still, Mr. Toy finds "no trace of purpose to misstate the meaning of quotations" which are found in the New Testament. "Citations are made in good faith, and with general accuracy, from the versions which were familiar to the writers; and the changes made were such as were believed to bring out the meaning into stronger relief."

We have written enough to indicate the character of this book; s evidently written in the interest of truth and an intelligent lerstanding of God's Word. For that sort of Bibliolatry that ıdders at the very thought of any inaccuracy in the Bible, the hor has no favor. He holds to the sacred books of the Bible h firm faith in their inspired authority; and students of the iptures cannot afford to dispense with such helps as are afforded these laborious and learned researches.

Bible criticism will go on in some way; either from a purpose harmonize and vindicate the Scriptures or to allege and prove crepancies that militate against their infallibility. No matter at may be the animus, there will be no abatement of criticism; l there can be no cessation of attention to these great matters the part of those whose business it is to know and expound the ord of God.

E DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION: By Rev. R. J. COOKE, M. A. New York: Philips & Hunt. 1884.

This neat volume comes from the large Book Concern of the M. Church, heralded by an introduction from the pen of Dr. D. D. edon, who gives the book high commendation. The author is oung writer of very fine ability, and his treatise has made ıe sensation among those accustomed to consider such themes. is bold and confident in his utterances—arrays himself in ant resistance to scientific objections, and to all views which ly or virtually deny the resurrection. Readers of his argu- ıt may prepare themselves for much discussion of molecules, on the question of the identity of the resurrection body with physical organism of man before his death. Mr. Cooke's treatise igorous in thought and expression—really about the fullest and est book on the subject written from his standpoint.

The doctrine of the resurrection has a prominence in Scriptural ching that entitles it to greater position in the schedule of relig- s truths given forth by press and pulpit. It was accepted by ancient Pharisees, but denied by the Sadducees of the Savior's e. During the days of Apostolic ministry it was among the st commanding themes, treated in the most glowing manner. culcating it as a basal fact and dogma in the Christian scheme

its novelty excited and startled the world wherever it was preached. The very rapid progress of Christianity in the beginning was doubtless owing to the charm and exhilaration of such a doctrine bearing so forcibly on human hopes and destiny. But even in the time of Paul, debates arose concerning the resurrection—the nature, time, order, etc. Some were led to such a theory as asserted that "the resurrection is passed already;" this delusion Paul rebuked. Exactly what the people meant we do not know, though we suppose it was a belief that the resurrection was simultaneous with death—a theory very like that of Swedenborg. Whether the erroneous conception included a resurrection for all in this way, or only the saints were thus privileged, we do not find; for Paul does not specify and enlarge upon the peculiarities of the heresy.

The fact of a resurrection has been often questioned, but the character of the future body has been oftener a matter of debate. All phases of the subject are presented and discussed with candor and force in Mr. Cooke's book. We find all we desire to know on this sublime subject in Paul's second Corinthian letter, which is a grand revelation, ample for our faith and hope. It is more than probable that the transfiguration of Jesus was intended to teach pictorially the transcendent glory of "the saints in light," when they shall arise in the likeness of the Lord, and be fashioned like unto his glorious body. We read Mr. Cooke with pleasure although sometimes we have dissented from his views. The volume is one which can be cordially commended for its unusual originality and ability.

CHARACTERISTICS: By A. P. RUSSELL. 12mo., pp. 362. Boston Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1884.

Of the twelve "Sketches and Essays" that make up this book we have read the following: The Conversation of Coleridge, Doctor Johnson, Lord Macaulay, Lamb, Burns, John Randolph and John Brown, Habit.

These are certainly subjects which could hardly fail to be made interesting. The characteristics of the men mentioned are vividly portrayed. Of course, no one need expect, from the title of the book, anything similar to Carlyle's essay upon the same subject. Any one who has read Mr. Russell's former work entitled "Library

Notes," will have a very clear idea of his present work. His manner of treating a subject is, in most cases, *sui generis*. He seems to have read extensively, with a pencil and note-book ever at hand, and whenever he happened to meet with any striking sentence or thought upon a subject which he had been considering, he would copy it for future use. He has culled many beautiful illustrations from the fields of literature, history, science, art and anecdote. His essays are made up almost entirely of these passages and illustrations, following each other in quick succession, sometimes a dozen on a page, like so many pearls in a necklace.

It will be easily understood that there is little room for originality in essays thus written. Indeed, the author seems to desire less to be original than to please. Frequently his compositions resemble those quilts of a thousand different pieces, made by industrious old women, in which the few stiches necessary to joining the parts would represent all that could be called his. In the article on the "Conversation of Coleridge" there are not even the stitches, but it is none the less entertaining for all that. We have heard that once, in a shop where elegant windows of variegated colors were wont to be manufactured, a workman picked up from time to time the bits of glass that had been cast away, and formed them into a window more beautiful than all that had ever been made in the shop. This we can hardly believe to have been possible, but such a window would fitly symbolize Mr. Russell's Essays. Composed as they are, they must have beauty, yet, as in the window mentioned, we could not expect much close continuity between the parts, so there will be found in these essays very little connection and coherency of thought. This is most so in the article on Burns, in which the author digresses for several pages at a time, introducing quotations and anecdotes having not the slightest possible connection with his subject. The article on "John Randolph and John Brown" is the most coherent and original; yet it is difficult to see why these two persons should be treated in one chapter, unless it is because they were both named John.

It is about time that persons like our author should cease trying to exalt John Brown, the midnight murderer and the barn-burner, into a Christian saint and martyr. The true view of him has been thus lately expressed by another:

"His principles were those of the Russian nihilist—first, make a clean sweep of the present civilization, and let the future build what it can. Surely such a man is not the proper hero for the youth of our country to worship, and we believe that, as his true history, too long concealed, becomes known, admiration for him will be changed to disgust, and disgust to anger, that we have been so long deceived."—*Rev. D. N. Utter, in North American Review, Dec.*, 1883.

Emerson's remark that he was the "saint whose martyrdom will make the gallows glorious like the Cross," is not the only *blasphemy* that was spoken by abolitionists concerning some of their godless heroes.

The article on "Habit" is very interesting. Among the habits peculiar to great men, we have discussed here Marlborough's avarice and Carlyle's habit of detraction and vituperation. Of hardly a living soul did Carlyle ever write anything kind—certainly not of contemporary authors. And this man, forsooth, must be exalted to the position of a seer!

The most entertaining articles are those on Coleridge, Johnson and Macaulay, widely different in most respects, yet alike remarkable for their wonderful conversational powers. The whole book is a very readable anthology. J. C. H.

A ROUNDABOUT JOURNEY: By CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1884.

Mr. Warner has written a book of travels, containing 360 pages. There are twenty-two chapters in which the reader will find abundant entertainment. These journeyings take us over much of the Eastern Continent, extending into Europe, Asia, and Africa. Books of travels, if written with any degree of vivacity by observant explorers, are always entertaining, and that is the chief aim of authors in this field of literature. Mr. Warner's volume deserves high rank in this class of productions on account of the superior ability of the writer, and the great variety of topics which he discusses.

How fortunate are people who have money and leisure to make such journeys. What enlargement of mind should come from contact and communion with persons. What pleasures of imagination are possible to those so fortunate as to visit so many scenes and objects illustrious by association with great men and grand events

In the highest measure these advantages are denied to most of mankind, but the next best thing—the privilege of reading such books—is possible to nearly all. Home life, in its monotonous rounds, is much relieved of dullness by the printing press, which furnishes, at a low cost, rich and varied entertainment, such as may be found in this itinerary.

VIRGINIA: By JOHN ESTEN COOKE. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1884.

This is a history of the people of Virginia, done up in a genteel book of 500 pages. Mr. Cooke, the author, is very well known by previous productions. Virginia was earliest settled of the vast area in North America. Abortive attempts had been made to effect settlements before in Florida and North Carolina; but the English colony, very small in the outset, which came to Virginia in 1607, antedated the advent of the puritan pilgrims of Massachusetts by thirteen years. Our author gives a vivid picture of the infant colony, and life-like sketches of those who figured most in that unpropitious beginning. He dwells much on the colonial history at a later period, giving quite a pictorial view of Virginia during the century that preceded the revolutionary era. His description of the several classes of the population, widely dissimilar, is in a vivacious style, perhaps rather highly colored. When the author comes to the period of the Revolution he has a drama of events and illustrious men worthy of all the ability that could be employed by poet, painter or philosopher.

So often have we read of these matters, we find little that is new to us in Mr. Cooke's book, yet we have found delight in following the writer from opening to close. There is no large space devoted to Virginia in the late war, but enough for this present generation. At a future day the record of Virginia in the terrible conflict will furnish material for history that will make this great State a land of enchantment. Virginia has furnished heroes, orators and statesmen worthy to be compared with the most eminent in the annals of nations. Nor is the race of great men extinct; capabilities will be found to rescue her from the perils that environ. She will be true to her past history; and that will be fame lustrous enough to satisfy her noble people.

THE METHODIST CENTENNIAL YEAR BOOK: By W. H. DEPUY, D. D. New York: Philips & Hunt. 1884. Price, $1.50.

Dr. DePuy has, with great labor, brought out this volume of statistics, adapted especially to the present year of Methodism. How any man could have the patience necessary to make such a book excites our wonder. It deals in matters great and small, everything of the slightest or greatest moment in Methodism. Not only does it deal with Methodism as found in the M. E. Church but with much fullness it goes into the details of other Methodist organizations. It would be well to examine this book of 400 pages in order to have a just conception of the magnitude of Methodistic operations and agencies. The reading is appropriate at this time to give spring and energy to the centennial movements now the order of the day.

HAND BOOK OF SOUTHERN METHODISM, by Rev. P. A. PETERSON, of Richmond, Va., is a book of the same order, adapted to the same end. Though smaller than Dr. DePuy's volume, it is quite full of statistical matter, well arranged for easy reference. Mr. Peterson's book being specially intended for the M. E. Church, South, would be more appropriate in this section if one is in search of the kind of information which these volumes supply. Lack of information in regard to the doings of the Church is the most serious obstacle to rapid progress. Mr. Peterson's small book does not read like a romance, but to a mind of religious affinities its disclosures are far more thrilling. We advise our readers to send for one or both these volumes, and to do this without delay.

INTERNATIONAL REVISION COMMENTARY—LUKE AND ROMANS. New York: Scribner's Sons. 1882.

These two volumes of the series of Commentaries on the Revised New Testament are by Professor M. B. Riddle, of Hartford. We have before commended this series as worthy of attention, on account of the ability and learning devoted to the explanation of the revised text of the Gospels and Epistles.

The volumes are small, not costly, and may be had separately, if desired. Our version is not likely to be supplanted by that of 1881

yet it will be very well to have both versions at hand, as the later one will be largely read and often quoted.

These volumes would be very serviceable to Sunday School teachers as well as to ministers. They are very neatly bound, and, owing to the small type, very much matter has been condensed into little bulk.

THE BRYENNIOS MANUSCRIPT.

Through the kindness of the librarian of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, we have been permitted to examine the first copy of the work of Bryennios which has reached the metropolis. The title (as we translated it) is: "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, now published for the first time from the Jerusalem Codex, with prolegomena and notes, together with a collation of the synopsis of the Old Testament, by John Crysostom, and an unpublished portion of the same Codex by Philotheos Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia. Large octavo, five francs, 232 pages. Constantinople. 1883."

The manuscript was discovered by Bryennios in the library of the Most Holy Sepulcher, in Fanar, of Constantinople, and announced to the learned world in his edition of the Epistles of Clement, published at Constantinople, 1875. The manuscript is an 8vo volume, written on parchment in cursive characters. It contains 120 leaves, and is numbered 456 in the library. It has a colophon, giving the date of the manuscript as 1056, A. D., and the scribe Leon. In 1875 Bryennios announced that the manuscript contained, beside the Epistles of Clement, which he then published, the Epistles of Barnabas and Ignatius, and also the Synopsis of John Chrysostom and the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, and promised to publish these as soon as possible. The manuscript contained a section of the Epistles of Clement which had been lost. It presented to the learned world for the first time after many centuries these Epistles in a complete form.

The learned bishop now gives us the synopsis of John Chrysostom and the Teaching of the Apostles, together with other little bits of great interest. The delay in publishing is fully justified by the immense labor that has been bestowed, in the prolegomena and notes, in tracing all the references to this long-lost writing in all

the earliest Christian writings, so that the evidence of the genuineness and antiquity of the document is overwhelming. If there had been a premature publication, the Christian world would have been agitated by intense and bitter struggles over its origin and genuineness in the interest of the several denominations whose darling theories are destroyed by it. But the learned bishop has wisely retained the document until he could present it in such a form as to compel the consent of the learned world. It comes exactly at the right time to smite with crushing power the sectarian prejudices of the several Churches of Christendom. It will exert a powerful influence in breaking down the denominational barriers.

The prolegomena takes up 149 pages, the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, with the elaborate notes, 55 pages, the indexes and appendixes, 20 pages. The whole work is a splendid exhibition of scholarship. It is a sign that the Orient is to play an important part in the learned world of the future. American scholars will have to study their Greek with renewed diligence if they would keep up with the productions of the rising scholarship of the Greek Church. If classical Greek has become less important, ecclesiastical Greek has risen to vastly greater importance in our times. One of the finest sections of work is the exhibition, by a difference of Greek type, of the text of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles embedded in the Seventh Book of the Apostolic Constitutions, and then also in the midst of the Epitome of the rules of the holy apostles, where, as in the Apostles' Creed, each apostle has his share in pointing out the way of life. There is also a careful comparison of the text of the synopsis of Chrysostom of this manuscript with the text given in Migne. There is, besides, a curious list of the Old Testament books in Hebrew and Greek placed in the manuscripts between the second Epistle of Clement and the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. The order of this list is: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Joshua, (this order, it will be noticed, inserts Joshua in the middle of the Hexateuch,) Deuteronomy, Numbers, Ruth, Job, Judges, Psalter, I., II., III., IV. Kings, I. II. Chronicles, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Jeremiah, The Twelve Prophets, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel I. and II., Ezra, Esther. This must be very ancient and will be greatly valued by Old Testament critics. Bryennios gives a list of passages of Scrip-

ture cited in the teaching of the Apostles. These are from the Old Testament: Deut. v. 17-19, Zechariah xiv. 5, Malachi i. 11-14. From the Apocryphal book, Tobit 1, Sirach 3; thus there is one more citation from the Apocryphal books than from the canonical books of the Old Testament. From the New Testament there are: from Matthew 20, from Luke 6, from the Acts iv. 32. The Gospels of John and Mark are not cited. The citations from the Epistles are: Ephesians vi. 5-9, I Thessalonians v. 22, and I Peter ii. 11. The Apocalypse is not cited, even where we would expect it, in chapter xvi.

The Teaching of the Apostles in chapters i.-vi. is ethical; in vii.-xvi. ecclesiastical and liturgical; the doctrines of faith are only indirectly taught. The type of theology represented is distinctly the earliest type—the Jewish Christian—and indeed the earliest form of that type—the one represented by Matthew and James. It is a type free from the slightest taint or suspicion of heresy. The Jewish Christian type speedily developed into heretical forms. That this writing is simple and pure and so near the spirit and the letter of the doctrine of Jesus, according to Matthew, is one of the strongest evidences, not only of its genuineness, but still more of its very great antiquity. We do not see how it can be placed later than the middle of the second century. It tends toward the first half of that century, and is by all odds the most important writing exterior to the New Testament, now in the possession of the Christian world.—*New York "Independent."*

Collection of Psalms and Hymns.

We have in this small volume a reprint of the first Methodist Hymn Book, if indeed we may call it Methodist. It was arranged by John Wesley, while he was a missionary in Savannah, Georgia—was printed by Lewis Timothy, in Charles-Town, South Carolina, 1737. Mr. Wesley says, in speaking of the matter in Wood's *Athenae Oxonienses*, that this collection was published in 1736; however, the *fac simile* title page gives the date as 1737. It was done, to use his own language, while he was "a missioner in Georgia." Strange that this book had never been known or seen in England until a recent period; that it should not have been used there of course is not at all strange. In this collection

he draws very largely on Dr. Watts, about one-third of the book being made of the writings of that eminent song-writer.

The printing was badly done, as the numerous errors will show. As this is a *fac simile* reprint, deriving all its importance from that fact, the *errata* are given in the text, though a list is made out to enable the reader to detect them in reading. The type is very good, but the spelling is antiquated, and the whole makeup quite different from the typography of our day.

Besides these hymns, the book has a collection of tunes which were sung at the Foundery in 1742, and afterwards. This part of the volume is really of more value than the other, for the hymns we have in later issues by the Wesleys, while the old tunes, perhaps, have passed away or would be lost, but for these musical notes. Antiquarians will value the rescue of this early hymn book from oblivion, deemed the first collection in our language by some authorities. But one copy of this Savannah collection has been known in England; and from that, this *fac simile* edition has been made. We add, in conclusion, that the book is printed in London, but no doubt it can be had of Philips & Hunt, New York, or of J. B. McFerrin, Nashville, Tennessee. It is a neat enough job, though this is a case where the printer would likely do *wrong* by going *right* with his types.

FIVE YEARS IN THE WEST: By a Texas Preacher. Nashville, Tennessee. Southern Methodist Publishing House. 1884.

These little sketches give a very good picture of Western affairs, as seen by the eyes of a Methodist preacher. Written in a free and easy way, varied in the matter presented, they are quite entertaining, and the narratives may be a source of information of value to those who expect to itinerate or settle in Texas.

The book is written in the interest of the Southwest University, by which we suppose is meant the profits on sales will enure to the advantage of that important educational enterprise.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MORAL LAW—FERNLEY LECTURE: By Rev. W. ARTHUR, M. A.

John Fernley, of England, was for many years an influential layman of the Wesleyan Connection. He was rich in money; a

large portion of which he dovoted to the promotion of the best interests of mankind. His contributions to missions were munificent, and in a great variety of ways he employed his large resources for the glory of God and the good of man.

Mr. Fernley established an Annual Lecture, bearing his name, which was designed to explain and defend the Theological and Ecclesiastical system of Wesleyan Methodism. Several of the most eminent men in the Connection have successively delivered this Lecture; the last one was made by the famous writer, Rev. William Arthur, well known as the author of "The Tongue of Fire." The eminent preacher is greatly impaired in his health, especially in his vision, and by loss of voice. This Fernley Lecture was read by his friend, Rev. T. B. Stephenson, D. D.

Mr. Arthur begins by stating that "few things are more familiar to us than writing, in which it is taken for granted that minds and bodies are both governed by laws of one and the same order." John Stuart Mill is quoted as having been the most successful in expressing the opinion in question when interpreting the ideas of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte: "All phenomena, without exception, are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere." Mr. Arthur points out the fallacy of this hypothesis, and states that "when Mr. Mill speaks of 'invariable laws,' he did not mean only what the word means, namely, unalterable laws, but that he meant what the words do not mean, namely, inviolable laws, or laws both unalterable or inviolable." Various illustrations are given, as for instance: "Queen Victoria governs Englishmen; but not by laws that cannot either be altered or broken. Temperature, on the other hand, governs the freezing, melting and vaporization of water, but governs them by laws that cannot be either broken or altered by any human will." So that there are two widely differing senses in which the word "govern" is to be understood.

Physical and moral law are explained at great length, and no one can peruse this part of the lecture without being convinced of the fact that Mr. Arthur has taken great pains to define terms and explain their signification; and, though the subject be somewhat intricate, all must allow that he has succeeded most admirably in bringing the question within the comprehension of

the feeblest intellect, and proves that moral law and physical law are rudimentally different, though they may possess one attribute of importance sufficient to account for their being very easily confounded.

In treating the difference between the two kinds of agents governed respectively by the two orders of laws, Mr. Arthur is less diffuse than in some other parts of his lecture, but he is sufficiently definite to convey the sense of his meaning. In explaining how physical and moral law acts he uses the following apt illustration:

"If I attempted to assert that a physical law determines the order of relation between two moral agents, as, for instance, between father and child, or between brother and sister, all would know in those relations order is not ruled by a law invariable in its operations, and every physical law, just because it is invariable, is also invariable in its operation."

He then further illustrates how—

"A brutal father no more violates physical law with the hand that knocks on the brains of his child than does a good father with the hand that snatches him out of the fire. A greedy brother acts under physical law as uniformly in the movements that put him in possession of his sister's goods as does the good brother in those by which he furnishes his sister with daily bread. Nevertheless in the case both of the cruel father and the greedy brother, laws are broken. But there are laws that were not written on the unconscious adamant of atoms, but on the conscious ground of mind."

Physical laws and moral laws may be in themselves good, and will produce good upon all who obey them; but there is such a marked difference between the agents which are governed by the one class, and the agents governed by the other, that the effects are necessarily different. There is no conscience in physical agents, hence they know no guilt and can feel neither pain nor regret when anything disastrous occurs; whereas moral agents know themselves to be responsible for every violation of law of which they may be guilty; hence, as they are enlightened by truth, they obey the laws which have been given for the regulation of the universe. Those who speak so frequently about man being subject to law do not sufficiently take into account his spiritual nature, which is influenced and acted upon in a different way altogether from mere inanimate nature.

Mr. Arthur next discusses "the different kinds of relations established by the two orders of laws respectively," and under this head

there are several fine pictures which cannot fail to captivate those who are admirers of the beautiful. Some paragraphs deserve the designation, "a prose poem." Here is one. Mr. Arthur supposes a little seed able to think and speak of itself as a Positivist can think and speak of himself, and saying of the sun what it is supposed to be philosophical to say of God:

"'The seed might say: 'As to the vital relationship existing between the great sun and me, it is out of the question. The sun has to hold the planets together; has to lend Venus and Jupiter their splendor. He has to illuminate the whole earth and shine in the council chamber of kings. Is it not absurd to think that he has nothing to do but come down to this lowly bed of mine and visit me? I do not deny, indeed, that at the origin of plant existence (if origin there ever was) he possibly did give forth some solar impulse to the primordial seed. After that, however, he must have left the seed to be governed by laws. Therefore, while he is enjoying his greatness in other ways, it is not for me and the like of me to look for interference on his part on behalf of us in our struggles against the many dangers thrown in our path by earth, air and water. Vital relations between me and him are, I repeat, out of the question.'"

Part four of the Fernley Lecture, which treats of "the nature of the two orders of laws, and the different ways in which they govern the agents subject to them respectively," is probably the most elaborate portion of the whole treatise, and gives evidence of the author's thorough acquaintance with the writings of the Positivists. Their strongest positions are assailed and the fallacy of their most powerful arguments are made manifest. Occasionally there may be here and there a little satire poured forth, but the author, while well able to make his opponent wince, evidently labors more to defend the truth and bring those who are enveloped in gloom into the pure light of heaven, than to gain a victory and leave the field of conflict with the laurels of a conqueror.

We can only quote one paragraph from this part of the lecture:

"Among atheists the credit belongs to the Comtists of making a serious attempt to commend morality, and to connect it with their system. That attempt yields strong proof of the practical force of Christian law, while their mode of making a new basis for moral obligations yields equally strong proof of the necessity for seeking the basis in the Rock: our Father which art in heaven. To replace belief in God, as the natural and logical ground work of all sense of right and duties, Comte presents the idea of humanity. This is carefully explained, not to mean beings, but existence; not individual man in the concrete, which is too low a conception, but humanity in the abstract. What, then, is humanity? Comte, says Dr. Robinet, finally defined it: *the continuous sum-total of conver-*

gent beings. Not, I repeat, the beings, but the sum-total of them. Now, d take my word for it when I call this sum-total an abstraction."

Comte looks at it in this light: "For the positive mind (or m of thought,) man, properly speaking, does not exist; nothing exist but 'humanity;'" and the reason for this conclusion is "beca all our development is due to society, in whatever point view we regard it. If the idea of society still appears to be abstraction of our understanding, and that arises from the po of the ancient philosophic regime; for, to speak the truth, it is the idea of the *individual* that such a character pertains, at leas our species." The individual, then, if the truth is told, is abstraction, and man, properly so-called, does not exist. But concrete society or humanity, or the continuous sum-total of c vergent beings is to replace men at one end of the line and God the other. Now, if this is a jumble of terms and thoughts, there method in it. The individual is to be annihilated in order to up by the roots any idea of a future life. On the next page lowing the last quotation, this 'thinker' goes on to say that tendency of men to eternize themselves, which formerly sou satisfaction in illusions incompatible henceforth with our me evolution, will find it's satisfaction in collective humanity. "' individual, not being any longer able to prolong himself, ex through the species, will be drawn to incorporate himself with i completely as possible."

"This is the Comtist substitute for the law, 'Thou shalt love the Lord, God, with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself': First, you have no to love you or any other man; and, therefore, you have no God to love. ondly, neither men as actual beings, nor humanity as an abstract total, had Father. Men are others, but not brothers, not offspring of a common par all your good feeling towards them is only 'otherism' or 'altruism,' not b erly love; and if you do call them brethren, it is in defiance of the fact there is not a common Father."

Surely men will be slow to adopt such a system in preferenc the Gospel, which regards the human family as brethren—mem one of another—and God the Father of all. The world would a dark abode, not at all desirable, as a dwelling-place, if the vi expressed by Comte should become universal. The human fam would be in a state of orphanage. There would be no lov Father, with his bowels of compassion, no Supreme Ruler at

lm of affairs, no certainty in anything; all would be chaos and nfusion.

The fifth part of Mr. Arthur's Lecture treats on "Man's Power Modifying Phenomena," which, like previous portions of the ecture, is written in a clear and interesting manner, with such lustrations as cannot fail to be understood even by persons of lim-ed education. Here is one:

"If one learned in the stars is asked, where will such a heavenly body be this y ten years, and whither will it be going? he has no difficulty about the answer. it if one learned in granite is asked, where will this block be this day ten years d what will it be doing? he is not so sure. Why not? Can he not compute e operation of physical laws, from that of gravitation up tothe friction of winds? ren if he can, is that all? Does he not find that the adamantine strength of anite comes within reach of the more subtle force of will? The simple fact is, ere is no telling what the block may be ten years hence. You may magiste-lly tell a true man of science that prediction is the business of science. He rs there is a higher business than that, which is to tell the truth; and where e truth is that he cannot predict, true science commands him to say so.

"The block of granite is not in the safe-keeping of mere physical laws. The ll of an engineer may interfere and turn it into the keystone of an arch. The ll of a rich man may interfere, and turn it into a column in his hall. The will a Church-warden may interfere, and turn it into a font. The will of a cor-ration may interfere, and turn it into a pavement, so that ten years hence the eater part of the block may have been converted into street mud, and what mains of it may be daily trodden under foot of birds, beasts and men, each of hom, at his own weak will, shall modify its phenomena."

Mr. Arthur gives further illustrations in proof of the position of Man's Power of Modifying Phenomena" from the weather and ants, and the ranks of insect life, proving that "while in each w order the agent modified them in ways of its own, and while e can tell, with some confidence, what effects it will produce, if ft alone, it by no means follows that it will produce the same ects if interfered with by other agents." The power of man as ing at the head of all earthly agents is seen in all the illustra-ns, but, at the same time, the clearest evidence is manifest that ere must be an all-embracing mind, which at first set everything order.

The limitations of the various portions of physical nature and e extent of their influence on each other are noticed thus:

"It is manifest that an agent of one grade is not a good judge of what is con-ry to nature in the case of an agent of a higher order. A worm starts this

morning for his daily labor. It is perfectly fitted for the life and ideal of its own worm world. It soon comes upon a lark's nest. A young lark begins to cry. The worm asks what the matter is. 'I see an enemy.' 'See! What is seeing?' 'He's a hundred yards off; I see him and am afraid.' 'See! I don't believe in that. Things that touch one can be felt, but seeing at a hundred yards off would be against the laws of nature, and you know one cannot believe in the supernatural." The young lark goes on crying. 'What are you doing?' 'I am using my voice to call my mother.' 'Voice! What is voice? Something you say that sends your feelings out of yourself and shoots it acroos vacant space into your mother's breast. No, no; that would indeed be against the laws of nature, and I cannot believe in the supernatural.' The young lark, however, replies: 'She is coming.' 'How is she coming?' 'She is flying.' 'Flying! I do not believe in flight. Motion on the ground is natural; motion above the ground, where there is nothing to bear one up, would be contrary to the laws of nature, and of course there is no supernatural.' "

There are several other paragraphs of a similar kind which we would like to produce, but lack of space prevents. The above, however, is sufficient for our purpose. We see how the lark is superior to the worm, and the same is seen in various other created things, how that some possess a wider range of knowledge than others. Even men, in certain circumstances, are much more limited in the extent of their knowledge than others, and hence their capability to judge is in the same proportion, and, therefore, what to one kind of created beings may appear to be supernatural, may appear very different to another. All this teaches us that, however man may be superior to all created intelligence, he cannot know and understand all things; there is a power above us, that though unseen, has stamped its impress upon all creation, and reveals the gratifying truth that God is the universal Father.

The last part of this admirable lecture on "What is Presupposed by Establishment of Law," may be regarded as the conclusion of the whole matter. Mr. Arthur proves the

"Physical forces are really masters of physical forces weaker than themselves, but they are the servants of mental and moral forces, and the fit instruments of mental and moral purpose. Under the rule of man, they show forth the power of man. But, older than man, they took not their rise from his will; more wide-spread than man, they cease not when he ceases to be; more numerous than the discoveries of man, they never all meet under his eye; stronger than the will of man, they show forth a thought that is above his thought—a glory that is above his glory."

ıe importance of moral law which alone governs man, is
r understood. It reveals the truth and brings man into the
, and when man feels himself lost, bewildered, and groping
the darkness which surrounds him, Paul's words are sounded
ı ears: "Put on the Lord Jesus Christ," for, as Mr. Arthur
"In putting on him you put on truth and righteousness,
peace and salvation. The mind of Christ is the sum of the
l law, the will of its Author, and the image of your Judge."
'. Arthur has added another laurel to his brow, and has laid
hristian Church under increasing obligation for the valuable
ibution which he has thus given to the truth. Limited space
elled us to give fewer selections from the lecture than we
led, but since we commenced writing this paper we learn
Harper Brothers, New York, have issued an American edi-
which, no doubt, many of our readers will purchase. We
earn that a complete and uniform edition of all Mr. Arthur's
ı are in course of publication by an English house, which
no doubt, command a large sale.

ll no wealthy American gentleman imitate the example of
Fernley, Esq., in establishing an Annual Lecture in connec-
vith the Centenary of Methodism on this Continent?

E. B.

ICS: By JAMES STRONG, S. T. D. New York: Philips &
ınt. 1883.

e author, Dr. Strong, is a Professor in Drew Theological Sem-
, of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He is well known in
ture by his connection with Dr. McClintock in their religious
pedia. Dr. Strong calls these essays "Irenics," because they
esigned to show a virtual agreement between Science and the
, Nature and the Supernatural; the Divine and the Human
ripture; the Old and the New Testaments; Calvinism and
nianism; Divine Benevolence and Endless Punishment.

ell, this is a stupendous undertaking; much more than can be
ıplished in a small book of two hundred pages. It is praise-
ıy that Dr. Strong should attempt a work so noble; and if
ı be failure at some points, inevitable, we think, on any scheme

of thought, yet, a partial success in such difficulties should be accepted with pleasure. Controversy cannot be wholly avoided; but its asperities may be greatly abated by writers adopting the line of Dr. Strong. If disputants were intent on showing agreements rather than discords, there would be a greater harmony in opinion and more fraternity of feeling among abettors of variant and conflicting systems.

Many of the differences among men come, when analyzed, to mere logomachy—a war of words, not of ideas. A book like this should be read by all persons of a one-sided order, who have never had compass enough to see the whole of any great dispute. Ignorance is the mother of bigotry—enlightened minds have learned that much can be said on all sides of perplexing questions. Curiosity will lead many to read such a book; we want to see what accord can be found between dogmas that appear so plainly opposed.

The ability of this writer will justify as much confidence as can be given to any such design.

NOTICE TO PUBLISHERS.

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Address, J. W. HINTON, EDITOR, ETC.,
Macon, Ga.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

PREACHERS AND PREACHING.

BY THE EDITOR.

Jesus Christ chose twelve men and gave them this commission: "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." The original ministry of the Christian Church were audibly called and specially designated to the office of preaching. The Apostles, as such, have had no successors—none have been called as they were; none have had the same unmistakable Divine voice, nor have any been endowed with the same power of showing by miracles their authority from Heaven. Believing as we do that a Divine call is essential to a Scriptural ministry, and yet seeing that there is no infallible proof of such a call in any given case, it is often a perplexing problem to solve whether this or that man is a chosen messenger of God.

Frequently, pious persons are impressed and deeply perplexed with convictions of duty to preach. Some hesitate for fear they may be deceived, and be guilty of sacrilege in their presumptuous efforts to preach when not divinely authorized. Persuaded as they are of the solemnity of the holy office, they dread its responsibilities. How may their minds be eased and consciences satisfied as to duty? While there are many unable to decide as to their obligation, perhaps there are some who too readily conclude that they are called to this sacred work. This is a subject demanding discussion for the sake of the Church and individual repose. Let us begin by looking at first principles.

In whatever way God may issue a call to preach, it is certain He does not do so by any mode so infallible and specific as that by which the Apostles were selected. Even Paul *heard* the voice of Jesus and saw him, although after his ascension. The others had a still more immediate divine vocation.

No measure of spiritual persuasion, no degree of emotion can equal in force of conviction that spoken invitation and command

of Christ to the work of preaching. It is a subject on which one should write with caution and reverence, but to exactly distinguish between self-generated impressions and such as proceed from the Spirit of God does not seem quite easy. Supposing a man to be pious, devout, intent on doing his duty, anxiously inquiring for the way of usefulness, it is certainly quite possible by his own excitement and reflections to decide on preaching as a duty. A deep impression must indeed be supposed when the Spirit calls to preach, and this state of mind may easily be distinguished from mere reasonings of an unmoved understanding; but is it possible always to decide whether the conviction of the mind is directly from God or results from a confused and incapable judgment? We lay down the first criterion as a deep conviction of duty, not traceable by an analysis and history of this consciousness to a preconceived desire to preach, and not sustained by any motive incompatible with gospel purity. Let a man satisfy himself, as he may, that he has not called himself to the work of preaching, and then if still concerned on this subject, let this abiding concern be regarded as presumptive evidence of a divine call. More than a presumption in itself (although a very strong one) it cannot be—it is not decisive of the whole question.

While it is not infallibly decisive of the question of divine call, it is a sufficient warrant for an application to the proper Church authorities. It would be a serious trifling with conscience, attended with fearful hazard, to refuse to act under such impressions. But the Church has its responsibilities, and must decide according to such tests as are furnished in the word of God and by reason on the case. The facts being considered and the case decided, the mind of the candidate should rest, whether the decision be *pro* or *con*. The ultimate authority is with the Church, and it should exercise its prerogative with solemnity and fidelity. Failing to do this, the Church of God is damaged and the progress of religion hindered.

Preaching is teaching—an elder or minister of any grade "must be apt to teach." Has the candidate capacity for teachiug? is the first question. To know this, regard must be had to native and acquired ability—readiness in learning and aptness in imparting knowledge should be deemed essential requisites. He who cannot

learn, of course cannot teach, and if there be even respectable native endowments yet some culture (varying in different latitudes) is essential to a successful teaching of the gospel. An incapable preacher does no good and may do much harm—if error was unimportant, Heaven would have taken no care to reveal a system of truth. "A sound mind" is indispensable—a weak, confused and benighted intellect should be deemed incapable of the great task of exposing error and defending truth. This class of persons are generally clearest in their conviction of a call to preach.

No measure of gifts can suffice of themselves to qualify one for the sacred office. Graces or fruits of the Spirit are essential elements in the gospel minister. If not endowed with the excellences of the religion he is to expound, what can the preacher be but the occasion of ridicule and of contempt for holy truth?

Most carefully should the Church mark the walk and conversation, the general and special traits of all candidates for the ministry. Here, more than elsewhere, the chief failure of success in the ministry is to be found—the authorities are too careless of those qualities which, while less shining in a religious teacher, are yet the chief elements of his success.

Religion is not mere logic nor simple creed—it is experience and practice of the deepest moral laws, and to propagate these nothing is better than a practical illustration of them in the life of their expounder. Success in the work, or usefulness, is rather a corroborative proof of a call to preach than an original condition on which commission is issued by the Church. He must preach before it can be known certainly that success will follow preaching. That much of necessity must be taken on trust—it may be reasonably inferred as a necessary consequence from the exercise of competent talents duly sanctified by grace. Should the experiment, however, prove to the Church that so far from being useful the preacher is harmful, the mistake should be corrected and the authority to preach be revoked speedily.

But as talents are so various, and degrees of usefulness also, the Church acts wisely when in the absence of any harmful qualities it considers even limited success consistent with a divine call.

God's chosen plan of saving souls is by preaching, and as reliance must be had on this agency chiefly for the promotion of reli-

gion, it is well to consider the ways and means of making a efficient ministry. It was an evil day when pompous forms an ceremonials were adopted as modes of advancing Christianity, the neglect of the sermon. Even what are really more allowab auxiliaries, we fear, are made to assume the prominence in Chur operations that supremely belongs to the preaching of the gosp Woe unto the Church, woe unto the ministry, when this divinel appointed agency is deemed of subordinate importance to huma devices, however well conceived and well applied. Nor is th arrangement of God arbitrary and to be defended solely on Divi prerogative.

We can indeed conceive of the truth being communicated mo directly from God, and alike to every soul; nay, we can conceiv of a spiritual efficiency so powerful as to defy resistance, and thu dispensing with all means except the sole operations of the Spirit

But it is too evident for dispute that if such a method of savin souls was compatible with God's attributes, the same Divine natu would have interfered irresistibly to prevent sin originally. Th final cause of the creation of moral agents we know not fully, bu seeing they were created and have abused their free agency, if save at all, it must be upon a plan that harmonizes with moral freedon It is a part of the calamity of the fall that there is a repugnan to divine truth in the natural mind—it is "alienation and enmity in Scriptural language. Moreover, ignorance is united with depra ity, and hence both the understanding and the affections need th agency of preaching for their enlightenment and renewal.

The preacher's appliances, then, are all those truths, facts an arguments deducible from God's Word and works, which may sup ply the needed information and incentives to induce religious actio First of all, a preacher needs to know man and the range of h capacities, duties and dangers. Man is to be studied thoroughl in all his relations to God—he is to be analyzed by the closest sel examination, each man being a microcosm of the race. Theologi cal principles, and Bible facts, doctrines, and duties, all enter int the preacher's study. Dealing as he does with the indifference an wickedness of his race, every incentive to thought and action shoul be employed, and all possible moral restraints be placed aroun the rebellious mind.

With some, he will need to argue in no slovenly way to overturn objections, specious and profound. Hence the necessity for a well disciplined and well stored mind. Christianity will often be put on the defensive. With others, warning and rebuke will be necessary. Here Christianity, assuming the offensive, is to carry boldly its demands to the very gates and citadel of the enemy. Again, there are many pitiable cases of disconsolate souls whose attitude invites tones of compassion, and all the wooing of affection and sympathy—the grand design in every case being, as Paul expressed it, "that by all means he may save some."

God's word is the basis of the preacher's in the whole work, yet for a thorough understanding of this word every available facility should be employed. And as the preacher has to impart his own knowledge and experience to win souls to Christ, he cannot neglect attention to such modes of thought and speech as are found most efficient in other departments of life. Men are first to be convinced and then persuaded to become Christians, and to accomplish these all the powers of logic and rhetoric will often be found essential.

While the illiteracy of the Apostles may be fairly pleaded as proof that high culture is not indispensable; yet their special endowments of supernatural wisdom and power must not be forgotten in making a fair estimate of the requisite qualifications for the ministry. It is evident that no one can now claim inspiration, and its loss must in a measure be supplied by such a culture as will enable the minister to clearly present the merits of Christianity. Besides, the Jews were never as a people highly cultivated, and it is quite likely the fishermen of Galilee were on a general level with their generation, and, where this is the case, no positive damage is likely to result from want of larger attainments.

Paul was the great Apostle of the Gentiles, a more cultivated people than the Jews, and he was a man of corresponding learning—the peer of philosophers, statesmen and orators. And as was natural in those sections where learning was highly valued, God raised up eminent men to advocate his cause. If there was a Porphyry and a Celsus, there were also Jerome, Augustine and Chrysostom, "the golden mouthed." It is not the prerogative of the Church to call such men directly, but where there is need for them God will always do it, and the Church may aid in develop-

ing talent by encouraging learning and by showing a proper appreciation of eminent endowments. Schools, colleges, and books should be brought within reach of the pious young men of the Church and they should not be deterred from entering the ministry by the forbidding prospect of want of a respectable maintenance, and the saddening thought of absolute poverty as the heritage of their families.

Very often it is said we are indebted to the poverty of the ministry for its purity, as men are not likely to seek the holy office from sinister motives. This specious argument is a convenient cloak for parsimoniousness, and its unsoundness ought to be exposed. It is in no sense true, not even in State religious establishments, much less in a voluntary system. High offices are sought by comparatively few, while poor places are thronged with applicants.

As it is in the State, so in the Church; for the higher places there are a few, for the humbler, a multitude of preachers.

Now, if the Church desires, nay *demands* a more intellectual ministry—and does not the state of society require it?—one of the chief means for obtaining it is the providing such temporal remuneration as persons of this description might reasonably expect in other departments of life. Call this a low view of the subject if you are so disposed, but until it is acted upon, the result will be as unvarying as other natural or moral laws. Heroic spirits now and then may appear in defiance of all obstacles, but all godly men are not heroes, and while a double honor may be ascribed to a noble spirit, yet it would be a sad mistake to expect the world to be converted only by the labors of the bravest and the best.

Uniformity in remuneration is neither practicable nor necessary—the experience of the past goes to show (among Methodists at least) that the supply of preachers of humble abilities is in excess of the demand, notwithstanding the certainty of a scanty provision, while the supply of men of higher endowments is far below the actual wants of society. In an age of great intellectual activity and wide diffusion of knowledge through the schools and press, it is evident that Christianity cannot occupy its commanding attitude and importance without a fair proportion of sanctified learning in the pulpit, and as this is a desideratum, every movable impediment

ment should be taken away, and every allowable incentive supplied that would increase the number of able preachers of the gospel.

Success should be the preacher's end and ambition, and this is attainable by different methods, absolute uniformity being impossible and absurd.

It is no small objection to "Theological Seminaries" that nearly all their pupils become moulded into a stereotyped, dull uniformity, that is as unnatural as it is disagreeable. No such levelling system is seen at the bar, and the best school in the art of speaking to which a young preacher could resort, would be at a bar where variety and individuality have full scope. It will become evident how little is due to mere mannerism.

Preparation for the pulpit is a matter for preliminary inquiry.

Much has been said for and against written sermons and perhaps no universal proposition can be laid down in regard to writing. There are minds so affluent in resources, so entirely self-poised, that writing is needless as to *them*—it is an irksome task and useless waste of time and energy. Such need only read and think, talking requiring no effort; but there are very few indeed who would not be gainers in effectiveness by frequent and extensive composing. The power of abstraction is so feeble with most men, that thought must be embodied and put into form like a mathematical diagram to make it available. What chalk and blackboard are to the mathematician generally, such are the pen and paper to the preacher. But very rarely should a sermon be read, and he is indeed a poor preacher who cannot, even after writing, deliver his thoughts clearly and forcibly.

Yet reading is not necessarily fatal to success, for very eminent and useful men have practiced reading their discourses. However efficient, doubtless they would have been more so, had their custom been to declaim.

Occasionally a man can be found who reads so well and with such evident emotion that the impression is forcible, but let no poor reader ever undertake the difficult task of doing the work of preaching in a way where only the fewest can hope to succeed. It is a questionable policy always, and inexcusable as a general rule. Memorizing and repeating verbatim, objectionable as they are, do not offend so much against propriety, and are even advisory meth-

ods where there is an incurable want of self-possession, without which no one can extemporize in speech. But this plan is so laborious it rarely happens to be adopted, and of it we may justly remark, it yields less fruit than any other proportionate amount of labor. To make a ready speaker, the memory must be furnished with such extent of matter and of such variety that any subject taken for discussion can be readily presented with a proper array of argument and illustration. Hence the preacher's reading should cover a wide field—no accessible department of knowledge is without its bearing in the pulpit. Facts, proofs, images all come at the bidding of a well-stored memory.

Next to memory, imagination is the most important attribute of the mind of a public speaker. He must have something to say, and be able to say it well, and imagination is essential to effective oratory. *Extravagance* of imagination is indeed proof of feebleness, but *poverty* of imagination dooms a speaker to be deplorably dull. The sensibilities need enkindling quite as much as the judgment wants convincing, therefore, the logical and rhetorical faculties alike demand cultivation.

A preacher should never undertake to preach on a subject he does not comprehend to the extent it is apprehensible by him, and in delivering his sermon he should be able to impart the same vividness of impression to others that has been made on his own mind. In all effective oratory there is a mesmeric influence or mental coincidence between the speaker and auditory, and this is never attained except the speaker be master of his subject. No man yields himself a ready captive to the orator—he only does so when overcome by the conviction that the speaker understands his theme far better than himself; then the auditor is taken captive at will

Voice and gesture are subordinate parts of forcible oratory, but possess a measure of importance deserving serious attention. Often is effect destroyed by a monotonous tone whether high or low, and by observing the same pitch in narrative, discussion and peroration. The voice should go through all the modes, from the calm conversational tone to the earnest controversial pitch, and again, as in the peroration, it should rise, swell, and flow like a torrent of waters foaming and booming as it rushes over all impediments.

We do not doubt there is much speaking too loud, and much too low, but it is impracticable to establish uniformity. Some speakers cannot speak loudly, not only from lack of voice, but from lack of vehemence. Let a preacher be possessed of a vehement nature, and also of voice, and it would be as impossible for such not to be loud as it would be to prevent thunder after a vivid flash of lightning. Passion, however, should be so controlled by reason that all extravagances of utterance and gesture will be avoided, and the orator will most completely control his hearers when he entirely controls himself.

The themes of the pulpit should be such as deserve and demand serious treatment, and care should be taken to avoid topics not suited to the place, unimportant comparatively, and those subjects should be presented in which are found the chief excellences of religion. Go before the people the preacher should, to warn, woo, and win; to instruct and improve the minds addressed, by a powerful array of doctrines and duties. Argument, appeal and persuasion, intensified by prayer and the Holy Ghost, will result in the grand attainment of salvation, both to those who hear and those who preach.

UNCERTAINTIES OF SCIENCE.

The *London Quarterly Review* for January, 1884, has a fine review of a treatise of J. B. Stallo, entitled "Concepts of Modern Physics," a book in the International Scientific Series, 1882, published by Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. The reviewer's drift is to show the Uncertainties of Science on the authority of an eminent scientist, hence, in the main, the author, Stallo, is allowed to speak for himself by a transfer of his views from the book to the pages of the *Quarterly*. Stallo's book is not written in the interest of theology; it is intensely and exclusively scientific, says the *Review*. We quote from the author and his reviewer:

"The belief is that modern physical science, has not only made its escape from the cloudy regions of metaphysical speculation, and discarded its methods of reasoning, but that it has likewise emancipated itself from the control of its fundamental assumptions. It is our conviction that this belief is but partially conformable to the fact, and that the prevailing misconceptions in regard to the true logical and psychological premises of science are prolific of errors, whose reaction upon the character and tendencies of modern thought becomes more appa-

rent from day to day. . . . It will be seen at once, upon a most cursory glance any one of the chapters of this little book, that it is in no wise intended as an op or covert advocacy of a return to metaphysical methods and aims; but that, on t contrary, its tendency is throughout to eliminate from science its latent met physical elements; to foster, and not to repress, the spirit of experimental inve tigation, and to accredit, instead of discrediting, the great endeavor of scienti research to gain a sure foothold on solid empirical ground, where the re data of experience may be reduced without ontological prepossessions."

Our author sets himself to question the validity of the mechan ical theory of the universe, as that theory is now held, and wit its ordinary assumptions. "The founders of modern physics pro ceeded upon the tacit, if not upon the declared, assumption that al true explanations of natural phenomena are mechanical explana tions." Very early in the history of modern physics the doctrin that all physical action is mechanical, was stated in terms. All th great scientists—Descartes, Hobbes, Leibnitz, Huygens, Newton held that everything in Nature is effected mechanically; tha change is, of necessity, nothing else than motion of the parts of the body changed, that all motion is caused by impact. The most definite statement, however, of the proposition that the true aim and object of all physical science is a reduction of the phenomena of nature to a coherent mechanical system is found in the scien tific writings published during the second half of the present cen tury. Kirchhoff, one of the founders of the theory of spectral analysis, is quoted to this effect: "The highest object at which the natural sciences are constrained to aim . . . . . is, in one word, the reduction of all the phenomena of nature to mechanics." Helmholtz and Clerk Maxwell are quoted as expressing the iden tical view. The physiologists are equally explicit with the physi cists. Wundt writes: "Physiology thus appears as a branch of applied physics, its problem being a reduction of vital phenomena to general physical laws, and thus ultimately to the fundamental laws of mechanics." Still more broadly, Haeckel: "The general theory of evolution . . . . assumes that in nature there is a great, unital, continuous, and everlasting process of development, and that all natural phenomena, without exception, from the motion of the celestial bodies and the fall of the rolling stone, up to the growth of the plant and the consciousness of man, are subject to the same great law of causation—that they are ultimately to be reduced

to atomic mechanics." So Huxley speaks of "that purely mechanical view toward which modern physiology is striving." Our author concludes:

"With few exceptions, scientific men of the present day hold the proposition that all physical action is mechanical, to be axiomatic, if not in the sense of being self-evident, at least in the sense of being an induction from all past scientific experience. And they deem the validity of the mechanical explanation of the phenomena of nature to be, not only unquestionable, but absolute, exclusive, and final.

Our accomplished author sets himself the task of criticizing this approved theory of the universe. He shows that the mechanical theory is inconsistent with itself; that it frequently and manifestly fails to explain the facts for the explanation of which it is propounded, and that its advocates find themselves involved in many grave contradictions. What particular dynamical theory our author is inclined to substitute for the mechanical theory, the imperfections of which he feels so keenly, does not appear; he propounds no alternative method of interpretation, but contents himself with emphasizing the many and glaring defects of the popular theory propounded by modern science for the interpretation of phenomena. His contention is that some new conception of the constitution of things is necessary, or that the mechanical theory must be subjected to such profound modifications, that it would no longer be capable of identification with the mechanical theory of to-day, or that otherwise science must continue miserably illogical and contradictory. It is our duty to stand by and listen whilst an eminent scientist points out to his brethren to what a large extent their stately house is built upon the sands. Legend says the Tower of Babal rose so high that from its top the singing of the angels might be heard; science boasts truly that it has introduced us to grand harmonies, but whatever glories may be seen or heard from its battlements, there are evidently sad confusions at its base.—*London Quarterly Review.*

OUR CIVILIZATION: ITS PRESERVATION.

The *North American Review,* in its March and April issues, discusses American Civilization—the danger of its decay and destruction, and the remedies deemed essential to its conservation.

The articles are written by Judge J. A. Jameson. He thinks it presumptuous conceit to deny this possible destruction in the f of historic facts furnished in abundance by other nations. Not dwell on the deluge of Vandalism which overflowed Anci Greece and Rome, an example may be found in modern times ev in our own century of rapid deterioration, as in the history Spain. Indeed, the people in this country, judged by politic tendencies and aspects, are advancing to that very situation affairs which existed in the Roman Empire when by civil war assassination of rulers, political intrigue and social immorality this grandest of ancient governments become an easy conquest to a horde of barbarian invaders. Judge Jameson says:

"Of the things necessary to be done to save our civilization, the first and most important is to cause a complete change of attitude on the part of society toward wrong doing. What is now the attitude maintained? It is one either of indifference, toleration, or connivance, or one suggestive of paralysis of the power of indignation, and of every faculty needed for the repression of crime. Toward the criminal the attitude of the public is that of weak pity, not unmingled with admiration. The criminal is an unfortunate man, to save whom from punishment seems to be the chief end of the law. Look for a moment at his trial in a court of justice. The jury, carefully selected for their ignorance, are made judges of both law and fact; to convict they must be unanimous; if they have a reasonable doubt of guilt, they must acquit; they are themselves to determine what is a reasonable doubt; and, to crown all, they are instructed that it is better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be punished. These rules and maxims, devised centuries ago by merciful judges, then met the ends of justice, since, as the laws were, as against the crown officers seeking to convict, a person accused had no chance of acquittal, for he was allowed neither counsel nor witnesses; but now they operate to screen the guilty from punishment, save in the few cases where there is a general cry for vengeance against some atrocious offender. The maxim about the ten guilty men is pressed upon juries by every felon's lawyer as the great safeguard of private rights. In truth, however, the interests of justice would be best subserved by making it read: "It is better that ten innocent

men should suffer than that one guilty man should escape." Were that declared to be the policy of the law, juries would be made to feel, not that the innocent were less deserving than before of acquittal, but that the guilty were a hundred times more deserving of conviction and punishment; and the results would be most salutary. In not one case in a million could an innocent man suffer; and hardly one in a thousand of the guilty, instead of three out of four, as now, would escape. How necessary such a change of attitude is, may be seen from the constant recurrence of voluntary movements of private citizens intended to supply the defects of the law.

"One of the causes which might tend to the destruction of our civilization, is such a radical perversion of the reasoning faculty itself, that its verdicts would not correspond to the truth of things; and the supposition is made that a sect should maintain that the end justifies the means and, accordingly, that homicide, even of the innocent, though generally a crime, becomes praisworthy when deemed necessary to the propagation of the tenets of the sect. What could be done with such teaching as that? Assuming that the teaching would be conducted in secret, or that, if public, the old prejudice in favor of freedom of speech and of the press would prevent its suppression by law, recourse could only be had to measures tending to counteract the evil consequences. To this end, two things might be done: one, to compel the education of the young and to direct it, in order to protect them from the perverting influences of such instruction; and the other, to refute the false reasoning. Of the two, the former would be the more effective, since to be of much avail refutation must reach the minds sought to be influenced by it. The "Provincial Letters" of Pascal in vain refuted, as is generally thought, his Jesuit adversaries. Those letters have been read mainly by Protestants, and if they have prevented the lapse of these to Rome, they have not diminished materially the number of Rome's adherents. It is a dangerous fallacy that "error is powerless for harm when truth is left free to combat it." There must be a combat, and for that, truth must not only be free to advance, but it must advance; and it must be able to strike the enemy in his strongholds. This could be done, in the case supposed, only where society had ena-

bled it to reach the young by compelling them to receive the education it should itself prescribe.

"Another cause is the prevalence of an immoral literature. The question what to do with such a literature is not free from difficulty, save, perhaps, as to its grosser forms. These, with their pictorial aggravations, should be relentlessly ferreted out and destroyed. It is amazing that a civilized community should permit in the mails, on the book-stalls, in the hands of its youth, openly, the shameless profanations of the printer's art which are so common amongst us. This is a new danger, which the abundance of money, the cheapness of printed books and papers, and the universality of the reading habit have brought upon us, and which has become extremely pressing while our law-makers have been asleep. Such literature should be dealt with after a new method; it should be treated as we treat venomous serpents; every man's hand should be against it for its extirpation, and its authors and venders should be punished. As for the more subtle, but seemingly less harmful forms, while something might be done by forbidding their importation, by declaring them not the subject of legal contract, and by prohibiting their sale to minors of either sex, still more could be effected by a judicious censorship which should forbid the publication of matter not fit to be printed because of its immorality—a prudential measure, the employment of which the frenzy for freedom to do whatever one pleases has too long, perhaps, discouraged amongst us.

"The evil could be cured, however, only by cultivating a taste for better literature, through the multiplication of library facilities, and by a more pointed religious instruction, accompanied by a vigorous campaign against the production and the sale of the noxious matter, like that which is suppressing the sale of intoxicating liquors. And here, also, a change of attitude is much needed. Hitherto, given a work of artistic genius, no matter how filthy its subject or its treatment, the blind devotees of culture have made haste to stamp it as sacred, and have refused to let it die. Words are weak to express the absurdity of such a worship of impurity under the guise of art. No expense or effort is too great on the part of governments to prevent the approach of a plague which kills its thousands, while they permit the ravages of

a moral pestilence which is certain to corrupt the spiritual natures of the millions, old and young, who come under its influence."

BIBLICAL COSMOGONY: MODERN SCIENCE.

Dr. Arnold Guyot, Professor of Geology in the College of New Jersey, has recently published a treatise on the above topic, irenic in aim and spirit. He is a man of authority among scientists, having before published a volume on "Earth and Man." His last book is devoted to the discussion of geological data, and the account of creation given by Moses in Genesis. Dr. Guyot's aim is to show a very exact harmony in the rocky and written records. Most theologians have accepted the adjustment offered by Christian scientists; and the shock to Christian faith in the authority of Moses has passed away without serious damage. Some there are, however, who still believe in the old interpretation of six days of twenty-four hours each—who accept the Hebrew Chronology as to the age of the earth and the universe. This opinion is harmless so far as they are concerned; but if a Christian teacher should insist on this belief as essential to a reverential belief in the Bible, he may do others much harm.

It is always folly to quote Scripture against facts. The Copernican system of Astronomy cannot be overturned by quoting Joshua's command to the sun; nor will geology be invalidated in its material facts by any quotation from Moses in regard to days. Our reverence for the Scriptures should not rest on any theory which conflicts with facts, and that cannot itself be sustained by indubitable proofs. We do not affect such a knowledge of Geology—one of the youngest of the sciences—as would enable us to give a critical estimate of value concerning Dr. Guyot's book. Our faith in the authority of Moses does not depend on this effort at reconciliation, nor on any other similar adjustment. We accept Moses as a veracious historian, as a law-giver who had a divine legation; but what his opinions were about the age of the world, and the time occupied in its creation, we are not concerned to know.

None of the ancients knew much of science in any of its forms as the word is now understood. There is no sufficient evidence that God made any revelations to Moses of a scientific character. He may have believed in the six literal days—we think it likely

he did. But this was only a matter of opinion, if it was his opinion, and in no sense binding on any man's faith. When he delivered the decalogue he was giving forth the direct commands of God, shown to be divine by the miraculous proofs attending the revelation. These commands we must know, teach and obey: they were made with the emphasis of thunder and vivid force of lightning. We do not find any such certainty or any such importance attaching to the age of the world. Whether it be six thousand or six millions years is of no importance; only it is important to believe God made it as Moses declares.

A TALK TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS.

We close this number with a talk to our subscribers and readers. Probably the list of names on our mailing book is as large as was ever obtained in the past history of Southern Methodist Reviews, under any management. Such a comparative view may serve to bouy an editor, and keep him encouraged with hope for the future. Flattering as the fact may be, and inspiring to energy, we are not elated, much less inflated with our achievement. If a print like this could thrive on compliments, our QUARTERLY would have robust health. It is true that the best things said of it rarely get into print, but are contained in private letters to the Editor. Our readers seem to admit that we have done all that was promised or that could be expected in this enterprise.

We appeal to all subscribers in arrears to remit by postal notes or small bills, if it he possible; and we ask all who may become subscribers to follow the cash plan, if at all practicable. We greatly prefer to run subscriptions with the calendar year. The REVIEW is offered for three dollars per annum. Any one can know how much will be due for a part of the year by remembering the cost is seventy-five cents per number, and there are four numbers in the year—January, April, July and October.

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OF THE

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THE BORDER-LAND BETWEEN THE ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE KINGDOMS.

BY PROF. J. W. KILPATRICK, A. M., CENTRAL COLLEGE.

All will recognize the truth of the statement that the domain of Nature is made up of several kingdoms; and that these are kingdoms, literally, in that each comprises various parts, which we may call sub-kingdoms, provinces, or any other similar name that is pleasing to the ear; and each of these provinces includes sundry groups of objects more or less mutually dependent, all subject to well-defined laws, and, in the organic or vital kingdoms, all running through prescribed courses, and finally giving place to others, which in their turn obey the same laws; and all show forth the wisdom and power of the one "Lord of all." So plain a fact is this that in our common talk we easily fall into the use of the expressions "Animal Kingdom," "Vegetable Kingdom," and the like. When we use one of these expressions, as "Vegetable Kingdom," we have a vague idea that we mean all plants; and if we pause a moment to reflect on the full significance of the words, our minds may sweep in hurried review over an extended panorama, including the tall, straight-stemmed pines and oaks with

their peers, then the lowlier trees, the shrubs, the trailing vines, and the humble herbs, even to the tiniest flower that lifts its head above the clods. Prolonged thought may summon into view the ferns, mosses, algæ, fungi in myriads, and others, until our sight is obscured by clouds of microscopic forms. Even then, most of us would never suspect that we could not, at a moment's notice, determine whether or not any given object is a plant. Yet careful men, of strong sense and clear judgment, after years of most studious examination of the lowest living forms, tell us that it is impossible to decide whether some of them are plants or animals: many are the controversies they have occasioned. Zoölogists and botanists have wrangled more over some microscopic specks of animated jelly, than ever Democrat and Republican did "for the good of the country." "What!" you may exclaim, "don't anybody know the difference between a cow and a cabbage, or a goose and a gourd-vine?" Of course; but it is not in such cases that the trouble is found. For it is easy to name the differences between the higher animals and plants. This was very well done, in 1828, by Cuvier in his "*Regne' Animal*," in which the question is treated with "that comprehensiveness of knowledge and clear, critical judgment which characterize his writings, and justify us in regarding them as representative expressions of the most extensive, if not the profoundest, knowledge of his time." He said that living things had always been separated by man into two classes; the one of *animated beings*, which possess sense and motion, and the others of *inanimated beings*, which have not these functions, but simply grow, reproduce their kind, and die. Sense and motion, then, we will take as the something in which generally an animal is superior to a plant. We know that the plants we daily notice always turn their growing stems in one direction, their roots in another; nearly all of them are more or less sensitive to the touch, shrinking when roughly handled; while a few, like the Sun-dews, show remarkable and complicated movements. Yet no one would, for an instant, think of attributing either volition or perception to them.

Concerning motion, we may note that plants, being always in contact with their food—with the soil through their roots, and the air through their foliage—do not have to change their places. They are fixed. On the other hand, the food of animals is not so abun-

dant, and must be sought by them. Hence, it becomes necessary for them to have some means of taking food in large quantities when procurable, storing it up and conveying it about with them, that they may draw upon it as the waste and repair of tissues may demand. As we usually find Nature's arrangements about the best that can be made, we expect that this animal food, that is to be carried from place to place, should be in a very concentrated form. Such is the case. Just here, then, in the matter of food, its kind, and the manner of taking it, we find the *first* great physiological difference between plants and animals. It is also the most constant.

But animals do not all take the same kind of food. Therefore, the reservoir for receiving it and preparing it for use must vary in structure. Moreover, as animals are exposed to great variations in external heat, and cannot control any physical agent capable of distributing the digested food to the different parts of the body as needed, like the sap is distributed in plants, they must have a special system of vessels for this purpose. Here, then, in the circulatory system, is found the *second* great distinctive character of animals—less important than the first and not so generally met with. Indeed, Cuvier practically relinquishes this in the admission that it is not always to be found. But more of that presently.

Furthermore, as the animal function of locomotion requires a special apparatus, the muscular system, for its exercise and sensibility, requires another, the nervous system, it was argued that the chemical composition of animals should be more complex than that of plants; and this was formerly held to be true. As a matter of fact, you will still find such statements in many of the text-books now used, where it is taught that an additional element, nitrogen, is, in the animal body, added to the carbon, hydrogen and oxygen that make up the greater part of the plant. Herein was placed the *third* great difference between the two.

As said above, plants maintain a fixed relation to the soil and air. From both, they draw a supply of water, composed of hydrogen and oxygen. The atmosphere surrounding them on all sides consists of nitrogen and oxygen, and contains a small proportion of carbonic acid gas, which is made up of carbon and oxygen. Plants were said to retain the hydrogen and carbon, give off the excess of oxygen and take little or no nitrogen. The peculiarity

of plant life is the giving out of free oxygen under the influence of sun-light. It returns large quantities of this gas to the atmosphere, while absorbing water and carbonic acid from it. On the other hand, animals feed only upon plants or other animals that have been nourished by plants; they retain less hydrogen and carbon than plants do, and store up nitrogen within their tissues; they are all the time absorbing oxygen from the air, and as constantly pouring into it water and carbonic acid. This function, respiration, is the special peculiarity of animals which constitutes their *fourth* distinctive character.

This is a very condensed summary of Cuvier's elaborate discussion of the difference between animals and plants. It is a fair statement of the matter as it was then understood; but now we can accept it only for the higher orders. For since that time the compound microscope has been developed to a wonderful degree of efficiency, methods of making more accurate chemical analyses of organic compounds have been discovered, and instruments for making precise measurements of many vital forces have been invented. These have enabled us to learn much more about this matter than could be known before. Let us examine some of the testimony they have given to the many who have sought their aid, and see what bearing it will have upon the teaching of Cuvier. It was long ago discovered that certain cells of some aquatic plants became detached and moved about with considerable velocity, and with all the appearance of spontaneous action; and it is now known that many plants, during the greater part of their lives, and some of them throughout their whole life, have the power of moving swiftly from place to place, in the same manner that animals of the same grade move about. Prof. Huxley says that this locomotive condition of the lower aquatic plants is "in nowise distinguishable from that of one of the simpler animals; and while in this condition their movements are, to all appearance, as spontaneous—as much the product of volition, as those of the simpler animals." Well, then, if it was necessary, as Cuvier said, for animals to have an internal cavity for holding their food as they moved about, surely these locomotive plants ought to have a similar arrangement. But they have not. And the microscope has shown us that the lower forms of animals have none. In fact, so highly

organized an animal as the tape-worm, has no digestive apparatus of its own. For, living in the alimentary canal of other animals and absorbing its food ready digested, it has no need of such organs. Of course this is an exceptional case. But there are animals which do their own digesting, yet have no digestive cavity. An example of such is the Amœba. This animal, in form and structure, is like a very small drop of jelly which has been endowed with life and motion. It is aquatic. When a particle of food comes in contact with *any part* of its body, a depression is formed there, the particle of food is drawn in, the depression deepens until it closes over the food. Thus, this animal, without head, mouth or alimentary canal, takes in its food anywhere, and digests in every part of of its body. We see, then, that locomotion and its generally correlated function of digestion in an alimentary canal, will not furnish us a basis for drawing the boundary line between the two kingdoms. But I have already said that in the "matter of food, its kind, etc." was found the most constant difference between animals and plants. If we define an animal to be a living body which has the power of taking *solid* food into its body and there digesting it, our definition will be about the most general one we can construct, and will be true for all animals except such parasites as the tape-worm and a few of the simpler ones which do not take any food at all. Of the last kind we have examples in the males of Rotifers, which do not take any food from the time they leave the egg. And as the food of most plants is liquid and gaseous, this definition will also exclude them. But there are also exceptions on this side, *e. g.* some moulds seem to swallow their food.

When we come to examine observed facts in regard to the circulatory system of animals, we find that only vertebrates have a complete apparatus for distributing the products of digestion. As we descend the scale of invertebrate life, we notice that these organs rapidly diminish in complexity and perfection, until, in the star-fish, a mere rudiment appears; and in animals below the star-fish no trace of special development of blood vessels can be detected. Then, in this particular, a great multitude of animals show no difference from the plants.

Looking into Cuvier's third rule for distinguishing the two, we quickly conclude that it is not longer reliable. But in justice to

Cuvier, we ought to say that his error, in this particular, was due to his reliance upon the teachings of contemporary chemists, and the chemists were wrong. For by the improved methods of analyzing organic compounds, we have found out that nitrogen is just as essential an element in plants as in animals. The same chemical compounds that are characteristic of plants are now known to be quite common to animals as well. For example: Cellulose, which is almost universally present in common plants, was formerly supposed to be exclusively a product of vegetation; but since Cuvier's day it has been found in the skeletons of almost all the lower animals that have any skeleton at all. In short, "all those starchy substances as cellulose, sugar, and the like, which were formerly regarded as peculiar to plants, are now known to be just as normally animal products as they are vegetable products." Moreover, the living, growing "physical basis" of life—the protoplasm—is the same in both. As Prof. Bessey, of the Iowa Agricultural College, says: "It is a fact of great biological interest that in animals the essential constituent of all living parts, is a substance similar to the protoplasm of plants. We cannot distinguish the two by any chemical or physical tests, and can only say that, taken as a whole, the protoplasm of plants differs from that of animals in its secretions." What I mean is this: the protoplasm, that first formed something in the animal or plant, that which constructs the body, is precisely the same in both; but in the plant it forms wood, bark, etc., while in the animal it forms muscle, nerve, etc., or just as it did in the plant, it forms cellulose, sugar, and the like. So far, then, from serving as a distinction between the two, the matter of chemical composition will rather show that they are very much alike. It is true, however, that in products formed by animal protoplasm, that is in the animal tissues, there is generally present a larger per cent. of nitrogen than there is in vegetable tissues.

Similar examination of facts bearing on Cuvier's *fourth* distinction between the two kingdoms, invalidates that also. For while it is true that green plants in sunlight, (as has been claimed, under the electric light,) decompose carbonic acid and give off free oxygen, and animals absorb oxygen and give out carbonic acid all the time, yet recent investigation has abundantly demonstrated that in the

dark, even green plants have no power of decomposing carbonic acid, but actually give off that gas and absorb oxygen. And those plants which have no green coloring matter in them, as the fungi, all the time maintain the same relation to the atmosphere, that animals do in respiration. Perhaps nothing better illustrates the rapid advance of natural science in the last half century than the facts just recounted. In them we see that the teachings, *upon this subject*, of even that master in the early history of the science of organic forms, Cuvier, have been set aside by the accumulated knowledge of his most ardent disciples. And few things better show the undoubted ability and influence of the grand old master and founder of scientific zoölogy. For it is upon the broad foundation he laid that all the subsequent building of the noble science has been raised, and those principles laid down by him, which we must now reject, have had a flood of light poured upon them from sources discovered only since his day, and by researches that would hardly have been undertaken save under the inspiration of his example.

But has recent research given us no rules in place of those destroyed for distinguishing animals and plants? No! it has rather shown us that such rules are impossible. It has done this by assuring us that all organic objects belong to one kingdom, from which two great branches rise and diverge—"that there is at bottom but one life which is the whole life of some creatures, and the common basis of the life of all; a life of simplest moving and feeling, of feeding and breathing, of producing its kind and lasting its day; a life which, so far as we at present know, has no need of such parts as we call organs. Upon this general foundation are built up the manifold special characters of animal and vegetable existence . . . . . the unlikeness between them widens the higher the building is carried up. As we pass along the series of either branch, from low to high, the plant becomes more vegetative, the animal more animal." And, as might have been added, descending the series of either branch, we arrive ultimately at the same point. In the beginning of its life either plant or animal is a small, round particle of protoplasm, called ovule in the plant, *ovum* in the animal, in both cases alike in composition and function. However diverse the perfectly formed tissues of the bodies of the two may be, they are all built up of "those morpho-

logical units, the cells," which are not only essentially the same in all animals on the one hand and all plants on the other, but when compared, the plant cells with the animal cells, they show the closest resemblance throughout the whole range of living bodies. If the forming tissues are watched in their development, these resemblances, which may afterwards be obscured, are very apparent. Moreover, experiments have often shown that there is the same kind of electrical disturbance in the contracting muscular fibres of an animal, and the contracting tissue of a plant that produces motion of its parts. Nor have we any means of distinguishing between the reactions of certain plants, as the sensitive plant and sun-dews, and what we call "reflex," nervous action in animals. As an illustration of the last remark, I will describe one of the most interesting plant reactions under external irritation: The Venus Fly-trap is a plant belonging to the Sun-dew family. (You can find full description of it in any work on Systematic Botany.) From the base of the stem comes up a number of long, narrow leaves, each three or four inches in length. For two or three inches they are narrow, oblong in shape; then there is an abrupt constriction, after which the leaf widens again and its upper part is elliptical in form, but divided by the midrib into two equal parts, which can be closed so as to meet each other like the leaves of a book, or the "jaws" of a steel trap. From the upper surface of each half of this part of the leaf, three delicate bristles stand out perpendicular to the leaf. If one of these bristles be touched by even a fine hair there is an instantaneous contraction of some of the plant substance, bringing the two lobes of the leaf together quickly and forcibly enough to catch and kill an insect like the common house fly. This feat is often performed by the plant, which thus digests its prey by means of a special juice poured out upon it and absorbs it for nourishment.

With this nervous-like reaction on the part of a plant, many similar movements in animals might be compared. The example which will answer best, and the one usually selected for this purpose, is the common snail, because this animal is so well known that nearly all of us have noticed how quickly it withdraws into its shell when one of its horns or tentacles is touched. In the case of the snail we can trace a nerve fibre to the extremity of the

tentacle. A foreign body coming in contact with the tentacle "causes a molecular change in the nerve which is transmitted along the nerve to the muscles," causing in them the contraction that withdraws the animal into its shell. We know that this is a general characteristic of nerves. Now, we cannot trace a nerve fibre in the leaf, but how, in the face of such analogous action as described above, are we to deny the existence there of something just like it in function?

Prof. Huxley, after discussing this same matter at some length, finally says:

"'The results of recent inquiries into the structure of the nervous system of animals converge towards the conclusion that the nerve fibres which we have hitherto regarded as the ultimate elements of nervous tissue are not such, but are simply the visible aggregations of vastly more attenuated filaments, the diameter of which dwindles down to the limits of our present microscopical vision . . . . . and that a nerve is, in its essence, nothing but a linear tract of specially modified protoplasm between two points of an organism, one of which points is able to affect the other by means of the communication so established. Hence, it is conceivable that even the simplest living thing may have a nervous system; and the question whether plants are provided with a nervous system or not, thus acquires a new aspect and presents the histologist and physiologist with a problem of extreme difficulty, which must be attacked from a new point of view," etc.

In the meantime, we can hardly deny that they have one, at least in essence.

Well then, while forced to admit that many plants have the power of moving from place to place with as much appearance of freedom from external influence as the lower animals; that they present notable examples of the same kind of action that in even ourselves we call "reflex;" and that in some cases, as the East Indian "Telegraph Plant," the leaves rise and fall with a quick, regular beat, which may be continued for hours, and is always, so far as we can determine, independent of external irritation; what is to prevent our accepting the teaching of our most noted contemporary botanist that living protoplasm has always, under proper conditions, the power of spontaneous movement; and that while, in the lower plants, this gives rise to active, visible movements, it is prevented from doing the same thing in most of the higher plants, only because the tissues which are built up in them by the protoplasm, as wood, etc., are so rigid as to be no longer under the

control of the protoplasmic movement? Then, when we remember that vegetable protoplasm and animal protoplasm are not physically or chemically distinguishable from each other, we can hardly hope to find an invariable difference between the members of the two kingdoms.

Some eminent authorities, however, are of the opinion that we can find such a difference in the food and mode of nutrition of the two. Simple experiments, often performed and easily verified by each for himself, will illustrate this, so far as plants are concerned. (I believe that all are agreed that animals can live for any considerable time only upon organic food—upon plants or other animals.) Make a solution of a few ammonium and other mineral salts in pure distilled water. Plant any common bean in this, and carefully keep from it all organic matter, but allow free access of air and sunlight, and keep the temperature at such a degree as is favorable to vegetable growth. The bean will germinate, grow, blossom and mature its fruit. We could easily prove that the increase in weight in the plant with its fruit was just equal to what it had drawn from the air and solution. Here, then, the plant, under the influence of sunlight, has been enabled to work up the mineral matters into organic substance, obtaining the necessary nitrogen from the ammonia, the carbon from the carbonic acid of the air, and the hydrogen and oxygen from the water. It is by means of the green coloring matter of its leaves and bark that it has been enabled to break up the carbonic acid so as to obtain the carbon. But as has been already stated, not all plants have green coloring matter, or chlorophyl; and it is found by experiment that those plants which are not green cannot decompose carbonic acid, so as to get the carbon necessary for their growth. But if to such a solution as was described above we add some other substance containing carbon, as tartrate of ammonia, we can (in the light or in the dark,) by sowing in it a single spore of a common mould, soon have formed in it a flourishing growth of these plants, aggregating many thousand times the amount of organic matter contained in the original spore.

Upon this experiment, with some others, Prof. Huxley bases the generalization, "that all plants are characterized by their manufacturing capacity—by their power of working up mere mineral

matters into complex organic compounds." I am sorry to give up this last test as an *unfailing* means of distinguishing between the animal and plant. But while I very complacently took refuge behind the authority of Prof. Huxley's name, when speaking of the probability of plants having (at least in essence) a nervous system, I must protest against his generalization being made too sweeping. Because the tartaric acid which forms, with ammonia, the principal salt used in the solution for the last experiment, is a product of the fermentation or decomposition of organic compounds, never produced naturally except from vegetable or animal growths, or their derivatives.

Nor am I aware of any proof yet given of the ability of such plants to grow, except in the presence of some animal or vegetable substance upon which they can feed. But as a rule, with, perhaps, few exceptions, his statement will hold for plants, which are thus seen to be the great producers in nature, taking the dead mineral matter of the earth's crust and atmosphere, and building it up into their own tissues, which then serve as food for other plants and animals. Animals are the great consumers in nature, living upon what plants have already produced. Herein is a wonderful thing! Without hands to take, mouth to masticate, stomach or intestine to digest, the plant performs a miracle of digestion that is impossible to any animal—even the ox with his four stomachs and one hundred and fifty feet of intestine. Generally speaking, the plants feed upon rocks, cold water and gas; and yet they wail not with dyspepsia, and lacto-peptine is not in demand. While animals take as food only materials that have been built up into plant tissues, either still in that form, or, as in the carnivores, after such plant tissues have been still further elaborated into parts of animal bodies; yet the highest animal, with ages of experience to aid his selection and preparation of food, is subject to gastric disturbances that are awful to contemplate.

While in their higher representations the two kingdoms are separated by broad and well-defined differences, these differences gradually disappear as we descend to the lower forms; and we are finally left with absolutely no invariable test for separating them. As a matter of fact, many living forms, at one period of their lives, show only characteristics which would justify us in calling

them plants; while at another period of their lives they appear to be as plainly animals; and many of them cannot now be positively classed with either kingdom. This difficulty has led some naturalists to propose a third, or intermediate kingdom, to which Hæckel gives the name, *Regnum Protisticum*. But this rather doubles the trouble; for it is almost impossible now to say just where to draw the dividing line between this kingdom and each of the others. Prof. Nicholson, of Toronto, suggests that the relation of the two kingdoms might be represented by the divergence of lines spreading in two different directions from a common point." Prof. Orton said: "The kingdom of life must be taken as a whole from which two great branches rise and diverge."

I wish we had time to study together some of these humbler forms of animals and plants. I would first describe one of the lowest undoubted animals and one of the lowest undoubted plants—then some of the forms near to each of these, but of doubtful character—and finally some of those perplexing living things which it is now impossible to classify. I could show you by what slight but sure steps the two kingdoms draw nearer and nearer to each other until they finally seem to blend; how we seem forced to the conclusion that the difference is one of degree rather than of kind, and that the question whether in a given case, an organism is an animal or a plant may be unanswerable. Though this difficulty can never arise in regard to any but the lowest forms of life, I would not have you believe that it is an altogether trivial matter, or that the investigations carried on among them are matters of little moment to all save the specialists in this field. It would aid us much in understanding the importance of the study of these minute objects, but more in appreciating the arduous labors of the biologist and microscopists, if I could give you detailed descriptions of some of their observations and the results they seem to indicate. But this might prolong this article too much. Still, I can briefly state some of the work done in this line and the benefit derived from it. A good example for this purpose is the disease of silk-worms, called *pebrine*, caused by a microscopic parasite. By working its mischief upon a great national industry of France, it had brought ruin upon many of her citizens. In 1853, the silk culture of France produced a revenue of 130,000,000

francs. It was expanding rapidly, having doubled in the twenty years immediately preceding that date, and there was every indication of continued prosperity. But an epidemic appeared among the insects, and in 1865 had reduced the total production of silk to one-sixth of its former amount, entailing a loss of 100,000,000 francs in a single year. In the provinces where this industry was followed, great distress prevailed. The unhappy cultivators battled desperately against the disease. Remedy after remedy was tried in vain. In 1863 the French Minister of Agriculture signed an agreement to pay half a million francs for the use of a remedy that was declared by its inventor to be infallible. It proved to be worthless, and there seemed to be no relief. No one knew even the cause of the disease. Small black spots would appear upon the worms and they would sicken and die in multitudes, bringing their owners to beggary. In this crisis the celebrated chemist and microscopist, Pasteur, was appealed to for help. At that time he had never even seen a silk worm. But he set to work upon the case, and after months of the most trying labor and patient search, he discovered the cause of the disease and traced it through its entire course. He found out that the sole cause of all the destruction was a microscopic parasite, one of the lowest of the forms of life. Having made himself thoroughly familiar with it in all its stages, he suggested a remedy for its ravages. So earnestly and laboriously had he applied himself to his work that he came out of his investigations with health shattered, and one side of his body permanently paralyzed; but he restored to France and Italy their silk culture, and brought back prosperity and happiness to thousands of homes. Nor is this the only case in which the microscope of this remarkable man has been, in his hands, the means of averting disaster which had assumed the magnitude of a national calamity. Over and over again, had ravages occurred among the wines, vinegars and other national productions of the French. Without apparent cause, they would become unfit for use, sometimes completely putrefying, especially when exported. All these diseases of the wines, etc., were traced to organic forms, like the parasites mentioned above. For each a remedy, easily applied and infallible in its beneficent effect, was found. Verily, even those who cannot get up an interest in a thing except as it is shown to

have a commercial value, ought to find here a sufficient reason for careful study of even the lowest living things.

Pasteur also spent much time in the investigation of splenic fever, one of the most dreaded diseases of continental Europe. But in this particular field he was preceded by a young German physician, named Koch. We can get an idea of the destructiveness of this disease from the fact that in a single district of Novgorod, in Russia, in two years it destroyed fifty-six thousand horses, cattle and sheep, and five hundred and twenty-eight human beings. During the researches for discovering the cause and cure of this malignant malady, blood was taken from an infected animal and placed under the microscope. It was found to contain a vast number of rod-like bodies which grew and multiplied just like the yeast plant used in making bread, or the plants which produce fermentation in wine. Some blood, containing the spores, or germs of these rod-like parasites, was dried, allowed to remain for days in the midst of putrefying matter, was exposed to the action of the weather, and after an interval of four years, was introduced into the circulation of various small mammals, with the invariable result of producing, in each, splenic fever, which caused death in twenty or thirty hours. Truly it seemed that there was little hope of destroying the vitality of these germs. But it was found that they did not affect the health of birds even when placed directly in their blood-vessels. This at first perplexed the observers. But remembering that the average temperature of birds is ten or twelve degrees higher than that of mammals, it occurred to Koch, that possibly this temperature, in the early stages of their development, was fatal to the germs. Accordingly, he inoculated some birds with the germs, then artificially reduced the temperature of the birds to the same standard as the average temperature of mammals. The invariable result was that the birds died in a few hours, with all the symptoms of splenic fever. Again, he took mammals, of species and varieties that had always succumbed to the attacks of the disease, introduced the germs into their circulation, then, by artificial means, raised their temperature to the standard of birds. Without exception they escaped, with no apparent inconvenience. Here, then, a secret of incalculable importance to man lay revealed. A loathsome and appalling disease, that throughout the old world

had daily claimed its hecatombs of victims, was tracked to its hiding place; its nature and habits discovered, and the strong hand of science placed with strangling grasp upon its throat.

As a matter of course, men are trying to extend similar investigations to other forms of epidemic disease. Only last year Dr. Ecklund, of Stockholm, Sweden, who has devoted himself to the special study of scarlatina, announced some highly important conclusions resulting from his researches. They throw a great deal of light upon the connection between general sanitary conditions, especially bad drainage, and outbreaks of that disease, without actual infection. He always found a great number of small, disk-shaped bodies (animal or plants?) in the secretions from the bodies of scarlatina patients; and has also found the same kind of organism "in vast numbers in the soil and ground water" of the Isle of Skeppsholm; in mud from the trenches; and among moulds upon the walls of buildings in which scarlatina had been most violent. He also found cases of the disease among children who had not been exposed to ordinary infection, but who had drunk of the ground water of the island; and "one case which followed an immersion in one of the trenches, and the drying of the child's clothes in a small room." Many other circumstances pointed to the same conclusion. May he soon learn the full life history of the parasites, and find the means of infallibly destroying them. We expect great results from his labors.

For a considerable time it has been known that the development of microscopic life, from germs floating in the air, was the cause of putrefaction. Within the last five or six years Prof. Tyndall has proved, by nearly ten thousand experiments, that infusions of "fish, flesh, and fowl," and vegetable matters, which rapidly putrefy when exposed to the ordinary atmosphere, can be kept perfectly sound and sweet for an indefinite period, when the germs of organic life are filtered from the air before it comes in contact with the flesh or vegetable. For generations surgeons had observed the fatal influence of dust upon wounds of all kinds. They had learned the value of absolute cleanliness to their patients. But it often happened that wounds, which had received the most careful treatment, would become inflamed, the tissues would die, and decay frequently even before their separation from the living body. Prof.

Lister, of Edinburgh, marked the similarity of the changes that took place in living tissues as inflammation advanced, and the dead animal bodies as they putrefied; and concluded that the same cause, or, at most, nearly related causes, must produce both changes. The microscope, by showing him the similarity of the life that was developed in both cases assured him that he was right in this opinion. Then he began an earnest search for some ways of destroying these atmospheric germs that came in contact with the wounds, without, at the same time, producing additional injury to the parts affected. His search was rewarded by the discovery of the high therapeutic value of carbolic acid spray as an application to all wounds accessible to the air. By it the germs are destroyed, and the system allowed to repair the damaged tissues without interference. I doubt if any other remedy in the pharmacopeia has prevented as much suffering, and saved as many lives as this one, though it has been in use only a few years. "The antiseptic system of surgery, based upon the recognition of living contagia, has triumphed."

Other examples, of as great value as those mentioned already, abound. But it can hardly be necessary to produce them here. I consider it established, by modern research, beyond all question, that *all* those diseases usually called epidemic, and possibly a great many not ordinarily classed among these, are produced by infinitesimal living bodies, whose germs, gaining access to the human circulation or other tissues, feed upon them—just as the atmospheric germs of the ordinary kinds feed upon dead animal matter—producing in them changes analogous to putrefaction. These changes differ in each according to the nature of the organisms whose germs enter the system. Just as cotton seed produce cotton, and peas produce peas, so measles germs produce measles, yellow fever germs produce yellow fever, and so on through the whole list. And nothing else but the specific germs of each communicable disease ever produces that disease, any more than an acorn when planted will produce a peach tree. I know that cases do occur where it is difficult, or even impossible, to trace to its source the contagion which produces a given disease; and that many, among them some able physicians, insist that in such cases at least there must be a "spontaneous generation" of the germs. After

ing a number of reported cases of this kind, I can find only
e evidence (and no surplus of that) in favor of "sponta-
eneration." The same kind of evidence, of greater force,
roduced to prove the "spontaneous generation" of num-
animals and plants; some of them very high in rank. I
s willingly believe that an oak or a dog could be evolved
ie dust by fortuitous association of its atoms, as that the
any infectious disease was ever spontaneously generated.
e spoken of the experiments proving the perfect immunity
trefaction which accompanies the contact of flesh and air
th are freed from germs, and of the frequent decay of even
issues when attacked by these wafted particles. Consider
y of the wounded, as through the breach, in his tissues,
stroyers swarmed, tearing down parts of the yet living
nd pouring into the very channels of life a poison that
ch nerve a tingling pain, until the whole frame was but
fying mass. Remember how such things have gone on
the most carefully watched of homes, and in the hospitals
Christianity has built for the care of the suffering, and
rably more in those dark ages when Christian philan-
dwelt not among men. Consider how, in addition to
iquitous multitudes of our unseen foes, the special contagia
w fever, cholera, and unnumbered other ills so often
s, sowing pestilence and death over States and continents.
upon these, and you can easily see how all the desolation
by the brutish ferocity that sets man to seek his fellow's
ether in the hand-to-hand struggle of personal malice, or
lesale murder which nation inflicts upon nation, is small
mpared with the ravages due to atmospheric germs.

nly to-day that the light of science is being let in upon the murderous
s of our foes. . . . . From the vantage ground already won,
ward with confident hope to the triumph of medical art over so many
enes of misery that are too familiar to us all. The cause of the
being once clearly revealed, not only to the physician, but to the
hose intelligent co-operation is absolutely essential to success, the final
humanity is only a question of time. We have already a foretaste of
ry in the triumph of surgery."

, there is a border-land between the animal and vegetable
ns. To which of these great kingdoms the inhabitants of

this strange realm owe allegiance; or whether, in a given case, to either, or to both, we cannot now say, with certainty. But it is a land of broad extent, with a swarming population, whose census statistics are known only to Omniscience, but which must foot up aggregates almost infinitely exceeding those of known animals and plants. Some of its people have been employed in the service of man; but many, perhaps most, of them are inimical to his welfare. Times without number have their invading swarms swept with desolation into the houses of man, and his nearest and dearest animal and vegetable friends. Often in the pride of their beauty and strength have the noblest fallen before these fierce attacks; while, with insatiate greed, these foes stand ever eager for their prey, and when a higher being falls, they feast upon its lifeless form, tear it, atom by atom, asunder, and, in wild riot, scatter it to the winds. Many an observer has essayed to explore this country. Strange, indeed, are the accounts they bring us. Some of these accounts are of priceless value; others are worse than useless, because misleading. For here, as elsewhere, "some men are endowed with the faculty of interpreting facts according to the logic of facts, and making a true exposition of a matter; while other some seem to be smitten with an everlasting incompetency for doing such things."

But some of our best men have gone far beyond the frontier of this little-known land, and have told us thrilling things of what they saw—enough to make us sure that it is of first importance for us to look further into these things.

THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS.

BY REV. H. M. DUBOSE, OF TEXAS.

There is a tide in human history; an ebbing and flowing of man's mental and moral activities; times when his strength seems spent and wasted, followed by a rebound which never fails to place him higher and more advantageously than before. To say that this is according to law or rule is to assert what is neither in keeping with the Divine will and purpose, nor demonstrable from experience or induction. The disparagement of humanity—its

imperfectness, its cumulative ills, its bitter wanderings—is no part of God's plan. Suffering is an anomaly—the result of a gross miscarriage in the administration of truth, and, while disciplinary under a covenant of grace, is not according to law; and the truest and most rational definition of the gospel is a warfare waged against the multifarious aspects of human misfortune; a heavenly purpose to lift man above and beyond his fall. But these ills and lapses are facts none the less, and a wise and loving providence so distributes and arranges them that their order and recurrence take on the semblance of design. Under this ordering, human hope is seen to recoil upon itself only to gather new force and rebound. A whole era of progress is suddenly entombed only to experience a resurrection whose effluent energy knows no bounds and no return; a birth whose nascent pangs disturb to motion latent life on every hand. This admits of one thought only, that of growth; for only an infinite force could move with such facility past these chaotic experiences. It is the momentum which the river acquires in the impetuous descent of its mountain torrent that drives it on through circling eddies and turbid lakes to its ocean rest. So it is, the innate momentum of life and intellect, divinely posited, that impels man forward, despite the ills and embarrassments that crowd his path.

It is neither an unbecoming nor an unprofitable task to turn aside and look into the lapsing and decadence of which man's history has been so fruitful. The exterior causes of these, it will be found, vary according to the different times and theatres of action; the mental and moral processes correspond in all ages and people. And a fact which should not be lost sight of, a fact of no little value in these studies, is this, that man is, under all conditions, a unity. One part of him cannot be in the ascendant while the other is letting down. He stands or falls as a whole. Apparently, there may be a reserve of vitality in one direction after it has quite expired in another; but it is only the semblance of life. Without a rebound, it could be but a matter of time when the attenuated spirit must expire and the whole fabric of man's being go down. Religion and learning, though not principles of co-ordinate value, have developed a strange harmony and affinity in the sphere of man's spiritual growth. One is not a great practical

fact without the other. To say that learning lights its fires at t altar of religion and catches its inspiration from her oracles is speak in keeping with faith and experience. It is true as t divine is above the carnal, the infinite above the finite. But th religion cannot become a broad and comforting, or even a tr experience, without the aid of learning, is equally a rational co clusion. It may, indeed, become a personal possession, and all i benefits be enjoyed, measurably, without higher culture, as t philosophy of its existence and movements is above the generaliz tions of the human mind. Yet, true religion and true learning a in perfect accord, and will be for all time. Hence, when lear ing fell into decay, it was no wonder that religion followed in i wake; and it was not more wonderful that religion and learnin hand in hand, should emerge from the same tomb and begin ane the work of evolving man into completeness. Under similar co ditions, their common ruin might be brought about again; b these can never more obtain. Religion is henceforth strong enou to maintain both itself and learning on their thrones and contin ally widen their authority.

The primary theory of culture—the bringing of the inner li into harmony with the life without—is as old as humanity. It not, therefore, dogmatic boldness, but pathetic faith in the past, well as in the future of man which we discover in these words Professor Max Müller:

"As far back as we can trace the footsteps of man, even on the lowest str of history, we see that the divine gift of a sound and sober intellect belonged him from the very first; and the idea of a humanity emerging slowly from t depths of animal brutality can never be maintained again. The earliest wo of art wrought by the human mind—more ancient than any literary document prior even to the first whisperings of tradition—the human language forms uninterrupted chain from the dawn of history down to our own times. . . . T formation of language, the composition of roots, the gradual discrimination grammatical forms—all this working, which we can still see under the surface our own speech, attests, from the very first, the presence of a rational mind—an artist as great, as least, as his work."

The oldest human learning of which we have any authent record, save, perhaps, the ethnic wealth of the oldest Aryan speec came into being on the banks of the Nile, nearly four thousan years ago. There the venerable sciences of Chemistry, Astronom

and Geometry, were born. A rude philosophy, and a ruder theology, came along with these, and left their uncertain record in the confused strata of history. But the learning of Egypt was either lost, or swallowed up in the more definite outgrowth of Hellenic civilization, which civilization forms the substratum of the world's intellectual greatness. Greece is the birth-land. She furnished the material, the laws, the suggestions. It was the task of after times to arrange and complete. It cannot be that humanity was ever wholly wrong. A pathetic sincerity marks its growth throughout, and this is, as has been well and truthfully said:

"A proof of the sort of instinct that has guided the course of civilization. The world was to have certain intellectual teachers, and no others. Homer and Aristotle, with the poets and philosophers that circle round them, were to be the schoolmaster of all generations; and, therefore, the Latins, falling into the law on which the world's education was to be carried on, so added to the classical library as not to reverse or interfere with what had already been determined."

How marvelous the thought! the smallness of the country, and the fewness of the centuries that perfected this beginning! How grandly the pageant moves! Poetry came first, the inner man hailing the delights or braving the experiences of the outer world—the outbreaking of religious impulse; the wild cry of a soul made conscious of itself, and of the startling discrepancy between the things that *are*, and the things that *should be*. Then came history, the careful hand that gathered up the jewels, brushed away the dust, and set each in its order. Lastly, philosophy, in response to the earliest voice of poetry, searching for the *way*, and seeking to resolve the real into the ideal, yet in such way as to leave all more real than before. These are best understood, perhaps, in their apostles. Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus and Xenephon, Socrates and Plato, are names synonymous with all that is true and perfect in the products of that land to whose sacred hills we trace the beginnings of that stream of literary life and sentiment flowing through every modern civilization. But Greece died in giving birth to these, and having long before lost the ethnic purity of her theology, and having no longer a mission in the world, her birthright passed to another. Rome caught her spirit, and wore the insignia of her greatness. The Augustin age

was the natural outcome of the Greek centuries. Homer and Virgil are the closing and opening notes of one grand diapason. Seneca is the complement of Socrates. But while the intellectual side of man was being thus completed at Athens and Rome, its spiritual counterpart was being wrought out, also, at Jerusalem. Principal Shairp, in his matchless treatise on "Culture and Religion," says of these correlated events in history:

"When we think of these two separate centers of illumination—the 'grace stored in Jerusalem, and the gifts which radiate from Athens'—the thought cannot but occur: How do these two stand related to each other? In that expression: 'When the fulness of time was come,' no thoughtful student of history can fail to recognize, along with the preparation that had gone on in Judea, some reference to the work Greece and Rome had done on the earth. You remember that superscription that was written in letters of Greek, and Latin, and Hebrew. That superscription seems to symbolize the confluence of powers which thenceforward were to rule the minds of men."

Christianity and learning kissed each other on the soil of Italy. Italy! How the thinking heart and feeling mind thrill at that sound. Italy, so long the home of letters and the custodian of the treasures of knowledge, when all the world beside was sunk in ignorance. Venerable and beautiful in the glory of her ruins! But as she had received from Greece, so she, in turn, surrendered her laurels with her ancient sceptre. The same instrument which wrought the ruin of learning, was to lift it up to a higher throne and a more exalted dignity. The barbaric hordes that came like mountain torrents upon the fair South, covering its centuries with a deep deposit of ignorance, were one day to turn back, not the barbarians they came, but the champions of the world's faith and the restorers of its morality and learning. Ulfilas, the Mœsogoth, laid the foundation and shaped the structure of that language destined to inherit both Hellenic and Latin greatness, and to carry out the tendency of their purer teachings and realize the promise of their philosophy.

From the close of the fifth, to the opening of the Fifteenth century, is the saddest period of the world's history—a millennium of night and blood. The spirit of religion was sunk in the deepest abasement and distorted into hideous impiety. Learning disappeared or was only narrowly cultivated by a few unambitious nobles and unwarlike laymen. A semblance of learning was pre-

served in the cloister, but it was a solemn sham. And it was no wonder. Thought was stifled in the atmosphere that pervaded the world. Instead of the blessed freedom of the gospel and the broad induction of a liberal philosophy, known even to the heathen, bigotry held over the minds of men the iron mace of scholastic subtleties and dogmatic absurdities. The wealth of learning was hidden in forgotten vaults or mouldered in the debris of ruined temples. The most precious relics of antiquity—parchments covered with burning words and forms divine, were as truly buried as were the undisturbed riches of the mine. Ignorance was enthroned. Infidelity and hypocrisy were united and arrayed in priestly robes. Ecclesiastical dignities were the reward of murder and hate. Europe became one vast battle field. A unity it was, but perpetuated by the sword. Armies of inquisitors, more heartless and cruel than the "stern legionaries" of Julius or Galba, traversed the length and breadth of the continent. A night scarcely less dark than Gothic barbarism fell everywhere.

An infinite array of causes might be named as contributing toward this downfall of religion and learning. But they may, with reason, be resolved into one—*the fall of the Roman Empire;* and by this is not meant its final collapse, but its slow and certain decay. This was the decay of learning and the consequent demoralization of religion. Not that Christianity was dependent upon the success or failure of imperial power. It rose and propagated its truths in the face of imperial persecution. But that which hate could not subdue, favor destroyed. The Church not only conquered the Empire, but it also united its fortunes with the sceptre, and the purity of one fell with the authority of the other. The victorious barbarians who spared not the treasures of imperial Rome, and who despised her letters and hated her philosophy, lowered their reeking swords before the tiara of the Pope, and became vassals of the Church. Ecclesiasticism took the place of religion. Barbarism mingled its rites with the simplicity of Christian worship; and thus the ruin of religion was completed.

But this long night was not without its convulsive throes and struggles after light. The middle ages are not the Saharan waste they are usually represented. Classical knowledge and religion were measuring out a long and steady decay; but an indigenous

literature was springing up everywhere. Especially was this so with the countries of Northern Europe, where the yoke of Rome weighed but lightly. The savor of old Norse song and Norse philosophy remained on the Teutonic races after their conversion to Christianity. This was bursting out in more definite and disciplined, though still rude and uncouth, forms. This literature was always distinctly religious, and illustrates the wonderfully transforming power of Christianity. "All deep things," says Carlyle, "are song;" and the faith of the Son of God invariably caused the rude heart of these barbarians to break forth in song. It is impossible to say when there was not a native literature in the British Isles. The opening of English history finds a Welch literature, which, in a few centuries, reached its "most high and palmy state." The legends of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table, are, perhaps, the earliest respectable body of homogeneous literature produced North of the Alps—a literature, in our day, recast in the faultless imagination of England's poet-laureate. And the songs of Ossian, could we believe them genuine, would revolutionize our ideas of twilight ages of Northern Europe. But it is at least certain that in the Sixth century Ireland and parts of Britain were enjoying no inconsiderable degree of native enlightenment. At this time, what is now the great empire of Germany, was little more than an unbroken wilderness; yet even then began the inception of its future greatness. Such men as St. Gall, St. Killain and St. Boniface, missionaries sent out from England and Ireland, were not content merely to fell the forests and baptize barbarian multitudes, but they began to collect the rude speech of that land into shape. National literature, from this period, developed steadily, and the great Charlemagne found time to turn aside from the cares of State to compose a German Grammar and to make a collection of national ballads and songs.

The Eleventh century was well nigh a blank throughout the world; the crude literature which had grown up during the previous centuries went again into chaos. But the succeeding age witnessed a revival. Poetry passed out of the hands of the priests into the hands of knights and nobles. During this period Provencal poetry appeared; but it lacked both the depth and rational soul of early English and German song. It was polite

and sentimental, taking on the impress of the chivalrous spirit, and breathing the perfumed atmosphere of the age. But these quaint and floating lays of Trouvere and Troubadour became possessed of a deep and thrilling interest when we learn that they have given modern minstrelsy its exquisite finish and matchless versification. The crusades were the inspiring cause of this early movement. The wild chants of the harps that extolled the prowess of Godfrey of Bouillon, Fredrick Barbarossa and the Lion Heart, still charm with their potent spell. Indeed, the philosophic mind cannot overlook the fact that, indirectly, the crusades were the means of restoring to Europe a pure faith, a pure literature and a pure humanity. But the failure of the crusades and the wars that followed paralyzed thought as completely as before. The Thirteenth century, however, brought upon the stage one of the most illustrious men the world has ever produced. This was Dante Allighieri, "the one voice of ten dumb centuries." He lighted anew the taper of learning, and it beamed gratefully forth. Dante is properly the father of the Italian tongue. Latin, becoming more and more corrupted, fell into desuetude and finally disappeared as a spoken language before the Ninth century. A barbarour jargon took its place. Dante lived in fierce and chaotic times, and was himself a participant in the contest between Guelfs and Ghibbelines, but he brought harmony out of discord and left a lasting legacy to his countrymen. Boccacio and Petrarch came in his wake and held up the dignity of his name. But the age of Dante was destined also to be obscured by the corruption of Rome.

This ignorance and superstition culminated in the religious crisis of the Fifteenth century. Then it was that the inert mass gave evidence of returning life. The tide began to flow. Religious sentiment, we have seen, had long been restless. The spirit of the Reformation had been nursed even in the grim cloisters of Romish monasteries. But an iron hand had repressed it. If learning was in disrepute and hazardous, freedom of religious thought was infinitely more so.

At the very moment when Europe seemed sunk in complete exhaustion, came the final collapse of the Greek Empire and the fall of Constantinople. Then came the Renaissance. Those who had, through the long ages been the custodians of the treasures of

Greek learning, were driven out by the Saracens, and as they went scattered their trust, like precious seeds, over the world. Florence became the chief asylum for these illustrious exiles from "old Achaia." "The poetry of Homer, the drama of Sophocles, the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, woke again to life beneath the shadow of the mighty dome with which Brunelleschi had crowned the city by the Arno." The galley ships of Florence, instead of coming burthened with corn from Egypt, or with spices and gold from the East, brought back manuscripts and statuary as the most precious parts of their freight. "The recovery of a treatise of Cicero, or a tract of Sallust, from the dust of a monastic library was welcomed by the group of statesmen and artists, gathered in the Rencellai gardens, with a thrill of enthusiasm." Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Florence, generally known as the Magnificent, the representative of a long and noble line, became the munificent patron of the revived learning. The magnificence of his palace was only equalled by his love of the arts and his patronage of letters. Many celebrated men came and made their homes in Florence under the auspices of his friendship. Among these was the immortal Chancondylas, at whose feet sat the men who carried classical knowledge to the halls of Cambridge and Oxford. With the aid of these exiled masters was laid, in Florence, the foundation of that splendid library, which still bears the name of its founder.

At the height of this revival there ascended the pontifical throne a man at once the noblest, wisest, and most bigotted of all the Popes. This was Leo X., the Cardinal Giovani de Medici, son of the Magnificent. This strange man is a contradiction throughout. A friend of learning, yet inveterately opposed to its legitimate results. His education and judgment taught him that the religion of Rome was an empty fraud, yet general enlightenment must destroy this "myth," so "useful and desirable" to His Holiness. But it was with him a passion, not less strong than his love of power, to become a leader in literature and a patron of art. And so, more than any other man, he contributed to the revival of letters and precipitated the reformation of religion. It was not strange, however, that a de Medici, inspired by the traditions of his family, should be involved in so splendid a contradiction.

But it was in Germany and in England that the new learning was to accomplish its most immediate and lasting results. The thirst for knowledge was the thirst for religious liberty. In Italy the revolt against Rome became frigid rationalism. But here it was different. Renewed intellectual yearnings and simple faith in heaven were soon to converge and unite. At the time art and literature were finding encouragements in the vicinity of the Vatican schools and universities were springing up in England and Germany. Oxford and Cambridge were founded; one in the Ninth, the other in the Tenth century, but the history of their peculiar national influence dates from this period. The university of Heidleberg was founded in 1386; that of Erfurt in 1392, and that of Leipsic a quarter of a century later. Before this, however, the Hebrew and Greek, the languages of Scripture, were not only not understood by the clergy, but to undertake their study was an act of heresy and disloyalty to the Church. D'Aubigné tells us that Cardinal Cajetan, as late as the Sixteenth century, declared that the use of the Hebrew was the crown of heresy in the inferior clergy. But Germany was merging into the light. "A hundred years before Dante," says a celebrated German critic, "the German poets had gazed with their eyes wide open into that infinite reality which underlies our short existence on earth." German scholars were the first to cross the Alps and enter the gates of Florence, then the Mecca of the literary world. These carried back the key to the new learning, and began to lay the broad foundation upon which has since been reared the noble structure of German scholarship.

Reuchlin and Erasmus will ever occupy the foremost place among the men of this era. The former, by opposing a proposition to burn all Hebrew works, and by publishing a Hebrew lexicon, became the bulwark and defense of the new school.

Erasmus must always occupy a doubtful position as a religious reformer, on account of his vacillating character and equivocal utterances; but as a scholar, a man of varied talents and resources, he eclipsed the glory of the ancient world, and sent the lustre of his genius down the ages. He loved learning only for learning's sake, not as a means of overturning old methods and superstitions, and thereby making the world better. His industry was phenomenal; his labors prodigious. When but a young man, he wrote

from Paris to a friend: "When I get some money I will bu books, and then I will buy clothes." It may seem bold to writ thus; but his weakness, at a great critical juncture of human his tory, leaves him without defense.

Myconius and Melancthon are most attractive as having caugh the true spirit of learning in their time. But the Reformation an the Renaissance met in Luther. Though not himself the greates scholar of his day, and though not, in his life, a perfect exponen of the religion he sought to uphold, he yet became the centre o strength and courage. Men of mature learning and simple faith gathered about him, and these he directed. But Luther was, in no sense, deficient in learning. He was a master in his time, and would be in this or any other. From the moment he discovered a Latin Bible in the Monastic library of Erfurt—from that moment religion and learning recognized anew the oneness of their task. The new religion became henceforth a religion of letters, while the old held on more closely to its ignorance and chains.

"Christendom was divided into two hostile bodies, and their aspects were strikingly contrasted. Opposed to the old champions of the hierarchy, who had neglected the study of languages and the cultivation of literature (as one of their own body informs us) were generous minded youths devoted to study, investigating scripture and familiarizing themselves with the masterpieces of antiquity. Possessing an active mind, an elevated soul, an intrepid heart, these young men soon acquired such knowledge, that for a long period none could compete with them. It was not only the vitality of their faith which rendered them superior to their contemporaries, but an elegance of style, a perfume of antiquity, a sound philosophy, a knowledge of the world, completely foreign to the theologians 'of the old leaven,' as Cochloeus himself terms them. Accordingly, when these youthful defenders of the Reformation met the Romish doctors in an assembly, they attacked them with such ease and confidence, that these ignorant men hesitated, became embarrassed, and fell into a contempt merited in the eyes of all."—*History of the Reformation.*

The history of the Revival in Germany, was its history in England. Chaucer and Roger Bacon had already laid the foundation of liberal learning and philosophy. "But from the first," says Dr. Green, in his History of the English People, "it was manifest that the revival of letters would take a tone in England very different from the tone it had taken in Italy, a tone less literary, less largely human, but more moral, more religious and more practical in its bearings both upon society and politics." It was

Colet who gave it this tone, and who uncovered Greek literature in Oxford University. One thought alone inspired the labors of this man: The Greek was the key to Scripture. The concentrated light of his culture was poured upon the sacred pages. The theology, the philosophy of England, its Elizabethan age of literature, its matchless system of laws, and (who will not say?) the thrilling thought of Methodism itself, grew out of, and show unmistakably, the wisdom of this early use of classical learning."

But Colet was not alone. A group of scholars, knowing the same spirit, and inspired with the same noble ambition, gathered into the halls of England's great University. Erasmus himself gives us the following pen-picture of this brotherhood:

"I have found in Oxford so much polish and learning, that now I hardly care about going to Italy at all, save for the sake of having been there. When I listen to my friend Colet, it seems like listening to Plato himself. Who does not wonder at the wide range of Grocyn's knowledge? What can be more searching, deep and refined than the judgment of Lineacre? When did nature mould a temple more gentle, endearing and happy than the temper of Thomas More?"

The startling discovery of a new world, and the still more startling discovery made by Copernicus, caused the human mind to gather new energy and prepare to solve the mighty problems before it. "For the first time," says M. Taine, "men opened their eyes and saw." The restlessness and expectancy of mind at this period was illustrated in the tendency of such books as Sir Thomas More's "Utopia."

The printing press, which came into general use about the close of the Fifteenth century, completed the work of the revival. It multiplied with incredible rapidity every form of literature, and spread the love of liberty and learning far and near. During the last quarter of the Fifteenth century, ten thousand books and pamphlets issued from the press of Europe. By the opening of the Sixteenth century, all the Latin authors were in print, and were accessible to every student. The Greek classics followed during the twenty years succeeding. "The profound influence of this burst of the two great classic literatures on the world made itself felt." Mind broke away from its old moorings, and, was it strange, away from religion? But the truth of the Bible was being restored, and proved itself equal to the task of reorganizing the

demoralized elements of society, of curbing the fiery ambition and undisciplined energies of mind and turning them into the channels of sober thought. D'Aubigne, in the following extract from his great history, shows how completely the Reformation and learning were united:

"Whilst in the year 1518, only thirty-five publications had appeared; and thirty-seven in 1517, the number of books increased with astonishing rapidity after the appearance of Luther's Theses. In 1518, we find seventy-one different works; in 1519, one hundred and eleven; in 1520, two hundred and eight; in 1521, two hundred and eleven; in 1522, three hundred and fifty-seven, and in 1523, four hundred and ninety-eight. . . . . And where were these published? For the most part, at Wittenberg. And who were their authors? Generally, Luther and his friends. In 1522, one hundred of the Reformer's writings were published, and in the year following, one hundred and eighty-three. In this same year only twenty Roman Catholic publications appeared."

Thus we have gone rapidly through the long history of the saddest declension and the noblest awakening of humanity. We have seen that culture and religion have for each other an unchanging affinity—that one is the complement of the other. What is the result? Our faith in humanity, in its sincerity, its capacities, is deepened. Our views of culture are widened, our religious convictions are made practical. But is religion but a higher type of culture? And is culture itself a form of religion? Precisely so, if each be given its proper sphere. Religion is a culture attainable only after the soul has been touched by a divine impulse. Religion brings the elements of truth *to* man; or, more properly, lifts man up to a communion with the truth; while culture is the *use* of truth after it becomes a possession. A failure to see and acknowledge this will always drive religion and culture apart. The night that once was, we repeat, can never return; but if the Church should ever again forget its obligation to educate both mind and heart, to carry the blessings of knowledge with the message of love, it will again be in danger of losing its birth-right.

GREEK MYTHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.*

BY PROFESSOR J. C. C. NEWTON, A. M.

We come now to the second period of Greek Mythology. This is the period of conflict between Religion and Philosophy, and we may say, in anticipation, that it is the period of Mythologic decay. But, although the Philosophic spirit seems to prevail and the Mythologic to wane, the aggressions of the former were stubbornly contested by the latter. This "conflict" in the development of Grecian civilization is one which is inevitable in the history of any nation. This battle has to be fought over again—every few centuries; it is waging now.

The wing of authority, yea even the heavy hand of supreme authority, has been stretched out in many directions in the name of religion. In the early history of a people it seems wise to defer to this authority, whether it pronounces upon religious, social or scientific matters, for the priests are qualified to speak. But under the *law* of the *distribution* of *functions*, the time will come when other men are as well qualified to teach Philosophy as the priest—are as competent to declare whether the Copernican system is true rather than the old theory. The time must come when a Galileo is recognized as equal in authority to the Pope upon questions of philosophy and science.

Let us, then, in this conflict period of Greek Mythology and Philosophy, be careful how we walk.

Before proceeding further, we may get a better view of the field of battle, if we first count up the forces which the religion of Greece has to marshal in her defence. Let us inspect her strongholds and mark well her bulwarks. We enumerate briefly:

1st. The poetic literature of the Greeks, with at least one historian. Herodotus, the father of history, is a powerful ally of popular and traditional religion.

*This article is the completion of Professor Newton on the topic discussed. We did not intend to break the discussion, but were compelled to do so for lack of space. Serial articles do not suit a Quarterly; and this is not to be construed as a precedent. The article above should have appeared in April, but was delayed by the misplacement of several pages of the manuscript, which had to be re-written. EDITOR.

2d. Tribal traditions, family genealogies, and eponmys are continually reminding the people of the miracles of the Gods, and the exploits of deified heroes. Many of the principal families proudly trace their lineage back to a god.

Many of the surviving institutions of the people were memorial of gods and of matters connected with their religion; for example, the memorial ship of the Athenians.

3d. Art is an important ally of religion. The temples were the centres both of religion and the arts. The masters had wrought the statues of the gods, and had chiseled the columns of the sacred temples.

Here is concrete proof appealing to the emotions and to the imagination, and thus strengthening the faith and inspiring devotion. Who could look unmoved upon Phidias' divine statue of Jupiter at Olympia, or of Minerva in the Parthenon?

Art is a vehicle of religion alike to the common people and the cultured.

4th. The almost universal incorporation of religious notions and sentiments in the poetical affairs of the Greeks.

The author of the "Ten Great Religions," seems to maintain that religion sat rather loosely to the Greeks, that it was not really a matter of much concern with them. In all deference, a careful induction of the fact leads *us* to a different conclusion.

We can only mention a few of these. We may mention the almost innumerable consultations of their oracles. The oracles were consulted, whether they should go to war, join battle, make treaties, send out colonies, and where plant them. The immense treasures of their temples and shrines accumulated from offerings, gifts, etc., is another proof of the religious character of the Greeks.

Upon the eve of battle the images of the gods or of heroes were frequently brought forth. It was because the people *believed* in their gods. In one instance a most important battle was delayed for the Eacids to be sent for. After the victory off Salamis, thanksgivings were offered to Neptune for the destruction of the Persian ships. And so, calamities and plagues were averted by sacrifices and prayers; successes were attributed to the favor of the gods. See, also, Intervention of the Gods in the Trojan War, as set forth by Homer. Again, a colony never went forth without taking fire

from the sacred altar, thus preserving the continuity of their religious allegiance.

Another fact is, the Amphictyonic Council, the purpose of which was largely religious. Again, the oath of citizenship taken by the Athenians was a religious oath strictly.

The highest court, the Areopagus, had jurisdiction over religious questions. If we mistake not, one of the Archons was charged with special religious duties and prerogatives. The Senate assembly was inaugurated by sacrifice to Jupiter; so, also, the Agora of the people. Religion was recognized even in their sports. The victor in the Olympic games always sacrificed to the *Olmpyian Zeus*.

The number and popularity of the various *religious* festivals, including the Eleusinian rites, is another practical proof of the religious character of the Greeks. Religion was incorporated into the very foundations of society; it was recognized in their domestic relations.

The kings were clothed with special religious prerogatives, and when other forms of political government were adopted, some one was appointed to discharge the religious offices originally vested in the king. The whole life of the Greek nation was penetrated by religion. The facts above mentioned convince us that religious ideas and sentiments were deeply imbedded in the Greek mind, and that they were not easily dislodged. The Greek was lively, volatile; at times, venal; but the general trend of his nature was along the direction of religion. So that the opposing influences sufficient to change the religious beliefs of this nation must be very powerful.

But this dislodgement of a faith, once so strong among the Greeks, was gradually effected. In the growth of Philosophy is to be read the doom of Greek Mythology. That whole mass of religious traditions respecting the marvelous doings of the gods, the exploits of their deified heroes and the frightful adventures of Amazons, Cyclops and Minotaurs, for a long time so "steadfastly believed," is slowly undermined by the new view of things which Philosophy teaches.

We do not mean to say that Philosophy stood alone and unaided in her noble work of leading the Greek mind to higher conceptions, for as mythology had strong allies upon which to rely, so

Philosophy found assistance, from various sources, for her mighty work. Says Grote:

"At the end of three centuries from the first Olympiad, there is a marked advance in the Greek—ethical, social, political. Many of the repulsive, incongruous features belonging to the mythopœic productions of earlier ages, cannot be tolerated, so that there is a cutting out, and a softening of many things. This is perceptible even among the tragic poets. The battle of the gods with the giants and the Titans, the castration of Uranus by Kronos, the cruelty, deceit, licentiousness, supposed both in gods and heroes, now begin to excite disapprobation. A juster moral view revolts against such things. Moreover, geographical knowledge, and a more practical acquaintance with historical events, their causes and connections, begin to strain the faith faculty as to the reality of certain things hitherto received without question."

One example will suffice: "Where do the Amazons live?" In the light of increasing geographical and historical information, the answer begins to waver.

Again, owing to certain innate ideas of the mind, the twilight of Philosophy began to dawn long before the sun of a definite Philosophy arose to disclose clearly the glaring defects of mythological teachings and beliefs. The idea of causation, and the tendency, arising simultaneously with the reflective faculty, to subsume the particular under the general, to push farther back, through manifold secondary causes and incidental circumstances, in the search for primary causes, is the promise of the *idea of invariable sequence*, which can but prove helpful to the work of Philosophy. Accordingly, the first intimation of the presence of philosophic development in the Greek mind, is the tentative effort, on the part of *vigorous* intellects, to substitute for old mythical creeds of omnipresent personifications, some idea of the law of sequence; that is, to subsume the manifold phenomena of nature under some sort of *order*, as to *process*, and *unity*, as to *cause*.

Just here we have presented one of the strongest proofs to be found in the entire history of Philosophy, that the intellectual development of man is exceedingly slow. Let us see:

According to Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, Greek Philosophy is divided into three periods. The first is characterized by a prevailing tendency to inquire towards the universe of physical nature, the period of the predominance of cosmology. The first period of Greek Philosophy begins with the earlier Ionic Natural Philosophers. Ueberweg accounts for this type of the

philosophic schools in Ionic Greece, in the first period, upon the ground of racial differences. This is doubtless one reason, but we would suggest that another reason why the first philosophical inquiry of the Greek mind took this direction, addressing itself to questions concerning nature and her phenomena, is to be seen in the *religious interpretations* of natural phenomena, which for centuries had been the current interpretation, and with which all were therefore quite familiar. The search for the new and the unknown is always *begun upon*, and from that which is already known, and is nearly always merely a modification of the old and accepted view.

Now, the interpretation which religion and the poets had given of nature, was based upon the theory of omnipresent personification. Spirits were everywhere, and in all the phenomena of nature. All the motions, all the changes, whether the billowy waves of the sea, the lightning's lurid flash, the putting forth of the leaves and the growth of plants in Spring, or the scampering of the frightened flocks on the grassy plains, were regarded as the manifestation of the unseen spirit residing within these objcets. What we call growth or process, was to the Greeks, prior to the dawn of Philosophy and science, life, the life of a divinity; what we call a natural event, was to them the invisible action of a naiad or nymph.

Now, in view of these beliefs, and at the same time under the constraining influence of the idea of causation, and of sequence, what could be Philosophy's *first* word to the reflective class of the community? "There is life, there is movement in nature," says Philosophy, "but it is not because there are myriads of unseen individual demons inhabiting every visible object, but it is because the one animating principle is in nature." "There are gods," it must be admitted, and they may interpose in controlling *some* of the events of the natural world; but the notion of innumerable divinities, peopling all nature, is unnecessary. The *life* of nature is resident in herself. Thus is the religious conception of nature slightly changed and translated into the lauguage of a rising Philpsophy.

Philosophy addressed itself first to that question which had been pressing upon the thoughtfnl ones for ages; for, though religion had always answered, it could never exactly satisfy the quickening reason of the unfolding Philosophy of the Greek.

We are able, therefore, to see how that the prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry, during the *first* period of Philosophy, was toward cosmology, and that its attitude was at first not aggressive, but gentle, conciliatory.

But this almost exclusive study of physical nature, during the first period of Greek Philosophy, soon developed into a more positive antagonism toward religion. That Philosophy should look in this direction, and make her first questionings bear upon physical nature, had been determined previously by the attitude and interpretation which religion had made; but when Philosophy began to question nature, she could not get the same answer hitherto received by the poets and priests from nature's oracles.

Thales, born 640 B. C., the earliest of the Ionic natural philosophers, could not get away from the old interpretation of nature. Though maintaining that *water* was the *principle* of things, he admitted "all things were filled by the gods."

Anaximander, born 611 B. C., gets further away. "Living beings," he taught "arise by gradual development out of the elementary moisture."

Heraclitus discovers stronger opposition still. Says Ueberweg: "The opposition of Heraclitus to the ideas of the masses, and of the poets, probably had reference to the popular Mythology." "Homer," he said, "ought to have been driven from the lists and flogged." Strong language this, for a Greek.

Whether there is a world ordering spirit, *Nous*, distinct from matter, becomes more questionable as we proceed. When we reach the close of the first period, that of the later Natural Philosophers, represented by Leucippus and Democritus, we find that these atomists have gone on to materialism. Fire and the soul are composed of round atoms. Sensation is due to material images, which come *from* objects and reach the soul. Thought and sensation are confounded, and in reality we *know* nothing. Here we see developed a strong form of sensational Philosophy. So, then, that which was at first only a mild protest against an omnipresent personification, in natural phenomena, has become almost blank materialism, and bears heavily upon the religious beliefs, and that, too, by the time we reach the end of the first period of Greek Philosophy.

If it be asked how Greek Philosophy began to assume so strongly

he materialistic type, the answer is to be found in the history of hilosophy itself. The like result has always followed when the *bject* of knowledge, to the exclusion of the *subject* of knowledge, as engrossed inquiry.

Any course of philosophic inquiry, which fails to recognize the lation of subject and object in knowledge, must inevitably lead error, one-sidedness, narrowness, if not atheism. (See Kant's ritique of Pure Reason, by Morris.)

The predominant cosmology of the first period of Greek Philos- hy could but produce the fruit always produced, viz.: a sensu- s, materialistic Philosophy, whenever the object and the phenom- a are studied to the exclusion of the *knowing* spirit. And yet, e are glad to note an occasional protest, during this period, ainst a materializing Philosophy.

Xenophanes, born B. C., 569, enounces the doctrine of the one l-controlling godhead—God is all ear, all intellect, etc. But this otest against the scepticism of the sensationalist philosophers, is so a protest against the Anthropomorphic representations of God, esented by Homer and Hesiod.

When we come to the second period of the conflict, beginning with e Sophists, we find the direction of inquiry changed from physi- l nature to man; from cosmology to anthropology.

It is said that one extreme produces another; that action and action are equal. It seems the pendulum of thought had been inging long enough in the direction of physical investigation; d now, in the beginning of the second period, it begins to swing ck to the mind, to *man himself*, as a world to be studied.

The two theories of the existence and phenomena of the physical iverse, which had been projected during the first period, advance om each other with greater divergence during the second. The o streams, issuing from a common source, not only widen and epen, each its own channel, but diverge from each other, so that w, with theories of man as the *subject* of knowledge on the one nd, and nature, the *object* on the other, it is transcendentalism, d materialism. And just as the spirit of Philosophy is, in the cond period, more confident, and its attitude more commanding, so ese two principles of interpretation, while mutually antagonistic, come more decidedly unfriendly to the ancient religious beliefs.

The influences tending to mythologic decay are more vigorously at work, heresy becomes more frequent, and the conflict more bitter between those adhering to the *old* views, and those embracing the new.

Let us see if this presentation of the problem, the disputed problem, is sustained by the facts. For convenience of view and space we arrange in tabular antitheses:

TRANSCENDENTAL:	MATERIALISTIC:
SOCRATES.	SOPHISTS.
Though not the father of any formal system of Philosophy, yet with him so exalted was reason in man, as that virtue was dependent upon knowledge. The world is governed by Supreme Intelligence. "Know thyself," is the condition of practical excellence. Believed in a "divine leading." He glorified humanity, hoped for immortality.	By them a transition effected from Philosophy, as cosmology to Philosophy, as concerning itself with the willing and thinking subject, and still it degenerated into mere sensualistic subjectivism.
ARISTOTLE, B. C., 384:	PROTAGORAS, SOPHIST, B. C., 490:
"Principles are known immediately by the reason. The prior and more knowable for us is the sensible . . . but the really prior and more knowable are the principles. God is the immaterial and the eternal form, the pure actuality in which is no potentiality, the self-thinking reason, or "Absolute Spirit."	"Man was measure of all things—all truth relative."
	GORGIAS, B. C., 427:
	"Nothing exists. If anything existed it would be unknowable."
	ARISTIPPUS, COTEMPORARY OF SOCRATES:
	"We only know our sensations, not the things which cause them; of the thing in itself we know nothing. Pleasure the end of life."
PLATO, B. C., 427:	EPICURUS, B. C., 341:
"The Platonic Philosophy furthest removed from sensationalist Philosophy. Having learned that the sensuous is subject to change perpetual, and from Socrates, that these are conceptions which, when rightly defined, never change, he believed that their counterparts must not be sought for in the sensuous world.	"Natural Philosophy of Democritus carried on. Animals and men are products of the earth. Soul is material, and composed of fine atoms."
Knowledge is higher than sense perceptions. The principle of being not in matter, but in spirit; the organic unity of knowledge not in phenomena, but in self-consciousness, wherein is to be found the absolute self. Highest good, not pleasure, not knowledge alone, but in the greatest likeness to God."	PYRRHO, B. C., 360:
	"Impossibility of knowledge. Attacked the syllogism and the intention of causation. Of two contradictories, one is as false as the other, one as true as the other."
	Others might be mentioned, but the above are deemed sufficient for illustration of antagonistic attitudes, within the circle of Philosophy, and the bearings of each upon religion.

From the above we see that the two Schools of Greek Philosophy, the one represented by Aristotle and Plato, the other by

Heraclitus, Democritus, Pyrrho and Epicurus, reach a position of positive conflict. Mutually irreconcilable, both of these systems directly negate and destroy the mythologic beliefs of the people.

Beginning with the Sophists, let us note the increasing scepticism concerning the gods and religion, as given by Ueberweg: Protagoras—"Existence of the gods uncertain." Critias of the school of the later Sophists—"Existence of the gods, the invention of some wise statesmen for political ends." About this time Diagoras became an atheist. Knowing with what tenacity men cling to inherited beliefs, it must have shocked a pious Greek to hear Protagoras saying, that the existence of the gods is uncertain, or Diagoras professing blank atheism. Doubtless the irritation, alarm and suspicion, thus excited in the popular mind at Athens, ought to be considered in trying to account for the mad persecution which resulted in the death of Socrates.

The charge made against Socrates, B. C., 399, marks a crisis in the conflict. It was as follows: "Socrates is a public offender, in that he does not recognize the gods which the State recognizes, but introduces new demoniacal beings," etc. This charge is both true and false, and illustrates the misunderstandings which often arise between philosophic, or scientific, thought and popular religious beliefs.

Holding to the existence of inferior divinities, as we believe in angels, archangels, saints, etc., yet he has to die as a heretic, and an enemy to the people's dearest sentiments and interests. He dies as a martyr to the truth, the truth which the people did not as yet understand.

What strange emotions, what confusion of thought, as the word goes through the streets of Athens, "Socrates is dead!"

Nor did Aristotle escape the suspicion of religious devotees. He, too, had ascended to the height of monotheistic conception. God was above both spheres (of the Kosmos) unchangeable, permanent, unalterable. For these higher views of God he had to quit Athens.

The death of Socrates, and Aristotle's departure from Athens, were, however, events which must and did have a great moral effect upon the public mind.

The culmination of Greek Philosophy was reached through Plato. His was comprehensive of the hemispheres of partial Phi-

losophy, which had preceded him. His is the complement of Socrates. With him "Philosophy was the science of unconditioned Being. . . . . The reason perceives substance, the understanding, phenomena. Life and essence of all things in God." Plato's idea of God was the highest and purest ever attained by uninspired man, (if it be lawful to say that Plato was uninspired). "God is one, He is spirit." He avoids polytheism on one side by making God a distinct, intelligent personality. He avoids pantheism by making him to be the Absolute One. In his idea of God, he found the legitimate terminus, the logical basis of all research, the unifying basis of all principles of being, both in respect to man and nature. (See Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, and "Ten Great Religions.")

How the complicated system of idolatrous notions, and mythical traditions, wither and fall away under such sublime teachings of Socrates, Aristotle and Plato, it is delightful to imagine.

What then, we may inquire, is the result of the growth of Greek Philosophy upon Greek Mythology? It is disintegration, decay. Has the Religion of Greece failed of its mission? By no means.

"Religion is life, Philosophy is thought." Mark well this relation between them. Without the Religion of Greece her Philosophy would have been impossible. Religion gave to Philosophy its life, its impulse, its direction. Without Philosophy Greek religion would have degenerated into fetichism, puerile superstitions, low, sensual rounds of unmeaning, loathsome rites. Until the times of the bringing in of a better light by Christianity, Philosophy was a necessary complement to Greek religion. It held the mind expectant, encouraged the exercise of the rational powers, and prevented faith from descending into absolute superstition. Philosophy, either by negating old received notions, or proposing new truths, weakened the power of dogmatic conservatism, broke the spell of authority, produced that "discontent" of mind necessary to progress. The productions of this discontent that breaks away from the past, produced a receptive state for something new, something higher; so that, when St. Paul stands before the Athenians, he could truly say: "The unknown God whom you ignorantly worship, and to whom you have already dedicated an altar, Him declare I unto you."

TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY: EXPERIMENTAL ARGUMENT.

BY W. TUCKER, D. D., CAMDEN, OHIO.

Christianity is a system of practical religion. It is grounded in the common sense of the race and is based on principles of practical wisdom. As a system of truth, suited to man in practical life, it can be tested by experience, and every man may try for himself its claims to be regarded as a Divine revelation adapted to the nature and wants of the human race. Let all men apply its principles, obey its precepts, keep its commandments, believe its promises, and live according to its teachings, and learn from experience whether it brings to man the great salvation promised by Christ. This experimental method is in harmony with true philosophy, and has, therefore, been successfully applied in the building up of the whole system of inductive sciences. A method that has been so successfully applied to science, can be applied to test the claims of Christianity with equal success, and give as the result of the experiment a system of inductive religious truth as reliable and trustworthy as the boasted system of inductive scientific truth, about which so much is said, and for which so much is claimed. But Christianity must be tried by its own principles, and not by the application of the principles of physical science as the experimental or scientific method, but the organ of investigation must be consciousness, and not the senses. The facts of religious experience are not cognized by the senses, and therefore sensation cannot furnish the data for this inductive investigation of the claims of Christianity. We cannot test chemistry by applying the principles of the mathematics, the truth of astronomy by applying the method of the botanist, and no more can we test the truth of Christianity by applying the sensuous methods of the physical scientist. Every system of truth has to be tried by the application of its own experimental methods, and in its own chosen field of operation. Astronomy cannot do the work of chemistry; botany cannot do the work of mechanical philosophy; geology cannot do the work of the mathematics, nor can Christianity do the work of physical science. Each system must do its own work, in its own way, and accom-

plish the results which it proposes, as the test of its truth, and as the basis of the argument from experience, that as a system of science, or religion, it is adapted to the nature and wants of man. By this method of experiment, Christianity is willing to be tried, and in fact has often been tried. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. (1 John viii. ch., 17 v.) This is the language of Christ, and in it He proposes that we try his system of doctrine by the experimental method. This method is philosophical, rational and scientific. I lay down this proposition: That experience is the basis of all knowledge. The fundamental fact in all experience is this: That we know ourselves as knowing, and in knowing all other things.* This is the common and universal element in all knowledge. Without it, knowledge cannot exist, and its proposition would be *impossible to man.*

This fundamental fact of experience is thus seen to be the universal element in all knowledge, and makes the fact of knowing the result of experience.

Our knowledge depends on the possession of the faculties by which we come into sensible and conscious relation to the things known. We have no knowledge of sound, without ears; of light and colors, without eyes; of flowers, without taste; of form, without touch; of love, without affections; of thought, without intellects; of truth, without reason; of moral principles, without conscience; of beauty, without an æsthetic nature; of God, without a religious faculty. The reason for this is apparent; without such powers, experience is impossible.

To gain knowledge we must not only possess certain faculties, we must exercise them. It is the man who uses his organs of vision that gets knowledge of colors in the experience of seeing. The man who uses his ears gets a knowledge of sound in the experience of hearing. It is the heart that has been exercised in loving that knows what love is by experience. It is the intellect that has been exercised in thinking that knows what thought is by an experience of intelligence. This law applies to the knowledge we gain by testimony and intuition. It is the experience of the truth of testi-

*Ferrer's Institute of Metaphysics.

mony which we gain by trusting our fellowmen that is the basis of the knowledge derived from testimony. Intuitive knowledge comes by the development and exercise of the intuitions, and not alone by the possession of the intuitive faculty. Mathematics is generally regarded as an intuitive science, but our only means of acquiring a knowledge of it, is by experience in the application of its principles to the solution of its problems and demonstrations of its theorems.

The same law applies in morals and religion. It is when man's spiritual nature has been exercised in repentance, faith, obedience, love, worship and work, that he knows God and Christ in salvation.

Experience is reliable because it is grounded in consciousness. The experience we have of the material universe is true, because it is grounded in sense consciousness, or our conscious sensations.

The experience of thought is true, because it is grounded in our intellectual consciousness; so the experience of religion is true, because it is grounded in our religious consciousness. It we deny the truth of consciousness, and reject its testimony, knowledge becomes impossible, and truth is a misnomer. It is the interior, central, universal sense of man's nature; and is reliable, because human nature is trust-worthy.

Confidence, in its truth, is the necessary condition of all experience, all knowledge, all science, and all religion. Through the same consciousness that we get an experience of matter, the external universe, and of the existence of our fellowmen, we also get an experience of God, Christ, salvation and religion. Impeach the testimony of consciousness in favor of religion, and you cannot use it as a witness to prove any other thing in the universe. All knowledge resting upon experience as its basis, is authenticated by consciousness, and its truth can no more be questioned than the fact of our own existence, or the existence of the material universe in which we live. I claim that Christianity rests upon this basis; and its truth is therefore as certain as any law or fact in the whole system of experimental and inductive sciences.*

*The Logic of Reasons, p. 181.

We know God in knowing ourselves, in conscious filial and personal relation to him as our Creator and Father.*

We know Christ as Saviour in knowing ourselves as saved by him. We know the Holy Ghost in knowing ourselves as quickened, regenerated and comforted by his divine power and influence.

We know Christianity as divine and true in knowing ourselves as enlightened and saved by it.

The blessings promised by the gospel of Christ are such as to be recognized by consciousness when given; and as we must be conscious of their possession and enjoyment, we have an experimental knowledge of the truth of the gospel in which they are promised. The gospel is thus shown to be adapted to the nature and wants of man, and, as such, to have emanated from man's Creator, who alone perfectly comprehends man's moral and spiritual being, and its demands. Millions of men tell us that they have thus tested, by experience, the claims of the Christian religion, and know from personal consciousness that it is true. There is no way to evade the force of the argument from the experience of such men. To say that they are deceived is to deny the evidence of consciousness, and thus embrace universal skepticism. If we affirm they are trying to deceive us, we reject all human testimony; for their veracity stands unimpeached before the world. If they are not deceived themselves, and are not trying to deceive others, their testimony must be true, and their experience of the truth of Christianity is unquestioned. The claim that the witnesses are insane, and therefore incompetent to testify, will not be urged here. It will not be pretended that such men as Newton, Lock, Boyle, Chalmers, Herschel, Gladstone and Wesley are lunatics, and not to be credited. This class of men testify to the truth of the Christian religion on the authority of their own experience.† In bearing testimony to the divinity and truth of the teachings of Christ, as shown by their adjustment to the intellectual, moral, social and religious nature of man, as proved by their own experience, Christian believers could have no motive to deceive their fellow-men, by testifying to a class of facts that have no existence in their moral history. Men cannot do wrong without a motive. Motives are necessary to all

*Ferriers' Institutes of Metaphysics, pp. 79, 80.

†The Logic of Reason, by Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., page 180.

rational and voluntary action, and unless some motive can be shown as operating on the minds of the disciples of Christ, strong enough to make them try to deceive their own friends, when they could gain nothing, but must sacrifice everything by such conduct, the theory of deception cannot stand. This leaves the argument of Christian experience in all its strength, and shows the testimony of believers cannot be successfully impeached. All the objections to religious experience will apply to every other form of experience.

It is urged that religious experience is only a feeling, or a condition of the religious emotions, and therefore unreliable. Can there be any experience without feeling? Is not feeling, or emotion, the necessary condition of all forms of experience, and without which all experience is impossible? If feeling is reliable in other forms of experience, how does it become unreliable in religious experience? Does its application to religion change its character as an attribute of mind? What is pain, love, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, remorse, shame, anger, gratitude, reverence, benevolence, patriotism, but forms of feeling? Are all these states of feeling, with the forms of experience which they indicate, untrue?

The feelings are a part of the mental and moral constitution of man,* and are just as reliable as any other part of man's nature. They give to life its brightness, gladness, sunshine and music. Without them there would be no tears, smiles, laughter and songs. They have their function, and perform their office as truly as any other part of man's nature.† Their office is as necessary in the economy of life, and contribute as much to man's development, happiness and usefulness as the reason or intelligence.‡ Their power for good reveals itself in all the relations and enterprises of life. They have created art, law, literature and the home. It is also urged that our feelings often deceive us, and that men are deceived in their religious experience, because the emotions enter so largely into it. Do not our senses often deceive us? Who has not had an experience of double vision? Did any sane man ever refuse to trust his senses on that ground? Shall we reject the

*McCosh, on the Emotions, 1st vol., 8 vo., pp. 111, 115, 125.

†McCosh on the Emotions, p. 245.

‡Brinton on Religious Sentiment, pp. 47, 48, 49, 50.

revelations of the science of astronomy, and the existence of the material universe because we are sometimes deceived by our senses? Do not our intellects often deceive us—memory, judgment, reason and imagination all misleading us, but are they untrustworthy? Is all philosophy, science, morals and religion to be rejected as without any foundation in truth because our intellects sometimes deceive us? The liability to deception only proves that man is not infallible, not that his faculties are not to be trusted. Man being fallible, we are not to look for infallibility even in his religion. And it matters not whether man has an infallible book, or an infallible Church. So long as he has a fallible nature, error is possible. We should not reject experimental religion because deception is possible, when we find the same liability to deception attaches to every other system.

Here we are met by another form of the objection, for it is charged that there are a great many failures in religious life and character, that are grounded in religious experience. Is not the world full of failures? The health, reason, judgment, and morals of men all fail. Men fail in business—in the pursuit of wealth, honor, pleasure, usefulness. Is it to be wondered at that there are failures in religion? But there is a truth, reality and grandeur in life, and its interests, notwithstanding its failures.

So there is a divine truth, moral power, and spiritual beauty in religion, notwithstanding men fail in religious life. But there are no more failures in life and character among those who profess experimental religion than among those who profess religion of any other form. This objection would drive us to reject all religion.

Failure in religious life, like failure in every other department of human effort, is the result of the fact that man is a finite and fallible being. It proves that we should not worship him as a God; but it does not prove that we should not trust and love him as a man. Here religion and the Church share the weakness of our common humanity like other doctrines and institutions. This results from the fact that religion and the Church are forms of human development and methods of human activity under divine direction and inspiration. There are in both large human elements.

The deist urges against experimental religion, that he has had no such experience, though he has read the Bible and heard the

gospel. I admit the deist has had no such experience, but does that prove that all other men are as ignorant as he is; or that religious experience is impossible? This will not be claimed. Has the deist experienced everything that it is possible for man to experience? Does he never expect his experience to be enlarged and enriched? But this testimony is only negative. It is a confession of ignorance and not a declaration of knowledge. Ignorance is not evidence. It proves nothing either in law or logic. We never think of placing the ignorance of one man in competition with the knowledge of another. The deist cannot testify in this case because he has no knowledge of it. He must be ruled out of court as an incompetent witness. The atheist could assault the deist with his own weapon, and retort on him his own argument. He affirms that he has looked upon the earth, sun, moon and stars, the mountains, rivers, oceans and forest, and failed to derive from them any experience of God's existence, and failed to see any manifestation of his presence, power, wisdom and goodness. This argument of the atheist on the ground of deism is logically unanswerable. So, if men reason correctly from all the facts of the universe and all the phenomena of life and history, they must embrace Christianity. Atheism and deism both claim to build their systems of negation on man's ignorance.

It is urged again that this experience of religion benefits the person who has it, but is of no advantage to others. This is not true in theory or in fact. The experience of one man helps others in every other business, why not in religion? Are we not benefited by the experience of other men in science, medicine, mechanics, agriculture, law, government, and the fine arts? it is, therefore, natural that we should derive great benefit from the religious experience of our fellowmen. If we could not be benefited by the experience of others, there could be no general science, no universal history, no advancing civilization. The past would have transmitted nothing to the present, and the present could bequeath no inheritance to the future. It is neither logical, philosophical nor scientific to refuse to recognize in religion the influence of a law of human development which we recognize in all the departments of human thought, and in every other form of human progress. It is, therefore, evident that men are to be benefited by our religious

experience just as they are by any other form of experimental knowledge.

This argument from experience has vast strength. Religious experience is a fact, known to consciousness, recognized in history, proclaimed in biography, and vocalized in song. How can this moral and spiritual phenomena be explained or accounted for if the Christian religion is not true. The hypothesis of the truth of Christianity is not only the most natural and rational, but it is the only one that will fully explain all the phenomena of Christian experience. The experience of the Christian world is a grand moral and spiritual effect that demands for its production an adequate cause. There is no such cause if Christianity be not true. The law of causation compels us, if logically constituted, to receive the Christian religion as true; for if Christianity is untrue we have the grandest moral and religious revolution known to history produced without any adequate cause. But Christian experience has assumed a social form, and manifested itself in a spiritual organism. It has created the Church as the vital force creates the tree. This shows that it is a constructive force, and has creative power; and as such it is one of the most powerful factors in the world's civilization. The results of its influence are recorded in history, crystalized in institutions, embodied in laws, breathed into living thought, preserved in literature, and living in art. It has created a new era in legislation, poetry, painting, architecture and music. Is that a principle of falsehood which has produced so much truth? Do the elements of discord combine in such grand harmonies; and the author of deformity create such touching, moral and spiritual beauty? This is the fruit of experimental religion. The argument of experience combines in itself the strength of all other arguments. Is there power in the argument from miracles? We have that in Christian experience; for regeneration is a moral miracle wrought on the human spirit and testified to by man's consciousness. Is there strength in the argument from prophecy? Christian experience is fulfilled in prophecy. Here we find the argument, from adaptation, in all its strength and beauty. It is in experience that Christianity is seen to be adapted to the nature and wants of man. Experience presents us the practical argument; for in it we see the working of Christianity in practical life. It is

the grand ocean into which all the other streams of argument flow; the one point where all the lines of evidence meet, and on which all the rays of proof are converged to a burning focus, giving certainty and assurance. This argument is based on the Christian consciousness and life of to-day, as well as of the early life of the Church. These are facts that no theories of the origin of the earth or man can destroy. They are facts of experience, based on consciousness, and grounded in life—present facts of man's living experience of to-day, and cannot be unsettled by the age of the world, the age of the race, or the age of the Bible. I believe the Bible is the book of God, but it does not exhaust God; that it is a divine revelation, but it does not exhaust revelation; that it is divinely inspired, but it does not exhaust inspiration; that it is true, but it does not exhaust the truth. God is the God of the living present, and not alone of the dead past; and He is really, truly, powerfully, savingly present in the experience of the living Church of the present day.

MORMONISM: WHAT IS IT? WHAT WILL YOU DO WITH IT?

BY REV. W. J. SCOTT.

The various religions of mankind are largely the product of physical environments. Climate, topography and even hydrography have an intimate relationship to religion as well as to agriculture and to commerce. How broad the contrast between the Druidical superstition of the ancient Britons and the beautiful mythology of the Greeks—between the Odin worship of the Teutonic tribes and the dreamy Theosophy of India. And yet, these diverse races all belong, by language and lineage, to the Indo-Germanic family, and possess like ethnic endowments and capabilities. What other adequate explanation than the one just proposed can be given of these divergent, if not conflicting religious phenomena? Nor is it less in harmony with these views that of the half-dozen book-religions of mankind, all of them originated in Southern or South-Western Asia. If Mormonism, the youngest of them all, be rightly con-

sidered of Western origin, it at least claims to be of Semitic derivation. England's insular situation has contributed to make her "the mistress of the seas." Why may not the geographical conditions of Syria, and Arabia, and India have contributed to make them the birth-place of great religious faiths which have ruled the world in ancient and modern times? The fact itself may well excite our "special wonder," although it baffles our philosophical analysis.

In this connection, it is interesting to observe the points of contact and resemblance between the Mohammedanism of the East, and the Mormonism of the West. History repeats itself after an interval of twelve hundred years. The Koran, equally with the Book of Mormon, purports to be a supplementary revelation. They both concede the Divine origin of the Old and New Testament Scriptures. They both incorporate many of the doctrinal truths and historical statements of Judaism and Christianity. Mohammedanism, it is well understood, was an open revolt against the idolatry of Arabia and the image worship of the pseudo-Christianity of the East. Planting itself squarely on the two first precepts of the Decalogue, it went forth to evangelize the earth, not with drowsy homilies, but with sword and buckler.

Mormonism, dissatisfied with the dissensions of Christendom, and protesting against alleged social grievances, undertook to establish a Theocracy on a sort of Communistic basis.

As we have already suggested, there was an affinity between their founders, as well as between the religious systems they established. Mohammed and Joseph Smith, were both monogamists in the outset of their prophetical career. At a later period, both of them professed to receive a special revelation, authorizing and encouraging a plurality of wives. Both of them were destitute alike of learning and social position. Mohammed was, indeed, of the tribe of the Koreish, the hereditary guardians of the holy Kaaba. But this tribal relationship was of less significance than the title of an Italian count or a German prince. It was at least consistent with poverty to the verge of mendicancy. He was, up to middle life, a commercial adventurer, and so remained until he luckily espoused his mistress, the amiable and wealthy Khadijah.

Smith was not only of humble parentage, but members of his

immediate family were reputed to be sheep and cattle thieves. He was, however, never implicated in these depredations on the fold and herd. On the contrary, from his boyhood, he was regarded as pious. His religious susceptibilities were sufficiently marked to attract public attention, and cause him to be spoken of as a visionary. He, too, had a fondness for mercantile ventures. These enterprises were failures, and ended in disastrous bankruptcy. Wrecked in finances and shattered in health, he became, like Mohammed, a melancholy recluse, shunning society and courting solitude. What the cave of Mt. Hara was to Mohammed, that was the hill, Cumorah, to Smith. In this state of physical disorder, it is not stange that he was favored with visions of glory and visitations of angels. These psychological phenomena are the legitimate outcome of dyspeptic ailments and cerebral congestion. Modern science does more to remove or alleviate them by hydrochloral or saccharated calomel than do the most approved methods of priestly exorcism.

In the theological parlance of the Thirteenth century, Mohammed was stigmatized as a vulgar impostor, distinctly prefigured in the Apocalyptic writings. The charity of the Nineteenth century has placed Joseph Smith in the same moral category. And yet, after the lapse of twelve hundred years, the former has a following of two hundred and fifty millions, and the latter, after fifty years, has, according to the latest estimates, a discipleship of two hundred thousand. Can such phenomenal success be accounted for on the hypothesis of fraud and fanaticism, either singly or conjointly? Most assuredly not by the latter method, as these two elements of moral character are not only mutually exclusive, but mutually repellant, not less so than similar electricities. As for the theory of conscious fraud and wilful imposture, it is embarassed by insuperable difficulties. Great as is the corruption of human nature, we are not prepared to accept the hasty generalization of David, that "all men are liars" from a deliberate preference of falsehood to truth. Even the bachelors of Salamanca, as Sancho Panza averred, did not tell lies except when it served a selfish purpose. Human depravity, according to the opposite view, goes infinite lengths beyond the uttermost limits of St. Augustine's dogma of original sin. Moreover, it discredits human testimony to such a degree that the administration

of law, civil or criminal, is a sheer mockery, and the decision of the twelve judges of England as unreliable as the hazard of a die. Nor is the hypothesis, when applied to Mormonism, other than a two-edged sword that strikes at true, as well as false religions. The syllogism of Hume in regard to the credibility of Christian miracles becomes *ex hypothesi* an overwhelming moral demonstration. If men will endure persecution, imprisonment and death to uphold what they know to be "an old wives' fable," then it follows that our Christian Evidences from St. Paul's conversion to St. John's vision of the final judgment, are, in their last analysis, a series of "argumentative white lies." We justly spurn the conclusion, but to be consistent, we must likewise reject the premises. These remarks, which are mainly prefatory, bring us to the practical question—"Mormonism—what is it?"

As regards the Book of Mormon, the historical basis of the Church of the Latter-day Saints, there are two contradictory statements. According to the tradition of the Mormon Church, the contents of this book were originally written on plates of gold. Mormon, who was concerned in the arrangement and preservation of these records, was one of the few that survived the destruction of the Nephites in the Sixth century of the Christian era. They were deposited for safe-keeping in or near the town of Manchester, in Western New York. In two distinct visions the angel Moroni revealed to Joseph Smith the place of their deposit. On the 22d of September, 1827, Smith received these records by the ministry of angels. Along with the golden plates there was found a pair of stone spectacles, (attached to a breastplate,) which he called Urim and Thummim. With the aid of these he was enabled to translate the original language styled "Reformed Egyptian" into our English vernacular. In making this translation, Oliver Cowdery, one of his earliest converts, acted as the amanuensis of the prophet. This work of translation being completed, the book was published at Palmyra, New York, one Martin Harris defraying the expenses of publication. The appendix contains the certificate of three witnesses who testify that they had seen the golden plates and beheld a vision of angels about the time of the alleged translation. In the same connection there is a certificate of eight other persons, who corroborated the testimony of the

three original witnesses. Of this latter number some are men of very doubtful veracity. Others of the eleven subsequently renounced Mormonism and confessed that the entire translation was a cheat. This statement comprises the whole of the affirmative historical evidence for the authenticity of the Book of Mormon.

The conflicting account is to this effect: Some years before Smith's alleged discovery of the golden paltes, the Rev. Solomon Spalding, of Ohio, undertook to write a sort of historical romance founded upon the dispersion of the ten tribes of Israel. According to the sworn testimony of his wife and others, it was chiefly written to beguile the tedium of a chronic illness. After Spalding's death the manuscript fell into the hands of Sidney Rigdon, himself a wild enthusiast, and through him reached the hands of Joseph Smith. The testimony in favor of this statement is invincible and forces us to the conclusion that the GOLDEN BOOK is as fabulous as the Poems of Ossian, or the sacred books of the Cumean Sybil.

Nor are the internal evidences less conclusive against its claims to a supernatural origin. The story that this continent was peopled first by a colony of Jaredites, who left the plains of Shinar, about the time of the confusion of tongues, and then by another colony of Nephites who left Jerusalem six hundred years B. C., is more improbable, not to say impossible, than the adventures of Robinson Crusoe, or of Sinbad, the Sailor. The condition of the art of navigation is of itself an insurmountable difficulty. Dr. Robertson, the learned historian of Charles V., attempted to meet the difficulty by asserting that a literal bridge once connected Africa with South America, but that it was destroyed ages agone by wave and wind. This and other puerile conceits to account for the presence of the aboriginal inhabitants of North and South America, whom popular superstition had identified with the lost tribes of Israel. So Mormonism further asserts that Christ, after his resurrection, manifested himself to the inhabitants of this continent and established a grand Christian civilization that was overthrown about the year seven hundred of our era. Strange that it never occurred to these writers that these Indian tribes were possibly autochthonous and that the civilization, relics of which are seen in the ruined cities of Central America, is Aztec and not Asiatic. The Book of Mor-

mon, by committing itself to these scientific absurdities, has sealed its own doom as a Divine revelation.

As respect its doctrines, it is the veriest jumble of crudities and contradictions that can well be imagined. Its Theism is essentially anthropomorphic. At this point it touches Buddhism and makes the God-head a sublimated humanity. It holds the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and teaches that the gifts of tongues, healing and prophecy which were polemical in their very design, and, therefore, transitory, are the perpetual endowment of the Church of the Latter-day Saints. It maintains, also, the truth of such monkish fancies as the literal restoration of the Jews, and the personal reign of Christ on Mt. Zion for a thousand years. What is yet more decisive is, that the style, not less than the matter of parts of the book, unmistakably point to Western New York, and the present century, as the time and place of its nativity. It contains frequent allusions to religious controversies and even political squabbles that are known to have agitated the popular mind of that particular locality just previous to its publication in 1830. These references were, of course, interpolated into the original manuscript of Spalding, either by Smith or, as is most probable, by Sidney Rigdon, who, in the main, manipulated this stupendous swindle.

These facts and averments seem to be irreconcilable with the theory of Smith's sincerity. And yet, when we consider other facts of his former and subsequent history, we are constrained to allow that he was indeed a first-class fanatic, but in no just sense a religious knave.

We have studied history to little purpose if we cannot harmonize these apparent discrepancies. Take the story of Socrates and his genius who admonished him always of impending evil. No greater fable is found in Esop or La Fontaine. And yet, are we prepared to join his enemies who defamed him as a hypocrite, a reviler of the gods and a corrupter of the youth of Athens? How shall we dispose of Emmanuel Swedenborg, who claimed to have daily converse with disembodied spirits? What of his book on "Heaven and Hell" as intensely realistic in its descriptions as a school geography? Have we yet to learn that a fanatic has

method in his madness? The old belief that the lunatic was inspired may, after all, have in it a modicum of philosophy.

No intelligent man of the present generation believes that Mohammed was a conscious trickster. So, likewise, the persistence with which Smith pursued his purpose—the bravery with which he confronted dangers and privations of no commonplace sort—the calm intrepidity with which he faced a murderous mob in the jail at Carthage, Illinois, all bear witness to his honesty. This conclusion is not in any sense affected by the truth or falsehood of his religion. Every creed has its martyrology.

Whatever may be our views on this point, already sufficiently discussed, we are next brought face to face with a more perplexing problem that demands a prompt solution.

"What will you do with it?" Driven from New York to Missouri, pushed back to Illinois, ousted by military force and mob violence from Nauvoo, sojourning for a time beyond the Mississippi, their prophet and patriarch dead, their beautiful temple destroyed, the fortunes of Mormonism seemed indeed desperate. With the opening Spring, however, of 1848, they set forth under the leadership of Brigham Young, on an exodus to the Great Salt Lake Valley beyond the boundaries of Gentile civilization. Their journey was attended by perils and hardships that at least tested the thoroughness of their convictions. In the heart of Deseret, they planted, to use their quaint vernacular, the first "stake of Zion." The first year of their settlement was marked by numerous disasters. Disease and drought conjoined to dismay and dishearten the infant colony. The former diminished their industrial resources, and the latter damaged their crops, and even their scanty product was well nigh consumed by armies of crickets from the neighboring mountains. But in a few years their skillful husbandry, aided by artificial irrigation, made the barren waste to blossom as the rose, and to bloom like the garden of the Lord. The United States census statistics show that Utah has enjoyed more than an average share of material prosperity. The rapid increase of population, with the equal growth of leading industries, have been exceptional even in the annals of Western enterprise and progress. Nor have less material interests been overlooked. Education has kept pace in Utah with its advancement in portions of

New England. In this respect it has outstripped several of the Middle and Western States. It claims, likewise, to have been singularly exempt from the omnipresent whiskey curse, and to suffer less than other communities from pauperism and prostitution.

But behind these signs of thrift and progression, there looms up in the back-ground the deepening shadow of POLYGAMY, a grievous crime against God and humanity.

To conclude that this anomalous feature of Mormon society has, in anywise, contributed to the notably good results we have been considering, is to perpetrate the familiar fallacy of *non causa, pro causa.*

It is not less illogical for Orson Hyde, one of the most distinguished of the Mormon Elders to attempt, in a public disputation, a Scriptural defense of Polygamy. The examples of Jacob, David and Solomon, so far from helping his argument, are literally destructive to his hypothesis. Jacob was not only a polygamist, but a crafty and unscrupulous swindler. David was deeply defiled with blood-guiltiness. Solomon, with all his wisdom, was not less a royal debauchee than George the IV., of England. The Bible records the polygamous crimes of these men, not to condone, but to condemn. In all these instances, a retributive providence avenged their wrong-doing. Jacob's home-life, in every stage of it, was embittered by his crime. David not only cowered under the stern rebuke of Nathan, the prophet, but in the penitential Psalms we hear the wailings of a dismal woe. Solomon, because of his strange wives, and the multitude of his concubines, insured the dismemberment and downfall of the kingdom of David.

The Old Testament does not contain a single utterance that justifies this abomination, that maketh desolate the sanctuary of the home, and degrades woman to the level of the brute. Christ and his apostles, in the new and better covenant, distinctly affirm what science teaches, that monogamy is the original and normal relationship of the sexes.

American statesmanship has hitherto shown itself unable to grapple successfully with this difficult question. It has baffled the wisdom of successive administrations—Democratic and Republican. Congressional intervention, also, has, so far, signally failed either to remove or ameliorate this immense social evil. Some of

the measures have assumed the shape of religious intolerance, and to that extent have been unjust and impolitic. The trite proverb, "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church," has been amply illustrated in the past history of the Mormon sect. The murder of Joseph Smith and his brother Hyram, and the needless destruction of the temple at Nauvoo, were, at least, grave blunders. They gave a fresh impulse to a fanaticism they sought to crush. They invested a despised faith with a factitious dignity, and its proscribed founder with a halo of heroism, if not with the crown of martyrdom. A repetition of the experiment would be followed by similar results. In the main, this doubtful policy has found its principal advocates in those States where licentious divorce systems have well-nigh stripped the marriage-vow of its proper sanctity. This class of religionists are not altogether fit persons to cast the first stone of obloquy at the misguided polygamists of Utah. Nor are the descendants of men who believed that toothless crones could, by some "cantrap sleight" traverse the air on "aeronautic broom-sticks," exactly suited to lecture the dupes of Mormonism on the evils of superstition. Nor, indeed, are we prepared to recognize the expediency of a Territorial Government by a military commission. Such a precedent would be dangerous to constitutional liberty, as it opens a wide door to future inroads on the reserved rights of the States. It smacks too much of the "shot-gun policy," which has been denounced as a special characteristic of Southern civilization. It occurs to us that there is no urgency that warrants this appeal to the bayonet. Indeed, any effort to quarantine this moral pestilence is, in the light of both reason and experience, a hopeless undertaking. If a military cordon, as impassable as the lines of Wellington at the *Torres Vedras*, were drawn around the Territory of Utah, it could not shut in this deadly malaria. It has long ceased to be a purely local question. It has already diffused itself through the adjacent States and Territories. Its missionaries are not less aggressive and self-sacrificing than the Jesuit missionaries, who, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, dominated the leading courts of Europe, penetrated China and Japan, and, under Dr. Francia, founded a theocracy in the wilds of South America. These Mormon missionaries have made converts by scores and hundreds in England, in Sweden, in Spain, and have

organized "stakes of Zion" in the ends of the earth. We have to deal with it by other, if not more Christian, methods than are formulated in the Edmunds' bill. There is a more excellent way for the sure, if not speedy extirpation of this monstrous iniquity. Let us not become impatient or despondent. Truth can always afford to wait, because it is evermore in harmony with the fitness of things and the wise purposes of the eternal God.

First of all, let it be the settled policy of the Federal Government to keep Utah in a state of territorial pupilage until such time as she shall present a State Constitution, distinctly prohibitory of this polygamous enormity. In the meanwhile, let the most prudent men be appointed to official position—men wise in counsel, firm in purpose, and in full sympathy with the Christian sentiment of the age. As far as practicable, let there be a stringent enforcement of the laws against polygamy. In order to insure this, let every practical polygamist be disqualified as judge or juror and such other disqualifications imposed as discriminate between the theoretical and practical polygamist. There are a variety of considerations that commend this expectant treatment rather than a harsher treatment to the acceptance of the government. There is in the bosom of the Mormon Church itself a wide diversity of opinion in reference to this hideous vice. A minority, respectable for numbers and even for influence, deny that their founder ever sanctioned the introduction of polygamy into their creed. They insist that Brigham Young is mainly responsible for its existence. They allege that the pretended special revelation of 1843, was a palpable forgery—an ingenious afterthought of Young to vindicate his own beastly sensualism. For the present these malcontents are classed as apostate Mormons, but they serve admirably well as the nucleus of an opposition that is yet destined to become formidable. This protest will be materially strengthened by the steady growth of the Christian population already equal to twenty per cent. of the aggregate. As the matter now stands the members of the hierarchy and their satellites are the chief offenders, and the great body of the Mormons will refrain more and more from its practice for reasons of economy, if not from higher motives. In this way, without resorting to a policy that would permanently alienate the Mormon masses—the wished for consum-

mation may be reached. But, as we have before intimated, this moral infection is no longer purely local. It is spreading in all directions, and the public sentiment of the nation needs to be enlightened and reformed. The divorce laws of many of the States of the Union are a reproach to Christianity, and in their measure are not less demoralizing than polygamy itself. As long as marriage is regarded as a mere civil contract, we may expect that lax views will obtain in legislatures and courts. We might not accept the theory of the Catholic Church as to the sacramental character of marriage, but we are as little inclined to endorse the extreme reaction of Protestantism, which, in our estimation, is hardly less objectionable. The one is an error of excess, the other of defect. No marriage should be deemed valid that is not suitably solemnized by an officiating magistrate or minister, and also properly registered. Moreover, the press and the pulpit should urge upon the legislative department the repeal of these obnoxious laws, and upon the judicial department the necessity of greater caution in disrupting this sacred relationship.

Not only the polygamy of Utah, but these licentious divorce systems, are in conflict with the race instincts and immemorial traditions of our Aryan ancestors. Long before the age of Tacitus the countrymen of Arminius were not more distinguished for love of personal liberty than for their profound reverence for motherhood and wifehood. These political and moral traits have been transmitted through successive generations and find their loftiest exponents in our Nineteenth century civilization. The proper geographical *habitat* of polygamy and its kindred social vices is in the far East amongst the Semitic tribes which, from the dawn of history, have trampled on the Divine law of marriage. To one of these tribes which God had redeemed from bondage with a high hand and outstretched arm, He proclaimed as one precept of the fiery law of Sinai: THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT ADULTERY.

This precept the Great Teacher affirmed with higher sanctions and with a broader interpretation. On its faithful maintenance depend the purity of home life—the prosperity of the State and the well-being of mankind.

THEOLOGICAL METHOD.

BY PROF. J. J. TIGERT, S. T. B.

Systematic Theology is defined with sufficient accuracy as the scientific form of the truth of revelation. Theology proper, is, indeed, the immediate doctrine concerning God, his existence, nature and perfections (*logos peri tou Theou,*) but an adequate definition of Theology, as the science of religion, and as co-extensive with divinity, must include, in addition to the doctrine of God, the doctrine of divine things (*logos peri tou Theou kai peri ton Theion.*)

Various divisions of the *whole field* of theological research have been proposed, and have found wider or narrower adoption among theologians. Schleiermacher makes a division of Theology into philosophical, historical and practical.

To philosophical Theology are assigned: (1) apologetics, and (2) polemics. Historical Theology embraces: (1) exegetics, or acquaintance with original Christianity, including biblical archæology, introduction, criticism and interpretation—in short, biblical Theology, as the perfect fruit of the combination of all exegetical study; (2) ecclesiastical history, or an account of the subsequent course, development and extension of Christianity, with emphasis on the history of doctrines; (3) the presentation of the present state of Christianity, (a) as to doctrine (dogmatics), (b) as to general welfare and relations (statistics). Practical Theology includes: (1) Worship, homiletics, and the pastoral care; (2) Church government. Godet classifies Theology as speculative, or the knowledge of salvation, and as practical, or the art of saving men. Under the first he places: (1) exegetical, (2) dogmatic, and (3) historical Theology; under the second: (1) Church government, (2) *missions*, and (3) apologetics.

Dr. W. F. Warren, of Boston, following Schleiermacher, but making an advance and improvement upon him, gives the following division: 1. The Church in its *origin*, in time, including, (1) introduction, (2) biblical Theology, (3) biblical history, archæology, etc. 2. The Church in its *development* in time: (1) doctrine history; (2) Church history; (3) dogmatics and polemics; (4) Church government. 3. The Church in its *final consummation*,

which would include the teachings of revelation concerning the future development of the Church, and finally, eschatology. But for all the practical purposes of the student, the time-honored division into exegetical, historical, systematic and practical, will be found the most useful. The schemes noticed are sagacious and suggestive. This latter is comprehensive and logical, and has become familiar through its general adoption by theological instructors and writers. The name of each division is sufficienly indicative of the studies included in it.

The definition of systematic, or dogmatic Theology, with which this paper opens, may, on first consideration, appear to be too exclusively biblical, that is to refer the whole of Theology to the Bible, as its *only* source. But it is not so. Biblical Theology and biblical dogmatics, are very intimately related, and, consequently, are easily confounded. The definition is not biblical as opposed to dogmatic, for the relation of biblical Theology to dogmatics, is that of the *complete collection* of *materials* to the *organized system*; and the transformation from biblical to dogmatic form is implied in the designation of Theology as a science. A science is a complement of facts or truths, possessing organic connection and unity, elaborated by the generalizing processes of induction, with the legitmate operation of the deductive faculty, into a symmetrical and consistent whole. Biblical and systematic Theology are one, in that they both have the truths of Scripture for their subject-matter; they differ in form. The former endeavors to present doctrine as it lies in the Scripture, and to trace its individual treatment in, and development through, the various books of the inspired record. It is purely exegetical and historical; and as such is the indispensable base of a reliable and catholic system of Bible dogmatics. It persistently avoids all dogmatic predilections. Systematic Theology initially demonstrates or assumes the inspiration and infallible authority of the Scriptures, and then arranges and treats all Bible truths with this character impressed upon them. But biblical Theology does not take inspiration, or infallibility, for a beginning point or formative principle; but adhering strictly to exegetical and historical methods which may, and do, indeed, ultimately demonstrate inspiration, works out the exact doctrinal contents of each document of the Bible, and arrives at its own appro-

priate results. Systematic Theology takes this same matter and, by induction and deduction, transforms it into the scientific or dogmatic form. All the laws of thought, and powers of intellect, brought into legitimate exercise, in effecting this change of form, are included in, and approved by the definition.

In the second place, the definition is not biblical, in the sense of excluding reason, and nature, as sources of Theology. There are the implicit assumptions and presuppositions, and also the explicit teachings of revelation on these points. Reason and nature, as sources of Theology, are both implicitly and expressly absorbed by the complementary, corrective and complete revelation. More weighty words than those of Dr. Wm. Burt Pope, have seldom been spoken in this connection. Treating expressly of Jesus as the Great Revealer and Teacher, he says: "The Supreme Revealer confirms and absorbs, into his teaching, the original revelations of nature, or what is called natural Theology. (1.) He presupposes the elements of this natural knowledge. He everywhere appeals to it. But by the mouth of his servant, Paul, He has given the fullest exposition of what it includes.

First. The apostle speaks of the law, written on their hearts, or on the reason of universal man, which is the indestructible evidence of a God, in whose image he was created; for we are also his offspring.

Secondly. He appeals to the religious consciousness, or conscience, in man, bearing witness, and their thoughts, the meanwhile, accusing one another according to the standard written, or rather engraven, on the reason; to the evidences of the eternal power and Godhead, which were clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; and to a Providence, drawing men, in all ages, to feel after the unknown God of a final revelation. Thus St Paul, as preacher in the Acts, and teacher in the Romans, traces the broad outlines of the primitive, inferior and traditional knowledge of mankind. He is, himself, pre-eminently the theologian of the finished revelation in Christ, but he indirectly, and yet most clearly, acknowledges the labors of a certain Theology, outside of supernatural revelation, and preliminary to it. (2.) The New Teacher confirms and supplements the Theology of nature. Our Lord came not to destroy, but to fulfil this natural law, and these

natural prophets. Of these Scriptures, also, He silently says to the searcher: They testify of me. His coming reveals their imperfection; but his tribute to them, as the basis of his teachings, indicates their divine origin (Compendium of Christian Theology, Vol. I. pp. 10, 11).

Thirdly. This biblical definition is not exclusive of a proper historical treatment of the doctrines of revealed truth. Inasmuch as the history of doctrines is not only helpful but necessary to the attainment of our own final scientific or dogmatic form, we are entitled to its use. This use of doctrinal history should not, however, be given a prominent place in the definition, as it is tributary and subordinate to the specific ends sought, and Systematic Theology should not be made to usurp the large place assigned to historical. Exegetical, or biblical Theology, in its widest sense, is the great furnisher of materials for dogmatics, and historical Theology is the department of investigation chiefly auxilary to intelligent dogmatic study; but the dogmatic theologian is not authorized to trespass upon the peculiar province of either.

Lastly. While the definition implies all this, it divorces Theology from an unholy alliance with, and servile dependence upon, the various human forms of speculative and rationalistic philosophy that have so often been the medium of the interpretation of Scripture and of authoritative formation of dogma. Philosophical systems have never furnished abiding foundations for Theology. Christian Theology first adopted Platonism, and took its whole color from it. This system was abandoned for the Aristotelian, which, through the influence of the schoolmen, became universal. After the Reformation, came the philosophical systems of Des Cartes, Liebnitz, Wolf, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Theological belief, resting on the authority of Wolfian philosophy, was destroyed by Kant, and Kantian philosophical Theology was in turn deprived of its foundation by Schelling and Hegel. These theological philosophies and philosophical theologies, confessedly pantheistic, and really anti-Christian and atheistic, have been the curse of almost all recent theological learning in Germany.

These topics, presented here as an enlargement of the definition, would, of course, be more largely treated in the consideration of the Holy Scriptures as the rule of faith.

In prosecuting the study of systematic Theology we should be brought to consider, first, the character of materials to which the form of a science is to be given. This is the department of (I.) bibliology, or the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures. It would then be necessary to formulate the teachings of the biblical record in regard to the existence, essence and attributes of God. This is (II.) Theology proper. But this revelation is made by the Divine Being, not to angels, but to the race of mankind, and the third division of our subject would be (III.) anthropology, or the doctrine of man, in which we should consider his origin, nature, history, probation and fall. Finding man a fallen being, we should be led directly to the consideration of the great doctrine of sin, (IV.) hamartiology. The *revelation* from *God*, finding *man a sinner* in need of *salvation*, brings to his knowledge a divine scheme of redemption, and our fifth department would be (V.) soteriology, or the doctrine of salvation. Salvation is accomplished mainly through the instrumentality of an ordained organization, the Church, and we should have as our sixth subject (VI.) ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Christian Church, including its ministry, government, ordinances and sacraments. Lastly, human life is terminated by death, and human history is to be concluded with a judgment, and men, soul and body being reunited in the resurrection, shall reach permanent states and abodes in heaven and hell. The last subject of investigation, therefore, would be (VII.) Eschatology, or the doctrine of the Last Things.

These words may be a little new to some of us, but they are not intended for pulpit use, and it is extremely convenient and desirable to have a single word to designate each great department of theological study. And every science develops a terminology as it needs it.

MRS. BROWNING.

BY MRS. THEODOSIA WARREN, AMERICUS, GA.

Elizabeth Barrett, whose name was destined to find its comple-
on in that of Browning, was born at Hope End, near Ledbury,
1809. Of her childhood and youth our knowledge is meagre.
her maturity, when the world's recognition of her genius had
ade her famous, she has been minutely described to us; but it is
e delightful task of the imagination to picture the fair, fragile
ild of dreams and poesy—the light of a lonely father's heart and
me.

At the age of ten, she was a contributor to various periodicals;
d gave some promise, in her rhymes, of a poet's power. In her
venteenth year, she published "An Essay on Mind, and other
oems." This volume has been described as possessing more
omise than merit. But it was a remarkably precocious literary
oduction. For a girl of sixteen to write a didactic essay, exhib-
ng profound knowledge of her subject, establishes her genius
yond question. Even at that early age she had acquired many
nguages, and her mind was well stored with their literature.
oubtless to this fact may be ascribed her frequent use of obsolete
rds and obscure meanings. The quality of her mind was
oved, however, in that, though possessed of culture and learning
ualed by few women of any time, her use of it in her writings
s ever been more liberal than pedantic.

In 1833, she issued a volume called, "Prometheus Bound, and
her Poems." These, she afterwards rewrote, as she said: "In
piation of a sin of my youth, with the sincerest application
my maturer mind."

Miss Mitford, who made her acquaintance in 1836, thus describes
r appearance: "Of a slight, delicate figure, with a shower of dark
rls falling on either side of a most expressive face; large, tender
s, richly fringed by dark eye-lashes; a smile like a sunbeam, and
face of exceeding youthfulness." We have a portrait better
ted to our ideal of her, from her "Vision of Poets:"

> "Sublime significance of mouth,
> Dilated nostril full of youth,
> And forehead royal with the truth."

A lofty beauty of spirit, which proved, in itself, her right to sign the royal name of Poet like a Queen.

Always a delicate woman, a creature seemingly less of earth than of heaven, her physical frailty was greatly aggravated in 1837 by the rupture of a blood vessel of the lungs, which was so long in healing, that, after a year's confinement to her father's house in London, the physicians ordered her to the milder climate of Torquay. Her eldest brother, who was a congenial and devoted comrade in thought, as well as affection, accompanied her: and there occurred the catastrophe which was such a blight to her youth and returning health. She had been enjoying, for nearly a year, the mild, health-giving breezes of Devonshire, when, one sad day she witnessed, from her window, the pleasure boat, with her brother and two friends on board, sink, never to rise again.

Utterly prostrated by this tragedy, it was some time before she was able to bear even the most careful and tender transportation to her sad home. After her return, she began a life of confinement, which lasted seven years. There in her little world, bounded by four walls, she distilled knowledge and power as the fruits of her wide and patient research. And lying, almost a physical wreck, upon her couch of pain, her brain glowed with beautiful fancies; and she sent to the world poems which were almost prophecies, burning with special revelation through the hearts of all.

It was during this period of her life that she received the benefit of Hugh Stuart Boyd's friendship and teaching. We feel affectionate reverence for the blind old man, who, she tells us, was "enthusiastic for the good and the beautiful, and one of the most simple and upright of human beings." We cannot doubt that she had reference to him when she wrote:

> ——"What he taught before
> From many a volume, Love re-emphasized,
> Upon the self-same pages: Theophrast
> Grew tender with the memory of his eyes,
> And Alian made mine net."

In 1838, she published the "Seraphim, and other Poems." If in this, and some other poems, the daring height of speculation and invention had been sustained, she would have equaled Dante and Milton in their special province. This was followed, in about a

year, by "The Romaunt of the Page." We presume that about this time appeared "The Vision of Poets." This is a poem of rare delicacy of conception and symmetry of execution; a poem, where "song eddies through speech"—song, too, of such entrancing harmony as could come only from the pure depths of a poet's heart.

"A harmony, that, finding vent,
Upward in grand ascension went,
Winged to a heavenly argument.

A harmony sublime and plain,
Which cleft, as dying swan, the rain—
Throwing the drops off, with a strain
Of her white wings."

Giving her "Poet" of the vision her own experience, he says:

"I laid my soul before *Thy* feet
That images of fair and sweet
Should walk to other men on it."

About the only examples of her prose left to us, are some essays contributed to the London Athenæum on "The Greek, Christian, and English Poets."

Her first collected book of poems, containing numerous ballads, appeared in 1844. In these, she adopted a style more purely English; dropping the mannerisms and classical allusions that so marred her more ambitious poems, like "The Seraphim," and the "Drama of Exile."

In her lyrical efforts, her mighty spirit seemed to burst from its prison of pain, and voice itself in infinite song. One of these, "Lady Geraldine's Courtship," although written in twelve hours, to meet a contract with the publisher, was the key by which she unlocked the popular heart, and won for herself its unquestioning applause. It is a poem for remembrance! The verses flow in such rhythmic measure, that unconsciously they set themselves to music. "For the echo in you breaks upon the words which you are reading."

This delicious ballad contained a graceful compliment to Mr. Robert Browning. Already that poet's yearning for sweet companionship with a kindred mind, had met with the inspiration which her poems breathed; and in his soul he felt that:

——"One day out
Of darkness they should meet,
And read Life's meaning in each other's eyes."

It is a tradition, that by the mistake of a new servant, when Mr. Browning called to express in person his acknowledgments, he was admitted into the invalid's presence. Once in that presence, it was impossible to restrain the expression of his admiring love. He was indignantly repulsed; but admission once gained, he came again and again; and was not long in winning the heart already inclined toward him.

She had now reached that epoch in a woman's life, when existence, even in less poetic natures, becomes a poem. She had arrived at "The Gate called Beautiful," which opened, even to her, a life of grander possibilities.

We are permitted to catch glimpses of this perfect love story in real life, between the lines of the poems, "Life and Love," "A Denial," and "Inclusions," poems published about this time, and confessing her struggle against a love which seemed to her but a benediction, against a lover, who came but as the thrower of fresh flowers upon a grave. How touchingly she expresses her generous love in the closing lines of her poem called, "Insufficiency:"

"Oh, hold me not! love me not!
Let me retrieve thee;
I love thee so, dear, that I
Only can leave thee."

But her beautiful humility could not deter her poet-lover from adding to both their lives the "chrism" of love, whose sanctifying sweetness inspired her to write:

"The face of all the world is changed, I think,
Since first I heard the footsteps of thy soul
Move, still, beside me, as they stole
Betwixt me and the dreadful outer brink
Of obvious death, when I, who thought to sink,
Was caught up into love, and taught the whole
Of life in a new rhythm."

And it was well, indeed, for her, though against her father's unreasonable and immovable objections, she decided that:

"Love, mere love, is beautiful indeed,
And worthy of acceptation."

In her "Sonnets from the Portugese," (which are swift with feeling, as touching to all humanity as the choicest bits of their own experience, and the chosen vehicles for the expression of her own loyal heart,) she thus describes the transformation love had wrought in her: "And what I feel, across the inferior features of what I am, doth flash itself, and show how that great work of Love enhances Nature's."

In 1846, she consummated love's work by marriage; and her Poet "transported the 'English Nightingale,' which had but sung at night, with its breast against a thorn, to the soft clime of Italy; to become, beneath its sunny skies, a veritable sky-lark, singing a nobler, sweeter song." There, her genius became, like the native orange trees, hung at once with golden fruit and luxuriant flowers, which expanded into bloom and fragrance beneath those favoring skies; while she, herself, was nursed into health and beauty by the sunshine and dew of love. It was a venture, that poet's marriage.

It is said that ordinary people can more easily attain to that perfect mating, which is the sum of bliss. But here we have an almost unparalleled example of the true marriage of mind, and heart, and soul. And in the sequel there is deep significance. Nature gave as reward, renewed physical and spiritual life and thought; so that the ten years following her marriage were the most blessed of her life; not only respecting her individual good and happiness, but as to the quality of her published works. Love, like a dominant chord, imposed its harmony on all she was or did.

Some of those who were privileged to see and know her, after her grateful life had quaffed the "cool, blue wine of Southern seas," and she had felt upon her fevered brow the wind blow soft from the "land of souls," have written glowing words of the impression made upon them by this ideal marriage of two great poets. And we come to a grateful knowledge from these pen pictures, as well as from her own writings, that the woman was greater than the artist; the beauties of her Christian character more fascinating than her transcendent gifts of mind.

Her happiness was completed in 1849, by the birth of her son, an only child, thus rounding the circle of her womanly experiences. And her woman's soul proved wide enough to carry the whole octave, "living itself out vocally in books."

In 1850, came her "Sonnets from the Portugese." These Psalms are unsurpassed for depth of feeling and tenderness of expression; inspired outpourings of her love-burdened heart.

The sonnet we give below, is, of all those flowers plucked from her "heart's ground" for her beloved, the perfect rose, which will keep its rich, warm coloring and dewy sweetness as long as love reigns supreme:

"How do I love thee? Let me count the ways:
I love thee, to the depth, and breadth, and height
My soul can reach, when feeling out of sight
For the ends of Being and ideal Grace.
I love thee to the level of every day's
Most quiet need, by sun and candle-light,
I love thee freely, as men strive for Right;
I love thee purely, as they turn from Praise.
I love thee with the passion put to use
In my old griefs, and with my childhood's faith.
I love thee with a love I seemed to lose
With my lost saints—I love thee with the breath,
Smiles, tears, of all my life!—and, if God choose,
I shall but love thee better after death."

In 1851, she published "Casa Guidi Windows," thus immortalizing her Florentine home, and winning for herself the grateful affection of all Italian hearts. It is a noble song for Italy, which she sang thus:

"Exultingly and purely yet, with pang
Fast sheathed in music, touched the heart of us
So finely, that the pity scarcely pained."

She, herself, calls it a "simple story of personal impressions, whose only value is the intensity with which they were received, as proving her warm affection for a beautiful and unfortunate country."

It was five years before she gave to the world her crowning work, "Aurora Leigh," a narrative poem in nine books, which she declared to be the most mature of her works, and the one into which entered her highest convictions on Life and Art. This book is remarkable for triumphing over great faults, both in plot and style. One of its chief attractions is, that we have an idea that the noble-minded, high-souled woman and artist, Aurora Leigh, is the impersonation of Mrs. Browning herself. Indeed,

in the opening lines of the book we find some ground for this opinion. She says:

> "I who have written much in prose and verse
> For others' uses, will now write for mine,
> As when you paint your portrait for a friend
> Who keeps it in a drawer, and looks at it
> Long after he has ceased to love you, just to hold
> Together what he was and is."

It is a book of great power; every line bears the finger-touch of genius. It is, indeed—

> "The rhythmic turbulence of blood and brain
> Swept outward upon words, as wind upon the alders,
> Blanching them by turning up their under natures
> 'Til they trembled in dilation."

Her poems before Congress appeared in 1860. Her last poems were written in 1860 and 1861. In these, some critics discern a loss of power due to her failing health, but for others, those minor chords but enhance the sweetness of her last songs.

But she was indeed failing; her mental and spiritual nature seemed consuming her poor, weak frame with its intensity. Political events, seeming to sink her beloved Italy yet more deeply in the shadow of wrong and oppression, she sank as from a sharp blow. "Night was on the nation." But the poet was the prophet. In her new home she sat and watched for the day-dawn through "Casa Guidi Windows." It waited long, but it dawned at last, and she saw it, and then died! Is there not more than sick-bed meaning in the brief story of the telegraph, that she expired 'half an hour after day-break?' For the dream of her life—a free and united Italy—was finally realized in Napoleon's formal recognition of Italian freedom and unity in the very week she died! The full day-dawn of Italy was to shine from France; and she saw it and died—just after the day-break." So, she who has been called "The Passion Flower of her Century," quietly passed away on the morning of June 29th, 1861. And the bereaved city of her love and adoption placed on Casa Guidi this inscription of love and honor to her memory:

"Here wrote and died Elizabeth Barrett Browning; who, in her woman's heart united the wisdom of the sage to the eloquence

of the poet. With her golden verse she linked Italy to England. "Florence, grateful, placed this memorial, A. D. 1861."

Mrs. Browning stands pre-eminent among female poets. Her conceptions were broad and deep. Piercing, with a woman's quick intuition, and ready sympathy, through conventions and shams, she sought the vital point of every question, its moral attitude. She added to her womanly tenderness and pity for suffering at hand, the rarer power, among women, to feel deeply for abstract wrong. Her humanitarian poems place her among poets where Dickens stands among novelists. In her "Cry of the Children," she makes "the child's sob in the silence curse us deeper than the strong man in his wrath." In "Aurora Leigh," she pleads, in a masterly manner, the rights and woes of *the people.*

The religious influence of her poetry will be more and more appreciated. For she stands as opposed to George Eliot's darkness and doubt, the inspired apostle of hope, faith and love. She only would—

> "Have leave to loose
> (In tears and blood if so He choose,)
> *Her* inward music out to use."
>
> "And while she rests, her songs, in troops,
> Walk up and down our earthly slopes,
> Companioned by diviner hopes."

The late J. G. Holland has beautifully written of her:

"I think now of one whose genius was angelic, and yet whose heart was the dwelling place of all-pervading, all-controlling Christian purpose. Her whole being throbbed and sparkled like the sea, stretching its pure, life-giving sympathies around the world, and tossing evermore its white hands to the stars. She soared and sang as woman never soared and sang before: soared and sang, English sky-lark though she was, into the golden dawn of Italian nationality; soared and sang until the attraction of earth was surpassed, and Heaven drew her home."

It is easier to think of her as a spirit than as a mortal made of the dust of the ground: as a spirit lent to earth from Heaven to "show us how divine a thing a woman may become," and to teach how closely—

> "The sphere of the supernal powers
> Impinge on this world of ours."

She was almost a seraphic refutation of the gross materialistic philosophy of the age. The fleshly bars, within which her spirit

nestled, were so frail that, with one flutter of its wings, she might have brushed them aside and swept out into the freedom of the Eternal Poem. Yet, with burning love for humanity; with rapturous devotion to God in Christ, she panted out the days of her shortened span of life. With her, Christianity was a condition of all thought and feeling, and while her poems are not didactic in their inculcations, yet every line she wrote was in captivity to the spirit of Christ.

In the final moment, the body lost its imprisoning hold. Her spirit leaped up like the flame of a dying lamp; and while yet the blood moved in the arteries, and nerves tingled with sensation, the soul passed from its dissolving tabernacle. "It is beautiful," she cried. What was beautiful? Another poet had told us long ago: "Beautiful is Mount Zion, the city of the Great King." "Glorious things of thee are spoken, O City of God!"

THE INCARNATION OF CHRIST.

BY REV. J. O. MOSS.

The alliance of God with humanity in the incarnation of Christ, is the grand central event in the world's history. All that preceded, was preparatory to it; and all that follows must be regarded as its development and result. It was the culmination of a stupendous economy whose immense proportions were wisely reserved for the gradual evolution of successive centuries; and whose consummation is yet to be effected amid the splendors of the resurrection morning and the irreversible awards of the judgment of the last day. Each act and scene in the all-embracing drama conspired, in harmonious unison, to execute the heavenly mandate—"Prepare ye the way of the Lord." Age after age, furnished its contribution to the "fulness of time." Heaven and earth were wrought to intensest expectancy, when the angelic choir poured forth its exultant refrain—"Glory to God in the highest—on earth, peace good-will to men," the fitting annunciation of the advent of him who, though "the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person" condescended to our low estate "took upon

him the form of a servant and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross," that he might become the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him—whose kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost has survived the lapse of eighteen hundred years, and still, with unabated vigor, and repelling every foe, is moving sublimely forward to universal conquest.

An event so signalized of Heaven, involving interests so vast, and consequences so tremendous, cannot fail to fix the attention, and elicit the interest of every thoughtful mind. It is true, "Great is the mystery of godliness;" so great that its thorough comprehension surpasses the power of the loftiest intelligence of the universe. But if the angels desire to look into these things, how much more, if possible, should we, whose every interest, for time and eternity is directly involved. To learn all that is possible to be known of the person of our adorable Lord, is the ardent longing of every intelligent and devout mind. Vague and indistinct conceptions on such a subject will not satisfy the sincere lover of truth. We do not promise entire originality in the treatment of a theme so extensively discussed, nor can we touch, however briefly, on many of its absorbingly interesting features. What we purpose is, to contribute, as far as we are able, to a clearer and more precise apprehension of a few of its most important and vital phases.

1. The Holy Scriptures are distinct and positive in their assertion of the assumption by Christ of a nature absolutely identical with our own, as a necessary preparation for the great work designed to be achieved by his earthly mission. The student of the Bible can be at no loss for quotations in point. The following are perfectly conclusive: John I.: 14, and Hebrew II.: 14–18, inclusive. But human nature, in its entirety, consists of soul, as well as body—a spiritual, as well as a material part. Christ must, therefore, have possessed both, in all their essential powers. This fact, he himself implicitly affirms in the declaration: "My soul is exceedingly sorrowful even unto death," and in the dying ejaculation on the Cross: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Moreover, these Scriptures teach that such an identity of nature with ours was essential to the accomplishment of human

salvation. He must, of necessity, be our kinsman, our brother according to the flesh, or his redeeming work would have had no pertenence to our cases or availing merit for us.

2. But to be still more explicit. The human nature of Christ must have been derived wholly from the virgin mother, and was by no means, in any, the least part of it, the direct creation of God. Man was originally created as one, and not as the lower animals, in pairs. Otherwise, human history would have been "without unity of beginning, and thus without unity of coherence." Adam was, therefore, originally constituted the sole fountain of our race. He, alone, was brought into being by an act of God's direct formation. The curious and wonderful organism which constituted his mortal body, was indeed fashioned of previously created materials, but the spiritual and immortal part sprang into being and took possession of its heaven-appointed tabernacle by the immediate inspiration of the Almighty. Eve, according to St. Paul, was absolutely and wholly of Adam—educed, both as to soul and body, from the primitive man, who thus stands as the first link in the chain of being, subsequently to be developed, in its countless diversity of individuality, until the end of time. "What thus became independently existent in the woman, had previously existed in Adam." "In" his "pneumatico-physical nature, was at the same time potentially constituted *that* of all men that were to come into existence." This potentiality of the whole man was communicated also to the woman, in whom certain aspects of a common nature appear in a greater degree of development, while certain others predominate in the man. After the formation of Eve, the order of procreation was fixed by God's authority and power, and could not be changed except by divine interposition. Such interposition took place in the conception of the virgin mother by the Holy Ghost. In Christ, simply the order of derivation of offspring from its parentage was changed. He was, therefore, in so far as He was a man, truly and indeed the son of Mary, deriving the sum total of his humanity from her alone. It was for this purpose, that the Holy Ghost came upon her, and the power of the Highest overshadowed her, that his humanity might be derived from a single parental stem, and to effect the union of the human and the divine, and not for any

purpose of original creation. The importance of this fact cannot be over-estimated and fully justifies the apparent tediousness of the foregoing discussion. For if any part of the human nature of Christ was not derived from Mary, but was the product of the creative energy of the Spirit, then, so far as that part was concerned, He would not have been human, and his redeeming work would have been, from its incipiency, vitiated in its application to us. Speaking reverently, God himself could not make a second human being, except by traduction from an already existing human parent. He could, doubtless, make a being exactly similar, so that none but himself could detect the difference; but whatever might be the constitution of that being, it would not be identical with humanity, and he could not be our Mediator with God, or become the propitiation for our sins. Thank God, in the lower department of his twofold nature, Christ is flesh of our flesh, bone of our bone, soul of our soul, and thus the connecting link that binds man to God—the medium through whom the infinite attraction of the divine nature arrests the eccentricity of the lost wanderer, and brings him once more, in unspeakable rapture, to revolve around his appropriate centre, while anew, in holy sympathy, the morning stars sing together, and all the sons of God shout for joy. Such is a brief exposition of the teaching of Scripture in relation to this greatest of great facts that have signalized the world's history. It was nearly four hundred years before it was developed in clear and distinct outlines in the consciousness of the Church. Thenceforward it was embodied in certain definite forms of expression, around which the champions of orthodoxy rallied all their powers, and in the defence of which devout wisdom achieved its grandest triumphs. The true faith, once clearly apprehended, and expressed in terms conspicuous for their perspicuity, became a bulwark around which the waves of myriad opposing errors have raged and spent their fury in vain. Repeated assaults have but served to multiply its triumphs; and it has come forth from the struggle of ages with untarnished splendor, thus asserting the immortality and ultimate domination of truth. The Chalcedonian Symbol, which not only insists on the divinity, but affirms the complete and perfect manhood of Christ, derived by birth from his virgin mother, consubstantial with, and like unto, us in all things,

yet without sin, is to this day the common faith of the Christian Church. It must be remembered, however, that we adopt these formulas as "setting forth the facts, and establishing the boundaries of orthodox doctrine, and not as preclusive of further theological discussion." They rather exclude error than constitute an exhaustive presentation of the truth. They do not demand adoption as the "*ultima thule*" of human investigation, denying "the right of further research, and ignoring the possibility of constant progress in the development and illustration of the truth." They constitute, as it were, the geographical limits of an immense territory, whose interior features are still but partially known, and where rich rewards await the devout explorer's toil. Into this field, with cautious, reverent tread we now proceed, not hoping to unravel the inscrutable, but to learn many things which lie hidden beneath the surface, and which will come forth to the light at the bidding of patient, persistent, and prayerful investigation.

3. From what has already been said, it will be inferred that we are opposed, *in toto*, to the transcendental notion, that loses sight of the concrete and individual, in its advocacy of the generic and representative features of the humanity of Christ. To say, with some, that Christ was not a man by the side of other men, but, being the second Adam, he represented the totality of human nature in his exalted, comprehensive personality; and to assert that otherwise it would be impossible to conceive how his obedience and sufferings could have an essential influence on mankind, or with others, that only thus could He be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such, is to base the entire work of Christ upon a mere mental abstraction, that has no existence in fact, and thus to enshroud and lose in the mist and darkness of metaphysical idealism the grandest and most glorious reality under heaven. The first Adam, indeed, represented the human race as their procreative source, so constituted in the order of God, as to transmit his own nature, whether in pristine purity and uprightness or lapsed and depraved, to his posterity. Even so Christ, his great anti-type, being in possession of a nature common to the race of which He was born, the tendency to sin alone excepted, and constituted of God the fountain of spiritual and immortal life to the dead in sin,

appropriately represented that race in his atoning work. There is no difficulty in this conception, except such as is conjured up by an overwrought imagination that is never contented except when dealing with the incomprehensible.

4. That Christ was truly man, that He was in the entirety of his human nature, soul and body, the son of Mary, does, by no means, preclude the idea of his sinlessness, so emphatically maintained in the sacred Scriptures. His humanity, it is true, was derived from a member of a fallen race—a race entailing depravity upon every successive generation; but this depravity is an accident and not an essential property of man; and it was possible to the Holy Ghost to counteract its traduction in the case of the man Christ Jesus. We cannot believe that the holy, harmless, undefiled One was in any respect, or to any degree, tainted by the fall. Though the acknowledged tendency or bias of human nature, since the fall, to evil, be regarded as but one of the results of original transgression, an inherited mistortune and not in itself sin, a defect of nature and not depravity in the proper sense of the term, yet even such a bias cannot be attributed to Christ. The annunciation of the angel to the Virgin Mary precludes such a supposition: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore, also, that holy thing that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." Such a bias to evil, therefore, could, in his case, have had no existence, as it was forestalled from the incipiency of his human existence by the power of the Divine Spirit. The reader will readily recall many other passages equally in point.

5. It must be remembered, however, that though morally untainted and without man's present abnormal proclivity to evil, the human nature of Christ was heir to weaknesses and imperfections unknown to man in his unfallen estate. In this respect, his nature was not Adamic and Edenic, but Abrahamic, compassed about with infirmities, sharing in the effects of sin though not in its commission. Thus He became experimentally acquainted with every phase of human suffering and want, learned to compassionate the ignorant and straying, and was perfected as a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God and men. "For in that He hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succor them

that are tempted." Thus, He is our brother, our friend, in whose sympathies we find delight and solace, with whom we share our every joy and sorrow, and to whom we confidently commit our interests for time and for eternity.

6. The supposition of Christ's absolute sinlessness by no means vitiates the declaration that he was tempted in all points like as we are, or renders his triumph less a promise and pledge of victory to his followers. It is undoubtedly a fact that the same temptation may arise from very different causes, and the painful sense of being tempted, is rather diminished than increased by the unholy disposition to which the temptation makes its appeal. So, though Christ was not led away and enticed by ungodly lusts as we, though in his pure mind, pride, vanity and worldly ambition found no place, nevertheless his struggle in the wilderness and during the subsequent periods of his earthly career, was no sham fight. The assaults of the tempter were as diversified as have since been realized in the experience of the most sorely tried believers; and the combat was stouter and more prolonged than any that has since transpired on the theatre of time. And the fact that He came out of the conflict unscathed, is freighted with the utmost ethical importance and value. His triumph was, manifestly, not attributable to the fact that He was God as well as man—

"The matter-of-course result of the physical ground of his being, but the effect brought about by the operations of the Holy Ghost, dwelling in him, helping him to exercise strong faith, and to cherish lively hope; and inspiring him with a love to his Father and to men, and with a consuming zeal for righteousness which were more than a match for all the temptations that were directed against him by Satan and an evil world, acting on and through a pure, but tremulously sensitive human nature."

"So regarded, Christ's strife with sin is a fair fight, and his conquest a moral achievement" capable of realization in the case of those who trust in him by aid of the gracious influences of the same Spirit to the adequate extent, vouchsafed to all.

7. It is important, also, to remember, as it manifestly appears on the face of the record, that it was by this same baptism of the Holy Ghost that Jesus, our great Exemplar, was able to lead a holy and spotless life—a life of perfect obedience to God, and so hold forth his example as the moral standard of our race—the

"follow me" thus deriving its force—his own life demonstrating the possibility of the realization of the injunction in the case of his humblest disciples, and giving birth to the sublimest and most inspiring hope. "Be ye holy for I am holy," is henceforth by no means to be regarded as an absurd requirement, holding out the impossible of attainment to tantalize the presumptuous, or to overwhelm the humble with despair. In Christ we see what human nature, under the plenary influence of the Spirit of Grace, from the beginning, can accomplish; and, although in our cases, the bias to evil exists, and is often fostered and developed, and brings forth its legitimate and baneful fruitage, yet assured of forgiveness, we rise above our often failures and shortcomings on the wings of renewed hope. We know that our imperfections are not to be attributed to the impotency of Divine grace, but to our hesitancy to avail ourselves of the sanctifying and all-conquering energy of the promised, indwelling Spirit. As to the all-sufficiency of that Spirit, glorious in working, the verdict of enlightened and developed faith is most pronounced, and the mists of former misgiving are dissolved in the light of assured meetness for heaven.

8. The humanity was the focal point of the manifested divinity of the Eternal Son, in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead, bodily. Without entering the arena of discussion as to the self-emptying of the divine in its assumption of the human nature, several things are obvious as the dictates, alike of reason and Revelation, a due consideration of which will enable us to form clearer and more satisfactory views of a mystery, the dimensions of which we may never hope exhaustively to explore. It is manifest that the Divine Son did not cease to be God, in assuming our nature. Such a result would involve a contradiction in terms, and is transparently absurd. It is perfectly conceivable, however, that his attributes were, for the most part, held in abeyance, so far as their manifestation was concerned, while He chose to act by means of the earth-born and human. Hence, this manifestation awaited the normal development of the human powers which He had assumed, and through which He elected to act. Still, there were occasional overflowings of the divine meeting the exigencies of his mission. It seems also necessary to conclude that the divine self-consciousness remained intact, and continued the self-conscious-

ness of the one personality composed of the divine and human natures in inscrutable, yet harmonious union. To realize, in thought, the perfection of the manhood of Christ, it is not necessary to assume the existence of a distinct human self-consciousness in juxtaposition with the divine. Such an assumption is inept as inevitably involving duality of personality in him, who, in the highest sense, is our Lord and our Saviour.

The truth seems to lie here. The divine nature takes to itself all the essential attributes of perfect manhood, and is conscious, from the moment of their assumption, of the new personality thus formed. The humanity becomes henceforth the locus and instrument of the divine manifestation, but not necessarily enclosing and circumscribing the presence and activity, or limiting the wisdom and power of the divinity. This view would seem to throw much light upon the record of Christ's earthly life, and reconcile many an apparent contradiction with simple matter of fact.

9. The embodiment of the divine in the human, in the person of Christ, and the exhibition by this means of the disposition of God towards our fallen race, constitute a source of inexhaustible joy and consolation, and form the basis of the loftiest and most comprehensive hopes. In Jesus Christ, we see and know the Father. In his face we behold the glory of God, and through him we get an insight into the astounding possibilities and glorious purposes of redeeming mercy. As apprehended in Christ—how pitiful God is; of what long-suffering; how tenderly sympathetic; how ready to forgive; how prompt to aid; how resolved to save every willing soul; how inexhaustible his beneficence; how everlasting his love! How do these soul-winning graces shine out in Christ, like stars in the firmament, to which all eyes may be uplifted, and under the influence of which the darkness of doubt and despair vanishes, and hearts swell with sweet foretastes of the eternal inflowing of heaven's fullness of joy. In the gloom of multiplied afflictions and sorrows, when every other light of life has grown dim or gone out in utter darkness, "in his light we shall see light." Sinking in deep and storm-swept waters, we grasp a hand gladly extended in response to our cry, and potent to uplift us.

THE CATEGORY

BY J. M. LONG, A. M., UNIVE

A complete classification of the Scie
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modes of being—a category which shall embrace in its synthesis all the elements of space and time, which shall be the fountain of all motion, force, life and mind, under its two-fold aspect of thought and will.

In this ascending gradation of the categories from quantity up through motion, force, organism and mind, we have the logical order of increasing concreteness. There is here an increasing content and a decreasing extent. The category of quantity standing at the base of the hiearchy has the greatest extent and the least content, embracing, as it does, only the two elements of space and time. In the categories of motion and force, we have an increased comprehension of attributes, time, space, velocity, together with all the different forms of energy. Again, organism, embracing only the special class of objects which possess life, has a still less extent, but a correspondingly increased content. A rose is a far more complex object than a crystal. When we come to the category of mind in its two fold reactions, giving rise to sociological phenomena, the extension is still less, while the content is greater. The most complex phenomena with which Science has to deal are sociological. Among the class of phenomena termed organic and living, we have here the special and limited class of vital phenomena to deal with, known as social aggregates. Finally, to complete this logical order of decreasing extension and increasing comprehension, thought demands a category in which all manifoldness and diversity disappear in one indivisible and unchangeable unity, and which shall contain, within itself, all attributes, powers and potencies. This final crowning category, to have the least extension, must be a single object of thought—the totality of being, and to have the greatest comprehension of attributes, must be the absolute fullness.

Hence, the category required to give unity and consistency to the classification of the sciences, is not a mere hypostasized abstraction; it must be a concrete reality possessing the greatest comprehension of attributes. The category in question must represent the absolute and inexhaustible Fullness of all manifestations of being—of all possibilities of space and time, of motion, force, life and mind, in its twofold aspect of thought and will. This is, hence, the category of categories, under which all the sciences of

nature and of man may be arranged in logical order, and which, by division and definition, will form subordinate classes forming a continuous descending series. In our exposition of the scientific categories, we could have, therefore, begun with this supreme and highest category. This would have been the logical order descending from the most general or universal, to the particular, from the oneness of being to the diverse and manifold. But for the purposes in view, it seemed best to follow the chronological and historic order, passing from the most simple category of *quantity* up with an increasing complexity through motion, force, organism, mind, and, finally, to Being, the most universal and comprehensive of all the categories of thought.

The lower scientific categories refer only to phenomenal existence.

The necessity and importance of this higher philosophic category in a complete classification of the sciences further appear from the consideration that all the lower categories refer only to phenomenal existence. The categories of quantity, motion, force, organism and mind are assumed as ultimate ideas in science. The demands of science are satisfied when phenomena can be brought under any one of the foregoing categories. The mathematician does not concern himself with what space and time are in themselves, or in their ontological aspect; neither does the physicist concern himself with what motion and force are in their metaphysical and ontological significations. Physical science is satisfied when it can discover the empiric laws according to which the forces of nature operate to produce their respective phenomena. Again, the biologist does not concern himself with what life is in its essential nature. His sphere of thought and investigation has to do only with life in its empiric and phenomenal aspects as manifested under the category of organism. When the biologist studies life he deals solely with the phenomena and actions which living beings display, and not with the ultimate and essential nature of life itself. If we advance speculations with regard to this latter question, we are in the domain of essential being, of noumena and not phenomena. Biologists might succeed in proving that all vital changes and activities are directly due to physical and chemical forces, but we would still have left the question, what is the power which under-

lies the complex activities of life? We would still have *organism* as an ultimate and unexplained fact. The biologist accepts life and organism as ultimate facts in his science, facts of which he seeks only the conditions and laws of manifestation. What life is in the general system of things belongs to the higher ontological and metaphysical sphere of thought.

In like manner, the empiric psychologist studies the laws and conditions of mental activity in connection with the concrete manifestations of life and organism. He accepts consciousness, together with its phenomena of intellection, feeling and volition, as ultimate facts, of which he studies the conditions and laws as these can be learned by observation and experiment.

We thus see that all the scientific categories belong to the sensible and phenomenal sphere of thought. The categories of quantity, motion, force, organism and mind have arisen from the synthesis of the understanding which deals with phenomena. This the scientific phase of thought makes only a partial reduction of the world as given in sense-perception to unity. Hence, the scientific categories embracing only *special* and limited spheres of thought do not produce a complete unification of knowledge. They embrace, it is true, the entire Cosmos, as this is revealed in space and time; but this, with all its categories, needs to be explained by being referred to a higher principle. But when we ascend to the conception of one universal category or first principle, and make this the ground and explanation of all other principles, we are then in the transcendental sphere of thought. The scientific categories, dealing only with changeable and sensible phenomena, can find their own unity and explanation only in an ultimate first principle which belongs to the sphere of the unchangeable and supersensible. Phenomena, meaning appearances or sensible manifestations, imply that there must be something which appears, and which, therefore, lies behind the visible world of change and movement.

This supreme category must be Being.

When the mind attempts to frame a rational theory concerning the origin and nature of things viewed as forming a universe—a totality, it must have the idea of subtantial Being as the working

category. The idea of Being is fundamental to all the sciences. This is logically the first and most elementary of all ideas or categories; while logically, the first and most universal idea, it is the last reached by an ascending analytical process. But being the most universal idea, it is the first with which a descending synthesis begins. The sphere of science, as we have seen, is phenomena which are relative, sensible and changeable. When, therefore, the mind ascends into the sphere of the absolute, the supersensible and unchangeable, the category of thought thus reached must represent perduring and essential Being. "By a wondrous revelation, we are in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all representable reality."—*Hamilton.* "By the very conditions of thought, we are prevented from knowing anything but relative being; yet, by these very conditions of thought, an indefinite consciousness of Absolute Being is necessitated."—*Spencer.* We have quoted from these two high authorities for the purpose of showing that, while denying the possibility of knowing essential Being, they are compelled to admit the abiding belief in, or consciousness of, such existence as the most certain of all truths. Such an idea is admitted by all philosophers to be a primary and necessary element of thought. The thought which ever persists in consciousness, is the existence of a Reality—an ontological substratum, which is concealed behind, and yet ever revealed in, phenomena. All the different systems of philosophy are "the historic memorials of the efforts of the human mind to vindicate to itself the existence of a Reality, of which it is conscious, but which it cannot perfectly define."

This supreme category of thought, from the very nature of the case, must be *ultimate*—an idea which cannot be comprehended in any wider and deeper generalization. If there could be any wider and deeper generalization, then not this, but that, would be the fundamental idea or first principle which underlies and explains all other categories. This can be no other category than essential Being, and not sensible qualities and phenomena as science deals with them, for these are dependent and relative. This idea, as already indicated, is chronologically the last idea explicitly devel-

ed in the ascent of thought, while, logically, it is the implicit ntecedent of all other ideas and categories. When, therefore, the ind ascends to the category of essential Being, it has reached the al and highest phase of thought; neither does this supreme tegory represent an empty abstraction, but a Reality, the most rtain of all truths. This Reality, so far from being an empty stract ion, is the absolute Fullness, containing within itself the ound of all manifestations.

Relative and Absolute Being.

The idea of Being, by the relativity of thought, subdivides into o categories, namely: Relative Being and Absolute Being. By e former is meant finite reality, and essential agents and causes; r the latter is meant essential Being, which is the ground and planation of all relative and dependent manifestations, and which hence, the last term reached in the evolution and ascent of ought. We think through a perception of *difference*, as the ost original and fundamental law of thought. Hence, finite aces and time are correlated with the ideas of infinite space and ne; finite power with infinite power, secondary causes with timate Cause, and relative Being with Absolute Being. Thus ought moves and unfolds through a polar antithesis.

This twofold conception of Being, as relative and absolute, is so forced upon the mind by the dynamic conception of nature, ade familiar by modern scientific ideas of force. We have the ofold conception of relative and Absolute Force. As used by ience, *force* means relative and conditional energy, and which, erefore, acts from some antecedent action or condition. Thus, at causes electricity, electricity magnetism, magnetism light or otion, or some other form of kinetic energy. This is what is eant in science by the correlation and equivalence of forces. Bu; nid all those protean forms of force, which are ever appearing and sappearing, there must be a persistent and absolute force, self-used. This unconditional and absolute force must include and ake all conditioned and dependent forces. This absolute force ides within itself, as persistent activity, and hence connects itself ith the idea of substantial being.

If we ask what is the relation which relative and Absolute Being

sustains to each other, the answer must be that of *Creator* and *created* If finite and relative Being does not have the ground of its existence in absolute Being, then it must be identical with absolute Being. This is implied in the terms *relative* and *dependent*, which mean that which has its origin and ground of existence in creative and absolute Being.

The Category of Absolute Being Demanded by the Necessary Laws of Thought.

This idea is shown to arise in the mind from the essential laws and conditions of thought, by the fact that it cannot be expelled from consciousness. Being the final and prime element reached by the evolution of thought, it ever remains as the one indissoluble idea which ever persists amid all the changes of consciousness. This idea could only disappear from consciousness by being taken up and absorbed into some idea higher and more fundamental than itself. In this way partial ideas in science and philosophy have been absorbed. Those who oppose this idea, by denying the possibility of constructing an Ontology, show that it exists in their minds as a necessary element of thought, which underlies and conditions all their thinking. The same result may be reached by viewing the mental powers in their necessary correlations to their appropriate objects. The specific powers of the mind are *intelligence* and *will*. It is the essential nature of these to strive for the attainment of ultimate, absolute *truth*, and ultimate and absolute *good*. By the relativity of thought, the True and the Good are apprehended in their twofold aspect—the relative and the absolute. But the mind, thus endowed and constituted, cannot rest satisfied in the relative and the finite. Impelled by this necessary law of its being, the mind must ever strive to apprehend the absolute Truth and the absolute Good, and to express to itself the relations which these modes of Being sustain to the relative and finite truth, and the relative and finite good, as these are manifested to the understanding. Schelling truly says: "Would man strive to fathom this relation? I answer, if he would not, still he must. He always has striven after it; and, in the future, he always will strive after it." But the ideas of the absolute Truth and the absolute Good lead to the conception of Absolute Being, the

true nature of which is self-revelation, because the various phases of the true and the good, as manifested in relative and finite modes, are its manifestations. This divine and absolute Power, as we are able to apprehend its effects as manifested in the world-drama, becomes a finite and limited manifestation; it becomes limited in its manifestations as the essential condition of Being, known or apprehended by the finite human mind. But the absolute Power, putting forth this creative energy, must itself be conceived as the inexhaustible Fullness, working from everlasting to everlasting. The idea of Absolute Being may be presented to the mind under the form of a polar antithesis; but only one pole of this can be grasped by the understanding, which deals with finite phenomena, as manifested in space and time, while the other pole must be apprehended by reason.

Thus the human is intuitively impressed with the abiding conviction that the phenomenal world, as manifested to sense and understanding, has its basis and explanation in absolute and essential Being, that at the central core of things there is an absolute Power in which all things have their ground and unity.

In the spontaneous workings of thought there ever springs up in consciousness—

> "A sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."— [*Wordsworth.*

Thus, by an upward and necessary impulse, thought is forced beyond the sphere of the finite and the relative, to find its goal and rest in the idea of the infinite and absolute. Thought, as it ascends from category to category, in order to reduce the manifold of the phenomenal world to unity, can reach its final rest only by finding one absolute, essential and self-existent Being, in which all things have their ground and unity.

The Category of Absolute Being Demanded by Science and Philosophy.

Both Science and Philosophy imply and demand, as their fundamental basis, the idea of Absolute Being. Even agnostics, like Spencer, who refuse to elevate this idea with a category as the basis of Philosophy and Theology, assert the necessity of this idea as the necessary datum of Science and Religion. Thus Spencer: "Both Religion and Science are obliged to assert the existence of an ultimate Reality. Without this, Religion has no subject matter; and without this, Science, subjective and objective, lacks its indispensable datum." Again, he says: "The axiomatic truths of physical science unavoidably postulate absolute Being as the common basis." "The whole process of evolution," says Tyndall, "is the manifestation of a power inscrutable to the intellect of man." Equally emphatic is Dr. Maudsley:

"He who reflects upon himself and upon the universe is forced in the end to the recognition, in the workings of the world, of a power from which all life and energy proceed, which has been from the beginning, is now, and, so far as we can see, ever shall be, and which cannot be comprehended and controlled by human thought and will, but comprehends and controls human thought and will."

In view of these clear declarations with regard to the existence of Absolute Being by those who would confine all Science and Philosophy to phenomena, we may, with truth, adopt the language of Principal Shairp, who says:

"It is impossible for any reflecting mind, not dominated by a system, to regard the ordered array of physical forces, and to rest satisfied with this order, without going on to ask whence it came, what placed it there? Thought cannot be kept back, when it sees existence, from inquiring how it came to exist. And the question is a natural and legitimate one, in spite of all that phenomenalism may say against it, and it will not cease to be asked while there are reasoning men to ask it."

Thought, therefore, cannot rest satisfied with a "physics without a metaphysics, a natural without a supernatural, a material without a spiritual, a sensible without a supersensible world, and, consequently, a natural without an intelligible order, natural law without mind, natural forces without will—forces, and, in fine, a *Cosmos* without a *Logos*."

We find that all the sciences presuppose Absolute Being, for the sciences as such deal with the phenomenal, the relative and depen-

lent. But the phenomenal, the relative and dependent, imply the noumenal, the absolute and the independent as their ground and unity. Thus, mathematics dealing with finite spaces and times, or with number and extension, suggests by the relativity of these terms the infinite, the absolute, for which "there is no weight nor measure." Again, the idea of cause and effect which are fundamental in mechanical science, is grounded on the intuition of *substance* possessing power or energy. From cause and finite substance, the mind ascends to the idea of absolute and self-existent substance, the eternal and inexhaustible fountain of motion and energy.

When we ascend to the historic movement of humanity as a progressive development of mind towards an ideal of culture and civilization, there is here clearly implied one supreme and absolute Mind which directs and governs all in truth and wisdom.

Again, the lower unities of science demand the higher unity of philosophy, which demands, in turn, absolute Being as its first principle or category. The sphere of science is what appears to sense-perception in the different provinces of nature. These are particular objects, and relative and dependent phenomena. The decisive problem which science sets before itself is to reduce the manifold and diverse objects of the phenomenal world to system through the unitizing power of certain categories or first principles. But all those lower and partial unities of science need to be reduced to one all-embracing unity, and all those first principles of science need to be embraced within one absolute first Principle. Unless this higher and all-embracing category of thought is reached, the craving of the mind for unity of knowledge, and which science partially gratifies is, at last, defeated. Now, what the fundamental categories, quantity, motion, force, organism and mind, are in the different sciences, the category of Absolute Being is to all the sciences taken together as forming one complete organism of knowledge. This category reduces all other categories and principles, and all the sciences to unity, just as the different categories of science reduce special and limited spheres of nature to unity.

The laws of nature are accepted by science as explaining special and limited classes of phenomena. But philosophic reflection demands an ultimate ground or reason for those laws. The laws

of science, which are said to explain nature, need themselves to be explained. Just as natural phenomena can be explained only by being referred to their fundamental laws, so those laws themselves need to be explained by being referred to the one central fountain of all law and energy.

Thus, only through this higher and supreme category of Absolute Being, is it possible to explain that unity among the sciences which we are forced to believe exists in nature, and of which science should be a reflection. Science analyzes the world into separate elements of thought. Only by such a "dissection of parts does a strictly scientific conception become possible; only in this way does man obtain, at the same time, a point of attack and a lever by which to gain control over the events of nature and to turn them to his own ends."—(*Euken*, *p.* 186.) But it is a law of thought that synthesis shall supplement analysis in order to satisfy the craving of the mind for unity. But it is only through the higher philosophic category of Absolute Being that the thought-world can be reduced back to unity which has been destroyed by the analytic processes of science.

We thus see that physical science cannot rest in mere secondary causes, laws and forces. A world of motions, forces and laws implies a primordial power which originated these. Thus science implies the idea of absolute and self-existent Being.

We have three phases of knowing, namely: sense-perception, understanding, and philosophic reflection, or reason. Sense-perception gives a knowledge of concrete particulars, or of individual things with their properties and qualities. By sense-perception, man's knowledge of the world consists in disconnected and contingent phenomena. Through the scientific categories of the understanding, those disconnected phenomena are classed and bound together by means of fundamental relations. But to enable thought to ascend to the idea of a totality of existence, it must have the universal category of Absolute Being as the unitizing principle of all knowledge.

The understanding views things in their relations, and by comparison, abstraction and generalization, aims to reduce special and limited spheres of the phenomenal world to a unity of thought by means of categories or general ideas. This is, therefore, the scien-

tific sphere of thought. Philosophic reflection, or reason, views the world as forming a totality of existence—as one universe, having its ground, explanation and unity in absolute, self-existent Being. The scientific categories have been developed through the synthesis of the understanding. Hence, the scientific phase of thought makes only a partial reduction of the world as given in sense-perception to unity. It is only in the higher reflective and philosophic phase of thought, the phase of intuitive reason, that the mind ascends to the idea of the world as a totality, having its ground of existence in Absolute Being. This is, therefore, the category of philosophy, because it is the universal category or first principle as given by reason.

The phenomenal world, as viewed by the scientific understanding, is composed of ever-changing processes—forces which are ever passing into other forces, and forms which are ever escaping into new forms and combinations. It is only when the mind ascends to the idea of absolute Being that we have the conception of an abiding totality.

"To the eye of science, each thing is not an independent total, but a part or element of an including totality. Things are parts of greater things, and these are, after all, only temporal phasism in the activity of processes. When we trace up the history of individual things, we come on every hand to the activity of forces in which the individuality of the things gets lost. Before the things were, there were active forces involved in their creation; finally, the things vanished through the agency of destructive forces. The individuality of force is likewise evanescent, and there is only abiding a sort of mutual interdependence which we call correlation. At the bottom of the world, then, according to advanced reflection, there is a one highest principle which it calls *persistence* of force."—*W. T. Harris.*

Though science has its foundation in concrete facts, learned by observation, yet, by the aid of reason, it rises to the sphere of supersensible knowledge as its necessary culmination. It cannot rest in secondary causes, but leads the mind upward until all secondary causes are seen to converge into one primary cause as the central source from which all phenomenal and relative being radiates.

Just as the sciences need the category of absolute Being as the unitizing principle, so Philosophy also demands this idea as the great synthetic principle by which it endeavors to arrive at a

rational theory of the universe. But the human mind first awakened into philosophic speculations concerning the origin of things among the Greeks by the contemplation of material nature, was not able to rise to the conception of absolute Being. The Ionic school seems to have been material, or, what we would now call, natural philosophers who sought the original ground and origin of things in some material element immanent in nature, as water, air, or original chaotic matter.

The Pythagoreans made number in some mystic and not clearly understood sense the first principle of things. "Number is the essence of all things," was their thesis.

Among the Eleatic school of Greek philosophers, we find a great advance of thought with regard to the true nature of the fundamental principle of philosophy. Parmenides, the head of the Eleatic school, made pure Being the first principle, one and indivisible, unchangeable, as opposed to the manifold, the changeable and phenomenal. This thesis was, that *Being and thought are one and the same.* Anaxagoras maintained that the moving power of nature is a world-forming intelligence, working with design, and which is termed *Nous*, reason or mind. This luminous conception was a clear and bright flash of truth amid surrounding darkness and confusion of thought.

Plato expressed his conception of universal and abiding reality as the first principle or category of philosophy in contrast to the sensible and changing world of phenomena by his doctrine of ideas. Ideas with him are the eternal archetypes or patterns according to which all things are created. Aristotle characterizes this first principle "as an eternal and best living Being." "He possesses the activity of reason, of pure thinking and of eternal life, and is always his own object." Thus, all the different systems of philosophy are "the historic memorials of the efforts of the human race to vindicate to itself the existence of a Reality, of which it is conscious, but which it cannot perfectly define." Without this idea or category there can be no philosophy, for the prime object of this is to find the absolute first principle which shall explain the problem of the world.

Even agnostics who refuse to make Absolute Being a category of science and philosophy are compelled to admit that this idea lies at

the foundation of all their thinking. "While the Relativist rightly repudiates those definite assertions which the Absolutist makes respecting experience transcending perception, he is yet at least compelled to unite with him in predicating existence transcending perception."—*Spencer*, p. 551.

ÆSTHETICS.

BY REV. R. T. BENTLEY, ALABAMA CONFERENCE.

The subject of Æsthetics, or the Science of the Beautiful, engaged the attention of thinkers and writers in the days of Socrates, and has commanded its share of notice until the present time. Of late years it has been more prominent, perhaps, than at any other period of the world, being treated more particularly in the writings of Gœthe and Schiller, of Germany, and of Ruskin and Spencer, of England. The people of our own country recently had their attention called to the subject through the eccentricities of its abnormal apostle, Oscar Wilde.

Though the subject may constitute a complete science in the abstract, the various systems projected show that, as yet, it is very indefinite. The devotees of the several systems seem to look at the subject, respectively, from quite different standpoints. However, investigation may yet establish a well-defined science of æsthetics, reducing all systems of theory and experience to a unit.

The first and most important step to take, in developing a theory into a science, is to define its primitive terms. In the theory of æsthetics this has never been done, and hence it has never been developed into a concrete science. The word "æsthetics," in its original Greek form, implies perception by any one or all of the five senses. Yet some writers on the subject confine it to the province of vision alone, reducing it to a decision between the ugly and the beautiful, or the ludicrous and the sublime, as perceived through the eye. Others extend it to all disagreeable and pleasurable sensations of whatever character, embracing all the senses of perception. The latter theory, according to the original meaning of the word, is evidently correct. The former theory

robs the science of four-fifths of its scope and material. No one has a right to curtail the investigation of a science to accommodate it to the superficial comprehension of amateurs.

According to the correct theory, then, the fragrance of the rose, the melody of the harp, the sweetness of the morsel, the softness of the texture, as well as the symmetry of the human face, are all beautiful. And antithetic to these, the stench of the cess-pool, the discord of the violin, the acridity of the crab, the irritation of the nettle, as well as the deformity of the human face, are all ugly. And, under certain circumstances, the first series of the antithesis might appear sublime, and the last series ludicrous.

If a deformed object be placed beside another of exquisite symmetry, the former would appear worse deformed or ludicrous, while the latter would appear more symmetrical or sublime. For example: let a daub be suspended by the side of one of Raphæl's master-pieces, and the former would appear ludicrous, and the latter sublime. Or let one of Mozart's greatest compositions be played by a great performer, and then followed by Yankee-doodle imperfectly rendered, the former would be sublime, and the latter ridiculous. Again, let a clown appear suddenly, with his antics and flippancies, in the midst of an audience listening to the delivery of a serious and eloquent discourse, and the clown would appear more ludicrous than he would in the ring of a circus, while the discourse would be heightened in its sublimity. Similar illustrations might be produced in connection with smelling, tasting and feeling, though not so pronounced or well defined.

Again, there is a difference of opinion regarding the essential nature of beauty, as to whether it is inherent to the object or an independent element. And we use the word beauty, as signifying all pleasurable sensations produced by perception through any one of the five senses. For instance, we declare that a certain landscape is beautiful. The question now arises in the mind of the thoughtful: Does the landscape furnish its own beauty, or is it a capacity of perception in the soul of the beholder? Or does the soul project itself in one of its qualities, called the beautiful, and invest the landscape with beauty? Again, we declare that a certain succession of harmonious sounds is beautiful. The question is, whether the sounds contain the beauty, or is it in the soul of the

one who perceives them through the ear? And so on in connection with smelling, tasting, and feeling.

Yet, some hold the opinion that the essential nature of beauty consists of certain qualities or capacities of perception in the soul, and is, therefore, subjective, rather than objective. And they think that such qualities or capacities invest the object perceived with whatever beauty it may possess. Others hold that it is objective entirely, and that an object would be beautiful if never perceived. They subscribe heartily to the lines of Gray:

> "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
> And waste its sweetness on the desert air."

So, there is a great difference of opinion regarding both the nature and the medium of the beautiful, as well as the place of its lodgment. But without attempting to give even a synopsis of the different systems of æsthetics, we will venture to give our own humble opinion upon the subject, and let the reader take it for what it is worth.

It seems to us that the philosophy of the whole science depends upon a perfect affinity between the objective and the subjective, or the outer world and the inner soul of man. And this applies to whatever can pass through any one of the five senses and make an impression upon the soul. We use the word soul in the sense of consciousness. Upon this hypothesis, both the objective and the subjective have their respective provinces to fill and functions to perform. Both are equally responsible for the effect produced by their contact. Beauty is neither a quality solely inherent to the object nor a capacity solely inherent to the soul. But there must be a union of both capacity and quality to make it complete. As the body without the spirit is dead, so the quality of the beautiful without the capacity to perceive it is dead also, being alone. But for the sake of clearness, we will give four axioms, expressing the only possible conditions and arrangements under which the objective and the subjective can exist, with relation to each other. Of which we will give an illustration, respectively, called contacts:

1. There may be the elements of the beautiful in the soul and none in the object.

2. There may be the elements of the beautiful in the object and none in the soul.

3. There may be the elements of the beautiful in both soul and object.

4. There may be no elements of the beautiful in neither the soul nor the object.

First contact. Example: A painting of the Furies is brought in possible contact with the soul of a great painter. The painter gives no evidence of pleasurable emotions. Conclusion: The painting possesses no elements of the beautiful.

Second contact. Example: A landscape upon the Hudson is brought in possible contact with the soul of a savage. The savage gives no indication of pleasurable emotions. Conclusion: The savage possesses no elements of the beautiful in his soul.

Third contact. Example: An exquisite Madonna is brought in possible contact with the soul of a great painter. The painter gives evidence of pleasurable emotions. Conclusion: The painter possesses the elements of the beautiful in his soul, and the painting also possesses similar elements. There is an affinity between them.

Fourth contact. Example: The picture of some hideous idol is brought in possible contact with the soul of an idiot. The idiot gives no evidence of pleasurable emotions. Conclusion: Neither the idiot nor the idol possesses the elements of the beautiful. The third contact is the only condition under which the perfect affinity between the subjective and objective is possible. The other three are failures. And no other contacts can possibly be made. So it is proved, conclusively, that the beautiful cannot exist in either the objective or the subjective separately. But there must be a union or affinity of both to make it complete.

We draw our illustrations from the sense of seeing that they might the more easily be comprehended. But similar examples might be drawn from any one of the remaining senses. They only constitute different forms of the same principle.

As regards the process of this adaptation, or affinity, between the soul and the object, it is a mystery that no one can expect to be solved. But it can be illustrated sufficiently to show that it is a reasonable hypothesis. For instance, one tone in music is so exactly adapted to another that their contact produces harmony. Or one shade of color may be so exactly adapted to another that their contact would produce harmony. The word harmony must

be understood to signify the beautiful. And so it is in regard to odors, tastes and feelings. These tones and colors represent the objective and subjective and their affinities. Thus we say, on the same principle, that one has an ear for music, another a taste for the luscious, and still another an eye for the beautiful. By which we mean that they all have the elements of the beautiful in the soul.

The congenialities of love and friendship unite upon the same principle. The blending, flowing together, or harmonizing of dispositions and feelings, constitute love and friendship. They differ only in degree. The person-loved, the landscape viewed, and the strains of music heard, all occupy the same relative position to the soul with which they come in contact. The harmony of lights and shades, music and love, are all beautiful. In the person loved there may be the symmetry of features, the modulations of the voice, and the expression of the eyes, all taken as indexes of the soul. And as they all demand an affinity, it may be found in the soul of one who loves.

The subject of æsthetics is somewhat intricate, but is no less interesting, especially when we have gotten out of the mists of first principles and primitive terms. And no doubt it will be placed, some day, among the sciences of a common-school education. There is literally no limit to its principles and no end to its variety. Order is said to be the first law of Heaven; and order is the essence of the Science of the Beautiful.

LIMITS OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

The preceding article on Æsthetics is so brief, that we have added to the discussion by giving our readers an essay from the German, by Frederick Von Schlegel, a writer who has treated of Æsthetics extensively. Whatever estimate may be placed upon his views, every reader of taste will consider the essay itself a fine specimen of the Beautiful. EDITOR.

The intellect neither arbitrarily unites distinct elements, nor does it attempt, without just reason, the dismemberment of an entire system. The limits of all definition and argument are irrevocably determined by two opposing principles—the eternal im-

pulse of the struggling soul from within, and the unchangeable decrees of nature from without. Inclination vacillates doubtfully between the voice of freedom and the decrees of fate; the intellect exhausts itself in the study of individualities, till at length all idea of perfection in unity is as completely lost as if the beautiful in nature and the just equipose of human life were banished from the world.

To solve the enigma of Destiny, and Freedom of Will—to unite those adverse ideas in harmonious combination—correctly to define, and faithfully to observe, the delicate limits which separate the two—would be to unravel the most complicated thread in the tangled web of human life. Is chance, then, more wise than science? Can it be that this intricate problem is to be left to work its own solution?

When the scheme of civilization is grounded not on principle or science, but on the working of instinct, each separate element of the human character unfolds itself in distinct relative proportions. The organic development of antiquity is peculiarly characterized by independence and decision. Every individual point moves on in perpetual rotation. In ancient history the grand outlines of fate and freedom of will lie outspread before us. The varied relation still existing between nature and mankind arose originally out of the different gradations of ancient civilization, and at its highest point they blend in more or less harmonious union, and attain a certain natural bloom and perfection.

When the perfect consistency of the ancients is contrasted with our own dismemberment, their broad masses with our interminable mixtures, their simple decision with our paltry embarrassment and confusion, we are indeed impressed with the conviction that they were men of the loftiest stamp. Still we ought not to regard them as the especial favorites of heaven, nor need we envy their unreasoning and instinctive happiness. The very deficiencies which perplex us, are, in truth, messengers of hope; for they are natural consequences of the supreme dominion now exerted by the intellectual powers, and of the unfettered influence of the understanding—faculties, which, however tardy they may be in the attainment of excellence, are nevertheless endowed with a boundless capacity for improvement. Since the attempt to fix the mind

of man on one immutable basis, and impel him onwards in one unchangeable direction, has been abandoned, it has ceased to be a matter of doubt whether the history of the human race, like an unbroken circle, revolves constantly upon itself, or whether, progressively advancing into the infinite, it strives with unremitting ardor to attain the best and noblest objects. The majesty of antiquity is felt to be indissolubly linked with images of decline and ruin, for both arise from the same source—the dominion of instinct, and the spontaneous development of nature. When the work of civilization is under the immediate direction of reason, the more rapid progress of nature frequently outstrips her guide, and leads the latter either to mistake the means to be employed, or perhaps to confound the means with the end. Instinct, on the contrary, beginning and ending in nature, can only, in that single moment in which it attains the centre-point, unite nature with mankind. Grecian art itself, which rose to absolute perfection, ended also with itself, and it presents a remarkable instance of the perishable nature of merely instinctive greatness. The confusion and want of unity prevailing in the ideas of the moderns, have undoubtedly a powerful influence on their works of art and genius. One art strays into the province of another, one peculiar branch becomes intermingled with the family of another. Representation is confounded with perception—imagination with contemplation; while symbolism and reality, time and space, all change their relative position. The artist sacrifices unity in his struggle for actual nature; the connoisseur prizes nature only in proportion as she approximates to art; the visionary, absorbed in his own dreams, seeks but to trace their reflection in the world around him, and discover throughout creation only the all-pervading influence of love; while the loveless sensualist deems mankind and external nature created only to be the ministers of his enjoyment. One lives only for the beautiful, unheeding of the good and true; another recognizes the beautiful in its utility alone; and such, from the absence of unity, and the want of a just equipose, not content to have already plunged into error and confusion every element of society, still seem bent on employing their utmost efforts to dismember and subvert it. The man who luxuriates only in soft strains of music, will find his power of perception at last melt

away into shadowy indistinctness; the mind that dwells only on marble, will, in time, find its softer properties harden into stone; whoever makes poetry the sole object of life, loses vigor, boldness and decision, till, to him, existence itself becomes a dream. Even the union of poetry with reality leaves a vast chasm to be filled up; a void which can only be supplied by the power of intellect, and the exertion of those reasoning faculties, which, being subject to more precise and definite laws than poetic art, give to reality a more regular and decided form than it could obtain from the unassisted influence of nature. When men are left to the sole guidance of artificial laws, they become reduced to mere empty shadows and soulless forms; while the undivided sway of nature leaves them savage and loveless. How melancholy a thing it is to see a collection of the most interesting works of art heaped together merely as an assemblage of costly treasures! the void then stretches before us comfortless, hopeless, and unfathomable. Man is beggared—art and life are rent asunder! Yet this skeleton once had life, beauty, animation! there was a time—yea, there were nations in which the heavenly fire of art, like the soft glow of life reflected in their inspired strains, once gleamed through each glorious attribute of pure humanity! Nor are the slaves of utility, those victims of asceticism, who, by compulsory force, succeed at length in annihilating the elasticity of instinct and the senses, less completely at variance with nature than the votaries of imagination or of a partial and too prejudiced view of the art. The passive automaton thus framed, moves at least mechanically, in thought and action like a man; but in his pleasures, the inclinations of the animal are too clearly discernible. His ruined nature blushes at the very name of beauty. The faintest allusion to art, nature, or love, begets in him a sensation of dread and uneasiness, like the grave mention of a spectre.

The soul needs a certain amount of intellectual enjoyment to give it strength adequate for the daily struggle in which it is involved. The energies of the mind are as completely shattered and destroyed by constant restraint, as they are relaxed and enfeebled by perpetual enjoyments. To make pleasure the sole object of life is to defeat our own intention; for man exists but in accordance with the decrees of nature, and her laws stand in con-

stant opposition to his own desires. Life is a stern struggle between conflicting powers. Every inordinate indulgence involves a corresponding amount of suffering. Those who yield their souls captive to the brief intoxication of love, if no higher and holier feeling mingle with and consecrate their dream of bliss, will shrink trembling from the pangs that attend their waking. Others, on the contrary, who devote themselves to glorious deeds, and seek enjoyment only in the intervals of more serious exertion, will have their best reward in the pure, unchanging happiness purchased by such self-denial. Pleasure, indeed, has a higher zest when spontaneous and self-created; and if it rises in value in proportion to its affinity with that perfection of beauty in which moral excellence is allied to external charms. It must be a free, spontaneous burst of feeling: *not* the result of certain means applied for the attainment of any particular object; for pleasure thus pursued becomes occupation rather than enjoyment. We call it desecration and pollution to employ holy things in ordinary uses. But is not the beautiful also holy? Man can by representation inform the understanding; by beauty he can improve the manners; works of art may supply material for contemplation; but the mind will gain little or nothing thereby. As all energy demands for its development free and unrestrained power of action, so the sense of beauty and its creative faculty are kindled in the soul only by the free enjoyment and habitual contemplation of its creations. This inward perception of the soul for the beautiful is far different to the superficial artistic taste which refuses to acknowledge a susceptibility to comprehend represented and ideal forms as a creative and generative faculty for art. For beauty reigns supreme, not only in imitative works, but also in nature, in mankind, and in love. It is easy to decide on the proper limits to be prescribed for the soul's indulgence in spiritual enjoyment—to mark where it may commence and where it ought to terminate; but it is in truth a delicate task to avoid transgressing those boundaries. The same may be said of the limits of each separate element of beauty: of these there are three, which may be well regarded as the three original springs of spiritual enjoyment—nature, mankind, and art—which latter, in its mingled representations, blends and unites them all.

The most prominent characteristic of nature is an overflowing and exhaustless vital energy; that of art is spiritual unity, harmony, and symmetry. To attempt to deny the latter assertion, and define art as nothing more than a recollection or reproduction of the highest beauties of nature, strikes at the very root of its free and independent existence. Had not art a power distinct from that of nature, were it not governed by its own peculiar laws, we should be compelled to regard it as a feeble device of the ancients, a subtle contrivance by which to protract, in faint reflection, the declining vigor of their own natural life. Those who were not all-absorbed in the consciousness of youth and vigor would hasten eagerly in pursuit of truth, and leave the grey-headed to seek warmth from the *mummy* of life, and the feeble-minded to revel in unsubstantial shadows. There are mistaken men who traduce nature, and falsely give her the epithet of artistic; forgetting, that while art is bounded on every side, nature, on the contrary, is everywhere vast, illimitable and inexhaustible. Not only is she, as a body, of immeasurable extent, but every component element has, in itself, a twofold principle of fecundity. The universal variety of created forms is no less infinite than the ever-increasing productiveness of natural life; and every point of space, countless in numbers and unbounded in duration, is filled with life. Yet art, not content to borrow all its variety from nature, would even rend her asunder and separate the inward vitality from the outward form. The drama and the stage alone actually unite art and nature; yet even here one isolated feature is forcibly severed from her overflowing abundance; and although nature is necessarily presented to our view under two aspects, which, in other arts, are usually divided—as, for instance, a certain fixed and regular form combined with the varying features of actual life—still, this union is highly defective, and we feel the elements of which it is composed to be incongruous and imperfect. The representative portion of this plastic music is peculiarly incomplete. The ancients, by their ideal masks, sacrificed the life and illusion of beauty and truth: the moderns, on the contrary, sacrifice all beauty and truth, both of life and of the illusion. Let us compare with this a glance at the friendly rainbow with which the infinite, as it were, spans the heavens—or a glimpse of Spring, where the full variety of life

penetrates through all our senses into our inmost being—or, lastly, the spectacle of a fearful, and yet glorious conflict, wherein the abundance of a man's imprisoned strength foams up and overflows in resistless destruction. Under these several aspects the human mind seems to embrace and comprehend the entire wealth of existence and of eternity, which, in close connection with the immensity of space, streams forth from the plenteous horn of undying nature. "The world itself is ever young"—thus sings the poet of nature—"but its transitory scenes pass swiftly by. Men come, men go, eager as in a race; each stretches forth his hand to seize the torch of life." Fly—she seems, in seductive accents, to say to mankind—fly thy paltry legislations, thy miserable art, and reverently own thine allegiance to the generous and all-bounteous mother, whose full breast is the source of all genuine life. There is in the human breast a fearful, unsatisfied desire to soar into infinity—a feverish longing to break through the narrow bondage of individuality—and man is so utterly subdued by this wild longing, that his very thirst for freedom makes him a prey to the overwhelming force of nature. In savage disdain he spurns the restraint of laws, and with loveless soul pollutes the glorious excellence of his being. Never were there any people more distinguished by their keen enjoyment of natural pleasures, or their excess in every intellectual and mental indulgence, than the Romans; never were any people more mighty in strength, more lawless, intemperate, and cruel than that nation—from the time that Brutus first stained his noble name with the guilt of assassination, to the period of Nero's darker crimes. Their capacity for enjoyment, and means of supplying it, were so boundless, that the profusion and luxury of a Roman life surpasses the limits of our imagination. Even the enormity of their crimes excites a feeling of wonder, and indignation is almost absorbed in astonishment at the indomitable will, the unfettered independence, which could dare their perpetration. The history and results of such moral excesses are, however, inscribed in characters of flame on every page of their annals, and seem handed down as warnings for all coming generations. All that the earth could furnish was insufficient to appease their insatiable desires, till even Roman vigor proved unable to withstand

the constant influence of revelry and tumult, and, enervated and debased, they sank at last into total extinction.

Love is the spiritual bliss of the unfettered soul, and man its primary object; for as no interchange of feeling can take place in one heart alone, so love cannot exist without return. It is, indeed, no vain delusion to encircle the creation with love, and thus to make it one with nature. Human instinct desires an overflow of goodness, wisdom, and abundance, while reason is ever conscious of a blank, a void, extending beyond the limits of knowledge. It is by that overflowing goodness that the chasm is to be filled up; the image of a loftier Being is thus presented to the mind, and we feel attracted towards the Deity, as the highest symbol of unchanging and imperishable beauty.* Still, even in spiritual love, an excess of indulgence is injurious and enervating; faith or belief is the highest luxury of the soul; and the attainment of belief is a meet guerdon for the toil of investigation and inquiry; if enjoyed without previous labor and research, it may almost be said, like every other ill-regulated indulgence, to bring its own punishment. To seek in everything around us the reflection of our own peculiar temperament, the image of our own vain intellect and reason, is a paltry error, the vice of vulgar minds, which, though endowed with a certain flow of language, imagination, and ideas, have little

*It is in that light alone, as the highest symbol of eternal beauty, that the inspired genius of the ancients could aspire to comprehend the being of the Divinity; and the predominating aspect under which it is presented to us in antiquity, is in accordance with their ideas of that supreme beauty, which they regarded as his proper essence. Here we see clearly the difference between ideal inspiration, the spontaneous effort of reason, and that knowledge of the Divine Being, and of his relation to mankind, which we owe to the more glorious light of Revelation. The adoration, kindled merely by the contemplation of ineffable beauty, is rather an artistic feeling of delight and wonder than pure genuine love. The perfection of the Divine Being may, indeed, if held as symbolic of the loftiest beauty, afford a criterion whereby to estimate the value of every inferior object of affection, yet without inspiring us with the hope or assurance of meeting any reciprocal love from the Deity. Indeed, the love of God, extended to his creatures, must, considered in this light, appear to be a vain delusion of the imagination. Reason, though it may fill the empty space of idle thought with the reflection of its own individuality, is dead to the living impulses of undying love, and no less so the glorious idea of love divine embracing all humanity. That idea of quenchless immortality, the light of Revelation alone could impart, or give the human soul power to acknowledge.

ıte susceptibility or creative depth of soul. Such natures will, o, in other ordinary relations of life, confound the attributes of ; with those of love; yet that idea is desecration to the free spirit- ling of the soul, which, as it admits not being feigned, so its me cannot be justly applied to any premeditated art. Another m of spiritual lover, in the mistaken hope of some incaculable vantage, annihilates his individuality with unquestioning resig- tion; forgetting, poor man! that with substantiality, he tears the ry principle of love out of his bosom. Love is the interchanged ss of noble natures, and possesses in itself a quenchless spring of rfect and unbounded happiness. All mere earthly enjoyments poor and unsatisfactory: the highest and purest too quickly nish and depart, leaving the thorn of regret and longing more ply implanted in the breast! We are mocked for a moment th the delusive semblance of life, but the form we clasp soon ffens into a corpse; in vain we stretch our longing arms into the mensity of nature—she is ever mute, incomprehensible, unsympa- izing, and unconsoling. The highest bliss of the human soul i ve—the noblest love is the attachment to our fatherland. I speak t now of that powerful instinct which burned in the breasts of man heroes and patriots. Regulus, who, with eyes cast down, e himself from his kindred, quitted Rome, and hurried, a noble gitive, to the country of his enemies; Decius, who, devoting him- f to the infernal gods, invoked their vengeance upon his head, d rushed into the arms of death, seem to us rather demi-gods an men. But, compared with the heavenly, joyous simplicity Bulis and Sperthias, with the glowing cheerfulness of Leonidas, ey are but barbarians; they fulfill the law, but it is without love. ıtriotism was not the incitement of those who died at Thermopylæ; ey fell for the laws, or to fulfill their vows. To die thus was the mmit of their ambition. In that pure system of government ıich aims at reaching perfection by binding all its free members one general union, there is a communion of love, a mutual inter- ange of bliss for all. It was the loss of this which the unhappy ıcedemonian, who had forfeited his honor, and was condemned the laws of his country to perpetual ignominy, could not sur- ve. This divided the Dorians from the Romans, by a thousand rious degrees; this gave to the life of Brasidas so bright a glow

of equanimity and peace. The Romans, on the contrary, emulate the lofty independence of the Attic character, and in outward strength and self-command they far surpassed both Dorians and Athenians; the mighty struggle with themselves was carried on with fierce, relentless energy, and their inmost souls were raised to an unnatural and even bombastic degree of elevation; they seem the very athletæ of virtue. The inhabitants of Crete and Thebes luxuriated in the refined sentiments of patriotism and human friendship, and the indulgence of these fascinating emotions appeared to be the sole object of the state; till at length the people became deeply degraded, that they devoted themselves to those external charms, which are, in truth, but the veil of the beautiful, and thus transgressed their duty towards nature. Sensitiveness of soul is it must be confessed, the most glorious, yet dangerous gift of heaven. Imagine a character, in which the susceptibility of the mind is very trifling, but the sensitiveness of the soul so boundless that the slighest emotion thrills through every nerve of the spiritual being, united, besides, with a determination of the will so powerful, that it divides with the soul the entire guidance of the moral feelings. The life of any creature thus constituted would be a current of perpetual agitation, constantly fluctuating, like the storm-tossed wave, between earth and heaven—now rising as if to scale the eternal stars, then sinking into the most fearful abysses of the ocean. To such beings the urn of destiny assigns the loftiest or most degrading fate; close as is their inward union, they are, nevertheless, entirely divided, and even in their overflow of harmony, shattered and broken into countless fragments. Such may have been the temperament of Sappho; and this consideration would afford a clue to the numerous contradictory ideas entertained of that glorious genius, so essentially and intrinsically Greek. We also may say: "Still burns the passion that inspired the Æolian muse, still breathes the love her lyre's low chords betray." One of her songs, and some fragments of her verse, deserve to be numbered among the choicest treasures, flung by the shipwreck of a former world upon the stream of time, and borne down upon its bosom to the shores of the present. Their lofty tenderness seems, as it were, the offspring of a deep and cureless melancholy. Countless songs of a similar character have since won fame and applause, but all

seem feeble and common-place compared with hers, and, like troubled, earthly fires, grow pale in the stainless rays of the immortal sun.

Love is in itself poor and needy; all its wealth and fulness are derived from the rich gifts of nature. Nature, on the contrary, is in herself only the prolific source of animal life; all harmonies in her or pertaining to her—all her internal unity—she owes to love. Both these infinite faculties meet, and form a new and perfect system in the glorious sphere of art; combining, as in the crown and summit of existence, the fiat of destiny and the freedom of the human will; not piercing and rending asunder the hidden emotions of the soul, but tenderly soothing and appeasing every painful struggle. From nature the intellect derives richness, comprehensiveness, and living energy; love gives it an inward depth and harmonious unity, meet for the soul of that rich life, while art frames harmonious regulations, and points out the laws of the beautiful. The intellectual sense, and the soul's inner life, are combined in lofty perfection by the union of these three faculties. Singly they will produce only susceptibility, sensitiveness, or strength of judgment. The deep inspiration of love, and the lavish luxuriance of nature, mutually blended, and subjected to the immutable laws of art, are presented to us in the tragedies of Sophocles. Here the problem of human existence is solved, and the mind of man reposes in delicate equanimitv.

In fact, strictly to observe these delicate limits, and to preserve these contending faculties, in perfect equipoise, would be to attain that just proportion which (according to the saying of the oracle) is the summit of the art of life. But this can be attained only by completeness or perfection, and perfection is one of those holy things which man may never reach below. It is true that some struggle, even now, to obtain the glorious palm of victory; but we see too frequently that the most inflexible will, the most determined energy, the most subtle art, serve but to produce distortions more painful and convulsive. How, indeed, can an entire and perfect fabric be produced from so many varieties? Let him who is absorbed in the struggle for divine perfection, pause not, but wage continual warfare with all obstacles that cross his path. By such means, a return to original perfection is never impossible,

even though unity is still unestablished in the human breast, and though a miserable and deluded world may have struggled on through centuries of darkness and of guilt. Then, when the abundance of knowledge and of love, like some new-found power, shall start suddenly and incomprehensibly into existence, and the first thrill of delight be passed, man will not doubt to whom he should pay his debt of gratitude. He would not dare to appropriate to himself what his most passionate exertions have failed to effect, but of which the outward motives appear perhaps so clear; he cannot attribute to any extraneous influence that of which he is so intimately conscious as his own peculiar possession. He has gained a new portion of his unknown self: he thanks the unknown god! The new-found harmony is not gained by his deserts, but is his own act.

PARADOX.

BY THE EDITOR.

PARADOX, as a theme for discussion, is not specially inviting except to a peculiar class of minds. We introduce the topic with a view to practical treatment rather than to furnish a metaphysical disquisition. It is a subject of deep moment in its bearing on Christian character and destiny.

"Paradox" literally means "against opinion:" its common parlance acceptation means opposed to received, accepted opinion—something absurd and contradictory.

It is a logical canon that contradictory propositions can neither be both true nor both false; moreover, one of them is necessarily true, the other necessarily false. Every well disciplined mind is governed in its judgments by this inflexible law; it is as imperative and immutable as the decrees of the Medes and Persians.*

*Sir William Hamilton has furnished, perhaps, the most perplexing exception to this law of contradictory propositions. In his examination of the philosophy of Reid(p. 377,) Sir William says: "We cannot conceive an *ultimate* minimum of space or time, nor can we conceive their infinite divisibility: we cannot conceive the absolute commencement of time, nor the utmost limit of space, and yet we are equally unable to conceive them without a limit. Of these two prop-

y attempt to abrogate this canon must be abortive though many h efforts have been made. Theologians have been guilty of acting this primary law of rational opinion. We might illus-te largely in verification of our utterance, but will only do so enough to indicate our meaning. The interminable discussion the dogmas of Freedom and Necessity—Predestination and e Agency—furnishes an apt illustration. These dogmas are olly incompatible because they come under the category of the of contraries. The affirmation of one is the negation of the er; if one is true (no matter which) the other is palpably false. e Papal dogma of transubstantiation is less absurd, though a nstrous fraud on human credulity than a creed which both rms and denies the same proposition as a matter of faith and nion. Nor does it much help or justify such perplexity to quote ipture to sustain such discordant dogmas. The laws of the nan understanding are constitutional—are divine—if anything nd nothing can nullify them. It is a wretched service any n renders to the Bible who undertakes to sustain contradictions n its authority. No more effectual method to invalidate its ms could be devised by infidelity—a plan, in fact, much in ue with the enemies of Christianity.

We undertake no such task in this essay, although we may uss propositions which are apparently contradictory. Taking words of Jesus, we will present two specimens of paradox as strations of the many which abound in philosophic and relig-s literature.

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ons contradictory, one of which must be true, the doctrine of inconceiv-ty (as a test of truth or falsity) proves both impossible because inconceiv-."

o man was more deferential to the canons of logic than Hamilton—he justly s as the ablest of expounders, and the above deliverance is not to be taken nullification of the law of contraries. He is arguing against Mill's dogma a thing inconceivable is absurd and incredible, and the case Hamilton puts tes Mill's opinion.

e holds to the canon even in the perplexing problem presented. The diffi-y is, we cannot tell which part of the proposition to affirm, and which to r, seeing that the mind can conceive neither "limit" or "no limit." But ecessity of thinking there is an affirmative and a negative to these proposi-s; and they are mutually contradictory: *ergo*, one is true, the other false.

EDITOR.

There is a famous paradox in the gospels in regard to John the Baptist. Jesus said: "Among them that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist; notwitstanding he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he:" Matthew XI.: 11. Here the greater is said to be the less—none greater than John, yet he is less than the least in the kingdom of heaven. How can these things be? John was the equal in merit to any anterior prophet, though this proposition is not unqualifiedly true; it could not be sustained, taking the terms in their widest extent. Christ, indeed, excepts no man in this comparison—"among them born of women there hath not arisen a greater than John." To take these words in their literal import and entire comprension, leads to extravagance and absurdity too great for defence. In grandeur of intellect we should pronounce John inferior to Moses, to the eloquent Isaiah, to the pathetic Jeremiah. Who would think of comparing this simple man of the desert to the versatile David—warrior, statesman, poet and musician? And how would he dwarf and dwindle in intellectual majesty by the side of the magnificent Solomon!

As a public teacher, in personal popularity, John transcends any man who has ministered in holy things. His advantages, derived from near relationship with Jesus, his personal acquaintance with him, give John a superiority to all preceding prophets and public messengers. Bearing a grand message as the herald of the coming Messiah, he filled an exalted office; and the *official* and *adventitious* greatness which accrued to him was so lustrous that it could not be obscured by his simple food, coarse raiment, and personal humility. *Great* he was—even to sublimity; but he was also *small* when compared to those who succeeded him. Jesus had not yet unfolded fully to John the wonders which were to come. Whatever visions were permitted to him, still he died without the sight; in reality, he had no clear conception of the awful and glorious things which were soon made familiar to the very least in the kingdom of heaven. Hence, the paradox is clearly and fully solved; the apparent contradiction is entirely elucidated, and vanishes, leaving our judgments in complete repose.

Another Paradox: "He that is not with me, is against me:"

Matthew XII.: 30. "He that is not against us, is on our part:" Mark IX.: 40.

Thus spake Jesus to men in words of mighty import; and they are true words; the propositions do not neutralize and destroy each other. In one view they obviously agree—there is no neutral ground when we survey the attitudes men occupy toward Jesus. A position of absolute indifference is impossible in a Christian land where the mind has been made acquainted with the subject-matter, the claims and demands of Christ upon mankind.

Yet, it is obviously a difficult matter exactly where to place many who *seem* never to have taken any decisive posture concerning these affairs. Open, avowed enemies, of course, are aligned *against* Jesus; and equally clear is the posture of the bold and devoted disciples—they are *for* Christ. But, what is the attitude of the Saviour towards that large intermediate class who do not thus plainly take sides theoretically and practically in regard to Christian teaching? Are these for Jesus or against him? In what light must we view Jesus as related to *them?* He affirms, not to be with Christ is to be against him; but He equally declares that they who are not against him, are for him. The mere textualist, who is simply intent on making words mean all that they may contain, who unwisely builds doctrines on the slender foundation of single texts, would easily prove that a man who is not, unquestionably, on the side of Christ, (probably extending it to Church membership,) has no interest whatever in the favor of Christ; and such persons should be deemed and treated as if open enemies. But so did not Jesus decide. If a man is not *against* Christ, at war with him; denying and opposing, Jesus says such an one "is on our part." How far we may go in making our estimate of Christian character, it is not an easy question to decide; and a true verdict can never be rendered by applying either one of these tests alone.

To make the first our test leads to an over-estimate of mere externality, drives us to Churchianity, and reduces religion to form and ceremony. Rome has played this part in the sad drama of Church history; a hierarchy of utterly godless officials has usurped the authority of Jesus so far as to claim alliance with the Church as indispensable to salvation—non-affiliation being rated as open opposition, justly dooming to hell thousands of people having

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The paradox is relieved by the reflection that a man may be *for* Christ, and yet not *wholly* on his side; and so far he is against him. He may stand for him in his doctrine, while in his practice he is adverse; and by his own orthodox creed he declares for his own damnation. And he who says less of creed, and does most in religious practice, should not be rated as non-Christian, and be inevitably doomed to perdition because of some defect in the mere matter of profession.

May we not properly indulge in some reflections of a more general kind pertaining to the teachings of Christ and faulty methods of interpretation? It has been said:

"Of all beings in the world, Jesus is the least able to bear a literal, prosaic, scholastic interpretation; and chiefly because no being ever had so much, so profound, so universal, and so novel truth to convey through a narrow and imperfect vocabulary. Christ invented no language. He had to employ the one in popular use, and whose terms had all been appropriated, and in a manner perverted by the imperfect knowledge and ideas of those who had used it. Moreover, what he said was addressed to the intelligence of his contemporaries, and we read it as if it were directly addressed to ours.

"Those, therefore, who follow Christ with grammar, and dictionary, and Jewish antiquities, and patristic lore, into the record of the New Testament, and expect to find in each particular text a mine of exact and scientific doctrine, are not half as likely to reach the presence of the Saviour as the most ignorant and unlettered Christians who derive their ideas of Christianity from the well known facts, the uniform precepts and unmistakable spirit of our Saviour's life."—*H. W. Bellows.*

Variety, even to complexity, must appear in the presentation of truth; nor is this a discount on revelation. The Bible is a grand moral kaleidoscope—every turn gives a new combination—its little bits of words and thought, like the broken fragments of colored glass, combine in endless ways to exhibit inexhaustible beauty. Truth is not one-sided; we cannot see it all without changing attitudes. In a pictorial panorama we may see all by standing still while the painting moves; but if we would see the whole of truth, we must move and let truth stand still.

And, if our mind is inadequate to the task of making the complete survey, the same object is, in a measure, accomplished when different minds look at truth from different sides or standpoints.

This is, in effect, done by the conflicts and controversies among men—they are respectively reporting the results of their separate explorations. Harmony is, indeed, a beautiful thing, but it may have only a little more life than monotony. Discord has its uses: its harshest noise may awake from a slumber too profound. Who has not been led to modify his opinion, perhaps to change his attitude, by the extravagance of some advocate of the side at first espoused. Some will call this the love of opposition: in reality, it is a love of wholeness. We see at once the ultraist will give but a partial view; and this determines us to look at the question from another posture.

"Truth is as jealous, capricious and shy a mistress as was ever wooed. She eludes her lover as a hunted deer her pursuer. Her votary must follow her in all the circuits and involutions of her flight—now doubling on her track, now making the North star, and now the Southern cross, her beacon—now on the earth, now in water or wood, and again in the sky, but always having it for her purpose to lead her wooer through every parallel and point of latitude and longitude in her domain, that he may view her and her possessions from all quarters of the moral compass, and see her full shape and whole fortune, and so be more in love with his holy, heavenly bride—his destined partner for eternity."

But once more to our Paradox. It is a mistake to conceive of religion as a matter wholly dissimilar, a *sui generis* affair, lying entirely beyond the route of ordinary life.

Christianity prescribes duties; and stress is laid on obligation, but these are exactly on the plane of life. Men were often found discharging many of these duties before Jesus came; and so they are doing, where He is yet unknown, to some extent. Hence, it will be often seen that the professor and non-professor in much of life are very coincident in opinion and practice. As they may have the same interest in many things, it may be difficult to say whether these walk together because agreed, or whether one does under a sense of compulsion what the other freely performs. Anyway, as the moralist travels voluntarily much of the Christian road, (and so far is for Christ,) how much wiser it would be to "travel all the length of the celestial road."

What a dreadful thought that a man can come so near being right, and in the end may be found so far wrong as to fatally decide his destiny. The final doom of all will be pronounced by Jesus—it is enough to know it will be in accord with his own criteria as

above given—it will be rendered in terms that will fully "justify his ways to man."

We may note the fact that truth is often found in proximity to error. There is a frontier where the lines are so near it is not easy to so exactly trace them as to avoid blending. Searching for the truth is much like digging for gold, or hunting for pearls: there is much that looks like the precious treasure, mingled in earth and rocks, which scrutiny and the crucible will show to be of baser metal. The rock must be split and hammered, the mass sifted to get the finer ore. Diamonds may be encrusted with ugly casing, and the wheel of the lapidary can only bring to view the sparkling gem. Lovers of truth, in similar ways, must dig and delve, hammer and grind, to gratify their passion.

Alluding to the obstructions to be overcome in the search for truth, and also to its value, Solomon said: "Buy the truth, and sell it not." It is the pearl of great price—no matter what it costs of time, labor, or money, it is cheap to the buyer, and is so inestimable, that he would impoverish himself to sell at any valuation. Solomon means to teach that truth, comprehensively viewed, is the noblest object of human desire and ambition. Error may be harmless if it "leans to virtue's side," but it brings no positive benefits while truth is lavish in its benefactions.

In pursuance of Solomom's advice the devotee will rise above impediments in the way, though they be mountain high; he will crawl or climb to the top; and if necessary to descend to gain the object, the daring explorer will leap to the very bottom and stand on its granitic base. "Like Isis, in search of the mangled body of of Osiris, the earnest seeker will go up and down, gathering limb by limb the scattered fragments of truth, wherever to be found."

Truth is one, and the effort of every honest understanding is to realize and establish this unity. Skepticism affects to find so much of paradox and discord, so many antinomies and antagonisms in the world and in the mind, its advocates would lead to the conclusion that nothing is certain, nothing is absolutely true.

It may be rated a paradox to say that "skepticism is the correlevant and consequent of dogmatism; and so far from being an enemy to truth, it arises from a false philosophy; and skepticism is its indication and cure."

The skeptic cannot, on his own grounds, establish a system of philosophy—he accepts and applies, to further his negations, dogmas propounded and defended by others, to advance positive truth. It is his aim to reduce philosophy to zero, assuming his borrowed premises. The purpose is to bring the faculties of the mind into discord, to thus confuse and annul judgments that are mutually contradictory. But skepticism, in denying *any certainty*, refutes itself necessarily; for, as Cousin has remarked, this is the same as to say: "I am *certain* there is no *certainty*"—a clear case of logical suicide. "Either the facts of consciousness can be reconciled, or they cannot. If they cannot, knowledge absolutely is impossible, and every system of philosophy therefore false. If these facts can be reconciled, no system, which supposes their inconsistency, can pretend to truth." It is the absurdest of all teaching to assume the validity of logical canons and criteria, to prove their invalidity. If all reasoning is fallacious, then the reasoning employed to reach this conclusion, is also confessedly fallacious. Hence the impossibility of gaining a basis for a system of absolute skepticism: it furnishes, in itself, the elements of its own destruction.

Some utility comes of skeptical philosophy, in so far as it may, by challenging the coherency of schemes of thought, lead to a discovery of incongruity, and thereby to a revision in the interest of truth. A very eminent professor and theologian, Dr. Thornwell, has strongly delivered his mind as to the way in which truth is to be sought and determined:

"All real evidence we are bound to receive, according to the weight which it would have, in a sound and healthful condition of the soul. It is a defect in the mind not to be able to appreciate its lowest degrees. That is a feeble, and must be a fickle mind which, foolishly demanding certainty on all the questions submitted to its judgment, cannot proportion its faith to the amount of light it enjoys. Dissatisfied with probability, and ever in quest of what the circumstances of our case put hopelessly beyond our reach, such men, like Noah's dove, will seek in vain for a spot on which they can rest. Probability is the guide of life; and he who resolves to believe nothing but what he can demonstrate, acts in open defiance of the condition of sublunary existence. There are many things here which we can only see through a glass darkly. Our duty is to walk by the light which we have. God commands us to yield to all evidence that is real in precise proportion to its strength. Evidence, and that alone, He has made it obligatory on our understandings to pursue; and whatever opinions

we hold that are not the offspring of evidence, that have come to us merely from education, authority, custom, or passion, however true and valuable they may be in themselves, are not held by us in the spirit of truth. These measures of assent are only presumptions which should stimulate inquiry, and breed modesty and caution. They are helps to our faith, but should never be made props of it."—*Discourses on Truth.*"

In matters and questions of fact, depending on moral evidence, the question may be in such equilibrio as to forbid any decided or clear conviction. This often occurs in courts of justice, as we may see from division among jurors, and even judges. Hence a suspension of opinion is not only justifiable, but unavoidable. The mind cannot believe without evidence; and the imperfection of human nature precludes the possibility of absolute, mathematical certainty in such affairs. But when abstract truth is presented for consideration—dogmas in philosophy and religion—there may be *apparent* repugnance—there can be no real contradiction. The mind has in itself, in its consciousness, criteria to determine contradiction; and if there can be no intuitive apprehension of truth, in many instances, there is such an interdict laid on the judgment that it must refuse the acceptance of incongruous dogmas, and postpone a decision until further enlightened. Error is first suspected and then detected, while truth, at first hid in obscurity, emerges from the clouds of doubt and shines like a sun at meridian splendor.

LIBRARY TABLE.

POPE'S COMPENDIUM OF THEOLOGY: By WILLIAM BURT POPE, D. D., President of Didsbury Theological College, England.

The Compendium of Christian Theology is a work of three volumes, 8 vo., of more than 400 pages each, and has now become a standard of theology throughout the Methodist world. It is a text-book in the various seats of learning, and the Wesleyan Conference in England; and the minor Methodist bodies in that country have inserted it in their course of theological reading for candidates for the ministry. The Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States, have adopted it as their standard. The Methodist Church of Canada, at the General Conference of 1882, adopted it in place of Watson's Institutes in the course of study. It was stated, some time ago, that an English Wesleyan minister was about to render the Compendium into the vernacular of Wales, so that the thousands of people in the Principality, who are confined to their native tongue, would be able to profit by it. It will thus be seen that for many years to come, Dr. Pope's valuable work will be an authority in Methodism.

Methodist ministers, for the most part, have been too much engaged in their peculiar work of preaching, to afford the time requisite for profound or extensive authorship. Well-nigh fifty years ago, the eloquent Richard Watson published his "Theological Institutes," which were a valuable standard of Methodist Theology, and were of immense value to the Church; but they have long been regarded as too verbose, and their talented author, with his numerous other duties, and almost constant delicate health, could not do otherwise than largely make his work a compilation.

Since Watson's day there has been a wonderful revolution in all branches of learning: many important discoveries have been made, which rendered it absolutely necessary that the "Institutes" should be largely revised.

The work of Dr. Pope, which he has designated "A Compendium of Christian Theology," has not been allowed to become a Methodist standard, without being strongly objected to by some of our American authors. No doubt there are those who may be regarded as strong men, who would have preferred that the work of Professor Raymond, of Evanston University, should have been selected by the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, to be inserted in the course of study, rather than Dr. Pope's Compendium. A strong objection was made against the choice of the Bishops, that none of them had read the work. Dr. Whedon, the learned Editor of the Methodist Quarterly Review, does not fail to point out what he regards as the weak places in these massive volumes, and with his keen Jerusalem blade, he makes numerous incisions into what he conceives to be its more vulnerable parts.

One writer, in *Zion's Herald*, has published a series of papers condemnatory of Dr. Pope's views of "Entire Sanctification," and even goes so far as to assert that he is not Wesleyan in his dissertation on that grand doctrine of Christianity, commonly regarded as peculiar to Methodism, believing, as all the followers of John Wesley do, that the design of the Almighty, in raising up the "People called Methodists," was that they might spread Scriptural holiness through these lands. The said writer argues that the Bishops should insert the Rev. Daniel Steel's book, entitled "Love Enthroned," in the course of study, to counteract the errors of Pope on that subject. We dare say that Dr. Pope is far from regarding his Compendium as being free from blemishes, but, if we are not mistaken, it will be found that, taking it all in all, "The Compendium" has no equal in theological literature, and many years will roll away before it will be surpassed.

Dr. Pope's work is eminently suggestive. The arrangement of the subjects is very systematic. It is divided into sections, which are again subdivided, so that hardly any point is overlooked. The preliminary section entitled, "Christian Theology," may be regarded as a resume of the whole science of Theology, as to its source, its relation to man, to Jesus Christ, to the Church, and its aim, methods and study. The author defines METHODIST Theology as catholic in the best sense, holding the Doctrinal Articles of the English Church, including the Three Creeds, and therefore main-

taining the general doctrine of the Reformation. It is Arminian as opposed to Calvinism, but in no other sense. Its peculiarities are many, touching chiefly the nature and extent of personal salvation; and with regard to these, its standards are certain writings of John Wesley and other authoritative documents.

The following extract, taken from Vol. I., Page 27, may be said to contain the gist of the whole Compendium:

"It will first treat of the Christian Religion, and of its Documents as the DIVINE RULE OF FAITH, including the topics of Revelation, Inspiration, Canon, with such exhibition of the credentials or evidences of Faith as are consistent with the strictly dogmatic character of our course. This is the necessary introduction to the supreme doctrine concerning GOD; his Being, Essence, Names and Attributes. The consideration of these subjects will lead to the relations of GOD AND THE CREATURE. Then follows the doctrine concerning SIN: its origin, nature and universality. The MEDIATORIAL MINISTRY OF JESUS CHRIST, his Person, and his Work, as objectively finished on earth and in heaven, will next demand prolonged attention leading to the ADMINISTRATION OF REDEMPTION, including Personal Salvation, the Ethics of the Gospel and the Institutions of the Christian Church. All must needs be closed by the Doctrines pertaining to the LAST THINGS."

In the concluding paragraph of the section on Preliminaries, Dr. Pope shows that Theological Science has a Divine sanction, influence and control, which no other can claim. There is a spirit in man and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding in every department of knowledge. But in Theology which seeks in all truth its relation to God and eternity, there is the guarantee of a special guidance of the Holy Spirit of God. His witness is not given only to the personal acceptance of the believer; it is a testimony to the doctrine on which his experience rests. *Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given us of God.* This declaration refers to nothing less than the whole compass of theology as it unfolds *the deep things of God;* and, what is more, it assures us that the sufficient knowledge of these deep things is not the prerogative of inspired Apostles only, but is the common privilege of all who receive the Divine Spirit as a Teacher. The theological student who does not imprint this Truth on his heart at the outset goes on his perilous way without the strongest incentive for the encouragement of his labors. In this study the Holy Ghost more than blesses the dili-

gent mind. He directs its pursuits, shapes its conclusions, and sanctifies its reasonings. The first condition of the successful pursuit of this science is the submission of the reason to the teaching of *the only wise God*, OUR SAVIOUR. In the Holy Scriptures this is laid down as a primary axiom.

Having disposed of the PRELIMINARIES, in which are included, THEOLOGY; REVELATION TO MAN; BY JESUS CHRIST; IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, and THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE, Dr. Pope proceeds to the DIVINE RULE OF FAITH, consisting of REVELATION, INSPIRATION, and CANON, which are treated somewhat elaborately, as the parts contain two hundred pages, more than one-half of which are occupied with REVELATION, or THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, which is styled "the perfected Revelation, and the perfected Revelation is the Christian Faith, each and both being coincident, generally speaking, with the Christian Scriptures. But Revelation refers them to God, the Revealer: Christian Faith regards them as received by man, and what God is pleased to make known, man's acceptance makes his faith."

Dr. Pope is thorough here and does not leave any portion of the subject without minutely stating his views and defending the same from every objection that can possibly be brought against them. We have been particularly pleased with one peculiarity in Dr. Pope, viz.: The stress he lays on the faith which must be exercised and the certainty of the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Those who thus give credence to God's method of disclosing His redeeming purpose to mankind are easily guided into truth, because their "acceptance renders the mind comparatively easy of persuasion on subordinate points, and disarms captious criticism of documents and minor difficulties of every kind."

The sub-section on INSPIRATION is very complete, and while all modern theories are minutely examined and duly estimated, the author's views are clearly made known and will be pronounced sound according to the Orthodox school of Theology. He defines Inspiration as "the specific agency of the Holy Ghost in the creation and construction of Holy Scripture." The Testimony of the Scripture itself, our Lord's Testimony, and the Apostolic Testimony, are all dwelt upon in a clear and lucid manner. Men who have questioned the truth of the doctrine in question, have often

quibbled as to how men could know the mind of God, but Dr. Pope says:

"The Spirit used his instruments as men; their sanctity or special consecration to their task was the sanctification of their natural endowments, acquisitions and study. They were not passive in the writing of Scripture, even to that degree in which they were passive in receiving revelation. They wrote sometimes after long intervals what they had received, and always according to the characteristics of their individual genius, style of thoughts and diction. But their faculties were raised, invigorated and strengthened to their highest pitch."

Dr. Pope's theory of Inspiration is DYNAMICAL; that is, "that its influence acted upon and through the faculties of the inspired person. Hence, while the Scriptures are the production of PLENARY INSPIRATION, the Holy Ghost is responsible for the truth of all the written, not that this *verbal* accuracy means that the words were dictated, but only as above stated, that the faculties of the writers were influenced. "For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The new version we think is still better. "For no prophecy ever came by the will of man, but man spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost."—II Peter i.: 21. This is the reason why the Bible is a Book of such authority and demands our confidence. Its adaptation to man while in a probationary state has been proved in thousands of instances, while its rejection leaves him without an unerring guide, which certainly is a strong argument in proof of the supernatural character of the book, seeing that the Creator of man was sure not to leave him without a light whereby he could discern the right path to the celestial city.

In respect to the CANON, or the accepted collection of sacred writings, which form the rule of faith, it will be readily supposed that Dr. Pope accepts the Canon as fixed by the early Church, and rejects the Apocryphal books which are authorized by the Roman Catholic Church. We have often been surprised that so many respectable publishing houses in America, which have issued valuable editions of the Holy Scriptures, should have included the Apocrypha. The New Testament writers never quote from these books, nor make the least allusion to them. Dr. Pope quotes Josephus' testimony, which is ample against the Apocrypha: "We

have only twenty-two books which are to be trusted as having Divine authority, of which five are the books of Moses. From his death to the reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, the prophets, who were the successors of Moses, have written in thirteen books. The remaining four contain hymns to God, and documents of life for human edification."

Dr. Pope has no faith in Tradition as held by the Church of Rome, which "dishonors the prerogative of the inspired writers, and builds not upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, but on the Church as their interpreter," and shows what injury has been inflicted upon the Church by it, especially in the doctrines of "the Atonement, Original Sin, Immaculate Conception, and the Spirit's supreme jurisdiction in the Dogma of Pontifical Infallibility." The theory of the Church of Rome is hurtful to the simplicity and integrity of the truth, and is perilous to the faith once delivered to the saints. There is no safety in tradition; only the Bible is the true source of doctrine.

Volume I., of this invaluable Theological work contains some four hundred and fifty-six pages, two hundred and thirty of which we have now noticed; the balance, nearly one-half, contains our author's views on GOD, the existence and notion of God; the Triune Name; the Attributes; then follows God and the Creature or Creation and Providence. These different parts of an awfully profound subject are treated in the author's usual lucid way. This portion of the work has been regarded by some critics as the most superior, but where every part displays such eminent ability, it is not easy to make a preference, though doubtless some portions will contain evidences of superiority. Those who have read the volumes of Charnock on the attributes of God, will not expect to find in Dr. Pope's volumes such a minute and elaborate treatise on that subject, but the part which treats on the TRINITY which has always been regarded as a very mysterious subject, displays an amount of research, equal to any other work which we have been privileged to read. It would seem as though he had left nothing further to be added. The concluding paragraph on the Trinity, is worthy of the most careful observation, and presents the author's views in clear and lucid style.

"While it is obvious, on the one hand, that no human language can utter this mystery, Theology, both scientific and practical, demands that the Trinitarian phraseology should be ordered with careful precision as at least guarding the truth against the approach of error. After all that may be said as to the inadequacy of human words, and the absence of definitions from Scripture, it still remains true that many others besides those of the New Testament must be used both in teaching and in worship. As it regards the scientific terminology of the doctrine, it is well to be familiar with the terms that express the relations of the one to the Three-in-One. No thoughtful student will either discard or undervalue them. The Deity is the Divine ESSENCE, or SUBSTANCE, or NATURE; the three are SUBSISTENCES, HYPOSTASES and PERSONS; the last words of these counterpart series are philosophically the least exact, but they are the conventional and sacred language of the teaching, preaching, and worshiping Church. So, also, with regard to our practical and ordinary language. Nowhere is precision more necessary than in the ordering of the phraseology of worship. The mind and the tongue must be so educated as to recoil from such language as is tinctured with either the Tritheistic, or the Sabellian, or the Arian error. One of the results of careful and reverent study will be the discipline that shall make every word faithful to the equal honor of each of the Three Adorable PERSONS in the unity of the other Two, and in the unity of the Godhead, adding and praying to each with this sacred reservation. But, after all, we must remember what the ancient Church was never weary of enforcing in relation to this subject: The Nature of God is *arretos*, *ineffabilis*, unsearchable and unspeakable; the Godhead can be known only by him who is *Theodikatos*, taught of God.

Klineburg, Canada. E. B.

THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA AND METHODOLOGY, ON THE BASIS OF HAGENBACH: By GEO. R. CROOKS, D. D., and JOHN F. HURST, D. D. 1 Vol., 8vo., 596 pp. Price $3.50. New York: Phillips and Hunt, 1884.

This is the third issue of the Biblical and Theological Library, and maintains the high character of the preceding volumes of the series. Dr. Harman's "Introduction," and Dr. Terry's "Hermeneutics," have already been noticed in the pages of this REVIEW. Dr. Crooks and Bishop Hurst, the editors of the Library, have themselves undertaken the preparation of the present volume. English and American theological literature has been singularly deficient in treatises upon the number and distribution of the theological sciences, and the order and method of their study. Some practical suggestions concerning studies suitable for the minister and theologian and the formation of studious habits, are usually embraced in books on pastoral theology; but there is no attempt at scientific or exhaustive treatment. A posthumous volume on

Theological Encyclopædia, compiled from the seminary lectures of Dr. McClintock, was published in 1873; and Dr. Henry B. Smith began, but did not live to complete, a more elaborate treatise. In some of the earlier issues of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Prof. E. A. Park translates a few of Tholuck's lectures on Methodology and Prof. W. G. T. Shedd has written an essay on the Method and Influence of Theological Studies. This is about the sum of our express American literature in this department.

Some disappointment must be confessed, in view of this evident poverty, that Drs. Crooks and Hurst did not give themselves time sufficient to collect the materials and furnish an original contribution to the literature of Encyclopædia and Methodology. Of course we know they were very well able to do this, but such knowledge only intensifies our disappointment. Since, however, a selection was to be made among the numerous German authors, Hagenbach is doubtless a most judicious choice. Karl R. Hagenbach (1801–1874) was an earnest and able expounder of the "mediation" theology. Reared in a Church in which the extremest orthodoxy held undisputed sway, and greatly influenced in his theological development by the writings of Herder, and the academical instructions of Lücke, at Bonn, of Schleiermacher and Neander, whom he regarded as his masters while at Berlin, and of De Wette, at Basel, he attained a balance of the critical, conservative and constructive faculties which gave him special qualifications for his duties as a theological instructor when he was called to be professor ordinarius at Basel, in 1829. These qualities are well illustrated in his historical writings, and especially in the work before us.

Drs. Crooks and Hurst have embodied in the text accurate and tolerably full accounts of English and American activities in the various fields of theological study. Hagenbach, in common with all other German writers, had entirely ignored England and America, and these additions, together with a largely increased number of captions in the literature, chiefly English and American works, seem to make up the work of our two American "redactors."

The work consists of an Introduction and two general parts. Part I. treats of Encyclopædia, and Part II. of Special Theological Encyclopædia. This last part is divided into four great chapters,

consisting of multitudinous sections, on Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical Theology. This is the four-fold, time-honored distribution of the theological sciences, and as this point is discussed at length elsewhere in this issue of the REVIEW, it will not be necessary to consider it further here.

The section on Religion, page twenty-five to forty-two, shows strongly the influence of Schleiermacher's theology of feeling, but is withal richly suggestive. As a psychological analysis it is discriminating, vivid, and powerful. Any fertile mind will get abundance of sermonic material from its thoughtful perusal.

Our limits permit only one quotation. Hagenbach has outlined for us a system of Dogmatics which is certainly striking and worthy of serious and prolonged study. It is as follows:

"1. God and his relation to the world and to man as his creature. Natural, legal and prophetical theology.

"2. Man, as related to God (and the world) so long as they have not been brought together through the mediation of Christ. The doctrine of man's primeval state; the destination of man, and sin.

"3. The doctrine of the personality of the God-man and his work for the redemption of mankind. Christology and objective soteriology—the heart of Christian dogmatics.

"4. Man, as related to Christ, and through Christ to God. The doctrine of salvation, subjective soteriology, the *ordo salutis*.—The doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

"5. Man, as related to Christ, and through Christ to the world. Communion of believers, the Church and sacraments. Hence, also, man's changed relation to nature—death, the resurrection and the whole of eschatology.

"6. God, manifested in Christ, in his relation toward himself. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity in its immanent meaning.

"7. God in his relation to the world, viewed in connection with the fact of redemption.

"The kernel of the whole, Christology, is thus inclosed within theology, and the interior connecting links will constitute the anthropology."—P. 423.

Phillips and Hunt have gotten up the volume in handsome style, uniform with the other issues of the series. Ministers and theological students will be amply rewarded by its study.

Vanderbilt University. J. J. T.

EVERY SEVENTH SOUL: By M. CALLAWAY, D. D., President of Paine Institute, Augusta, Ga. Atlanta, Ga.: James P. Harrison & Co. 1884.

The above is a pamphlet of only twelve pages, from the pen of Dr. Callaway, late Vice-President and Professor of Emory College, Georgia.

The title in itself is not significant and gives no token of the aim and scope of the essay. Dr. Callaway, after a long and successful career as a professor, chiefly of the classics, volunteered to lead in the enterprise projected for the improvement of the ministry of the Colored M. E. Church—the Southern wing of African Methodism. With some promptness, after the close of our last General Conference, 1882, the authorities planned a scheme for the education of preachers and teachers in said Church. This was the joint work of representative men of that Church and of our own. It was decided to found and support a school in Augusta, Ga., to be named in honor of the late Bishop Paine. Funds were necessary to erect a suitable building and to pay teachers. But it was easier to ask for money than to get it; hence very little has been done.

Dr. Evans, a faithful and able man, acted last year as a commissioner, and very largely traversed the Church canvassing for the cause. Some success attended his efforts, but not enough to justify a continuance of that method of operations. He is still COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION for said object, appointed to the office by our Senior Bishop, George F. Pierce. Dr. Evans does not travel abroad, but solicits funds by private ways, and he is ready to receive any gifts which the liberal minded may bestow.

The school was opened in a rented house, in January, with a fair attendance of pupils. Besides Dr. Callaway, the Institute is officered by Professor George Williams Walker, of the South Carolina Conference. The apparent apathy toward the enterprise may be accounted for in several ways. Chiefly, we think, indifference and opposition have proceeded from a confused conception in the public mind as to the real significance and design of this educational scheme. Politicians and philanthropists have been stressing the necessity of a wide system of education to fit the

negro for citizenship, and to elevate the race from its semi-barbaric condition. Much has been said in this matter so utopian, and so extravagantly sentimental as to drive sober-minded, calculating people into opposition. The Paine Institute project has become identified, in a measure, with visionary plans of education. Regarded as the beginning of a Herculean endeavor to lift the African from his low plane into something like equality with the dominant race, the attempt has been resisted. It is deemed not only chimerical but unwise in conception and pernicious in tendency and results.

But all this is far-fetched and unwarranted by facts. The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, is not committed by words or acts to the Quixotism of devising and pursuing a scheme of universal and liberal education for the negro. What the State has done in providing elementary education alike for both races, the Church approves. Even this is done in a very imperfect way; but it is without discrimination as to "race, color or previous condition of servitude." Neither the Church nor the States can supply the facilities for a liberal training of either white or black population. No wilder dream was ever indulged than this would be; indeed we know of no sane mind that contemplates or advocates so untenable a project. The elements of education being furnished by the State, chiefly by the taxation of whites, anything beyond must come from the negro's own effort, aided by the liberality of philanthropists. Progress in intellectual development among races of men is very slow. If the doctrine of evolution is true anywhere it is true here. To become great a people must grow by slow degrees—the heights which are conceivable and desirable are not attained neither by leaps nor wings.

Oppressed and overwhelmed by the curse of a war waged about the negro as property, it is not surprising that even opposition should exist to his education when it is to be done by people who lost largely their wealth in the struggle, and what was left must now be taxed to educate their negro property. We venture to say no harder problem for solution was ever submitted to a people than this negro problem is to the South. The management and solution of the vexed questions in our complicated affairs is creditable to our statesmanship and the wisdom and virtue of our citizens.

What Paine Institute aims to accomplish is the improvement of

the colored ministry, in addition to qualifying persons to teach. By this policy, it is believed more good can be achieved than would be possible in any other way, even had the Church money to spend *ad libitum*. The power for good or evil of the colored preacher is immense—its force can scarcely be estimated. It is the manifest destiny of the negro to be swayed by leaders of his own race. Really, we take it to be an established fact that all nations must be Christianized in the main by natives; not by aliens and foreigners. A beginning must be made, of course, by teachers of the more advanced nations; but unless the natives can be brought into the field and put to the front, no great conquests can be effected. Hence, the scheme of educating negro preachers is only another way of carrying forward missionary operations. "The Greeks are at our doors"—yes, in great numbers and in great destitution.

As we have ample space in this department of the REVIEW, at present, we will let Dr. Callaway speak for his own cause, and at full length. He is our friend and *brother;* our partiality and love for the man may disqualify us for a criticism of the essay which follows. We may be excused for saying the paper is characterized by that classic elegance always exhibited by the author when he speaks and when he writes. This editorial prelude is written by one who, in the jargon of the day, may be called a "Bourbon," whatever such slang may mean. EDITOR.

"EVERY SEVENTH SOUL."

"The efficacy of Christianity is faith in the Son of God, its expression, doing good as the Son of Man. We bring the Christ to the people, when with Jesus we enter the hovels of the poor, putting light in their minds and hope in their hearts. This method the Church, in some sort, illustrates and commends. Through endowments which she first created, the hospitals of our cities invite the diseased to relief and the destitute to comfort, and, inspired by the Healer, miracles of restoration are wrought on a scale that would be confounding to the earlier disciples.

"Caring for the body, she did not altogether neglect the mind. The Church kindled the first intellectual fires of the post-Pagan centuries, and when the fires seemed dying out, sacredly cloistered the embers till the Medieval night has passed. Her record, how-

ever, is not flawless. At times she has shut her own eyes to the light; at times she has put her own light under a bushel. But she is recovering of her *strabismus*. She makes confession; and the Galileos of science may no longer distrust her. She now comprehends that Christianity is 'broader than the creeds and wider than the sects;' that all honest effort and striving to do good is one, and that every good word and work is of the Christ and should be so counted. Formerly, homes for orphans, asylums for the insane, retreats for the aged and infirm, universities, colleges and academies were under her immediate trusteeship. Now, in part, she relinquishes supervision. The pressure upon all these agencies calls for and obtains the oversight of persons not of the Church. But this release of superintendency argues neither decline of power, nor want of sympathy; but is rather an evidence of influence outside of her communion. Whole communities are matriculating in the schools of benevolence. The enterprise which founds eleemosynary institutions is an influence and an overflow from the Church. The world is moving Christward and reinstituting His modes of mercy. The public and the Church are interacting—the one thereby becoming more liberal, the other more humane; the one broader, the other more moral; and together they are working the reduction of the ills and evils of life. But the Church, no less than the public, sometimes unduly discriminates in her beneficence. Jesus went about doing good to any and to all, whether of one race or another; but the Church has delayed in her mission to some of the peoples whose condition calls pathetically for her ministry. Observably slow has she been in coming to the rescue of that race, whose occupancy of a continent yet unexplored, its dialects unclassified, constitute it the Sphinx of the races, from whose base the sands have been but partially dug away by the hand of curiosity, and whose riddle is not yet solved, unless it be in the guess of Œdipus, and in the gospel of Jesus—the African is a 'man.' The problem of the civilization of the Dark Continent is brought forcefully to our intelligence and to our conscience, by the fact of the presence among us of seven million souls of African descent. Passing unconsidered the recent European Alliance for the suppression of the slave trade, the possible advantages of projected commercial enterprises, as also the efficiency of

present missionary schemes, we shall discuss our duty to those of the race in our midst, with the implication, however, that whatever is helpful to the race here must in the end be helpful to it everywhere.

"Every seventh citizen of the United States is a Negro, or of his descent. New to his enfranchisement, and unconscious of his responsibilities, we ask, not evasively, what shall we do with him? But humanely, what should we do for him? Any attitude toward this anomalous citizen will be criticised. So be it. Sensible criticism is corrective; senseless criticism, suicidal.

"Unless we propose to traverse the judgment of the wise in all ages, it were needless to canvass the relation of intelligence to citizenship. We must appeal to other than civilized courts for precedents. The fathers of our Republic gave no dubious decision on this issue. We cannot afford to be behind the past. No statesman, it is true, stultifies himself by ignoring the factorship of education in our civil and social well-being; no party thus Bourbonizes its platform, and no sect thus mars its creed. And yet there are religionists who, to say the least, disparage learning, and there are politicians who flatter ignorance. To many partisanship and patriotism are synonymous, and to some charlatanry is a substitute for Christianity.

"Economy requires the education of the people. Ignorance and pauperism have been immemorially mated, and the grosser vices are their legitimate offspring. Illiteracy is expensive. Our taxes grow with its growth. 'Neglect of the Juke family in a New York village,' Mr. Dugsdale informs us, 'resulted in a marvelous multiplication of criminals and paupers. From Margaret, the mother, was traced one thousand two hundred descendants, of whom two hundred and eighty were adult paupers, one hundred and forty criminals and offenders, guilty of seven murders and of numerous thefts, highway robberies, and nearly every offense known to the calendar of crime, and cost society for their support and punishment $1,308,000.00, without reckoning the cash paid for whisky, or the entailment of those evils upon posterity, or the incurable diseases, idiocy and insanity, growing out of their debaucheries, and reaching farther than we can calculate.'

The prevalence of these evils is alarming. Of the illiteracy

that beclouds us, Dr. Eaton says, that the Church cannot displace it, nor the States; and that what is done in this direction must be augmented by National aid. The Commissioner wisely warns us of the threatening flood. 'In the Southern States,' he says, 'the family, the church, and other promoters of social and civil enlightenment, have been restored to their normal capability, and yet there are one million six hundred thousand white persons, and a total of whites and blacks of four million seven hundred thousand, ten years old and over, who cannot write.' While these States are creditably increasing their respective school funds, it is yet to be noted that the schools are open for inadequately brief terms, and that the teachers, especially for the colored schools, are generally incompetent; and, besides, there are two million seven hundred thousand of school age, not yet enrolled for instruction. But as the taxable property of the Southern States is only three billion, while that of the Northern is thirteen, it seems but equitable that the burden of taxation should be distributed among all the States. Advocates of national aid are pressing the question upon the attention of Congress, and the press, ever prescient, leads in the discussion. Should they succeed in their advocacy, much will remain to be done by the Church; should they fail, more. There are, however, ethical phases of education with which neither the Federal nor State governments are expected to concern themselves. The Church must look after the religious welfare of the people, and, in the main, their moral conduct. We do not minify the inherent uplifting power of secular education, nor would we unduly magnify the moral leavening of religious instruction. Secular education, we think, is not sufficient of itself to impart and maintain a becoming ethical conduct, nor in its earlier offices in the personal or national life is religion capable of so doing without the auxiliaries of established schools and courts of justice. The Church then, should come to the assistance of the Federal and State governments by founding schools, industrial, normal and theological. They should reciprocate and supplement each other—the one contributing what the other lacks.

"So far, the commendable attempt to enlighten the negro through the public schools is not satisfactory, and for want of the help which we suggest is the province of the Church to supply, teach-

ers equipped for their work. Hitherto the blind have led the blind. The Ephphatha must be uttered by the Church. Nor in doing this work does she transcend her commission, she is only complying with it. It necessitates no political complicity. If, therefore, indeed, the Church have erred, it is in her reluctance to speak out, where a *consensus* of her intelligence should have called for a declaration. She will hardly be censured should she oppose the suggested project of setting apart a territory for the Negro, as was done for the Indian. The experiment with the Indian has proved costly, and a similar one with the Negro would bankrupt the Government in money and the Church in morals. The proposal is visionary, its spirit destructive, and few seriously entertain the thought of such a colonization. For had we the territory to spare, and the 'reservation' granted; that whites without *allodium* were consenting, and that we had a fund equal to the expense of the removal and settlement of his vast family, this stubborn fact stands in the way: The Negro does not wish to go. Here by no purpose or act of his own, his ejectment by persuasion or purchase, by force or fraud, would be unjustifiable or cruel according to the means adopted. Any contrived exodus elsewhere is *a fortiori* impracticable. He is not ready to emigrate. He is not sufficiently schooled for self-government. We shall not ask him to go. We shall stand in our lot, and share the burden of his tuition. In the process of his civilization, when wealth and enlightenment have been secured, he may look away from the old homestead. But that time is indefinitely postponed by his needs and his nature. When it comes, Central and South America will furnish him a new home.

"The fear expressed by a few, of the result of the Negro's aspiration for 'social equality' is groundless, because there is no such aspiration and no such state. Equality before the law of the land and the cross of Christ has no necessary connection with equality at the fireside or at the table. Socially as well as legally one's house is his castle, and the portcullis can be put up or down at the pleasure of the lord. Dr. Abel Stevens cannot realize the growth of race-exclusiveness with the Negro, and his theory of limited amalgamation disturbs not the quiet of those who dwell among the race. For they know that fusion is as far from the expectation of

the Negro as it is from entertainment by the white man. The gardener may hybridize two flowers by close planting; but fusion involves the will of both sexes.

"In connection with the question of the seventh citizen, the Church is to answer the farther reaching one. What should be done for this imperiled seventh soul? In part, our doing for him will depend on his capacity to receive. Manifesting as he does a sort of religious aptitude for piety, and yet without moral muscularity, he has been despaired of for any but sensuous religiousness. The conclusion is unphilosophical. The latest deliverance of the science of religion gives hope of advantage in Christian labor and culture. DeBrosses and his school held that all nations begin with feticism, advance to polytheism, and close in monotheism; while Max Müller, leading the latest school, after a life of study, affirms that feticism is not at all the primitive form of religion. This being true, missionary enterprise is, after a sort, a work of restoration. We may indeed mistake the nature of a fetich itself. 'A Negro worshipping a tree,' says Halleur, 'with an offering of food, being questioned, replied: 'Oh the tree is no fetich, the fetich is a spirit, and eats only the spiritual part of the food.'' We must measure religion, as we measure the Alps, by the highest point they have reached. Religion is everywhere an aspiration rather than a fulfillment, and 'I claim,' says Müller, 'for the religion of the Negro no more than for our own when I say it should be judged by what it has been in its highest votaries.' Besides, we unconsciously, and with apparent uncharity, reverse the methods of judgment pronounced upon other races in the case of the Negro. We judge of the Chinaman by the mandarin, not the cooley; of the Italian by the prince, not by the lazzaroni, and of the Englishman by the baron, and not by the boor. While we rightly boast of our Saxon origin, it might be well to remember that the Romans gave us our religion, and the Norman-French our refinement. 'The Negro's religion,' says Tyler, 'as compared with other uncivilized peoples is neither peculiar nor exceptionally crude.'

"That the race can respond in improvement to the largest outlay in means and measures of helpfulness; that it has the receptivity and energy to take in and utilize the Christian elements about it, is shown in the history of the African M. E. Church. In 1802

this Church had seven thousand members and a small property; in 1836 it had reached forty-three thousand dollars of property, and yearly increasing; in 1880 it reports nine million dollars of property. This Church has a publishing house, college, and other adjuncts of Methodism. It is conservative and influential for good. This statement demonstrates that without the support of the dominant race the Negro has moved forward surprisingly, and that with its encouragement greater advances may be expected. His change of condition has perceptibly quickened the freedman's thought, and clarified his religious perceptions. But the dregs of superstition need filtering out. Neither here nor in West Africa have the conditions been the best to develop manliness or moral cleanness. The Negro needs what the Saxon villian needed, a sympathy practical and stimulating. 'There is nothing so crushing to moral effort as the suspicion that, however we may try to live rightly, the forces of the universe are against us.' Something of this depression the Negro feels; but from this gloom we argue for his relief. His elevation begins with faith in our purpose to elevate him. Philanthropy came in with the Christ. Christianity broke down the barriers between Jew and Gentile; between Greek and barbarian; and shall it fail only in the case of the white and the black man? The sympathy that reaches the Negro's heart shall be real enough to inform his mind, otherwise he will remain as he is, the subject of a capricious emotion. Hitherto the bread of life broken to him has not been converted into the blood and bone of a robust life. Spiritual dyspepsia with its illusions has ensued; but with an impulse to intellectual exercise, and with the tonic of self-reliance, we may hope for his improvement. The morality of any race comes of felt-personal responsibility and deference to custom and public opinion. For the Negro, schools are indispensable promoters of a better life, because healthful home influences are yet wanting to him. From the superior race must come the stimulus and training for the first corps of teachers that shall make the school efficient. For while the freedman is to work out his own redemption, he must draw, for generations, it may be, from our fuller resources and higher attainments. Thus impressed the General Conference of the M. E. Church, South, acting upon Episcopal recommendation, proposes to furnish the 'Colored

M. E. Church of America' with teachers and preachers for her schools and churches, and to this end a Commissioner has been appointed, a Board of Trust instituted, and a school inaugurated—the Paine Institute, of Augusta, Ga.

"Influenced merely by ecclesiastical pride, our Southern Methodism should seek to hold this Church and her people. But when her record in school and Church extension, her former labors of love, her doctrine of good works and free salvation, and the Christian co-operation she has throughout the Union are recalled, they forbid that she should hesitate to do her share of this home work, or suffer another to take her crown in its consummation. She cannot delay, unless in her memories and in her motive power, the life of the Christ in its own marked poverty, and yet in its ceaseless ministries to the poor, in its gracious words and alleviative works, in its surrender and sacrifice, in its renewal and intercession, unless all this life, so human in its nearness to us, and so divine in its usefulness, and this death, at once sacrificial and saving, be counted for nought. 'Behold I come quickly,' saith He who walked among the seven golden candlesticks, and shall He find this people unredeemed from ignorance and unsaved from sin through the indifference and neglect of their nearest neighbors?

"The Paine Institute is as really an exponent of missionary zeal as are our schools at Shanghai and Mexico—for the heathen at our door, as they are for the heathen far away. Probably the entire constituency of our Methodism do not yet concede the sameness of these works, and the diplomacy of the Church is thereby put to trial. It will not long be thus. She will grow in knowledge and grace for the emergencies of her mission. As they arise she will, we trust, meet and master the occasions of her testing.

"Appreciating the embarrassments of our Methodism, but assured of her duty, we confidently commend the Paine Institute to her centennial beneficence. The establishment of the Institute will vindicate her Christliness no less than her chivalry; her superiority over prejudice, no less than her concern for the people. Thus she will give and receive, will bless and be blessed. She will co-work with other Churches and the commonwealth. By this school she will substitute, as far as she can, the incompetent teachers of the public schools, not simply by those of accurate

technical knowledge, but who also shall carry with them some of those indefinable yet appreciable qualities that are the last and best results of contact with higher natures and greater refinements—that manliness which is the outgrowth, not of education as such, but the product of the educational process combined with that orderly and yet subordinate association which disciplines, not simply to obedience, but to energy, and specially to that quality only acquired under circumstances favorable to its illustration, the stoicism of duty, or rather the religion of sacrifice. If one principle of morality should be infixed more deeply than others, it is that of duty. This taught and enforced must clothe with power those who in turn shall illustrate its supremacy in life. A right sense of duty humanizes, dignifies and empowers us. It is the measure of character. The true man rises with its conscious control, and goes to rest under its protection.

> So nigh is grandeur to our dust
> So near is God to man,
> When duty whispers low, 'Thou must,'
> The youth replies, 'I can!'

"This undertaking springs from duty, and maintaining this spirit we shall charge the freedman with a moral tone which the Churches and schools could not otherwise develop in a generation. In the icy light of expediency we might turn over the work of educating and christianizing the negro to the North, but it would not be right. If the Southern Methodist Church claims equality of honor with her sister denominations, in patronage of good citizenship, not to speak of the Christian specialty of building up the Master's spiritual kingdom, she will co-operate. But if, with a professed love of souls, she permit this Bartimæus to stand sightless by the wayside unrestored; if she let this polyandrous woman, right at the well of cleansing, return to her home uninstructed; if she open not the Scriptures to this servant of Candace; if she suffer this Cyrenian to strain up the Calvary of race deliverance unaided; if she lift not these lame and impotent folk lying around the Bethesdas of health and home, of school and Church, the very rocks should cry out at the unchristliness of her conduct. It is not possible that Southern Methodism should thus discredit her past or defeat her future. The obligations of benevolence, under

the changed relations of the race, become more urgent, and must be assumed more fully.

"But suppose the freedman does not value aright his new relation, that he is ungrateful, what then? Why Christianity should be superior to ingratitude. Had not Jesus so illustrated it, his kingdom would have perished before the seal had been set on his tomb. 'Father, forgive them, they know not what they do,' was the spirit of his life and his farewell word to his followers.

"Connectional in its structure, Methodism in so much is eminently fitted for evangelizing. Besides, she has experience. Before the war between the States, she successfully conducted missions on the plantations. The Paine Institute is not out of harmony with her past; the adjustment to the conditions is the only novel feature. The Colored Methodist Church, too, a vigorous, aggressive organization, is her ally. While the Church, from the riches of her liberality, is endowing the Anglo-Chinese University and other schools, we will not doubt that her bounty shall bless the seventh citizen, or that her compassions shall reach the seventh soul. May the Holy Spirit descend on our Methodism for mightier missionary work at home, as well as abroad. The time is propitious for larger views and broader plans. The negro is gaining friends in all sections of the country and in all parts of the world. It is a time of expectancy with him, almost of fruition.

There's a light about to break;
There's a day about to dawn;
Men of thought and men of action,
Clear the way.

"Blessed day will it be, when Church and State, taking each a hand of the dusky son of servitude shall, with the pride of a conscious civilization, lead him to the heights where the breath of a better life shall invigorate, and the light of knowledge shall inform and renew him. Crowning day will it be when the aliened sons and daughters of Africa returning, shall themselves hold up the cross to their slumbering mother, who feeling its sweet light, shall rouse herself, look up and live."

A HIGHER CATECHISM OF THEOLOGY: By WILLIAM BURT POPE, D. D., of Didsbury College, England. New York: Philips & Hunt. 1884.

We have printed a full notice of Dr, Pope's Theology in this number, written by Rev. E. Barrass of the Methodist Church of Canada. Our worthy brother will accept our thanks for his favors which have repeatedly been shown to the REVIEW.

Messrs. Philips & Hunt, of the Methodist Book Concern, New York, have sent us Dr. Pope's Catechism of Theology for which we return our acknowledgements. A Catechism is suggestive of a small book or pamphlet and is always associated with childhood and youth. The reader will understand that this is a book suitable for any order of mind. This Catechism makes a volume of nearly four hundred pages, admirably printed and well bound. Price $1.50.

We need not write of Dr. Pope, in view of what Mr. Barrass has written in a foregoing criticism. Dr. Pope occupies an exalted place, perhaps the highest, among Methodist theologians. In this volume the whole circle of Theology is traversed and treated by question and answer. We have examined it sufficiently to be satisfied that it has been carefully prepared by the hands of a master. A student of Theology will find it an admirable guide as to the order of proceeding in the investigation of Theological Science. All great facts and doctrines are brought to our attention by an instructive question or answer; and the inquirer will readily see where he should extend his researches to find full and comprehensive treatment. The definitions are worth very much—the discriminations are all important to exactness in thinking and speaking. Theology taught by Catechism must necessarily be mainly of dogmatic cast; but this is not objectionable even to advanced students, for what is taught dogmatically and categorically serves as a base on which to rear a superstructure of thought by extended investigation. We need scarcely to say Dr. Pope is thoroughly Wesleyan in his teaching; and he is regarded as a very high authority in Europe and America as a systematic theologian.

DOOMED RELIGIONS: Edited by J. M. REID, D. D., Corresponding Secretary of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. New York: Philips & Hunt. 1884.

There are some words of such peculiar sound as to startle us on their pronunciation with either pleasant or painful emotions. "Doomed" is a word of that sort—the very sound invites and produces solemnity. Religions doomed are such as must decay and die; they have in themselves the elements and tokens of their own destruction. Venerated errors, hoary superstitions, cherished for centuries by millions of votaries, yet doomed to vanish, to perish from the earth. We are called to consider some of these systems which, according to this book, are predestined to this fate.

Dr. Reid invited essays by various writers on the leading false religions that have long dominated mankind. The Editor has introduced the matter of the volume by an extended essay from his own pen on the Primordial Religion, which he contends was monotheistic. Idolatry is a perversion and corruption of the original idea of worship. This is a question much discussed, and Dr. Reid's argument is an important contribution on the subject of man's earliest religion.

Ram Chandra Bose, M. A., of India, (a late delegate to the General Conference at Philadelphia,) writes the first essay on Mohammedanism. He has much to say of Mohammed, as well as of the system which he originated. Mr. Bose says:

"Mohammet began his career as a reformer, making war on idolatry—his watch-words were, the Unity of God, the Immortality of the Soul, and Revelation. Whatever of moral excellence may have belonged to the prophet in the beginning, there was in the progress of events such deterioration of character as to make his career black with crime. His system at first was one of pure theism—monotheistic—but in its course it became a jumble of incoherent dogmas, and especially a cover of lustful impurities."

Mr. Bose enters into a full exposition of Mohammedan doctrine and precept, into a description of the several sects of the same religion. He unfolds the teaching of the Koran in a good measure—a book so utterly incoherent and absurd that we have never had the patience to read it, though it has been in our library for many years. Mr. Bose says there are about a hundred and ninety millions of Mohammedans on the globe; this is about one-sixth

f the earth's population. What an appalling thought! How it axes our credulity to rank Mohammedanism among the "doomed eligions" in view of its immense magnitude and the past history f this monstrous delusion and fanaticism. Our author says:

"We may predicate of Mohammed what has been so justly said of the Highanders by Lord Macaulay. His life was looked at through one distorting iedium in days gone by; and it is being looked at through another in these ays, when a species of sentimentalism is growing up, by a strange fatality, de by side with the spirit of practical earnestness. Because he was blackened y a host of writers, who knew very little indeed about him, he has been whiteashed and brightened in our day by authors, who know a great deal about im, but who are determined to shut their eyes to the great faults by which his haracter is darkened. But leaving the extremes of indiscriminating censure nd fulsome praise, opinion is gravitating toward the belief, that he was a 'thoroughly good and righteous man' during the first period of his career as a eformer, and that he was rapidly demoralized, during its closing years, by success more magnificent by far than he had ever ventured to anticipate, This onviction, which is daily gaining ground, fails, in our humble opinion, to give o his life that coherence or unity which, as an index to the progressive develpments of a single mind and a single spirit, it cannot but have. This view /hich postulates some degree of selfishness and cunning in conjunction with ome degree of sincerity as the foundation of a career, which ultimately was ifigured by unblushing licentiousness, inhuman ferocity, and gross imposture, s decidedly the more preferable."

BRAHMANISM is discussed in an essay by Rev. T. J. Scott,). D., of North India.

This ancient system originated in India and is the chief religion)f that country. There are probably about one hundred and ieventy millions of people of this faith. Dr. Scott's essay in this)ook is exceedingly comprehensive and instructive, covering, as it loes, the history, literature, religion, philosophy, and the present :ondition and prospects of the system. These are all discussed in lhe order named.

The Hindus are of Aryan descent and ethnologically are of the iame race as English speaking people. They first occupied the :erritory on the Indus river, and gradually spread to the Punjab, the land of the five rivers,) and later to the Ganges. The Hindus ire so called from the Indus river; the country is named for the)eople by simply dropping the h—India. This people settled in :heir present land perhaps 1500 years before the advent of Jesus. When Alexander invaded India, 331 B. C., they were a mighty

and warlike race, and had developed a vigorous, intellectual and religious life.

Alexander's invasion did not penetrate the interior of the vast domain filled with an immense population. For centuries before and after this period the Hindus were shut up to themselves, but not without internal convulsions. Eusebius, the father of Church history, says the Scythians brought from India heretical dogmas which led to Manicheeism. If this is so it shows that this ancient people wrestled with that deep, dark problem—Origin of Evil—and with no better success than modern philosophers have attained. Manicheeism was so called from its founder, and consisted in the assumption of two Gods—a god who is the author of good, a rival deity who is the source of all evil. Dr. Scott says:

"When the Aryans first crossed the high mountain chain that girts, like a vast wall, the North-west border of India, they were nomadic tribes, who had also acquired habits of husbandry. They cared for their flocks, and tilled the soil. In the word 'arable,' fit for tillage, we have a plain echo indicating the occupation of the ancient Aryans. At that distant epoch they were nature worshippers, bowing before the powers that blazed in the sun, cheered them in the refreshing rain, moved in the wind, gleamed in the lightning, and spoke to them in the thunder. A simple priesthood was formed, which, in time, developed into a mighty hierarchy, the most absolute and arrogant the world ever saw. A caste system was formed that made the Brahman divine, and subordinated and fastened in its iron grip all other classes. Then followed philosophical speculations, in which a remarkable attempt was made to give a solution of the origin, nature and destiny of all things. In time, also, there came revolts against the arrogant supremacy of the Brahmanic priesthood, modifying to some extent the system. Such was Buddhism and Jainism. It was impossible that human nature, without a struggle, should submit to such exorbitant pretensions as were made by Brahmans, or endure that complex and extravagant ceremonial system which they had fabricated. Buddhism is supposed to have been a revolt against Brahmanism, occurring some centuries previous to the Christian era. Buddha, also called Sakya Muni and Gautama, was born at the base of the Himalayas, probably in the Sixth century B. C. The doctrine of this remarkable man spread, and he, in time, gained such a following that, for at least a thousand years, this faith held a dominant position in a large part of India. A long struggle was carried on with Brahmanism, by which it was at last expelled, and a Brahmanical revival followed. Buddhism retained a foothold in Ceylon, Burmah, and parts of the Himalayas. It found a new home in Thibet and China.

"Jainism was an offshoot or after-growth of Buddhism, apparently left behind as that system was driven from the country. Perhaps its most distinguishing tenet is a denial of the divine origin and infallibility of the Vedas. Brahman-

ism, having fully re-asserted itself, developed into a system of degrading idolatry and peurile ceremonies, and the recognition of an innumerable host of divinities forming the absurd system now encountered by the missionaries."

Our author gives a most entertaining and instructive account of the Hindu literature which he pronounces "wonderful." "It has been brought to light by Sir W. Jones, Colebrook, Muir, Max Müller, Monier Williams and others."

W. Jones has said of this literature: "It is more perfect than Greek, more copious than Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either." They were at an early day much given to philosophic speculation, and their literature shows a familiarity with all the metaphysical questions discussed at a later period among the Greeks, and are yet in debate among modern philosophers. Bishop Berkley's Idealism as a scheme of philosophy was in vogue in India centuries before Christ was born. They had also the atomic theory of Epicurus and Democritus—a theory vaunted in our day as if it were a late discovery. They were well advanced in mathematics, and demonstrated Theorems not known in Europe four hundred years ago.

In poetry Müller says they were not very excellent, thus refuting Macaulay's teaching that poetry is likely to be most excellent in the early periods of a people's history.

The Brahmanic religion has had several stages in its history, progress and development. It is too complicated and extensive to be analyzed in a brief space. Hindus claim that their most ancient books teach Monotheism—the doctrine of one God. Dr. Scott thinks this unity was only taught in a pantheistic sense, but he says the unity and supremacy of God is to some extent the belief of the people to-day. On this matter Müller makes a nice distinction between *henotheism* and *monotheism*, the former being the doctrine taught in their literature. Henotheism is from the Greek "hen," meaning *one*, but not excluding others. Monotheism comes from "monos" alone, without a second. Our author suggests the probability of an *exoteric* and an *esoteric* doctrine.

It is certain that pantheism has widely prevailed among the Hindus. This subtle form of speculative thought on the profoundest of all subjects seems to have a certain fascination and plausibility which keep it alive in all ages. The doctrine is that

— — is but a multiform showing—phe- — being and power. The doctrines of — — — of this old religion. In noth- — — from other systems than by their — — a formidable barrier to all pro- — — by the dogma of Caste. There — — intermarriage of different castes — — thing.

— — the Vedas—their sacred books— — ant schools of theology. These — — *nihil fit*—out of nothing, nothing — — is entirely excluded—the world — — atoms and souls, or as conceived by — — Deity who is all and in all. Sal- — — deliverance from transmigration — — *finitum.*

— — Shintoism, Confucianism, Lifeless — — —these are all treated in separate — — We have not space for the extended — — writers justice. Buddhism is a rival — — stands in conspicuous opposition at — — old and much venerated by its vast — — India, it has been propagated in — — dominates millions of people. The — — and labor to establish their system in — — have expended in all time to plant — — Empires. With what success, let — — monuments of its achievements as seen in — — desolation wrought among billions — — have lived and died for many centuries.

— — THE PENTATEUCH: By CHARLES — — Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. New York: — — 1864.

— — vindication of the "Mosaic Authorship" of — — the Bible. It is put up in the usual good — — Book Concern—contains nearly three hun- — — a copious index. Dr. Elliott, after elaborate

argument on a much mooted subject at the present day, concludes thus: "In view of all the facts, we conclude that Moses wrote the Pentateuch; and that it has been transmitted to us substantially as it came from his hands. This view has fewer difficulties than the opposite."

The existence of this book itself, and the statement with which it closes, go to show a questioning as to his affirmation. Biblical criticism has so much disturbed the traditional faith in regard to the Mosaic authorship as to put the Mosaic advocates on the defensive. We have found very much attention devoted to this matter in the Bibliotheca Sacra and in the Presbyterian Review (Northern.) A succession of very learned and elaborate articles have appeared in these very able prints, written by men of high literary and theological rank. Robertson Smith, Kuenen and others have been criticised extensively in replies to objections they have raised adverse to long accepted opinion.

"The Higher Criticism," as it is called, is of a comparatively late period in the history of Christianity. Prior to the Lutheran Reformation everything was stagnant in regard to the Bible, as it was indeed an expletive book so far as religion was concerned. This rested on the authority of the Hierarchy and its traditions. Few read the Bible or could read it. The priesthood had a monopoly of learning, and this was not much. Until the revival of letters, which preceded the Reformation and made it possible, there was neither disposition nor capacity for critical investigations of a literature two thousand years old. The Reformation began from a partial emancipation of the intellect from a despotic priestcraft effected by increase of intelligence first in thinking, afterwards in action. Proceeding on its fundamental doctrine of the right of private judgment men began to question, to doubt, dispute and deny. This was attended with many valuable results, but some also decidedly adverse to Christianity as a system.

Dr. Elliott, in an introductory chapter, has given a running account of Biblical Criticism, tracing its origin and course, and exhibiting its many phases in its progress. He names the chief authors who have become distinguished for attacks on the traditional faith from the earliest to the latest, many of them being reputed Christians. They often widely differ from each other,

agreeing chiefly in a denial of the supernatural element claimed for the Bible, and hence rejecting miracles. This Higher Criticism, as it is called, is distinguished from exegesis which is chiefly concerned in the interpretation of the assumed and accepted WORD. The criticism under review looks into the Bible to discover discords which diminish and destroy its authority. It passes from internal inspection and analysis to an examination of external evidences to find whether they are sufficient to make good the claims of genuineness and authenticity set forth in behalf of particular books of Scripture. Judging from its animus and tendency such criticism has been very justly called "destructive," though this would be resented as an aspersion by some of the great expounders, who claim supreme devotion to truth.

Our author promises to present the full force of the various arguments against Mosaic authorship. We doubt not he has acted as an honest disputant, although he confesses it has been impossible to free himself from that prepossession which some think incompatible with candid criticism. This opinion, if not wholly erroneous, is at least useless, for it is inconceivable that any mind should be wholly void of presuppositions. Any way, Dr. Elliott makes an elaborate array for his antagonists. He does not follow the example of a friend of ours at the bar, whose maxim it is "to admit nothing and deny everything."

Confident of his victory, he would not diminish his achievement by underrating his antagonist. The discusssion is too complex and elaborate for a book notice, else we would endeavor to reproduce it substantially. Some of the arguments against the Mosaic authorship are very old. His writing in the third person, "Moses did, and Moses said thus and so," which amounts to nothing. Perhaps Moses was not only meek, but modest, and did not like the *Ego* in composition. Shakspeare's "foremost man of all the world"—Julius Cæsar—wrote in the same style. That Moses could not have written an account of his own death must be admitted, unless by prolepsis we suppose he so clearly anticipated the facts (very improbable) as to speak of the future reality as if it had already occurred. This part of the Pentateuch must be attributed to some other writer. In an age like this the anachronism would not appear; at a time of great simplicity having no

fear of critics before his eyes, this incoherency might not have received a moment's attention from an author. This is mere skirmishing, not the real battle. Kuenen, Colenso, Dr. W. R. Smith, etc., use heavier artillery, leaving such small arms to Paine and his kind. Dr. Kuenen, Professor in Leyden University, Holland, examined the Israelitish religion just as he would Buddhism, Islam or Mormonism. He thinks it one of the chief religions of mankind, nothing more—the result of natural development. It had its mythical period, and by degrees it ripened into monotheism. Dr. Smith, (W. R.,) in his article on the "Bible" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, arrives at substantially the same conclusion. They deny the chronology of the Pentateuch and hold that some portions were written centuries after the assumed date of the Mosaic era. Internal evidence is adduced to sustain this affirmation, such as allusions to places and things which had no existence in the time of Moses. The chief argument as we gather it from these writings is found in the use of the names Elohim and Jehovah, distinct names of Deity. It is said that the exclusive use of one of these names in some sections of the Pentateuch, and of the other in different sections, implies two authors. Hence the Pentateuch is made up of two different documents—the one Elohistic, the other Jehovistic.

This argument assumes that these sacred names are synonymous, and ought to have been equally familiar to Moses if they were in use in his day—hence would have been used interchangably. Dr. Elliott replies to this plausible argument: *Elohim* is the generic name of God—*Jehovah* is a proper name just as Apollo, Peter and John. JEHOVAH differs from ELOHIM as Alexander differs from man. Elijah brings out this distinction: How long halt ye between two opinions? If Jehovah be God, (Elohim,) follow him; but if Baal be Elohim, follow him. 1 Kings xviii.: 21. Jehovah and Baal are here used as proper names, and Elohim, (God,) as a common name. The two names may be used interchangably, of course, for Elohim is Jehovah, and Jehovah is Elohim. The one means the Supreme Being, the other Self-existent Being. It would involve no difficulty if the names had been used interchangably as we would naturally expect with the same writer. But it is held that Exodus vi.: 3, necessitates belief in a dual

authorship. "And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of God Almighty, but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them." The recorder of these words, it is said, could not have written the history of earlier times introducing the name Jehovah, which was unknown. Such parts of Genesis as contain this ineffable word, therefore, must have been written by another hand. Dr. Elliott holds that the name "Jehovah" was not unknown to the patriarchs and a proper construction of the passage from Exodus does not sustain the objection. The real meaning is, I am Jehovah—I manifested myself to Abraham, etc., as God Almighty; but as to my character and attributes implied in my proper name I did not manifest myself unto them. Dr. Elliott shows contradictions among these critics, and hereby they nullify each other's views. Moreover, these names are not used as the theory demands with such entire separation in different parts of the Pentateuch as to warrant the conclusion of a dual authorship and a difference in Chronology.

"The two names occur together in Genesis ii.: 4, where one is manifestly the predicate of the other. If this verse and the subsequent verses of the same chapter, which combine the two names, were written by the 'Elohist,' how came they to have 'Jehovah?' And if they were written by the Jehovist, how came they to have Elohim? It would seem that the writer of Genesis, anticipating the critical attempts of modern times to dismember his history, used the two names conjointly to puzzle his critics. Such has been the result, for that single passage has arrayed the critics against one another."

STUDIES IN THE FORTY DAYS: By A. A. LIPSCOMB, D. D., LL. D. Nashville, Tenn.: J. B. McFerrin, Agent. 1884.

The Southern Methodist Publishing House is advancing in its vigorous effort to supply our people with literature. We call attention to the above issue from the House, although the book has been extensively noticed by the weekly Methodist press. It is a neat job as to printing and binding—the volume contains three hundred and sixty-two pages, price not given. Dr. Lipscomb tenderly dedicates the book to the memory of a beloved and honored son, Professor Francis A. Lipscomb who died at an early age. Dr. Harrison, Book Editor, furnishes a graceful introduction.

These essays, twenty in number, are called "Studies;" and he who reads them to profit will admit the title is appropriate. Brief

is the time—forty days—and not greatly thronged with incidents and events, yet the words and acts of Jesus between his resurrection and ascension afford matter for profound study. These studies are pursued by a highly educated mind, and are directed as an educational process intended to improve such as have an aptitude for high and deep thinking. We find nothing commonplace in these essays—all of them are written in elegant diction, and display great power of analysis, wide imagination, and a tone of religion very edifying. There is much that is pictorial and artistic in the author's descriptions, for which the writer is admirably prepared by his long devotion to æsthetics as seen in art and literature.

We have read many notices of the book, but have seen none more appreciative than that from Dr. W. M. Leftwich in a late issue of the *Wesleyan Christian Advocate*. Our readers are invited to this criticism given as to its chief parts in the following treatment: Dr. Leftwich says:

"I come now to speak of Dr. Lipscomb's 'Studies in the Forty Days.' No such work has appeared in these days. This book is a mosaic of literary art. The learned author has made the theologian, the philosopher and the critic subservient to the literary artist, and prepared for us studies in art, studies in psychology; studies in the applied philosophy of mind, studies in metaphysics, studies in the laws of education and culture, studies in the idiosyncracies of character, studies in the relation of Christ to each character in the narrative of the 'Forty Days,' studies in the psychological effort of his several appearances upon the witnesses and their training for the work of the Church, studies in the supernatural as it affects the natural laws of evidence in human witnesses, studies in the higher spiritual nature of the kingdom of God as revealed in the Risen Christ and the risen life of the believer, studies in Christ's method of dealing with mind, not only explaining the phenomena of the 'forty days,' but showing his highest art as a teacher, and linking his human teaching with the offices of the Holy Ghost as his successor, and, what is of special value, also, studies in the processes by which our Lord's previous ministry had prepared the way for the change in the social and religious position of woman in the new dispensation. 'Sex is evidential in the economy of Christianty, and hence without the

instincts of womanhood the internal evidence of Christianity would have lacked completeness. . . . . If the veil of the temple had been rent in twain, the court of the women was morally abolished as one of the triumphs of the resurrection.' . . . . 'Men study character, women look at nature; and this gives to woman such a superior insight into the human heart. Precisely at this point their value as witnesses to the Risen Christ would be manifest; for the very qualities which, in the nature of things, he would exhibit in the earliest interview with his disciples would be those they were best qualified to recognize and appreciate.'

"Thus he accounts for the presence and service of the women in the narrative of the 'forty days,' portraying the character of 'Mary of Magdala,' and the other women with an artist's genius and facination, as he does, also, every character in that thrilling narrative, from Matthew to Thomas, the Doubter.' These sketches of character and the processes of their training as witnesses will repay the utmost study of the reader many times over. They are inimitable."

HOW THE BIBLE WAS MADE: By E. M. WOOD, D. D. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. New York: Philips & Hunt. 1884.

The author, Dr. Wood, has been before the public before. He is the writer of "Methodism and the Centennial of American Independence," and was assistant editor of "Cyclopedia of Methodism." This volume contains two hundred and sixty-two pages, neatly bound in cloth. Dr. Wood's first discourses on Theories of Inspiration, of which there are several—this chapter is very brief, aiming merely to present several theories without exhaustive discussion as to their respective merits. He thinks a substantial agreement as to the fact of Inspiration makes it unimportant to wrangle as to the modus of revelation.

The word "Canon," so much in use in ecclesiology, is easily derived from the Latin or Greek, in which languages it is found in the same form as we have it in English. The Hebrew has a cognate word "karneh," meaning a reed. Dr. Wood uses the word "as embracing those sacred writings which are regarded by Christians as the ultimate standard of religious doctrine."

Chapter II. treats of the Old Testament Canon—what books are ripture, and how they were selected and collected.

The author cites the well established fact that the Jews believe at after the Babylonian captivity "Ezra was divinely directed to llect and arrange those writings generally received among them divine." In what way, at what time, and by whom the Old stament Canon was fixed, there is room for doubt and contro-rsy. Dr. Wood agrees with Davidson and Bleek in their opinion at the Jews never looked upon the Canon as closed; indeed, why ould they, seeing their sacred literature was cumulative with a dely separated chronology. The famous Septuagint version of e Scriptures, made in Alexandria over two centuries before Christ, ntained several books which are not admitted into the present non, except by the Greek and Latin Churches. These excluded itings have been named, since Luther's day, "Apochrypha"—arious, and without authority. Various reasons are assigned for is exclusion more or less cogent; the question is not free from ficulties and will always be mooted.

A history of the Hebrew Text is given in Chapter IV. Dates manuscripts are given and discussed; and a view is taken of odern Critical Study. The Samaritan Pentateuch, also the ptuagint, and versions from it are reviewed for the purpose of owing their critical value. The author gives extended considera-n, in several Chapters, to the several versions of the Old Tes-ment, appearing in different countries and distinct eras. He en proceeds to discourse of the "New Testament Canon," devo-ng the larger part of his book to matters related to that impor-nt subject. Much is written of the Greek and Latin fathers, and nat use is to be made of them. The English versions, of course, mand a large share of attention, and receive it in this survey. yclif, Tyndale, Coverdale, Cranmer, etc., are exhibited as to their spective parts in furnishing the English Scriptures. A full count is given of King James' Version (1611), the one now in neral use in England and America. Dr. Wood then comes to e Revised Version of 1881, arguing the necessity for it, and ves his opinion of the probable result.

A chapter is devoted to "The Homes of Heretics and Here-s"—leading characters. There is some fine writing in the last

chapter, which is devoted to the comparative merits of Eastern and Western Christianity. He, the author, has much to say in favor of the Western, as exhibited in the three creeds—Apostles' Creed, Nicene Creed, and Athanasian Creed. Athanasius was an Eastern Christian, and a grand hero he was; but our author thinks the Creed called by his name did not emanate from him. We give a paragraph, in closing, from Dr. Wood's pen:

"It is to the Western Church we are indebted for the Canon of Scripture. Had it not been for the great influence of Jerome, it is possible that the entire Apocrypha would to-day be in the Protestant canon; and whether this would have been an evil or a good, we do not say. But it seems evident to our mind that had not Jerome been so much under Jewish influence, not to say prejudice, especially when making his translation, and had not the Jews begun to reject the Septuagint because of its Messianic teachings, the entire Apocrapha, as found in the Septuagint, would now be recognized as Scripture by all Christians, and perhaps all the subsequent controversy on the subject would have been avoided. Augustine admitted into the Canon more of the Apocrypha than did Jerome, and he was more decided than Jerome on the New Testament canon. At the Council of Hippo, 303, where Augustine had been Bishop for some time, he (Augustine) delivered an address on the Creed, which led the Council to make the first official decision on the Canon. Four years after this, at the Council of Carthage, the approbation of the European bishops, who were absent from the former Council, having been secured, the question of the canon was generally considered settled. The question was formally reopened by the Roman Catholics at the time of the Reformation, when they adopted what is called the longer Canon; but for all the Protestant world, the question was finally settled at the Council of Carthage, and settled, as we have seen, by Western influence."

SERMONS: by REV. A. P. MCFERRIN, Nashville, Tenn.; J. B. McFerrin, Agent, 1884.

Here we have twenty-eight sermons, making in all a book of three hundred and twenty pages, in every way creditable to our Publishing House. There is great variety in the topics treated: the sermons not being serial. This is a recommendation. Unfortunately, there is no great fondness for this kind of reading among our people; hence, a volume on this order is more likely to attract attention than a book two heavily freighted by exhaustive theological discussion in efforts at a complete system of divinity. The author is a Methodist minister, a fact easily inferred from his name. Methodist doctrine, as far as the sermons are dogmatic, is presented and maintained. In the very wide range traversed by the thought

of the preacher, every order of mind may find entertainment and instruction. We cordially commend the volume as one adapted to edification and instruction in righteousness. That the author thinks and writes vigorously, the following extract will show. Speaking of sin, he says:

"Whatever may be our estimate of sin, in the sight of Heaven it is of awful turpitude; and but for the fact that our eyes are so blinded by its baleful effects, we would be overwhelmed with a sense of its hideousness. It is the world's destroyer, as its violence, suffering and cruelty plainly show. It is an insufferable burden under which humanity groans, impeding the progress of all temporal and spiritual good; while the mischiefs it is continually working, and the deathly throes it is ever inflicting, have so poisoned every fountain, and embittered every stream, as to make perfect peace and happiness impossible under its dominion.

"God hates sin, and it is perhaps the only thing in the universe which he does hate; hates it because it is hateful in itself, and is the destroyer of the peace and good of his children. Therefore, he will destroy sin, and to this end are all the workings of his providence directed; and nothing shall thwart the unalterable purpose of its destruction. To this end the scheme of the Mediatorship has been devised, that sin may so be destroyed as yet to save the *sinner;* a salvation not merely for the escaping of punishment, but also for a deliverance from sin; otherwise the destruction must involve both sin and the sinner."

WHOSE TO BLAME? By HENRY FAUNTLEROY, Nashville, Tenn. Southern Publishing House: 16mo., pp. 355. Printed for the Author.

We cannot notice this volume, not having read it. Finding an extended criticism on the book in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, New York, we transfer it to our columns, having faith in Dr. Whedon's judgment. The Editor says:

"The author of this volume writes under the inspiration of intense antagonism to that prevailing epidemic of financial corruption, which was begotten by the necessary expenditure of vast sums of money during the War of the Rebellion. It is inevitable, human nature being what it is, that such prodigality as war com-

ness, associated, as it always must be, with a vastly inflated currency, will create a passion in many minds for the rapid accumulation of wealth. That passion blinds and paralyzes the moral sense, and men learn to transact business, not in the spirit of the second great commandment, but under the impulses of that supreme selfishness, which is utterly reckless of moral obligations and consequences. Out of these base impulses come the adulteration of food, fraud in manufactured articles; lying misrepresentations, grinding of *employees*, financial trickeries, gambling, speculations of various kinds, breaches of trust, defalcations, bribery, collusions between lawyers and judges, the corruption of legislators, and a multitude of kindred deeds degrading to their perpetrators, operating mischievously on society, and, if permitted to continue indefinitely, breeding confusion, distress, and serious disturbances in the nation.

Mr. Fauntleroy, profoundly impressed, apparently, by the extensive prevalence of these Protean forms of corruption, seeks to illustrate their operations and effects in a story which, though it cannot be accorded very high literary rank, does, nevertheless, produce a deep impression on its reader. It brings before him a young man of moral stamina sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, to keep him honest, but not tough enough to resist extraordinary temptations presented in moments of extreme trial. He places this man in a business house whose head, though a member of a Christian Church, and actively engaged in Christian work, conducts his extensive business on methods requiring misrepresentations on the part of his poorly-paid clerks. Our author's hero refuses to lie, and is discharged. Unable to find other employment, he and his delicate wife are reduced to extreme want. One of his ex-employer's men, already corrupted by his enforced habit of lying for the benefit of the business, meets him in the crisis of his fortunes, persuades him to rob the store, and then betrays his confidence to the firm. He is consequently shot on entering the store and subsequently tried for burglary. Nothing saves him from the state prison but the sympathy of an upright lawyer, who, having learned the facts in the case, so exposes the immoral conduct of the firm that the jury spontaneously acquits him. The details of this part of the story are sensationally wrought out; but they move

reader's heart to indignation against those who are chiefly to
ıe for the wrong, to hatred of their unprincipled methods of
ness, and to sympathy with *employees*, to whom such men vir-
ly say: 'You must tell lies for our benefit or starve.'

ne is loath to believe that there are many business houses in
land such as this book so mercilessly exposes. Neither can one
r willingly admit that there are many such tricky lawyers and
rincipled judges as it describes. Yet the citations from several
ıly respectable metropolitan journals, found in its appendix,
icate that at least in some States there are some such. One of
ıe journals affirms that 'courts have become 'shops' where law,
gments, and final processes are turned out to applicants accord-
to the expenditure that is made. This does not imply that the
ges sell their judgments, but it does imply that the system is so
ned and administered that, 'by the expenditure of money,
ice may be delayed and defeated, and irreparable wrong com-
ted.' Conceding that these statements are justified by far too
ıy facts, constantly transpiring even in this State, they forecast
evil future. Viewed in connection with the unprincipled
hods of greedy millionaires, gigantic railroad and other cor-
ıtions, and with the organization of labor to resist the encroach-
ıts of capital, they portend social and political storms before
ch much of the wealth so wrongfully acquired will be swept
bottomless abysses. Every social wrong has its Nemesis, as
history demonstrates. The reign of injustice is sure to be suc-
led by the reign of terror, unless the latter is averted by timely
ıntance. Hence the need of the hour is a wide-spread ethical
rm in law, in business, and in political life. And since this
only be brought about by spiritual and divine forces, it
ooves the Church of God to elevate and enforce the ethics of
life within her own pale, and then to go forth in the spirit of
Lord and regenerate the life of the nation. The volume under
ice, despite its lack of superior literary merit, especially in its
versations, which, in places, have a savor of sentimental cant,
r contribute somewhat to this end. For this reason, it is com-
ıded to such readers as prefer learning truth through fiction to
graver but more profitable study in didactic essays.

TWENTY YEARS IN CONGRESS. FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD. WITH A REVIEW OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION OF 1860: By JAMES G. BLAINE. Vol. I. Norwich, Connecticut: The Henry Bill Publishing Company.

A book of political history, embracing the period of the author's public career, written by a candidate for the office of President of the United States, is a repast to which the readers of this Republic are now for the first time invited. If they find that it is not so much of a feast as they had expected, if the *entremets* lack seasoning and there is no *piece de resistance*, they may thank themselves for their disappointment, for there is very little in Mr. Blaine's known traits to justify the hope which may have been entertained. He has been "before the public," in one way or another, some quarter of a century, and he has done much that has attracted attention, but he has done very little that rewarded it. Judged by his speeches in Congress and on "the stump," he is the last man from whom a judicious person would expect a historical work of special value or interest, according to the standards usually applied to such work. Moreover, it should be remembered in justice to the author, that, though he was an aspirant for the Presidential nomination when he entered on his history, as he had been for at least eight years, he was not a candidate for the office, and probably did not expect to be. His appearance in that role has been a surprise, not altogether agreeable, to a great many people; it was very likely a surprise to him also. In any case, he is entitled to have his work judged on its merits, and it would be unfair to condemn it because it does not correspond to the remarkable circumstances in which the writer now finds himself.

Approached in this way, the book will repay, not only reading, but, for a certain class, study as well. There is not very much in it that is new to the readers of American history, so far as concerns the course of principal events, but there is something fairly novel in those parts of it which relate to party politics. Mr. Blaine is, as our readers may know, a politician, and a very successful one. He is, perhaps, the most successful of his generation, for he has managed to attain to the highest honors that his party can confer,

(the Presidency is the gift of the people; the party can give but the nomination.) He has won a genuine popularity, stronger and more efficient for his purposes than has any of his contemporaries; he has drawn about him a band of able, active and devoted followers, more potent and more closely attached than any public man of his time could command; and he has done this without being intimately identified with any great policy or any high principle. He has accomplished it by the sheer force of his personality, expressed through the methods, more or less elevated, of the politician. When, therefore, he undertakes the explanation of "the events which led to the political revolution of 1860," to which a very considerable part of his first volume is devoted, he is able to throw new light on the subject, which, in its general outlines, is already familiar. He tells us what was the feeling between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Van Buren, between the former and Mr. Clay, and between Mr. Clay and Gen. Jackson, and how these affected the contest in which Mr. Clay was defeated for the Presidency. There has been much written on the question of Mr. Clay's terrible misfortune, but no one has before made exactly the same contribution to its history, or described so succinctly and so effectively the party exigencies which drove the great leader to the letter on the admission of Texas, or the elements in the position of the Whig party in the North that made that letter fatal. Mr. Blaine also describes, with the keen interest and the easy exactness of an expert, the subsequent course of the contending ambitions, jealousies, resentments and intrigues which led to the Free-soil party, the nomination of Van Buren and Adams, and the temporary, but last triumph of the Whigs under Gen. Taylor.

What is surprising in connection with it is that, while seeing so clearly, and perhaps exaggerating, the importance of federal patronage as an element in the great contest of that time, Mr. Blaine nowhere points out the essentially mischievous nature of the system on which that patronage was used, and with recent and limited exception, has ever since been used. He accepts it as naturally as a Prussian general accepts the system of supporting his army on forced contributions from the enemy. He perceives that the spoils of office are an ugly weagon in the hands of political leaders; but he notes no reason why they should not be used, and is serenely

blind to the dishonesty of their use, and to the widespread and disgusting demoralization to which they give rise. He does not seem to know, or, if he knows, he regards as of very little consequence, the fact that Calhoun, the arch-leader of the South, denounced with energy the instrumentality for which his party is represented as contending so persistently, and would gladly have put it beyond their own and their opponent's reach. Nor does he note that Webster held the same view. Yet a history of "the events which led to the political revolution" of 1860 that omits all mention of the machinery by which the Democratic party in the North was kept in alliance with and subjection to the slave-power for so many years, is plainly defective in a very important point. It would be going too far in another direction to say that the spoils of office were the sole motive-power by which this machinery was impelled, but it was unquestionably the chief motive power. Ultimately it was one of the principal causes, also, of the disintegration of the party, by a process not unlike that which is steadily tending to a similar effect in the Republican party, and of which it is not improper to remark that the present position of Mr. Blaine is one of the features.

The style in which Mr. Blaine writes is chiefly his own. From a literary point of view it is open to criticism, if it were worth while to make it. But it is hardly worth while. It is at once pretentious and clumsy where he treats of questions higher and broader than the strictly political; but it is clear, crisp and animated where he treats those matters in which he is at home. As these are what give his book its special value, there is no occasion to quarrel with the style. If he can maintain it at the same general level through the next volume, which will embrace some questions that, frankly handled, will be literally "burning," the reader will have reason to be gratified.—*New York Critic.*

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

RATIONALISM AND REVELATION.

ery reader of the Pauline Epistles must be impressed by the
hat the chief of the apostles was much given to reasoning;
et he evidently distrusted it when employed in divine things.
ourse is a practical paradox; he seems to act in opposition to
wn opinion. The foolish Galatians were "bewitched"—the
ed Collosians were in danger of being spoiled by "philoso-
nd vain deceit."

e era of Christ was one of strife and religious debate. Jesus
ot make his advent amid mental darkness, but at noon time
e world's ancient civilization. This period was not inferior
e present in the development of mind; it was inferior in
ng relating to man's capacity for thought. Every age must
the rear of succeeding epochs in the knowledge of merely
ial things; for of necessity such knowledge is cumulative.
is a sufficient exaltation of the mental force and culture of
ra to say, at this day, the productions of its wise men are the
passed models of our schools and universities. Various
ls of philosophy ruled the faith of warring sects. Opposed
h other they made a solid phalanx against the religion of
. As this was designed for universal diffusion it came into
ct with every hostile order, whether of Jewish or Pagan origin.
iumphs were great but never complete. Many who never
abandoned their ancient faith embraced Christianity; they
engrafted their former opinions on the Christian stock.
e, the doctrines of Christ were either brought into competi-
vith human creeds, or were likely to be modified by combina-
vith incompatible elements.

human reason is adequate as a guide on the subject of religion,
esort to the discoveries of Revelation? If it is unreliable,
hat purpose was it given? How are we to determine the will
d—the rule of faith and practice? To make an accurate

survey some points must be selected from whence our observations are taken, and to which the compass must be directed.

The basis of religion is truth; this is the corner and capstone of the edifice. If truth be the great desideratum the question must arise: What is the truth? An appeal is thus made in the necessity of the case to reason and private judgment.

How can it be said he adopts truth who does not inquire whether an opinion be false or true, but receives into his creed whatever is suggested by authority of others, or by example of ancestors? If a man be right under such circumstances he is right by accident—he certainly is as likely to be wrong as right. The mind does not intuitively and necessarily apprehend divine truth. Variant and flatly contradictory creeds go to show there is no infallible recognition of what we should believe and what we must obey.

How must the mind acquaint itself with what is not constitutional in its very structure? This knowledge does not spring and ripen like indigenous fruit on proper soil. There must be planting and culture before reaping; hence, instruction, thinking and reasoning are indispensable. It is not necessary to decry learning to elevate the claims of religion. By such measures the world would be reduced to mental stagnation, and religion to a cheerless and tyrannical superstition. The worst types of Christianity have been developed among people little enlightened, whose first principle is the submission of the private judgment to an infallible priesthood.

God is the only source and authority of religious faith and obligation; from his will no appeal can be taken. But God does not make direct and personal communication of his will to every man; this is evident from the Atheism of some and the contradictory creeds of others. How are we to determine the divine will?

Man does not know it and cannot possibly know it unless it be revealed. "What man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of man which is in him; even so no man knoweth the things of God but the spirit of God".—Paul. If a man cannot even know the will of his fellowman without its revealment, *a fortiori*, it is impossible to affirm anything to be the will of God until himself makes the revelation. Truth is necessary to religion, and revelation is essential to a knowledge of truth in this connection.

Whether such a revelation has been made is a question of fact to be determined by appropriate evidence addressed to the understanding.

Our argument is abstract, and is intended solely to prove the *necessity of revelation* as the only basis for a *rational* religion, paradoxical as this may seem. Reason can do no more than to sit in judgment on the evidences adduced to support the Christian system. This office it must perform. The alleged facts of Christianity are to be tried by approved, admitted laws of evidence—more than this could not possibly be demanded; less than this may reasonably be rejected as giving presumptive falsity to the system.

After determining the fact that God has revealed his will to man, an enlightened understanding is necessary to find its meaning. The words are to be interpreted by the same rules which are applied in seeking the sense of uninspired writings. Such a revelation is to man and for man; and, therefore, private judgment is the inalienable right of all mankind. Papal infallibility is religious tyranny, and is in conflict with the primary principle of moral obligation. Whatever aids can be obtained in arriving at the teachings of revelation are allowable; and many of these are important. Our understandings have their irrepealable constitutional laws; these must be respected and obeyed in the entire process. So far, Rationalism has a firm posture in the great work of religious research; this position it will hold, and ought to maintain.

Reason, however, can never be allowed to impeach God's veracity by opposing to established facts and declared principles its most plausible speculations. Has the witness spoken? What has he said? Is he competent? After this the question ends. God is the author of both reason and revelation; and in a perfectly developed mind these must harmonize. But God is the author of reason only in the sense of giving man this capacity; his reasonings are his own, and are confessedly imperfect; and are less reliable than the teachings of a Supreme authority.

It is very true, as there is no infallible interpreter of the word, erroneous opinions from wrong constructions may arise, which advancing knowledge will remove. Many incongruities of this kind have already evanished, and perhaps others will follow.

Rationalism has done fearful damage to religion while vaunting its arrogant claims against the demands of revelation. But its worst form and most powerful force will be seen in the alliance often made with revelation itself. The origin of evil—freedom and necessity, foreknowledge and fate—these questions have excited endless contest. Ages have been spent in futile attempts to prove necessity and responsibility compatible laws in the divine government. That all men are forced to do what they do, and yet are accountable for what they could not avoid. God wills sin, and then damns the helpless sinner. He decreed the salvation of some before they were born, reprobated the remainder, or brought them into being with a fatally sinful nature, then left them to perish inevitably without a remedy. Is this theology? Is this the Bible? Nay, we think it rationalism, not revelation—the dogmas and conclusions are the offspring of subtle, specious philosophy. The mind of man had better never think, than to think its own death, and to turn supposed revelations into engines of war against the very battlements of heaven.

There are mysteries in revelation, resting solely on dogmatic authority; absurdities there are none; if so, then revealed religion dies a suicidal death. The trinity of the godhead, the duality of Christ's person, may be classed as profound mysteries. Transubstantiation is a transparent absurdity as demonstrably false as the Forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid is demonstrably true. The suffering of the innocent for the guilty, the chief peculiarity of the Christian system, is a mystery beyond our reach. We may not be able to understand the precise connection, philosophically viewed, which the death of Christ sustains to pardon. Admitting these facts we accept the mystery; but every one should see that if salvation is an affair of decree, and damnation also, then the whole work of atonement is an expletive arrangement, reflecting no honor on God, conferring no benefit on man. If Jesus died for all, it may seem strange that any are lost; but it is a monstrous absurdity to say man should be damned for not believing in Christ, and at the same time to teach that he is damned because Christ did not die for him; *i. e.*, a man is damned for not believing a false proposition.

Our ignorance of a matter is no disproof of its existence; the

finiteness of our capacities leads to the expectation of a gradual and perpetual evolution of thought and knowledge. Shall we expect the moon to shine with the lustre of the sun? and when it fails ought we to bow and worship for its very inferiority? The apostles had not closed the Canon before arrogant gnostics (rationalists) defiled the temple of divinity with their theories and systems.

Many questions are suggested by the Bible that are left without solution. We are required to admit that natural and moral evil exist in the world; we are not asked to explain how evil could originate in a government of infinite wisdom, power and goodness. We are told that Christ "tasted death for every man," and yet "some will not come unto him that they may have life." It is a self-imposed task to inquire in view of the first statement how any can be lost, or in view of the second to ask: If God foresaw their damnation how could they possibly be saved?

Do the Scriptures tell of a resurrection of the dead? It is needless to discuss the possibility of an event which must necessarily be miraculous. And thus we might prolong the discussion to trace the respective bounds of reason and revelation, that conflict might be avoided and harmony attained by proper attention to these fixed limits.

We are fearfully and wonderfully made in our endowments and responsibilities. True wisdom consists in knowing ourselves, but far more in the knowledge which we may obtain of God in the words of his Revelation.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

Recently there has been very much discussion of the above topic in Congress and in the public prints. There has not been too much attention given to the subject, which is one of lasting importance. If the pulpit would rise to the height of the great argument and meet its responsibilities, there would be more reason to look for improvement in opinion and practice among the people. As it is a subject of much delicacy, refined congregations might not relish the plain dealing demanded. Moreover we fear that in some sections of the republic there are so many guilty persons in high life (even of the Church) the faithful preachers would incur disfavor and damaging opposition. We take no pleasure in arraying

the ugly statistics on the matter after the fashion of Senator Brown, of Georgia, in his late speech on Mormonism. The Senator made a frightful exhibition of New England in the matter of divorce and legalized adultery.

His speech, as to its facts, cannot be answered—the figures are not denied. True, his portrayal of New England crime by the side of Mormon polygamy, to the advantage of the latter, involves a palpable *non sequitur*. The Federal government has no control of New England as to this social putridity and moral pestilence. It does not follow that nothing should be done in Utah Territory, where power is absolute, because people of certain States are in a worse moral condition. The laws in this State (Georgia) are very liberal in the matter of divorce; but to the credit of our people it may be said divorces are rarely sought, and when asked, the action is chiefly on scriptural grounds. In the last issue of the *North American Review*, there is an article from Judge Noah Davis, a veteran of the New York bar, on "Marriage and Divorce"—an essay of decided ability. Judge Davis says:

"Marriage is an institution, public as well as private in its nature, whether created by simple contract or the most solemn religious ceremonies. In this light only can the marriage relation be rightly viewed.

"But there seems to be no great good in this world without some great antagonizing evil. Every Eden has its serpent. Marriage is no exception, for over against it stands its antipodal foe, Divorce. The State, society, good government, good order, *i. e.*, and all their attendant blessings are, from the necessities of their nature, hostile to divorce, which disintegrates and destroys the condition of things out of which these spring and grow to their supremest beauty and strength. If a state of society could be found in which no present recognized ground of divorce did or could exist, the folly and crime of inventing a ground would be monstrous. All the conditions of perpetuity through the family, by growth, prosperity, and power, other things being equal, would be guaranteed to such a state; and the introduction of divorce would be, like the dynamite of modern Irish warfare, a devil's ingenuity. As it is the State—society—that is the most deeply interested in the existence and continuance of the family, and marriage its founder, so it

is society that is most deeply wounded when divorce disrupts and terminates those conditions of life; because it invades the home, defiles its sanctities, lays open its privacy, dishonors its parentage, shames its childhood, and arrests the only pure revenues of human life.

"Therefore, in considering the subject of divorce, the interests of society are great and paramount; those of individuals are subordinate and secondary. In entering upon the marriage relation, the parties contract with society to respect and perform all the functions and duties of that relation for the welfare of society: to set up the family, to create a lineage and rear it to good citizenship for service in war, and in peace, in order to maintain the State. This contract they have no power or right to annul without the consent of the State.

"Herein lies the fallacy of the notions of some of the modern advocates of free-and-easy divorce. They ignore the supreme conditions and purposes of marriage, and elevate the individuality of the parties above the supremacy of society and the State. They treat marriage as a simple contract, affecting them only who make it, and who, they say, can therefore unmake it at pleasure. They wholly discard the idea of the life-unity of one man and one woman in a relation sacredly consecrated to any high, or holy, or other purposes than those of caprice or passion. They ignore the family and exaggerate the individual, and wholly discard the claims of the State. This is no new idea. It has always been a central idea of barbarism. It has prevailed through the most licentious eras of all peoples. It is the culminating thought of the harem. It has been the curse and degradation of woman, making her the slave and man the master, a creature for the shambles, bought and sold at the price of lust—higher in her bloom, lower in her decay, than 'the dumb driven cattle.'

"But you will say: 'Do you argue, then, for no divorce?' Better, infinitely better, that than the result to which we are madly hastening in this country. But no: I do not take that stern and stronger ground. I know that the weakness and wickedness of human nature are such that some system of divorce must be tolerated by society to protect injured innocence; but it should greatly differ from those systems that now prevail. Our present systems

are barbarous and degrading. They have led to a large increase of divorces in proportion to marriages. In some States the ratio has advanced from, say, one in thirty-five to one in ten; in some to one in six, and in some cities the proportion is even greater.

"It is safe to say, says one writer, that divorces have doubled in proportion to marriages in most of the Northern States, and present figures indicate a greater increase. There are remarkable contrasts between the States, attributable to the difference of statutes and modes of procedure; the percentages of increase being largest in States furnishing the readiest facilities as to grounds of divorce, and the ease and cheapness of obtaining decrees.

One great evil of this state of things is that the public mind is becoming habituated to look upon divorces without shock, and without a thought of their injury to public morals. The press teems with scandalous reports of such suits, often giving prurient and disgusting details, which the youth of neither sex can safely read; and thus our conception of the marital relation and its duties is becoming alarmingly debased. It is even doubtful if marriage is not often entered upon now with much preliminary consideration of the chances of easy divorce.

"Another, and by no means a less evil, is found in the effect the general looseness of marital obligation has on the growth of families. A large family of children is a safeguard against divorce. Parental love, with all the mutual and tender affections with which it surrounds and hallows the family circle, hovers like a guardian angel over the sanctity of conjugal love. Seldom, indeed, does Satan's device—the dissolution of the ties of marriage—invade such a home. But I have no doubt its possibility often goes far to prevent the existence of such homes. Children have come to be considered obstacles to the freedom of separation; and whenever that is the case, the malaria of divorce is fatal to maternity. All right preceptions of Nature's law, which is God's law, and of that righteous patriotism which seeks to make our own virtuous and well-trained posterity the strong hope of the nation's purity and greatness, are in danger of being sacrificed to our petty conceptions of individual ease, to an extent which, by the laws of sociology, prefigures barrenness. And so we Americans, by descent, are fast handing over our country with all its mighty interests to the races of immigra-

tion and their descendants who are happily taught obedience to the laws of nature as a religious duty.

"I cannot dwell upon these evils, yet I will denounce them as fatally injurious, not only to the morality but also to every good interest of society. Doubtless, the evils I have named prevail most largely wherever the grounds of divorce are most numerous. We have one State, South Carolina, where no divorce, either legislative or judicial, can be or has ever been granted, though by strange political perversion that State has never been over-attached or faithful to another union. I am greatly misinformed if in that State the peace, purity and felicity of families do not maintain a far higher standard than in States where divorces are the chronic mischief and misery of domestic life. In the Colonial history of the State of New York, for more than a century, divorces were unknown. Who asserts that conjugal unhappiness was greater in that period than after divorce became the law and rule, speaks without proof.

"All precedent shows that human life, and especially woman's life, is happier, as a rule, in countries where divorce is not lawful and not permitted than in those where it is most common and free. For divorce is an evil that always grows by what it feeds upon. It feeds upon the baser vices of our nature, and they propagate and increase as the demand enlarges to meet an inordinate and depraved appetite. A striking illustration of this fact has just been disclosed by the discovery of a manufactory of forged divorces in the city of Brooklyn, from which it is said two hundred decrees have lately issued with the apparent formalities of judicial procedure; the parties obtaining them looking and caring for nothing but expedition, cheapness and secrecy. Such a state of things could not exist, but for the appalling moral laxity bred by the frequency of divorces. Both physically and morally, men accommodate themselves to the rule and necessity of conditions. So, if the condition of life and law be such that the marriage tie may be easily disrupted, men speedily come to think of its disruption as a process of relief, proper and defensible. This fact speedily operates to change the harmonies of wedded life into discords; and conjugal jars, which otherwise might only be considered as new starting-points for closer and tenderer affiliations, are nursed into irrecon-

cilable and fatal quarrels. But when the rule and necessity are the opposite, both husband and wife are taught by that condition to adhere to the true nature of marriage by turning discords out-of-doors and studying the conciliations due to mutual happiness."

MARRIAGE IN CHINA.

Colonel Tcheng-ki-Tong, military attaché to the Chinese Embassy in Paris, is telling the Western barbarians, in the columns of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, how very inferior their civilization is to that of China in such essential fundamentals as the position of woman and the sanctity of marriage. Another eminent Chinese mandarin, who sometimes surveys English civilization from the pavement of Regent Street, has come to a similar conclusion about an even more painful phase of the woman question; but of him and his philosophizings we may have something more to say hereafter. At present we are concerned solely with the criticisms of his military confrère, Colonel Tcheng-ki-Tong whose paper in the current number of the *Revue* is lively reading in good sooth. It is natural enough that he should begin by a tribute to the family life of China, which he declares resembles that of the ancient patriarchs; but we may skip all his dissertations about those matters and come to his vindication of the Chinese mode of regulating the great question which has preoccupied man and woman-kind ever since the world began. Colonel Tcheng-ki-Tong sees nothing to admire in European marriages. Marriages in well ordered states should be arranged by the parents. They are emphatically affairs of the family, and should be settled by the heads of the families concerned. The idea that two young people are qualified to decide upon their future destinies on the strength of a brief acquaintance formed in their green and April days, seems to our good Oriental unspeakably absurd. They manage these things better in China than in France; as for England and our long engagements and free opportunities for acquaintance before marriage, Colonel Tcheng does not speak of them, but his principles would probably lead him to condemn them unsparingly. He has at least one point in his favor. In China, where the parents choose the bride, every one marries; celibacy is regarded as an anti-social vice, and old bachelors and old maids are rare phenomena. All good Chinamen

aarry young. Bridegrooms of sixteen marry ladies two years ·ounger than themselves, and a Chinese grandmother at the age of hirty is a more familiar sight than a spinster. The unpopularity ıf marriage in France springs, he thinks, in great measure from he decay of ceremonial at weddings. Every one is in a hurry to atch the train or the steamer. Everything is rushed through, and he happy pair vanish by express the moment they are married. 'That is why marriage has lost its charm." A truly profound bservation, and Chinese to the last point.

There are no marriages for money in China, we are told. The reat institution of a *dot* is unknown. Marriage for money, exclaims olonel Tcheng, is the greatest injury which you can inflict upon omen. In a social system based upon the virtual purchase of a ouse, the good Chinaman is not surprised that men should fear ıat the introduction of divorce may prove like the discharge of rtillery at a house of cards. In China, it is otherwise; there, in ldition to the causes of divorce recognized in Europe, marriage ıay be dissolved for sterility or for contumelious conduct toward ıothers and fathers-in-law. Yet divorce is comparatively rare. Everybody whom I have met," says Colonel Tcheng, "and who ıs asked me about our morals, has addressed the question to me, Do divorces often occur in China?" The first time I was astonhed at this demand, but on reflecting I found out that indeed this the only question which is important for them to know. When ır the first time you are obliged by pain to go to the dentist, you ık a friend whether "it hurts much?" The fact of the matter is ıat divorces are only rare exceptions, and the strong family ties hich are the outcome of the patriarchal system forbid divorce. Among aristocrats divorces seldom occur from the very fact that ıey are such; among the working classes because they have no me for vain discussions, and if they quarrel they do not end by eing divorced, but by being reconciled."

Women in China are deeply interested in avoiding a divorce, as ıe divorcée loses the honorable position of a wife. The Chinese ıdy, not having the consciousness of personality strongly develped, avoids both scandals and intrigues. The magistrate often ɔmposes quarrels instead of pronouncing a decree of divorce, and he wife has an unfailing source of consolation in the upbringing

of her children. "She is ever a creature of hope," says the Col. and she endures patiently the injuries inflicted on her by her husband in the thought of her children." If a husband surprises his wife *flagrante delicto*, he may kill her on the spot; but Colonel Tcheng makes fun of A. Dumas for his assertion that adulteresses in China are lifted up by an elephant and then thrown down to be crushed on the stones. "There are fewer elephants in China than in France; there are hardly two or three at Pekin, which one goes to see out of curiosity, like animals of a menagerie."

Colonel Tcheng vehemently combats the popular delusion that a Chinese woman is a crippled, waddling creature, who lives imprisoned amid her servants, her husband, and his concubines. As far as the crippled feet are concerned, we read: "The Chinese woman walks as well as you and I, she runs even with her small feet;" and as to being imprisoned, "she goes out, takes walks in her sedan chair, and has not even a veil to protect her from indiscreet glances. From higher education the Chinese would gladly save their wives and daughters; they are not trained in colleges where they might acquire the knowledge of art and science, but family life forms the world of the Chinese woman; she aspires solely to be learned in the art of governing her family. It is she who directs the education of her children; she is content to live for the good of her relations; and if heaven has granted her a good husband, she certainly is the most fortunate of women. Colonel Tcheng has many severe things to say about the position of women in France. In China the wife's legal position in disposing of her goods and her children he asserts is far more privileged than that of her French sister. He concludes his interesting essay by some remarkable words about concubinage. In France says he, you have mistresses; in China, we have concubines. The former is a clandestine connection, and the children are bastards; the latter has a recognized position, she is tolerated by the wife, and her children bear no social brand. The Chinese regard concubinage as the safeguard of the indissolubility of marriage, and, accepting human nature as it is, they prefer to recognize an admitted evil, to sacrifice the innocent offspring of a guilty passion. On the whole, it must be admitted that Colonel Tcheng-ki-Tong does not make a

fight for some of the peculiar institutions of the Celestial pire.—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

HONOR.

"Set honor in one eye and death i' th' other,
And I will look on both indifferently:
For, let the gods so speed me, as I love
The name of honor more than I fear death."

Shakspeare.

specially to those who stand, as it were, but on the threshold of and are anticipating a speedy participation in its active con-s, do these lines furnish a most excellent motto. Neither are meaningless to those who have already begun the march of ; nor are they void of application to them. They appeal alike ll, old and young, except perhaps in different degrees. But rtunate does it seem indeed that there is a disposition, appa-ly inherent, in mankind to regard too indifferently those things ch relate alike to all, and in which all have a common concern. ice it is that we see so many in this age who are so indifferent o making and preserving a good name, and so few who, as the : says, love the name of honor more than they fear death.

ut what is this honor whose name we should love more than fear death? Is it something to reach only in private life? Is mething to be exhibited only in domestic concerns? Should e seen only in the social intercourse of society? Is it some-ig to be exhibited only on particular occasions, and under par-lar circumstances, and at other times to be laid aside? Is it s to be used simply as we would use our fine and costly apparel? th all the powers of reason, I would answer no. It should be guiding influence in public life, as well as private. It should exhibited, not only in domestic affairs, but throughout the le sphere of our action, at all times and under all circumstances. should, like a silver thread, pervade our whole lives and racters, imparting to our lives its own worth, and to our charac-, its own purity. The term honor, though used in quite a ber of connections, in its widest sense, and its usual accepta-as applied to the characters of men, may perhaps be correctly ned as esteem due or paid to worth; reputation; and a scorn of

meanness, as opposed to principles of right and justice. Beginning then, as does its very definition, with esteem and worth, continuing with reputation and ending with right and justice, it is manifestly something at which every one should aim, and the attainment of which is worthy our greatest efforts.

We may, perhaps, more easily appreciate the truth of this by asking the simple question, what is man without character—that impress which gives this human dross its currency? Alas! too many examples have we around us who furnish an answer to this question to render it necessary to be answered here. Too often do we see men in this age who, from a lack of internal worth, are shut out from all enjoyments of a pure and elevating nature. Often do we see powerful talents and bright intellects which might illuminate the world, and be a blessing to the age in which they exist; but a lack of that elevating and ennobling principle which characterizes the lives of all truly great men holds them in obscurity. They fade and wither under the influence of some injurious and degrading practice of their possessors, and finally, to these, the death summons comes but to find them overwhelmed by the terrible recollections of a misspent life and by the fears of entering their future state.

These instances furnish us with only a specimen of the disadvantages, deprivations and disastrous consequences attending lives void of honor. But, thank God, there are many men of our age, and in our own land, who furnish us with a more glorious view of life than this. Many men have we, who, to use the language of the poet, set honor in one eye and death in the other; who govern their every action as though a world of honor depended on it, and as though their next act would be to die. Living thus, and acting thus, the most glorious achievments are theirs; their names are illustrious, their lives useful, and their deaths triumphant. It is the love of rectitude which exercises the most elevating and ennobling influences over the lives of all great and good men. It is this which enables us to enjoy the highest grades of social intercourse with our fellow-man. It increases our strength and strengthens our weakness. It is the prime source of every pleasure which is worthy to be indulged in by the great or good. It is this which holds men above that which is wrong and enables them to enjoy

the confidence and true friendship of all with whom they associate. Without it, a man is not a man.

In private life, the influences of a love of honor are no less to be seen and felt than elsewhere. Here it is, indeed, that we find in its greatest perfection and its highest degree of purity. Who, that acts dishonorably in private life, can hope to enjoy the friendship, the esteem and confidence of those around him? How can such a one hope to be surrounded by kind friends, whose joys he may share, and whose sympathy and assistance he may receive in misfortune? How can such a one expect to enjoy that mental quietude, and that peace of conscience which can be realized only as the result of living a pure, honest and upright life? We answer, none can reasonably expect it. He who would realize the full measure of these enjoyments must, as the poet suggests, set honor in one eye and death in the other, and make every act of his life accord with his motto.

But the influences of honor and dishonor do not end here. Still another broad field over which they exercise a powerful influence presents itself, but can be only hastily reviewed. We refer to the affairs of State, and to public affairs in general. On what does the proper execution of public business depend? On what does the prosperity, and indeed the safety of public affairs depend? Most certainly upon the degree of honor possessed by those to whose keeping they are entrusted. Upon what do the peace and harmony of public affairs depend? Certainly upon the public men of our country. The public servant whose guiding influence is honor, is indeed a blessing and an ornament to his country. Always anxious to know his whole duty, and in what way he can best serve his country, what act he can perform that will result in the greatest good to the largest number of his fellow men, and ever laboring diligently in the discharge of his own conscientious convictions of duty, his life is a pleasure to himself and a treasure to his country. He has no reprimands of conscience for any delinquency on his part to disquiet his mind; no fears of detection and punishment for some violation of his trust, or some breach of his oath of office to disturb his hours of repose; but with the sweet consciousness of having discharged his whole duty and nothing but his duty, he is able to reap the full measure of the enjoyments of this earth, and to

fearlessly yield up his life to him who gave whenever it is his good pleasure to demand it. With all our public positions filled with such men, how much purer, nobler and grander would be this old commonwealth of ours! How high would it set the standard of our public officials above those who, void of any sense of honor, by their paltry, pilfering acts, disgrace high offices and noble names! When our great republic shall have reached such a stage of perfection and purity, we can then boast of a country not less grand than the clear evening sky above it. The bright dome o'erhead will but find a counterpart in our glorious land beneath, whose chief executive shall reign in the purity and splendor of its moon, and whose lower officials, in the subordinate brilliancy of its stars.

There is another feature in this connection which deserves careful and deliberate consideration; but we can make but little more than a reference to it here. It the fact that our sense of honor, though at first it may be weak and liable to be easily overcome, yet in accordance with the laws of all nature, like the tender plant, it will grow and become stronger under the influence of proper cultivation, thus serving as a guide to lofty, virtuous, and self-sacrificing devotion. The grand old century oak, though once but a tender twig, now stands up proudly, almost unshaken by the tempest, and, as it were, mocking the lightnings themselves. Thus it is with the young mind and its first ideas of honor. Though weak and tender at first, they may be transformed into a power, against which death itself cannot prevail. May we, if ever called to choose between death, and the sacrifice of an honorable name, wisely and nobly yield up our lives, and be able to say, with a firmness unsurpassed by the martyr's constancy, "Take it, take it! as I love the name of honor more than I fear death." Then, and not till then, will we have reached the loftiest pinnacle of the temple of earthly glory.—*University Reporter, Athens, Ga.*

DRUMMOND'S NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.

It is a notable sign of the generation to which we belong, in the last quarter of the nineteeth century, that a book like Mr. Drummond's should pass into a seventh edition within twelve months of its publication, and attract such varied and continuous interest. To our own knowledge it may be found, not only upon the tables of

rofessional men and merchants, but in the houses of those belong-
ıg to the humbler classes in society, who might be supposed to
ıck both the time and inclination necessary to get through a vol-
me of speculations on Natural Law in the Spiritual World.

The reasons of this interest are not far to seek. The relations
etween science and religion form the problem of the day; a prob-
ɛm anxiously pored over by thousands, and glanced at with curi-
sity and wonder by tens of thousands. And the number of those
'ho just now are holding the judgment in suspense, unable to give
satisfactory answer to the question of questions concerning self
nd mankind, "Whence, and oh heavens! whither?" is far larger
ıan some would suppose—larger than the man of the world sup-
oses, who cannot conceive of any one in bodily health occupying
is mind with such unsubstantial speculations; and larger than
ıe Christian teacher supposes who cannot understand that any
oubt on these matters of first importance should be entertained
xcept by those who seek excuse for self-indulgence and sin. Those
'ho do not believe that the answer of Christianity to this great
uestion of whence and whither, is true and sufficient, may be
ivided into those who would not, and those who gladly would,
ccept this solution of the world's problem, if they could do so
ɔnsistently with other beliefs. To this latter class (including
ɔme professional adherents of Christianity, who often have their
ark hours of doubt and fear) this book will be especially wel-
ɔme—is, indeed, in some sense specially addressed.

For, if we were to try to express the real difficulty of our gen-
ration in a single phrase, we should say it lies in the lack of power
ɔ assimilate its recently and rapidly earned mental acquisitions
'ith its traditional possessions. The process of assimilation must
ɔnstantly go on, wherever there is life and growth in the individ-
al, the nation, and the race; and in proportion to the complete-
ess and soundness of the process is the health of the body, indi-
idual and corporate. One whose life-work was marred by the
ıalady of his generation, wrote:

> "'Old things need not be therefore true,'—
> Oh brother men, nor yet the new;
> Ah! still awhile the old thought retain,
> And yet consider it again."

How much of the new is true, how much of the old erroneous or effete, is a question only one man here and there can answer, that when any one with the slightest pretension to acquaintance with the subject speaks, many crowd eagerly to hear.

Our minds are not built, like many modern vessels, in water-tight compartments, so the contents of one section may be shut off from the rest, and the knowledge that has entered one door into its own chamber, be entertained there and do its work, without interfering with knowledge that has entered by another. Rather, as in the case of liquids separated by a thin membrane, the processeses technically called exomosis and endomosis are continually going on, a filtering in and out, an exchange of constituents and properties between the contents of the different chambers, till something like a homogeneous state is reached. Philosophy has been defined as the rationalizing of experience. And, using experience in the largest sense, to include the result of all the varied influences which effect man within and without, this process of philosophizing, reducing experience to unity and harmony under the laws of the universal reason, is always consciously or unconsciously going on. To find the One in the Many was the problem of the ancient philosophy; it is not as yet the achievement of the modern. A unity in Nature, which implies a "great exception," is not a unity in which the mind of man will long rest.

"All are but parts of one stupenduous whole," writes the poet in a line we may use without continuing the quotation. Of that whole, the material universe, with its planets, satellites, and suns, its systems of suns and nebulæ, in countless numbers and absolutely unbroken order, is but one part; the teeming life which, in myriads of ranks and orders, peoples the one of these orbs with which we are acquainted; is another part. The mind and spirit of man, with its exquisite delicacy and versatility, its marvelous capacity and complexity, its almost endless variety under varying laws and conditions, is another part; and the revelation of higher truths made to man in the course of history by him who has never left himself without witness, but chose his own time for the unveiling of the highest knowledge man is able to bear, is but another part, though incomparably the most sublime and important. The whole, of which these are parts, is stupendous indeed, so that it

might well be thought to surpass the powers of man to survey and comprehend it. But so much as man knows he will endeavor, as he always has endeavored, to harmonize, arrange, and unify, thus working out a problem which a Higher than himself has set, and ever approximating, rather than reaching, a conclusion which seems to fly before him as he approaches it.

To this problem Mr. Drummond addresses himself in his own way. He is weary and distrustful of "reconciliations" between science religion, and of much that goes by that name we are weary and distrustful also. As he tells us in his preface, he has not only received both a scientific and theological training, but has been accustomed to "lecture to a class of students on the natural sciences on week-days, and on Sundays to an audience of working-men on subjects of a moral and religious character." Only a man who is acquainted with the methods as well as the nomenclature of science can understand what is the bar which to so many minds lies at the entrance of the harbor of religion, and prevents them from happily sailing in. Many a religious teacher ignores a need he does not himself feel, and fails altogether to bring home to minds trained in the rigors of the inductive method truths which speak another language, and are established by appeals and arguments to them altogether new and strange. On the other hand, it is the tendency of the majority of students of science to eliminate or minimize the significance of the higher elements of knowledge by explaining them in terms of the lower. The inorganic, they tell us, "explains" the organic; the lower forms of organized life explain the higher; man is the highest organism known, and of God we can know nothing. Truly this is to make a solitude and call it peace." Mr. Drummond, as a religious man, is in no danger of falling into this error, and he quite sufficiently understands the essential nature of the two regions of knowledge which in this book he brings into mutual relation.

Perhaps the best way of indicating our author's position is to begin by comparing his book with three others (to confine ourselves to these), out of the many that during the last year or two have attempted a similar enterprise. Each of these appeared in the first instance anonymously, but in each case the author's name is tolerably well known. The *Supernatural in Nature* of Mr.

Reynolds endeavoured to show that "mystery and miracle are the source and foundation of Nature, underlie all science, are everywhere, and interpenetrate all things;" thus making the natural but a subordinate province of the great empire of the supernatural. The *Natural Religion* of Prof. Seeley tried to explain religion in terms of this world, and to show how much of the admiration, hope, and love by which Agnostics live, deserves the name of religion; and the book seems to imply—though this, we believe, the author would not admit—that the "worship" awakened in many minds by Nature, life and art, is a very fair substitute for and contains the best part of the old-fashioned worship of God. The *New Analogy* of Mr. Fowle travels, as its title signifies, somewhat upon the lines of what Englishmen will always call THE *Analogy*. It differs, however, from it, in that while Butler argued that we might expect to find, and do find, the same difficulties in the course of Nature that we do in the teaching of revelation, Mr. Fowle contends that Nature and revelation can be proved to "have similar methods, laws, characteristics, ideas, a consistency of operation and a striking capacity for combination," so that those who have studied one may be led by easy steps and readily apprehended parallels in the other.

Mr. Drummond's position differs from each of these, and shall be stated in his own words. He contends, "not that the spiritual laws are analogous to the natural laws, but *that they are the same laws*. It is not a question of analogy, but of identity. The natural laws, as the law of continuity might well warn us, do not stop with the visible and then give place to a new set of laws bearing a strong similitude to them. The laws of the invisible are the same laws—projections of the natural, not supernatural" (p. 11). And again: "It is a question, indeed, whether one can speak of laws at all as being analogous. Phenomena are parallel. Laws which make themselves so are themselves one" (p. 53). Parable has taken the analogy of phenomena for her sphere; Mr. Drummond aims much higher than this, and announces that he will introduce a new method, which he marvels that others have not discerned (p. 52). Others may have seen the supernatural in Nature, or analogies between natural and supernatural; he will be content with nothing short of nature in the supernatural. The

basis of authority on which belief in the supernatural has hitherto rested, has, Mr. Drummond thinks, been abandoned, and a new basis, that of science, must be put in its place. Spiritual truth hitherto has been believed; henceforth it must be seen. And our author thinks that he can show to those who wish to see in religion, as they have been accustomed to see in science, that which will not make them start back in despair. As they gaze into that natural-spiritual world they will say, we have seen something like this before. It is not arbitrary. This law here is that old law there. And so the spiritual world becomes slowly natural, and what is of all but equal moment, the natural world becomes slowly spiritual" (p. 27).—*London Quarterly Review.*

HOW CAN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION BE SECURED?

If we are to have the Christian element recognized in Higher Education, we must have colleges and universities planted upon Christian foundations and under Christian control. In colleges endowed and controlled by the State, the religious element must be ignored. They can take no account of it either in authorizing the *curriculum* or in appointing the professors. But may not the professors in a State college be Christian men? Assuredly they *may* be, but we have no guarantee that they *will* be. Such appointments will be made—unless party considerations intervene—solely on the ground of ability to teach the required branches, viewed from a purely secular standpoint, and the religious character or views of the candidate cannot be considered at all. Moreover, in the sudden changes which result from party government, it is quite within the possibilities that we may some day have a Minister of Education who would regard religious skepticism as a recommendation rather than an objection, and hence the Chair that is filled by a Christian to-day may be filled by an atheist to-morrow.

But how can we have Christian colleges? Only through the Churches. How can they be adequately endowed and sustained? *Chiefly by private liberality.* It is held by some, perhaps by many, that it is the duty of the State to provide every requisite for Higher Education. I question the correctness of the theory, as I do the soundness of the policy. That it is the duty of the State to provide for *primary* education, and even to make it compulsory,

is clear, because illiteracy is the prolific parent of vice and crime; but in the matter of Higher Education, which partakes somewhat of the character of a luxury, it may be the duty of the State to aid and encourage it, but not to provide for it entirely. State aid should be an encouragement to private benevolence, not a substitute for it; and grants of public money for Higher Education should be conditioned, both in direction and amount, by the principle of helping those who help themselves.

It is possible that these lines may be read by some who recognize the solemn trust of stewardship, and who sincerely desire so to fulfill the trust that at the last the "well done" of the Master will be theirs. Sometimes, perhaps, you are in doubt as to the best way of investing your Lord's money, so that it may yield the largest returns in glory to God and good to men, because you see that much that is given in charity, so called, seems to produce no good, or at least no lasting, results. Far be it from me to dissuade you from helping the poor because results seem so small; but I would fain show you "a more excellent way," and it is this: Let a portion of your wealth be given to aid in endowing Christian colleges and universities, and thus put in operation agencies that will work for the good of thousands long after you have passed to your reward. Ye give your money in daily charity, and ye do well; but the dole of to-day will be spent ere to-morrow, and the effect upon society is *nil*. Ye help to provide refuges for the destitute, and homes for God's suffering poor, and ye do well; but although the suffering inmates are sheltered and comforted, they send no healthful influence abroad, and the grace of your benefaction is unfelt beyond the narrow circle that shared the benefit. Ye leave wealth to your children, and they *may* use it wisely; but, on the other hand, the wealth you labored to accumulate may be wasted by others on sinful indulgences; the fortune which held in it unmeasured possibilities of blessing, may prove a corroding curse, and the fruit that seemed so fair may, like apples of Sodom, turn to caustic ashes on the lip. But he who endows a Chair in a Christian university, like one who digs a well in a desert, unseals a fountain whose perennial waters shall refresh the weary while passing centuries march their rounds. He may die, but his work shall live, and its power to bless shall grow with each revolving

sun. He may pass from toil to rest, from labour to reward, but he leaves behind him a long succession of representatives, Christian teachers who shall send forth generations of men wise in all the wisdom of the schools, and loyal to the heart's core to Christ and His truth; and thus the benefits shall multiply till he who sowed the seed shall reap the harvest with vast and abiding increase.—*Dr. A. Sutherland, Canadian Methodist Magazine.*

SERMONIZING.

Sermons should be composed with the congregation always in view. They should be not simply discussions of subjects with inspiring rhetoric, elaborate argument, or pointed illustration, but the question should ever be present: "Will this be profitable to the congregation? Will it reach the conscience of the hardened? Will it guard the young from danger? Will it bring them to the Cross of Christ? Will it solve their perplexities? Will it dispel their doubts? Will it impart comfort to the sorrowing? Will it arouse the Church to holy living and Christian activity?" With questions like these, and with a single eye to benefit his people, the minister will compose a sermon not only manly in itself, but *specially* suited to the needs of his people.

The sermon should always be prepared in the light of individual experience. The preacher who searches the depths of his own heart will find a fathoming line for the hearts of others. If he studies earnestly what will probe and arouse his own conscience, he will be instrumental in reaching the consciences of others. Let him notice in his own heart the character of the temptations which assail him; their insidious approach; their apparent harmony with the laws of his being; their gaining strength by indulgence, and his people will feel that he is speaking directly at them. If he uses the language of the books; if he dwells on metaphysical speculations; if he uses technical terms, they will listen, confused and bewildered. But if he speaks from the workings of his own heart, and describes the struggles which actually pass within him, not unfrequently some member of his congregation will be angry, supposing that somebody has revealed to the minister his own inner life. The most effectual sermons are those drawn from the inner consciousness of the speaker. They have the freshness of life to

the audience; for, "as in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man."

Every sermon should have illustrations. They are like pictures to the eye, and help to fasten the truth in the memory. Our Saviour gave us most forcible examples of illustrations of various kinds. Part of these were from history; but, what is remarkable in his case, they were never outside of Biblical or Jewish history. In biblical history we have his reference to the days of Noah, a type of the days of the Son of man; of Jonah preaching to the Ninevites, and of their repentance; of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah; the visit of the Queen of Sheba; the glory of Solomon. We have allusions to Nature—to the grain of corn falling into the earth and dying, and the new life springing therefrom; the lillies of the field, and the growth from the mustard-seed; allusions to the sparrow in its littleness; the hairs of our head in their number; the redness of the evening sky as betokening fair weather; and that of the morning as foreboding a storm; allusions to the sheep which follow the voice of the shepherd; to the fowls of the air who are fed out of God's storehouses; to the fox in his cunning, to the wolf in his cruelty, and the dog in his sympathy; allusions to the employments of men in their occupations; to the farmer, in sowing his seed and gathering his harvest; the wine-dresser, caring for the vineyard; the traveler, going into a far country and delivering his goods to his servants; the unfaithful steward, the foolish rich man, who pulled down his barns to build greater; the young man with his wealth and morality, and the beggar in his poverty and friendless death. He turns to the employments of women, and introduces the leaven hid in three measures of meal; the careful housewife, sweeping her floor to find the lost piece of silver; the mite of the poor widow; the waywardness of the prodigal, and the delight of the father's heart at his return; the wedding garment; the alabaster box of rich perfume; and the love that issues from the heart once sinful, but now repentant. How wide a range, and at how many points the Saviour's teaching touched the life of men!

How sweeping, yet how minute his laws! The laws of marriage and divorce; filial obedience; forgiveness of injuries; fasting, prayer, and giving alms; the duty of men to reconcile difficu-

ties and offences; obedience to government. His field of view sweeps time and eternity; embraces supreme love to God and love to man as ourselves; finds illustration in the grave, judgment, and resurrection; in the fall of Jerusalem and in the end of the world; in heaven and in hell; in the raptures of angels, and the torments of the lost. What a field for us to copy! If the Saviour thus illustrated his sermons, why should not we? Parable, allegory, and metaphor were sanctified by him for our use.

The Apostles followed the example of our Saviour, confining their illustrations to Jewish life, history, and habits, or to the great facts of Bible history, with the exception of Paul, who in Athens used illustrations from Grecian poets and sculptors, and in his Epistle to Titus, he makes an allusion to a Cretan author. This indicates to us that we are not confined to Jewish habits or life for our illustrations, but we may draw from them the life and habits of the people to whom we minister. Thus the knowledge of the employments of men in our congregation may be of service in gaining an influence over them. The work of the assayer of metals, the nets of the fisherman, the case of the attorney, the diseases and remedies familiar to the physician, the digging of gold in the mines, the duties of the housewife, the care of children, are so many storehouses filled with almost inexhaustible stores, which may be drawn upon at will. Often have I enquired as to the preaching of some man of note who has been famous for pulpit power and success. His hearers spoke of him with enthusiasm and rapture; but all they could remember of his sermons was his manner in the pulpit, or some illustrations he had given.—*Bishop Matthew Simpson, in New York Independent.*

"STUDIES IN HISTORY."

We are not among those who join in the outcry against the republication of articles and papers originally contributed to reviews and magazines. On the contrary, we should lose much that is valuable, much that is instructive and beneficial, were it not for the garnering, gleaning, and binding habits of literary people, who, more anxious for their offspring than a small section of the cynical public, decline to send them to the foundling hospital, or let them

lie in the unvisited *creche* of the monthlies in which they first saw the light. The reviews are the topmost crests and billows of thi huge sea of contemporary writing; on them float all the light, and buoyant, and sparkling things cast forth by a thousand busy brains, all the winged and barbed *miscellanea* of the time, that buzz, and sing, and sting, and make an incision in our memory; and many of the deep and remarkable things that the scholar draws reluctantly from their hiding place, and commits, with many a prayer, to the press. The flotsam and jetsam which men fling impatiently from their minds are caught there like the echo in the shell; the stir, the song, the suffering, all are there; and to these delicate and wonderful whispering-galleries must we apply our ear if we would catch the thrilling voices of the hour. The deadest review is full of living gems, of desiccated brains that need but the vitalizing touch of republication to live and bud again, of *umbra* that wander on the Stygian shore, waiting for reincarnation at the fingers of their maker. Why should their prayer not be granted?

These reflections are suggested by Mr. Lodge's 'Studies in History' which have been sheaved and garnered in part from the columns of contemporary reviews. With a single exception, the eleven papers therein contained bear directly on the history of the United States, and are sprightly and thorough studies of their kind. Particularly good is the group of studies relating to certain Federalist leaders and their contemporaries, which form a closely connected series of biographical discussions of the prominent figures in that famous part. To our mind, however 'A Puritan Pepys,' comprising a criticism of the diary of Judge Sewall, of Massachusetts, is the pleasantest paper in the book. Mr. Lodge has an exceedingly light and effective touch; he waves his hazel-wand and finds water infallibly in that arid desert of early New England life; he shows us, as no common cicerone can, the lights and shades of that overclouded age, its anxieties, spiritual miseries, groanings unspeakable, its fearlessness and freedom, its simplicity, godliness, and superstition. In the essay on Hamilton we have a vivid presentation of that many-sided man as soldier, jurist, orator, statesman, and financier. Other essays on Cobbett, Fox, Pickering, Strong, Gallatin, and Webster display a similar mastery of the subject. In short, Mr. Lodge may be congratulated on giving us

a book so full of literary skill, of new and bright points of view, and of solid information most agreebly conveyed.—*New York Critic.*

HOLINESS OUR HOPE.

Unquestionably the clear experience of holiness or perfect love subsequent to the regeneration, is a doctrine of our Methodism. And just as unquestionably the holiness doctrine, by whatever name it is called, is the power-doctrine; that is, holiness is power, and indispensable to spiritual power, whether you call it perfect love, the pure heart, entire sanctification, full salvation, complete consecration, or what you will. Holiness is power. The very conditions of knowledge, experience and grace on which it is obtained and retained make it a power. No man can possess genuine holiness and fail to be a power for good. A man may think he possesses it when he does not; but he cannot possess and retain it without making himself felt for God and truth, and the souls of men. Some who think they have it not may be nearer its possession than some that boasts they have it. But however men may differ about it, and however they may judge one another or themselves as to having it, this thing is certain, they cannot have power with God unless they possess it. And the converse of this proposition is equally safe; they cannot possess and retain it without having power with God. And in the degree they approach and possess it they increase in power with God. Man may long approach it and not secure it, and after they have secured it they may make great advancements in knowledge and godliness. So here are likely as many grades of spiritual power as there are varieties of religious experience.

Methodism in this country is uniting. Men are adopting the polities, adjusting the boundaries, equalizing the finances, consolidating the institutions, reconstructing circuits, districts and conferences, re-forming classes and societies, and gathering all under one general conference and superintendency. But is all this the true and desirable union? Will all this secure to us the anticipated benefits of union? If placing the waggon on the roadside without the use of the horses will move the produce; if placing the locomotive engine on the siding without the steam will sweep

the train along; if connecting wire and lever will transmit the message without electricity: then these ecclesiastical arrangements will be union without holiness, without the power of God. But the waggon alone would rot and fall to pieces on the roadside; the locomotive on the siding would rust and sink into the earth without the steam; the telegraphic apparatus would be useless without the electricity: and so Methodist union will be futile, fruitless, ruinous, a disaster and the mother of disasters without the power of God. What shall save us from pride, if not humility? What shall save us from weakness, if not strength? What shall save us from division and destruction, if not unity and love? What shall save us from darkness, if not light? What from envy, indifference and hate, if not zeal tempered with knowledge and a noble Christian charity? And what are humility, strength, love, light and zeal in their highest attainable degree but holiness?

We may think we have voted union through, and it is going all well enough. We may think we have planned wisely and it must be a success. We may think the united Church has large resources and will move on by its own majority and weight. We may think there are able men and they will make things go. But what is all this but wicked pride of opinion and sinful abandonment of trust in Almighty God? What is all this but that spiritual and moral condition, that state of mind and heart which God always sends confusion, blasting and overthrow. And to us this very confusion and overthrow are inevitable if we trust ourselves, our schemes, our resources and not the living God. The Methodist Churches of this country kept separate and trusting God would be far better and would have far more power, notwithstanding their occasional collisions and oppositions, than united with their resources aggregated and their abilities accumulated, forgetting God, and trusting themselves and human policy. And this is a thing of degrees, all the way from exclusive self-trust, selfishness and worldliness, to perfect self-renunciation, trust in God and holiness. And the Church is weaker than water or omnipotent according to its place in the scale.

This trusting ourselves and human policy is the danger apprehended by many pious souls. An argument urged vigorously against Union was that our people will become proud and forget

God. Nor does any man say there is no danger here: just as no man dares say, it must be so that the Church will be proud and forgetful of God; it is utterly unavoidable, an absolute necessity. In this state of probation both opportunities are before us: we can become proud and forgetful of God, or humble, constantly mindful of God and holy. It would be sad to think that a Church cannot come into the possession of large resources of men and means without forsaking God and losing religion. If that be so, how is the Church ever to succeed in conquering the world for Christ? If that be so we had better plead with the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States to stop growing or to divide up into several contending sects. But that is not so. A Church can have large resources and be humble and holy. If the consecration is commensurate with the resources all will be well. A man can be just as humble with a mighty intellect consecrated to Christ as can the man one grade above the simpleton. A man can be just as humble consecrating a thousand dollars to Christ as if he were consecrating but a cent. A Church can be just as humble sending out ten thousand missionaries as if it had no missionary society, and never collected means to send a man into the field. A Church can be just as mindful of God and humble with many religious schools, leaning on its people for support, as if it had not a school at all and gloried, as some do, in its ignorance. Poverty and ignorance are, to say the least of it, as likely to be proud and envious as abundance and intelligence. It is a simple question of the gradation of consecration, the commensurateness of holiness.—*Dr. Carman in Canadian Methodist Magazine.*

OUR REVIEW.

This Quarterly is nearing the close of its sixth year—quite an age for a periodical of its rank to live in our section. We began six years ago without a subscriber, amid a battle of fears and hopes. Very few believed success possible on the scheme devised; indeed, the prospect did not warrant any great expectations. People confine their reading now chiefly to newspapers, and to novels: they want paragraphs, not essays; something pleasing to the imagination, not thought burdensome to intellect. But there is a class, comparatively small, who demand a literature of higher grade, and

these we believed were sufficient to justify the serious undertaking. The success of the first year was a surprise to its editor, an untried man in this sphere. Progress, however, in the matter of patronage, was not up to expectation.

When we *resumed* the management two years ago, we had to begin nearly where we at first commenced. At the end of last year, the mail books showed more than a recovery of what had been lost. It is not extravagant to say that the patronage has been better than at any time in nearly forty years. Considering that the REVIEW, during this period, has been edited by the brilliant Bascom and Doggett, and the learned Summers, this statement may appear egotistic. Really, we have not claimed much, for at no time in its history has the Quarterly had revenues sufficient to pay publisher, and editor, and contributors.

We make no comparison as to ability, only state facts. There are evident reasons why such a print should be better sustained now than it was thirty years ago. With far more culture in our ministry and Church, the result of numerous schools and colleges, it would be strange if there should be no progress in our literature. And there is to-day a better basis for such a print than ever existed in our history. How long we may direct this enterprise, under God's providence, it depends on us to say. Having *twice* made this REVIEW, having at the present the entire financial responsibility, having risked much in the undertaking, we do not propose to evacuate the editorial chair at the whim and caprice of one or many. It is is a fair presumption that our readers are satisfied (not all, of course) and will continue their patronage. We indulge in no conceits as to the attainments of the present or achievements of the future. As our literary labor is mainly gratuitous, and financial liability, without good prospect of recompense, is not a pleasant attitude, the time may come when it will take no persuasion to induce us to make way for a successor. At this writing we make no intimation.

We return our cordial thanks to those who have manifestly tried to help us with tongue and pen: many good things, strong words, have been written and said of the Quarterly, especially of its Editor. Adverse criticisms no doubt are freely indulged in a private way—this is to be expected. We do not object to criti-

cism: it is our own vocation. If an article is obnoxious, it is but just to let the public know it, if the critic can make good his allegation. The most eminent writers for periodicals have found some who could not perceive their excellences. Macaulay, Jeffrey, Sir Wm. Hamilton, etc., have had their censors. Men, who could not in a thousand years rise high enough to get a horizontal view of such writers have looked at the inaccessible mountain peaks from the plane below, and because of dim vision and wide distance, they have not seen the lofty characters above. Our Review is not perfect, but we believe its merits are fully equal to its claims, and pretensions, though not to its nobler aspirations. Let all help who can, either by kind words or better deeds.

DRS. WHEDON AND CURRY.

The late General Conference of the Methodist E. Church elected Dr. Daniel Curry to edit the QUARTERLY REVIEW. Dr. D. D. Whedon has filled that office for nearly a generation. Worn down by weight of years and afflictions, there seemed to be a necessity to release him from a position of arduous toil. Dr. Whedon's name has become almost a synonym for the REVIEW, so long and ably has he conducted it. Dr. Curry is himself a veteran editor and well-known writer, occupying a conspicuous place in the Church. We have always read his editorials in the prints he has previously controlled, with a relish, even when not agreeing. He is a bold, independent thinker—does not run his mental machinery in old ruts. This Quarterly is over a half-century in age—it deserves a liberal support.

THE MODE OF BAPTISM: A CATECHISM FOR CHILDREN, LARGE AND SMALL: By L. S. BURKHEAD, D. D., Raleigh, N. C., P. W. Wiley & Co., 1884.

Dr. L. S. Burkhead of the North Carolina conference has issued a pamphlet on "The Mode of Baptism" put up on the Socratic plan of Question and Answer. The usual arguments are adduced in this way more concisely and effectively than by more elaborate treatment. While nothing new can be said on either side of this old controversy, yet, there may be a great difference in the method of treatment. Dr. Burkhead so conducts the argument as to place

the Baptist disputant on the defensive, rather, we may say, throws on the Baptist the *onus prbandi*, or burden of proof. Much of the skill of debating depends on the posture of the contestants as to who should take the *onus*. Our Baptist friends are somewhat accommodating in this matter and are quite willing to any arrangement, yet, in certain phases of the controversy they never fail to insist that the burden of proof is on pedobaptists. They are asked for proof, positive and explicit in terms of scripture that infants should be baptized. Pedobaptists on their part hold nothing more is necessary than to show the unquestionable right of infants to ceremonial alliance with the ancient Jewish Church. *Prima facie* they have this right in a more liberal and enlarged dispensation—in the Christian Church. The presumption being in favor of infants, the right must be admitted unless a repeal is shown in the later records. Hence, the *onus probandi* is shifted. Dr. B's pamphlet may be very serviceable in communities disturbed with an agitation on this subject. And it will do useful work in informing people of the points in controverry who have not access to larger treatises.

The Catechism discusses only the Mode of Baptism.

NOTE TO PUBLISHERS.

The Editor returns thanks to Publishers for their favors. Books forwarded free of charge will receive proper attention; they should be sent long in advance of the date of publication. Those who have sent books will receive a copy of the issue containing notices—a marked copy.

THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF THE

METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH.

OCTOBER, 1884.

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THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW

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VOL. VI. OCTOBER, 1884. No. 4.

BISHOP GEORGE F. PIERCE.

BY THE EDITOR.

Bishop Pierce has lived long and well; and he will not cease to live in an important sense—"though he be dead, he yet speaketh." No man in the ranks of Episcopal Methodism has been more widely known, or more revered. For fifty-three years he has had a public record; for the most of this time he has been conspicuous as a leader and ruler in the Church, equally distinguished for his talents, labors and virtues. Having a rarely perfect body he was a stranger to disease until the last ten years of his life. During these later years death has been sapping and mining his stalwart frame—on the 3d of September, 1884, the explosion came and the citadel fell, crushed and crashing in the fall. The eminent man deserves the best tribute and the highest honors that may be offered to his memory. We gratefully tender in this article our estimate of the Bishop; and if it falls below his just claims it can only be from lack of capacity to express our appreciation.

We have had the best opportunities to know Bishop Pierce from our boyhood to the close of his life. Hence, what we may write will not be from hearsay and tradition—the only possible discount

may arise in a suspicion of partiality incompatible with candor and sobriety of judgment. But this may be rebutted by the statement that no special intimacy has ever existed between us—only that association which was common to the brotherhood of the Conferences.

This article will be biographical in a large degree; in a measure it will give an estimate of the Bishop as a public man administering the affairs of the Church, and as a pulpit orator of commanding position and influence. The material for the essay we do not have to seek and sift; for it is in our own mind gathered for a long time by the accretions of memory from reading, conversation and reflection.

George F. Pierce was born February 3d, 1811, in Greene county, Georgia, one snowy day—a beautiful symbol of his spotless life and character. He was the eldest child of Dr. Lovick Pierce and of Ann Foster, a daughter of Col. George Foster of the above State. His ancestry was good; and from them he derived many fine endowments—physical, mental and moral. We have heard Dr. Lovick Pierce, who lived to be nearly ninety-five, speak of the great bodily strength of *his* father; the Bishop was far more muscular than Dr. Pierce, who yet outlived the son twenty-one years.

Very little has been written of the childhood of George F. Pierce, or even of his youth. This most interesting part of his biography will be meager, unless matter is supplied by posthumous writings left by father and son. The lives of eminent men usually show the rich buddings of the bloom and fruit of mature years. It is one of the silliest and falsest of fallacies, very largely held, that precocity in childhood foretells failure in the future career. Facts of history, gathered by the curious, conclusively show that those excelling in school and college are usually foremost in the achievements of life. Dr. Lovick Pierce once told us of the fatherly pride he felt in George and Julia, when little children at school, on account of the honors won for proficiency in learning.

At an early age George F. Pierce was prepared for, and was admitted into, Franklin College, (Athens, Georgia,) where he graduated in 1829. Several in his class were destined to distinction, but none have attained the eminence accorded to him. This class furnished two Bishops to the Church—the late Bishop Scott, of

Oregon, of the Episcopal Church, being a class-mate of Pierce. Two eminent men of the Baptist Church graduated with him—Dr. N. M. Crawford, (son of the famous Georgia Statesman,) and Dr. S. G. Hillyer, yet living, venerable for age, wisdom and virtue. There was one member of the class, who finished elsewhere, that was fully Pierce's equal in brilliancy of genius—the Hon. Robert Toombs, of Georgia, who yet lives, and recently brought his laudations to add to the fame of his life-long friend and College class-mate. About the close of his College course three others entered and became very eminent as lawyers, orators and statesmen, namely: Alexander H. Stephens, Herschel V. Johnson and Howell Cobb, a brilliant galaxy of stars of the first magnitude.

Very recently, we saw Bishop Pierce on the stage at Athens Commencement; and in view of his infirmities it was a painful sight to behold. What a change since he stood there fifty-five years ago, the most brilliant orator of graduation day, exciting admiration to the highest pitch by his genius and magnificent person. We walked over the grounds, and stood together looking at the boys in the ceremony of the "class tree"—he showed us the route over the Campus once accustomed to the elastic step now changed to the slow motion of an old man. We also listened to the humorous exercises under the venerable oak in front of the Chapel—a tree, perhaps, two centuries old, and which served as a shelter on Commencement occasions in the early days of the College. The boys closed their fun of prophecy and poetry, and burlesque speech—the Bishop remarked, "there were no such doings in my College days."

The venerable oak which had been a benignant shade for so many eminent men, had recently been stricken by lightning; and of this we talked and lamented. Alas! the forces of nature tend irresistibly to decay; the oak was but the symbol of the great man when in his prime, and now of his waning strength and early death.

During his College course he was deeply moved on the subject of religion—in his sixteenth year. From the most reliable source we learn his experience was very marked in its features. His conviction of sin was deep; the struggle for relief was agonizing. After earnest, protracted seeking, he found pardon, not dubious, but attended with a happy consciousness. His experience in reli-

gion was of the type characteristic of early Methodism. Such repentance and relief qualified him for his life-work of preaching the gospel to a sinful world. Sin with George F. Pierce was a term of dreadful import—not a mere misfortune, but a curse, only to be removed by the atonement of Jesus and by a real regeneration by the Holy Ghost. He never diluted the idea of sin by euphemistic words tending to soothe the sinner; but looking at the matter in the light of Scripture and experience, his convictions were deep, his contrition profound, his faith self-abasing.

Leaving College with *eclat*, as one of the most brilliant young men of the day, it was natural that he should have strong impulses to a profession promising fortune and fame. His attention was directed to the law, and he, for a brief time, read with his uncle, Hon. Thomas Foster, a gentleman of position, and afterwards a member of Congress.

Blackstone and Coke were soon abandoned for the Bible and Wesley's Sermons. What he might have achieved had he pursued his first intention is, of course, only a matter of speculation. A man of such varied endowments could not have failed to win honor, perhaps renown, in any profession. He certainly would have had an open field for political eminence; for his almost unmatched power of speech, his splendid person and flawless character, would have made him irresistible before the people. We recall an observation made to us by a prominent politician, after listening to a brilliant oration by the Bishop. Said he, "What a politician he would have made!"

However this might have been, certain it is that Bishop Pierce never regarded his choice of the ministry a mistake even from the world's point of view. We have heard him say, that in *every way* he deemed his decision wise and fortunate. George F. Pierce was licensed to preach in 1830. John Collinsworth was his pastor, and was opposed to the application for license. Collinsworth had all the sternness of an early puritan, and would have made a splendid soldier in Cromwell's army or a legislator in his long parliament. Holding rigidly to the ascetic views which largely tinctured early Methodism, he had no concessions to make to the fashionable world. He had no objections to young Pierce except as to his fashionable coat, and the elegant arrangement of his hair—these were

serious defects in his eye. Anyway, Pierce was licensed, and Collinsworth finally became satisfied that he would make a Methodist preacher, when he heard of his swimming streams in order to reach a camp-meeting.

These are small affairs certainly, but we have long since learned that in the biographies of the great such incidents are read with the greatest avidity. We have talked with the Bishop about his first sermon, which was delivered in Monticello, Georgia, in 1830. Rev. Wesley P. Arnold, of the same age, but three years older in the ministry, was in charge. Arnold announced with that voice that rang like a first class church bell—a voice unmatched—"Bro. George F. Pierce will preach to night." The young preacher was the son of his father, whose fame was in all the Churches; and said the Bishop, "Everybody who could put on a shoe went out. Being very well prepared, however, I got through with some credit."

In January, 1831, the first Georgia Conference was held in Macon, Ga.; before this Georgia had been included in the South Carolina Conference. At this time there were a few preachers of distinction in the Georgia ranks, and some who were destined to eminence. Dr. Ignatius A. Few was, perhaps, the only collegiate in the body when Pierce entered. His beginning was auspicious, and success inevitable. It is hard to say whether, in view of reputation, it was better or worse for him to have a father so pre-eminent as a preacher. The most famous pulpit orator in America—Henry Ward Beecher—has spoken of how hard a fate he had in early life by reason of the fact that Dr. Lyman Beecher was his father. People were irresistibly led to compare the two; and so it was with the Pierces.

The young preacher was sent to Alcovi circuit—a large field in Middle Georgia. Here he labored efficiently with Jeremiah Freeman as senior preacher, evincing a complete fitness in every view for the vocation he had adopted. But he did not always find preaching an easy task as we have heard him say; and he illustrated by an example. He attended a camp-meeting his first year near Eatonton, Georgia. James O. Andrew was there (not yet Bishop) in all the majesty and splendor that belonged to him in middle life at a camp-meeting. Young Pierce was appointed to preach, but

could find no text that he could manage. Wrestling in the woods for aid, no help came. In his desperation he resolved to take the first words for a text which he might chance to read on opening the Bible. These words happened to be "As it was in the days of Noe so shall it be at the coming of the Son of Man." This was certainly a perilous experiment—an example never to be followed. He attempted to expatiate on his text which really was one suited to his genius. Andrew was placed behind him to exhort, but instead of exhorting took a new text, and such an one! "My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge." Rushing on with an impetuous torrent the great orator turned and put his hand on the young preacher's head and bid him hope, inspiring him by kind words. This incident he gave us at the same camp-ground, just before his election as Bishop. He was then standing as Andrew had stood, and the writer was the young preacher. We preached as best we could; and the coming Bishop exhorted after us. The sermon was to sinners in the very opening of the camp-meeting. Bro. Pierce was very much surprised at this; and took occasion to say in his exhortation, he was glad to find a man who had courage enough to preach to sinners at the opening of a meeting. He discarded, he said, the common opinion that nothing could be done until the Church was in a stir and excitement.

The second year of his ministry was in Augusta, Georgia, in 1832, being a junior preacher, with James O. Andrew as a colleague. We have talked with Bishop Pierce about this year of his pastoral work; well do we recall his stating the embarassment felt in preaching before Andrew, and how glad he was to find the senior preacher absent when the junior had to preach. During that year, (May, 1832,) James O. Andrew was elected Bishop; and our young preacher, just twenty-one years old, was left in charge of the most important station in Georgia. Quite recently have we heard Bishop Pierce speak of his ministrial success this year—it was a time of continuous revival, and of numerous conversions. While the matter is fresh in mind we desire to record the Bishop's explanation of what seems to many a perplexing fact. Said he, "It is well known that the most fruitful years of most preachers are the earliest days of their ministry. The reason is this: At such a period the young man knows but little—he is conscious of his lack, and so is the

hurch. Hence, there is no reliance on human power either by reacher or people; and the sense of dependence on God brings the nly power to produce results."

From Augusta, at the end of a very prosperous year, he was sent) Savannah, and after one year he was stationed in Charleston, outh Carolina. Remaining but a year, he then returned to Geor- ia. He was married February 4th, 1834, to Miss Ann Waldron, f Savannah, Georgia. This well-mated pair lived in happy union)r over fifty years—the golden wedding was appropriately cele- rated in Sparta, February 4th, 1884. They have been blessed ith a number of children, most of whom survive to perpetuate heir name and character.

In 1835, Mr. Pierce was made a Presiding Elder on the Augusta)istrict, serving here four years consecutively. Admirably adapted) this high office on account of fine administrative talents and ommanding eloquence, his career on the district was rich in good esults.

The enterprise of building a Female College in Georgia, agitated)r three years, had finally developed into reality. It was deemed grand experiment; indeed, it was such, and besides a project ery perilous. George F. Pierce was elected President, and took his position January 7th, 1839. The scheme was wisely conceived nd planned; the execution was attended with the usual difficul- es of all great enterprises growing out of new ideas yet unfamil- ir to the popular mind. To George F. Pierce belongs the honor f being foremost in the great educational move in behalf of woman. Vords of burning eloquence did he write and speak in those days) arousing from lethargy the people, and in combatting their pre- idices. In a periodical of that day he said, "This is a prophecy f the past and the beginning of the fulfillment." In a large meas- re, he was successful; and he deserves a lofty monument on Col- ge Hill, (Macon, Georgia,) two sides to be engraved with his ame and deeds, the other two sides to be devoted to his honored re, the first agent of the College. This noble work, worthy of ie loftiest mind, did not suit such a man as George F. Pierce. His soul was on fire with ministerial zeal; and during the first ear of his Presidency at Macon, Georgia, he conducted a revival

of religion, the traditions of which yet linger, and some of its visible fruits still remain.

Continuing in the Georgia Female College, (afterwards called Wesleyan) for three years, he was then stationed in Macon, in 1842. Serving one year in Mulberry Street Church, he next went to Augusta, Georgia, where he labored as pastor for two years. Again he was placed on the Augusta District as Presiding Elder, and held that position in 1845, 1846, 1847, rendering his usual efficient service.

During this time we lived in the bounds of the district, and had ample opportunity to know the famous preacher who had now reached the meridian splendor of pulpit eloquence. His form, action, diction, are as vividly before our mind to-day as if we saw him yesterday. We heard him often on all sorts of occasions great and small—no occasion was too small, nor any too large for the wonderful preacher. The most powerful sermons preached by Bishop Pierce were delivered under unfavorable surroundings. If matters were dragging, the meeting deemed a failure; if hope was gone, and the harps of Zion hung on the willows, it was just such a juncture as this that brought out his reserved force. Could he be made to believe there was a crisis; that he stood in the Thermopylæ of a spiritual battle, oh! then he preached with Seraphic fire.

After three years on the district he was stationed in Columbus, Georgia, 1848; but he remained here but a few months, being elected to the Presidency of Emory College, Georgia. He accepted reluctantly, for preaching was his only congenial work; but Dr. Longstreet had resigned, and this young college demanded no ordinary man as his successor. He served the college three years and retired, when Dr. Means was elected, in 1851. Dr. Means served only a year; the late President was recalled and filled the Presidency till 1854 when he was elected to the Episcopacy. This election was in Columbus, Ga., May, 1854. Columbus was the home of his father and near kindred and friends; and it was in Georgia so many of his associates witnessed the ordination. There were no whisperings and misgivings when he was elected Bishop. He was elected on the first ballot; by common consent all eyes were turned

to him as the man best fitted to the high office. And no man who has filled this office has ever rendered more efficient service.

Possessing for most of his life a physical system almost perfect, very robust, full of zeal, all his time, talents and energy were consecrated to his holy work. Everywhere in the Connection he was admired and revered; his impress on the Church for fifty years has been wide and deep; and may it be as lasting as time.

We have had much association with Bishop Pierce in the work hardest to perform—the making of appointments. A man who is weak here is a failure as a Bishop, no matter what may be the measure of his pulpit power, or his social attractions. Nothing can be more difficult, nothing more delicate, than the assigning men to charges upon our plan. It is precisely a position where a feeble man is reduced to zero; at the mercy of every agency in and out of the Cabinet, his mind vexed and confused, he is likely to do things after the worst or best fashion according to the influence that directs him. The only safety of such a man is in throwing himself into the hands of his Cabinet where he will, upon the whole, find discreet guidance and be saved from serious blunders. A bold, arbitrary, self-willed Bishop is even more dangerous in this office than the brother of feebler grasp and volition. The system is liable to dreadful friction except in the hands of a wise man, a firm and resolute person determined to do right no matter as to consequences.

Our meetings with Bishop Pierce in cabinet work have been many, as he often presided in Georgia, and we have had a good long service as Presiding Elder. There was apparently little need for him to consult Presiding Elders in Georgia, as he had a large personal acquaintance. Relying too much on his own judgment and opinions, he sometimes made appointments not deemed judicious. But we have seen him called to act amid perplexities perfectly bewildering—we have heard him groan and sigh, have witnessed his patience and anxiety to meet emergencies wisely; and we do not find it in our mind to disparage his capacity of head or heart to fill his office in its most trying responsibilities. He was quick of perception, and readily saw the true situation, though he might be slow in finding the needed adjustment.

As a President, he dispatched business with commendable rapid-

ity, yet without any unseemly dictation or hurry. He was affable in the Chair; and having no great regard for technicalities, and being no stickler for rigid parliamentary law, business went on without much wrangling about order. The humblest man in Conference had his ear as quickly as the brother of high position. He was a good judge of men, and sometimes a severe one, but his opinion was usually vindicated by facts in the run of events.

Sometimes he seemed to have an unaccountable admiration for men of whom little could be said; and for these he spoke words of praise that sounded strangely in the ears of his brethren. There was in this matter some occult affinity not open, perhaps, to his own understanding. He was easily accessible to all brethren whether of high or low degree: there was nothing of tremor felt in approaching him, either in public or private affairs.

Bishop Pierce was never reckoned a close critical student: in learning he has often been surpassed. But he was a reader and thinker as his sermons clearly evinced. Sermons he never wrote at all, not even sketches; and hereby the Church has sustained great loss; nay, by this habit, he himself lost very much in pulpit efficiency in later years. He was a genius in oratory; it was no trouble for him to speak, much less than it was to write. His mind was so affluent he could preach on the shortest notice, and was always ready. Bishop Wightman said of Bishop Capers that he could preach impromptu as well as if he had two weeks to prepare. It was much this way with Bishop Pierce. Bishop Bascom had advised his brilliant brother to write, because he could not, in old age, produce *extempore* such sermons as he easily made forty years ago; and by writing in the vigor of life he would have his best productions in the evening of age. Similar views have been advanced by other able men, and all our capable young preachers would act wisely to weigh the observations. It is a fatal mistake for an ordinary man to make when he presumes that what a genius can do so easily he may also attempt to perform. Genius can do easily and quickly what a tamer mind can only do with difficulty, or cannot do at all.

Bishop Pierce appeared to greatest advantage in the pulpit—this was his throne, and here his sceptre elicited homage and admiration to the last degree. His voice in his prime had great compass and

s well controlled. His form was symmetrical, his entire appear-
ce commanding and attractive. About five feet ten inches, one
ndred and sixty pounds in weight, erect, very muscular, and
e from all nervousness, his presentation was of the highest type
manhood. When in repose his face was benignant and amiable
expression—when illumined with the light of thought and
iotion, nothing human could excite higher admiration. And the
aceful action when at a high pitch of impassioned declamation
th the flashing of the brilliant eye, these forces, taken altogether,
ire simply overwhelming. There were many occasions in his
e made memorable by his oratory. Wonderful was the speech
ide in New York at the Anniversary of the American Bible
ciety. This speech delivered before he reached middle life, gave
n a national reputation.

In the famous General Conference of 1844, when the Church
is divided, he was a conspicuous debater on the famous case of
shop J. O. Andrew. More elaborate and logical speeches were
ide on both sides, but no speech was so thrilling as his—none
oduced such a sensation. He was always prominent, though not
nspicuous in the proceedings of General Conference.

Bishop Pierce never figured much in literature: he wrote only
casional letters for the weekly Church papers. He failed to
alize fully what he might have done with the pen; if he had felt
d met this responsibility, the Church would have been much
her to-day in the fruits of his genius. He never wrote for
agazines and Reviews: the use of the pen was irksome to him.
or a short time he edited the *Southern Lady's Book*, a monthly
inted in Macon, Georgia, when he was President of the College.
ke all of its tribe, it had a short career, but it deserved a better
e. *Possibly*, a monthly magazine for ladies might now receive
more generous support, since Female Colleges have been estab-
hed until they may be numbered almost by the hundred. It is
ry little to the credit of the culture imparted in these pretentious
stitutions that so little literary taste is developed, and so few
iters of excellence among the vast throng of graduates. We are
en reminded of a sarcastic remark once made by Bishop Pierce,
at many of these colleges, so-called, "would deserve their repu-
on more, if their name was something else."

We hazard nothing in saying that Bishop Pierce will occupy decided prominence in the pages of history contemporary with his career. Few have excelled him in all the great elements necessary to make a leader and ruler among men; and none have surpassed him in the splendid gifts of oratory that have made fame in the generations of the past fifty years. Probably no man with such gifts ever lived who was so little concerned for honor and eminence. We were present at a conversation between Bishops Pierce and Marvin when this topic was slightly touched. Said Bishop Pierce: "Since the death of my mother I have felt no concern for honors and triumph; while she lived I enjoyed them on her account; for I thought the *pleasure afforded her* was some compensation for the great trouble had with me when a child." Did ever man utter a grander or more refined sentiment than was herein expressed?

Let us cease our contemplation of brilliant qualities and achievements, and turn our attention to the grander attributes of a real Christian character. Great men are not always wise and good; examples of virtue outlive and outshine even eloquence. Bishop Pierce was so soundly converted, so thoroughly changed, that the teachings concerning sanctification, as a second work, were not in accord with his judgment and experience. What advocates of the second blessing claimed as a standard and ideal of religious excellence, he had from the *first*, and always maintained? This we have heard him say; and where will a more rounded, robust, coherent life as a Christian be found? It is a great wrong done to a pure man to represent him, as has been done, as opposed to the high spiritual life taught by Wesley and the sainted Fletcher, albeit, it must be admitted his opinions and words did not exactly harmonize with the terms much in vogue in the early days of Methodism, and recently revived in current terminology. He made no loud and frequent profession of holiness, but lived it, and gave illustration of its truth and loveliness. It is not our purpose in these remarks to disparage brethren who are known as advocates and professors of sanctification—for them we entertain high respect. They may justly claim to stand on the platform of Wesleyan Methodism as it was made in the beginning. If there is any advantage in this they have it, and certainly are entitled to

exemption from the censure due to rash innovations. But they must be tolerant of differences on a subject of such transcendental cast that much room will always exist for variations in the exposition. It would be a woful day to the Church if all non-professors of sanctification were to be deemed as lacking in the essential graces necessary to salvation.

Bishop Pierce was foremost in the advocacy and support of all benevolent enterprises. His own benefactions were liberal and extended in every direction. Hence he accumulated but little property; though always living in comfort, he had little concern for anything extravagant. His heart was sympathetic in viewing the wants of his less favored brethren; and it was no unusual thing to find him on an errand of mercy for some preacher in deep distress.

In social life the Bishop was affable and cheerful, not a leading talker, but ready to contribute his share to the entertainment of company. He was also a good listener, a very necessary quality to make society pleasant. A man always ready to talk, impatient when addressed himself, eager to reply, is a great social bore. There are few men like Macaulay and Coleridge to whom every body desired to listen and gladly did so even when they monopolized conversation.

The Bishop was firm in his opinions and open, but asserted and defended them without any overbearing dogmatism. He was emphatically a man of the people, yet without even a tinge of demagoguery. They liked his simplicity, his unaffected manners, his affinities for things plain, and his ready condescension to men of low degree. Besides, there was in his preaching a freedom from abstruse themes beyond their comprehension—he did not affect philosophy, of which he knew little, and was at the utmost remove from offensive pedantry. His oratory was bold, impassioned, the rhetoric evolving metaphors as expressive and luminous as his piercing eyes. Never was there the slightest intimation of a doubt as to the verity of the doctrines he preached. These he took on dogmatic authority, and spent no force in combatting the specious objections of crafty minds. The Bishop was not given to controversy; very seldom, indeed, would he utter a sentence calculated to wound other Christians. Defective Methodists might hear fulminations that would make them quake with

fear and terror. He had no mission nor genius for settling the theological wrangles of the world. The themes selected by him were usually the staple doctrines of Christianity, on which he dwelt always with a solemnity and force that evinced their truth and vital importance. We never heard him speak from a quaint text, nor employ his time in seeking to extract meaning out of impenetrable obscurities in symbols and language.

Without claiming to be, or even aspiring to be, a revivalist distinctively, he often gave impulse to a meeting by a few soul-stirring sermons which led to victory. Deeply conscious of the reality of Christian experience himself, he had much fear (of late) that the Church had lowered its standard, and multitudes were led into the fold entirely destitute of saving grace. This was a matter that gave him trouble. He feared concessions and compromises had been made till the line between the Church and the world was very dim; and in some places it had evanished leaving no demarcation. Free from any objectionable asceticism, he yet declaimed fiercely against certain fashionable pleasures as utterly beyond religious toleration: the dance was his abhorrence.

It is proper to notice the Bishop's services in the cause of education. He was a Trustee of the State University at Athens, Georgia, and was an able and devoted son of his *Alma Mater*. Although a warm advocate of denominational colleges, he never allowed his zeal to make war on the noble institution founded and fostered by the State. Once he said in a public address: "Franklin College, like an eagle, sits gracefully on the hills by the side of the rolling Oconee, and blasted be the archer that would pluck a single feather from her pinions." There was room enough in Georgia for all the rival colleges; and all of them shared in his advocacy, and received impulse from his liberal views. No preacher of this day has been called oftener to preach and speak on college occasions; and his responses, freely given, imparted an impetus to education that makes the present generation largely his debtor.

We do not fully realize the great worth of the Bishop to the Church and country unless we count the aid to education proceeding from his presence and counsels on great public occasions, heightened by his many eloquent sermons and literary addresses to immense multitudes of people. He was nearly always present at the Com-

mencements of his beloved Wesleyan, at Macon; and he cherished this literary daughter with tender care and affection. What a joy for him to behold, in his old age, this lovely daughter full grown, invested with all the charms which grace and beauty can impart. The veneration of the child for the father, too, was deep and intense, exhibiting itself in many handsome tributes from year to year on the public stage.

Mr. Pierce was elected Vice-President of Transylvania University, Kentucky, in 1845, Dr. Henry B. Bascom being President. This position he never occupied. The degree of D. D. was conferred by this University on the distinguished preacher, then in the very zenith of his fame as a pulpit orator. At a later day he received the degree of LL. D., from some other institution. These honors were not his badges of distinction; in fact, a very small estimate was placed on such dignities by Bishop Pierce at any period of his life.

He was a man of such exalted worth that a college might feel itself honored in connecting his name and fame with its history. This probably explains his election to the Vice-Presidency of Transylvania, an institution at the time struggling against adverse winds, and making hard efforts to emerge from the clouds which hid its real worth and expected splendor. Had Bishop Pierce been moved by a vaulting ambition he would have gone to Transylvania to be next to Dr. Bascom, the most famous orator of the day. He preferred to preach; and nothing but an imperative call from his Georgia brethren could have turned him aside from this noble work.

His attitude towards education in the ministry was not of the advanced type. We have often been impressed with the belief that his weight was on the wrong side of this question. As no one of position has advocated a very high culture as a *sine qua non* in our ministry, it was useless to argue as if this calamity was near at hand. He himself believed in Church schools and colleges as important to real progress; but he seemed to fear that in the course of events there might be an undue estimate of ministerial culture tending to the diminution of high regard for spiritual endowments. He had seen deplorable weakness in Churches arrogant on account of learning; and had seen the world in commotion and

in religious progress moved by men of small culture. His inferences were not forced; and yet they were not just nor true. Methodism, from the first, was in the hands of learned men as chief directors, and would long since have come to naught but for such successors as Bishop Pierce and men like him. No great religious movement can persistently advance if it lack the propelling power of sanctified intelligence. An army without leaders is a rabble and mob—the ulterior force at last is the essential of success. Therefore, it is wise in the best sense to advance our ministry in culture; there is no need to fear that very many will attain to greatness, not too many for the imperative wants of Zion. If Methodism, as a spiritual force, should lose its vigor, and decay to lifeless formality, professional preaching might become the order of the day. This possible sad result is not to be averted by a low standard in the ministry, but rather by such power in the pulpit as will keep, not only common people in harmony with Methodism, but will hold, also, dominion over the higher classes of society. Our Church has the right record in the past, and we believe its schemes of education for the present and future are exactly in accord with her great mission in the world—to save mankind.

We close this tribute to the memory of our honored brother by saying, we have never known a man of fewer faults—have never seen a more rounded, harmonious character. There was in his make-up no sharp angles, no eccentricities—the bane of the Church; no morbid sentimentality, nothing incongruous with his high vocation and office. Universally honored, he deserved it, and the tribute of praise was from every grade of society. Living long, his whole life has been consecrated to the weal of mankind. Loved in life, lamented in death, he has gone to his destiny among the saints, having served God and his generation well. His sun went down serenely, nay, it turned its rays to a new clime where it is destined to no decline, nor shall it suffer any eclipse.

ABSOLUTE BEING—HOW KNOWN.

BY PROF. J. M. LONG, A. M., MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY.

We are told by the agnostic school of Hamilton that we cannot ow being in its essential nature, but only its phenomenal and ite manifestations. It is admitted that we know that Absolute ing exists as the necessary datum of science and religion and ich is, therefore, the most certain of all truths. But it is most utly maintained that it cannot be really known in its essential ture and that hence all real knowledge is confined to phenomena, ir empiric laws and relations.

The reply to be made is that we know being, either relative or solute, by knowing its qualities or attributes, and that when we ow these we really and truly know being itself. If it be replied at when it is said we cannot know being in its essential nature, is means being out of all finite and cognizable relations, then the ply is that we can know being as *existing* only by its making me impression on the mind. As to the *thing in itself* existing out all relations to the mind, this is a nonentity, and can hence have existence for thought whatever. By *Absolute* Being is not meant philosophy that which exists out of all cognizable relations, but at which does not depend on anything else for its existence, and ich is, therefore, the ground of all relative and finite existence. is Absolute Being, so far from being unknown and unknowable, s the fundamental and essential attribute of self-revelation, because is creative intelligene, as will be shown in a subsequent section. Then, the true position is that neither phenomena, nor attributes d being exist independently of each other. Phenomena, attri- tes or qualities, must be known along with their proper being, atever this may be. We can neither know being independently its properties or attributes, nor the attributes independently of ing, but must know them both together at one and the same time. it it is said that the mind is able to apprehend the idea of Abso- te Being, in only a vague and indefinite form. What is the dif- ence between the *definite* and *indefinite* in knowledge? By the finite is meant that which can be limited and defined by being pressed in the relations of the scientific understanding. If Abso-

lute Being could be thus expressed, or limited and defined, it would cease to be the absolute and infinite. Hence, by *indefinite*, as applied to Absolute Being, is meant the very thing contended for, namely, the universal, which as a totality contains in itself all limited and finite particulars. In the very nature of the case, the absolute and universal must be more vague and indefinite as posited in thought than the relative and particular. But it is none the less really and truly known on this account. Knowledge obtained by sense-perception can be expressed in the clear and exact definitions of the understanding. But when we leave the domain of the sensible world and advance into the higher regions of the supersensible and spiritual, we cannot take with us our line and compass of scientific thought—our analysis and synthesis, for the purpose of tracing out the metes and bounds of knowledge, and determining things in their full compass and extent. This is the sphere of philosophy and theology. This, no less real than the lower sphere of science, must be expressed not in exhaustive definitions, but in descriptions. Definitions, to be logical and scientific, always imply the existence of a larger somewhat under to which the thing defined belongs. But Absolute Being forming the highest *genus*, under which all nameable and definable things are arranged, in the very nature of the case does not itself admit of definition.

The indefinite must mean that which cannot be bounded or limited by thought. But science cannot dispense with the indefinite any more than philosophy and theology. The idea of *force*, of a *molecule*, and of *matter* itself is indefinite, yet there can be no physical science without these ideas. The indefinite in both science and philosophy may be apprehended, but not comprehended in its full import.

The descriptive terms which the mind is compelled to use in expressing its conceptions of Absolute Being do not mislead thought or involve contradictory ideas. The predicates applied to this idea do not exhaust the subject, but express only single phases of it, the true idea of which is that of the inexhaustible fulness ever manifesting or revealing itself in nature and Humanity. But that which as the fundamental category of philosophy gives a unity and explanation to all things must itself be inexplicable in this sense, that it cannot be embraced in any truth or principle more universal than

self. This must be the ultimate truth or postulate of thought, ie category of categories, which as the first principle of philosophy id theology cannot be embraced in any truth more ultimate than self. Absolute Being, then, is known in its perpetual and inexaustible manifestations, without human thought ever being able) fathom it in all the heights and depths of its meaning. While it ay be known truly and really so far forth as the limitations of uman thought allow this, there must ever remain depths which annot be fathomed.

But the agnostic endeavors to found an argument on the evolution of thought by which he would show that the idea of Absolute Being under the conception of a personal God must ultimately be xpelled from theology and religion. He shows how the idea of od has been a gradual development in the thought of man with egard to the attributes ascribed to him. He shows that there have een several stages in this development, such as *physiolatry* which dentified God with physical nature; *anthropomorphism* which dentified him with man, and *psychomorphism* which makes only an's intellectual or spiritual nature the true image of God. This ast stage which makes *mind* the archetype of nature, the agnostic ontends must be outgrown, just as the others have been. The hildish things of the race, like those of the nursery, must be laid side as vestiges of superstition. Hence, the agnostic tells us that he goal of thought to which we are advancing is an unknown God, oid of all attributes, such as thought, intelligence and volition.

Now, the agnostic is right in expecting a growth of knowledge, oth scientific and theological, in the future just as there has been n the past. But he is wrong in supposing that while knowledge hus grows into higher and fuller phases, there can be no ultimate ruth which has already reached its highest and final stage of devel-)pment. Evolution is not an endless process; it has been truly aid that trees do not grow up to heaven. There are certain fundamental ideas in science, philosophy and theology, such as quanity, motion, force, organism, mind and Absolute Being clothed vith the attributes of personality, which having developed into undamental categories of thought can undergo no further change. These are first truths which underlie all other truths, and which orm the logical basis of all science and philosophy. These logical

categories of thought may unfold into new determinations so that they may have in the future an increased content, but as fundamental categories of thought they cannot be evolved out of existence. A tree as a growing and unfolding organism may put forth new branches, while it remains identical with itself.

We cannot predicate evolution of primary truths and ideas in the same sense in which this is predicated of truths developed by experience. Primary and ultimate principles forming the essential structure of the mind are fixed and permanent. The only effect of developing thought on such ideas is to free them from foreign accretions and to bring them out into a clearer and fuller recognition in consciousness.

ABSOLUTE BEING KNOWN BY REASON OR INTUITION.

How can we know Absolute Being which does not belong to the sphere of sensible experience? This is one of the most important questions which can be asked in philosophy and theology. In considering how the mind arrives at a knowledge of ultimate reality, it is first of all necessary to recognize the fact that the soul has capacities rendering it conscious of grand truths which cannot be expressed in the forms of the conceptive understanding. The only philosopic difficulty which the mind encounters in giving a rational account of the method by which it arrives at a knowledge of the Absolute Being is to conceive how it transcends its individual subjectivity. But we know from conscious experience that the mind does actually do this—and that hence its power to do this is not only an incontestable fact, but also a necessary condition of all knowledge. Subject and object is the constant and indissoluble relation which ever asserts itself in thinking. We thus see that the mind does possess the wonderful power of rising to the idea of subject and object. But it cannot rest satisfied with the two poles of knowledge thus sundered. Impelled by the intuition that unity pervades the universe, it must unite in one all-embracing category those two halves of all relative and finite being. But the only category which can give unity to relative being in its separate manifestations *is* Absolute Being. Moreover, to unite in itself subjective being and objective being, it must be both subject and object within itself. But only a self-conscious being can be an object to itself. Thus

Absolute Being which gives unity to all finite and relative being is shown to possess personality, or self-consciousness. Thus it is seen that the mind has the power of transcending its own individual subjectivity, and of knowing that which is not itself; and if it can thus rise to the knowledge of relative being, there is no real difficulty in the way of its also rising to the knowledge of Absolute Being which unites in itself both those phases of existence.

When the mind thus ascends to the knowledge of Absolute Being and makes this the unity and explanation of all finite and relative being, it then attains to the ontological stage of thought. This is the reflective, philosophic phase of thought—the phase of intuition and reason, because it affirms an ultimate reason for the existence of the universe.

Hence, because Absolute Being transcends conception, it does not thence follow that it is unknowable. Whatever transcends sensible experience transcends conception. Our powers of conception are bounded by the limits of sensible experience, for the reason that conceptions are mental pictures or images formed out of sensible experiences. The unthinkable arises out of a combination of ideas which have no basis in sensible experience. But the unthinkable, in the sense of the inconceivable, may not be unknowable. This is the false assumption of agnosticism. Conception does not exhaust the cognitive powers of the mind. The mind, also, has other powers, as sources of knowledge, known as reason, faith, or intuition. When, therefore, it is said that Absolute Being is unthinkable, all that can be meant is that it cannot be presented as a picture or image to the mind. Such knowledge is too high for the conceptive understanding, which deals only with the sensible, the relative and the finite. When it is denied that the idea of ultimate reality can be expressed in the forms of the understanding, or logical intellect, the inference meant to be drawn is, that such an idea lies utterly beyond the reach of the human mind, and can hence have for us no practical and regulative value. Thus the understanding is made the test and arbiter of all truth. With the realist, all knowledge must be sensible and demonstrated knowledge. But the ultimate ideas and postulates of realistic science belong to the idealistic sphere of intuition or reason, and hence, as ultimates, cannot be made matters of logical demonstra-

tion. These constitute the fundamental principles of science upon which the superstructure of knowledge is reared, and by which this superstructure is enabled to assume the form of demonstrated knowledge. Even in literary criticism the understanding is not an infallible guide. The higher powers of intuition and feeling are supreme in the realms of art. DeQuincy says: "The mere understanding, however useful and indispensable, is the meanest faculty in the human mind, and the most to be distrusted; and yet the great majority of people trust to nothing else, which may do for ordinary life, but not for philosophic purposes. If, then, the higher powers of intuition and feeling have to be called into exercise to enable us to apprehend and enjoy the artistic creations of genius, how much more is this necessary when we come to the study of the mind of God, as manifested in nature and humanity. Thus we see that the possibilities of conception do not bound the possibilities of existence and knowledge."

We have knowledge in the two-fold form of *representation* and *idea*. As to which one of those forms knowledge is received into the mind, depends altogether upon the mind's relation to it. If a material object is immediately present to the mind, impressing the senses, it is known as *perception*. If the object is one lying beyond the sphere of sense, which can be figured in thought by means of images or concepts, it is then known by *representation*, in the form of conception or imagination. But these modes of cognition do exhaust the intellectual powers of the mind. As already said, we have intuition in the form of faith and reason. Hence, the mind has knowledge, not only through representation, which is scientific knowledge, but also knowledge in the form of *idea*. It is a great error in philosophy to confound representation with reason, the image-forming power with the idealizing power.

In the elaboration of science, the senses furnish the crude materials in the form of facts. These are compared, analyzed and classified into system by means of fundamental concepts or categories. These mental processes, by which science is elaborated, are usually termed the *understanding*. The understanding as our scientific faculty looks outward, and deals with phenomena or sensible manifestations. But the mind, by reflection, turns inward upon itself, and studies its own processes, and thus seeks to dis-

cover the ultimate grounds of truth and knowledge. This is the sphere of philosophy and theology, the mental organs of which are *reason* and *faith*. Faith and reason are intuitive powers of the mind, which apprehend necessary and universal truth directly and immediately, and not indirectly by a discursive process of thought. But these higher powers of intuition do not act independently of the lower mental faculties. The mind acts as a unit, in which all its faculties unite and co-operate together to form one organic spiritual structure.

Faith and reason, as the two co-ordinate species, fall under the common and wider designation of *intuition*. By *intuitions are meant the primary and necessary truths which spontaneously spring up in the mind, and which form the primary data in all knowledge.* But *intuitions*, when used as the name of the mental faculties themselves, mean the fundamental principles, the rules or regulative laws of thought, according to which the mind acts in acquiring knowledge. Hence, the intuitions are implied in the action of all the other mental faculties, and regulate the forms of knowledge. The intuitions act spontaneously. These are given to, thoughts are given by, the conscious action of the mind. We apprehend the necessary and universal ideas of *space, time, substance* and *being*, relative and absolute, not through the discursive processes of thought, or, in other words, by the logical processes of the understanding, but by intuition, or reason. Hence, the idea of Absolute Being does not admit of logical demonstration. Intuitive and ultimate truths cannot be demonstrated, because they are the primitive data on which the development and activity of the understanding are based. This idea is revealed to consciousness directly and immediately, *i. e.*, intuitively. This idea may be presented to the mind under symbols taken from nature, as *power, force, cause;* but it is the internal consciousness, or intuition of the Absolute, which gives a meaning to all the symbols, by which it is presented to the mind. "No system of sensible signs, neither the magnificent symbolism of nature nor the artificial symbolism of human language, can carry the knowledge of God to a being destitute of the innate consciousness of God." We do not, first of all, divine the idea of God from nature, but we take the idea of Absolute Being as creative divine power, spontaneously springing up within the sphere of

consciousness, and project this out into external nature, which thus finds its unity and interpretation by this idea of First Cause, or God.

ABSOLUTE BEING KNOWN AS FIRST CAUSE.

The scientific idea of cause is necessarily correlated in thought with the idea of one supreme, self-existent and creative cause. Science deals with secondary causes and proximate origins; but these need to be referred to the one primary cause of all things. Science aims to formulate the laws of sequence, among phenomena, by discovering the causes or forces to which these, as effects, are due. But these finite causes, successions and laws, impressed on the phenomenal world, imply the existence of, and absolute First Cause in, which all secondary causes and laws have their origin. "It is not easy to perceive, indeed, how modern science, which makes its inductions, concerning natural forces, from observation of their manifestations, and arrives at generalizations of different forces, can, after observation of nature, avoid the generalization of an intelligent mental force, linked in harmonious association and essential relations with other forces, but leading and constraining them to higher aims of evolution."—*Maudsley.*

Thus, not only the facts of the subjective world of consciousness, but also the induction of physical facts and the unification of the laws of nature, through the correlation of forces, lead to the idea of a First Cause. The idea of ultimate, creative cause, thus asserted to consciousness, leads to the *dynamic* conception of the universal, scientific and philosophic thought, necessarily leads to what is now termed the dynamic theory of the universe. Both subjective and objective being, in a final analysis, lead down to the idea of force, or causal energy. "I know myself," says Hamilton, "as a force in energy, the not-self as a counterforce in energy." Hence the middle term or category, which reconciles and unites within itself both these poles of being, must be the ultimate force or absolute cause. When, therefore, we speak of Absolute Being, we do not mean something resting in quiet inactivity behind an impenetrable veil, which gives no signs or manifestations of itself. This should be conceived as the inexhaustible fullness of power and energy, the essential nature of which is creative activity. That which

is essentially creative activity, must also make a continuous revelation of itself, in manifold ways, in nature and humanity.

Secondary scientific causes seem to those accustomed to take a theological view of natural phenomena, to place God at a remote distance from the world, which thus appears wholly left to the government of mechanical causes. But the dynamic theory of nature brings back again the consciousness of God, "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." The idea of forces operating in different orders of phenomena, necessarily leads to the recognition of one absolute, creative force, as the fountain of all the energy which pulsates in nature. "Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the earth."

Again, the idea of absolute force, or cause, is identical with substantial existence. We know phenomena as effects which are ever losing their identity, while the idea of cause we recognize as referring to real, substantial and enduring existence which does not lose its identity. True cause we recognize as *substance* possessing power. The same idea is taught in the modern scientific doctrine of the *persistence* of force. Spencer takes the position that Absolute Being is known and symbolized by force. This cannot be any particular force, but must be that which makes all particular forces. These particular forces, as science knows them, do not persist, but are ever losing their identity by passing into other forms of energy. This absolute force (or ultimate), which ever persists, which never loses its identity, thus becomes identified with the idea of self-existent substance.

ABSOLUTE BEING KNOWN AS POSSESSING THE ATTRIBUTES OF PERSONALITY.

The absolute and ultimate force or cause, which makes or determines all relative causes and forces, must be a self-determined power or energy, for the reason that, being absolute and ultimate, there is nothing beyond to determine it. Being absolute and ultimate, it is self-existent, self-supporting, and must, therefore, possess the attribute of freedom or self-movement and self-activity. Hence, Absolute Being, as the fundamental category in philosophy and theology, must possess the attributes of personality, such as intelligence, reason and will—self-consciousness—in other words

it must be mind, because this alone possesses freedom, self-movement and self-determination. Thus the dynamic theory of the world, made familiar by modern science, leads directly to the idea of absolute mind or personalty as the divine, self-existent and self-active power immanent in nature. To have freedom, or self-activity, there must be First Cause uncaused—a *causa sui*, which acts within and through and by itself. There cannot be an endless succession of causes, but a First Cause, which in the fullness of its freedom and creative power, called the universe into being. The intuition of reason conducts the mind to the idea of Absolute Being, as possessing self-determining and creative power. There can be no idea of true and efficient causation without this conception of an absolute and self-acting Power. This appears from the fact that the idea of cause and effect proceeds from, and is grounded on, the intuition of *substance* exerting power. An eternal succession of causes and effects is absurd, a contradiction in terms. "All succession is finite and temporal, capable of enumeration, and therefore cannot be eternal." The mind cannot think an endless *recursus*, ever traveling back from effect to cause without end. The intuitions of reason demand a First Cause uncaused, and which is hence the cause of all other causes; or else there is left to thought nothing but an indefinite succession of effects without any true and efficient cause—a chain composed of many links hanging without any staple to support it.

This intuition of reason, demanding a First Cause, as already said, conducts the mind, not to an endless succession of causes and effects, for this is temporal and relative, but to substantial being possessing power, and which ever remains identical with itself. The manifestations of this absolute power, as these are made known in the world-drama, such as the personal attributes of intelligence, become a limited and finite manifestation—necessarily so for us to apprehend them. But the divine personality, putting forth this creative energy, must be conceived as the inexhaustible and absolute fulness, working from everlasting to everlasting. The predication of personality of Absolute Being does not imply, as has been said, any contradiction in terms. Personality being a spiritual unity cannot be expressed as mathematical quantity, in the finite relations of space and time, without manifest absurdity.

Hence, finite and infinite personality are evidently absurd phrases when used in a mathematical or quantitative sense, as referring to space and time. The mind invariably runs into antinomies, or contradiction of thought, whenever it attempts to express personality in the quantitative relations of space and time. Personality, in the completeness of its spiritual unity, has a subjective and absolute existence, independent of the finite relations of space and time. The only infinitude than can pertain to the sphere of spiritual existence, the infinitude of thought, of love, of goodness, is not that which has no element of finitude or determination in it, but that which is determined by nothing external or foreign to itself, that which, in the object of thought or love, only realizes itself or the latent richness of its own being."—*Caird.*

It is thus in Absolute Being, clothed in the attributes of personality, such as intelligence, will, reason and goodness, that we realize the true idea of God. By a necessary law of thought, which requires us to think of substance in connection with phenomena, of an intelligent law-giver in connection with law, and of a personal Creator in connection with creation, the mind is conducted to the idea of God existing and acting in the absolute fulness of his being, independently of the limitations of space and time.

Again, we know an inner spiritual being as this comes under the eye of consciousness. But in knowing this internal subjective being as the abiding substratum of thought, feeling and volition, we also know, along with this external, objective being which exists independently of our conscious self. We thus know subjective and objective being together as the ever present and indissoluble poles of all thinking. These we know not as mere abstract ideas, but in their concrete realities and manifestations. But the essential nature of knowledge consists in embracing its objects within those modes of being which the knower shares in common with the being known. Everything known by the mind must be brought within the circle of his own conscious personality. We cannot know the unintelligible. Hence the category of our own conscious personality entitles us to lay down the comprehensive principle that whatever we intuitively know as true of our own subjective being, has its counterpart, or corresponding truth, in the external objective sphere of being. Thus, by the conscious-

ness of personality, we know cause within; then we also know cause without; we know substance within, then we also know substance without; we know mind endowed with intellectual, moral and spiritual attributes within, then we also know mind, or personality, endowed with those same attributes without. Thus in the category of a divine and absolute personality, do we find all the modes and manifestations of finite and relative being, under the two-fold aspect of subject and object adequately represented.

It is contrary to the true idea of personality to conceive of it as something unknown and unknowable. Personality, either relative and human or absolute and divine, has, essentially, the attribute of self-revelation, for the reason that personality is at every moment self-activity; and that which is perpetually and essentially active, must of necessity reveal itself in the results of such activity. The results of this self-determined and perpetual activity are *manifestations*, or revelations of this divine personality.

But we may go another step farther, and say that not only may one personality know another, either human or divine, but personality or mind can know nothing but personality or mind. One may say that we know *matter*, and surely this is not personality or mind. But when we come to take account of this knowledge, and to see what it really is that we do, we find that our idea of matter resolves itself into the idea of *force*. As to force, we know this directly and intuitively as conscious *will* putting forth energy, which is identical with personality. We know external and material nature, and can express it in the categories of science, because it is manifestation of mind, and has stamped upon it the marks of intelligence, system, order and law. A universe, without *an intelligent* unity of plan and purpose, would not be a universe in any true sense of the term. Nature is intelligible, and can be expressed in the terms of science, such as *law*, *system*, *order* and *method*, because it is a manifestation of a creative intelligence, which works according to intelligent plan and purpose. The laws of nature can only be understood by viewing them as expressions of the divine ideas. "That which contemplated objectively, or as existing in the world without, we call a law; the same contemplated subjectively, or as existing only in the mind, is an idea."—*Coleridge.*

The unities and classifications of science are formed by the discovery of those laws or ideas existing in nature.

ABSOLUTE BEING THE FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORY IN ONTOLOGY.

What the several lower categories are in their respective sciences, Absolute Being is in ontology. This is the science of being, or of ultimate and essential truth, as intuitively apprehended. As Cosmology includes all those natural sciences, which treat of the phenomenal world as manifested under the finite relations of space and time, so Ontology treats of those intuitive truths relating to substance, being, and ultimate principles—the ultimate nature and constitution of things in themselves in both their material and spiritual manifestations. Ontology has to do with being in its fundamental determinations and necessary laws. Aiming to find the grounds of the certitude of knowledge, it must needs go into the realm of mind. Having established its subjective principles, it raises the question of the relation of the subjective and objective world, and of the relations of these to time and space. While dealing with the super-sensible, it does not neglect the sensible facts and phenomena of the empiric world. But those empiric facts and phenomena may not only be a study and source of knowledge in themselves, but may also furnish us grounds of inference to something out of themselves.

"Although, therefore, existence be revealed to us only in phenomena, and though we can have, therefore, only a relative knowledge, either of mind or of matter, still, by inference and analogy, we may legitimately attempt to rise above the mere appearance which experience and observation afford. Thus, for example, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are not given us as phenomena, as objects of immediate knowledge; yet, if the phenomena actually given, do necessarily require, for their rational explanation, the hypothesis of immortality and of God, we are assuredly entitled, from the existence of the former, to infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science conversant about all such inferences of unknown being, from its known manifestations, is called Ontology, or Metaphysics proper."—*Hamilton Met.*, *p.* 88.

Hence the central problem of Ontology is to demonstate the possibility of passing from phenomena to noumena, or substantial existence, and to thus unite both the subjective world of thought and the objective world of things in the unity of a single all-embracing principle. In the solution of this great problem phi-

losophy and theology find their ultimate goal, and thought rises to the knowledge of Absolute Being, or of God, which is thus shown to be the absolute unity of the world.

THE SONNET.

By Rev. Geo. Wms. Walker, A. M., Professor in Paine Institute.

THE BOOK OF THE SONNET: Robert Brothers. Boston.

AFTERNOONS WITH THE POETS: Harper & Bros. New York.

ENGLISH SONNETS IN LECTURES ON THE BRITISH POETS: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. Philadelphia.

THE POETICAL WORKS OF WM. WORDSWORTH: Riverside Edition. Houghton, Osgood & Co. Boston.

THE POETICAL WORKS OF ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING: James Miller. New York.

HAYNE'S POEMS: D. Lothrop & Co. Boston.

Professor Reid is somewhat fanciful, perhaps, when he asks: "May it not be that the wealth of several different quarters of the globe was laid under contribution to be coined in the diminutive mould of the Sonnet?" It would indeed be "a singular boast for anything so humble and unassuming." Yet, after all, there is reason for his theory—diffidently called a fancy by himself—"that one graft was brought by the Arab from the East, and another from the region of the Goth, and that these grew into one growth under the genial influence of an Italian or Sicilian sun." Though, in its origin, the Sonnet be an exotic, yet it has been successfully naturalized into English literature.

However, there can be no doubt that, in a large measure, we owe the Sonnet to Petrarca, since, as Leigh Hunt tells us, he "did for the Sonnet, for its readers, and for his own special renown as its examplar," that which made it famous. He first freed it from "the crudities and metaphysics of preceding times, which the lyrical poetry of Dante himself had not thoroughly outgrown; "he

gave to it a music superior to Dante's; he threw into it "beauties of style and modulation obvious to all," besides a charm "of which his countrymen only are thoroughly qualified to speak, and of which they always speak with delight;" he rendered the Sonnet popular by its abundance, and "such a favorite with women by its life-long praises of one object, and so welcome to the best of their lovers for the dignity of its author's character, and his exaltation of the passion, that it necessitated a like refinement in the love-making of his countrymen in general." Petrarcan surely is the Sonnet, since he who sang so warmly of his Laura, wrote during thirty-two years not more than three hundred sonnets, thus taking time to "let a sonnet lie polishing at leisure in his mind for months together, like a pebble on the seashore."

The Sonnet made its first appearance in English dress in the reign of Henry VIII. It was a translation of one of Petrarca's, and by "the noble-minded Sir Thomas Wyatt, who, in several of his poems, had the courage to aim the most cutting side-blows at the cruelty and effeminacy of that brutal tyrant." It is "as rough as if poetry itself had just been born in the woods among the ruggedest of the sylvan gods." But Wyatt's young friend, Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, gave us the first English sonnets possessing anything like Italian music. At thirty years of age he was executed by order of the tyrant he and Sir Wyatt hated. Probably one of his sonnets was the secret cause of his death. Sir Thos. Wyatt, the Earl of Surrey, and Sir Philip Sidney are "the knightly and accomplished men" who introduced the Sonnet in England. From their time, until of late, the illegitimate Sonnet introduced by them has been the pattern followed by English poets. To William Wordsworth, above all others, belongs the praise of abundantly vindicating the powers of the English language in the legitimate Sonnet.

The Sonnet is the one strictly-specialized form of stanza in English. Sydney Lanier calls it "the primordial form of English lyric poetry." There can be only fourteen lines in a sonnet. Each line is composed of "iambic 5's, rhymed according to fixed rules." There are two sets of rules governing respectively the legitimate Sonnet and the illegitimate Sonnet. The Italian, or the legitimate Sonnet, so called, since it obeys the laws which have prevailed

in Italy since Petrarca's time, is divided into two distinct portions, major and minor, each of which is subdivided into two parts. "The major portion consists of eight lines, called the *octave*, which possess but two rhymes; the minor consists of six lines, called the *sestette*, which possess never more than three rhymes." The subdivision of these eight lines are called *quatrains*, while the subdivisions of the six lines are called *terzettes*. The two rhymes of the major division almost invariably occupy the same places; the two or three rhymes of the minor may be varied at pleasure, but seldom close with a couplet." That is the first, fourth and eighth of the major rylime; the second, third, sixth, seventh of the same division rhyme. While as to the lines of the minor, when two rhymes are used, the rhymed lines alternate, as ninth, eleventh and thirteenth; the tenth, twelfth and fourteenth. Or, when three rhymes are used, the ninth, tenth and eleventh rhyme respectively with the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth. Strictly, these two forms of the Sonnet only are entitled to the name legitimate or "proper." All other forms constitute the illegitimate Sonnet.

See these technicalities of prosody exemplified in two exquisite Sonnets; the first from Wordsworth, the second from Paul Hamilton Hayne:

COMPOSED ON WESTMINSTER BRIDGE, SEPTEMBER 3rd, 1803.

Earth has not anything to show more fair:
Dull would he be of soul who could pass by
A sight so touching in its majesty.
This city now doth like a garment wear
The beauty of the morning; silent, bare,
Ships, towers, domes, theatres, and temples lie
Open unto the fields, and to the sky,
All bright and glittering in the smokeless air.
Never did sun more beautifully steep,
In his first splendor, valley, rock, or hill;
Ne'er saw I, never felt, a calm so deep!
The river glideth at his own sweet will:
Dear God! the very houses seem asleep,
And all that mighty heart is lying still.

Here is the other, showing the arrangement of the terzettes, when there are three rhymes:

"PENT IN THIS COMMON SPHERE."

Pent in this common sphere of sensual shows,
I pine for beauty; beauty of fresh mien,
And gentle utterance, and the charm serene,
Wherewith the hue of mystic dream-land glows;
I pine for lulling music, the repose
Of low-voiced waters, in some realm between
The perfect Adenne, and this clouded scene
Of love's sad loss and passion's mournful throes;
A pleasant country, girt with twilight calm,
In whose fair heaven a moon of shadowy round
Wades through a fading fall of sunset rain;
Where drooping lotus-flowers, distilling balm,
Gleam by the drowsy streamlets, sleep hath crown'd,
While Care forgets to sigh, and Peace hath balsamed Pain.

There once prevailed a logical notion with scholarly and conventional critics, that the business of the first quatrain is to state the proposition of it; of the second quatrain, to prove the proposition; of the first terzette to confirm it, and of the second terzette, to draw the conclusion." The Sonnet was too suitable a resource for expressing any and every emotion to be bound by any such pedantic formalities. So that, finally, it obeyed no laws in general but those that are essential to good poetry, with the exception of such as were necessary to render it what it was, and to secure for it that completeness, and that freedom from blemish, which alone can render a small thing precious." Some still claim that there should be a change of sentiment on passing from the major portion to the minor portion. This, however, is more fanciful than authoritative. "It may be remarked," says Lanier, "that every sonnet, whether legitimate or illegitimate, ought to be really a little drama, with every line converging directly upon some special idea in the last two lines, like rays of light into a focus."

There is a definite rationale for these two divisions, as well as for the fourteen lines. Leigh Hunt, in *The Book of the Sonnet*, states the reason:

"A sonnet is, or ought to be, a piece of music as well as of poetry; and as every lover of music is sensible of the division, even of the smallest air, into two parts, the second of which is the consequent or necessary demand of the first; and as these parts consist of phrases and cadences, which have similar sequences and demands of their own, so the composition called a sonnet, being a long air of melody, becomes naturally divided into two different strains, each of which is

subdivided in like manner; and as quatrains constitute the one strain, and terzettes the other, we are to suppose this kind of musical demand the reason why the limitation to fourteen lines became, not a rule without a reason, but an harmonious necessity."

While Mark Pattison, in his *Introduction to Milton's Sonnets*, elaborates the reason for only fourteen lines:

"The Sonnet, being designed to hold a single thought, mood, image or sentiment, must have a length sufficient, and not more than sufficient, for an exposition of such sentiment. . . . The limit is given by the average capacity of human apprehension. A period consists of one predication. . . . If the side, or secondary clauses become too numerous, they interfere with the unity of the sentence; the attention is withdrawn from the central object, and the impression broken. . . . The limit of the sonnet is imposed by the average duration of an emotional mood. . . . The thrill to be raised by the sonnet is more enduring [than the effect of the repartee and *bon mot*], yet it is too tense to be sustained long. . . . It would be rationalizing in excess to maintain that every mood or motive requires just fourteen lines for its presentment. . . . May we go so far as to say that fourteen lines is the average number which a thought requires for its adequate embodiment, before attention must collapse?"

It was Edgar Allan Poe who said no poem should be long. Emerson says: "It does not need that a poem should be long. Every word was once a poem." "Rare Old Ben" puts it finely:

> It is not growing like a tree,
> In bulk, doth make man perfect be;
> Nor standing long an oak, three hundred year,
> To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sere.
> A lily of a day
> Is fairer far in May,
> Although it fall that night,
> It was the plant and flower of light.
> In small proportions we just beauties see,
> And in short measures life may perfect be.

Henry Timrod, gifted but fated child of poesy, says: "Thought is independent of space; and it would hardly be exaggeration to say that the poet-minister of thought enjoys an equal independence. To-day, his stature reaches the sky; to-morrow, he will shut himself up in the bell of a tulip, or the cup of a lily." While Prof. Henry Reed, in his Lectures on the British Poets, defending "the Sonnet's scanty plot of ground" against the complaint of the narrowness of its limits, has these fine words:

"If a writer be indeed worthy of his calling, if he do indeed belong to that creative class who make the world they inhabit, what need has he of calling for

more ground? Is it not enough that he has a spot to rise from? The peak of a broken crag, or the point of a blasted branch, would be sorry quarters indeed for a bear or a buffalo; but the majesty of the eagle claims no wider sovereignty for his footing, when he is springing from the earth to bathe his wings in the flood of the sun. Or, when the lark soars, like a sick man's hope, to meet the coming dawn, the home he leaves is wrapped in the little circumference of tuft of grass. To these the spirit of true poetry is kindred."

While Wordsworth, the true restorer of the Sonnet to the English language, sings:

Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room;
And hermits are contented with their cells;
And students with their pension citadels;
Maids at the wheel, the weaver at his loom,
Sit blithe and happy; bees, that soar for bloom
High as the highest peak of Furness Fells,
Will murmur by the hour in foxglove bells:
In truth, the prison unto which we doom
Ourselves no prison is: and hence to me,
In sundry moods, 'twas pastime to be bound
Within the sonnet's scanty plot of ground:
Pleased if some souls (for such there needs must be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,
Should find brief solace there, as I have done.

The fitness of the form of the Sonnet as a vehicle for a serious and lofty emotion, but not so varied as to require the ode for its expansion, was early perceived and eagerly embraced. The opportunity for "distilling strong emotion into drops," was gladly caught at by all the poets. The fugitive nature of the poetic mood is the justification of the Sonnet; it being impossible for hearer and poet to sustain intense emotion for any length of time. "Every mood of mind can be indulged in a sonnet," says Leigh Hunt, "every kind of reader appealed to. You can make love in a sonnet, you can laugh in a sonnet, you can lament in it, can narrate or describe, can rebuke, can admire, can pray."

Leigh Hunt gives the five following advantages peculiar to the sonnet, which naturally tend to make it a favorite with every one:

"1st. That, with the exception of one class of subjects—the dithyrambical, which disdains all order and bounds—there is none which is unsuitable to it—whether light or serious, the humblest or the most exalted.

"2d. That, being short, it occupies so much the less time either in reading or composing.

"3d. That its brevity adds to its force, and so makes it the easiest to remember.

"4th. That, being restricted to certain limits, a sonnet complete in other respects, is of necessity complete in all, and thus gratifies the workman with a consciousness of his having done something finished, however little; and

"5th. That a single sonnet, in consequence, may procure the writer a repute, and win a duration which circumstances beyond his control might otherwise have put out of the question.

Though "this favorite of the Italian language" be of small compass, yet it requires much studied skill to reach perfection. Before one scorns the sonnet as a trivial affair, easily to be dashed off, and of little force, let him turn to the *Book of the Sonnet* and read the *thirteen* rules that govern its construction.

"1st. It must be legitimate.

"2d. It must confine itself to one leading idea, thought or feeling.

"3d. There must be no sense of irrelevancy or insufficiency to the reader's mind.

"4th. It must not have a speck of obscurity.

"5th. It must not have a forced rhyme.

"6th. It must not have a superfluous word.

"7th. It must not have a word too little—an omission for the sake of convenience.

"8th. It must not have a word out of its place.

"9th. It must have no very long word, or any other that tends to lessen the number of accents, and so weaken the verse.

"10th. Its rhymes must be properly varied and contrasted, and not beat upon the same vowel.

"11th. Its music, throughout, must be as varied as it is suitable.

"12th. It must increase, or, at all events, not decline in interest, to its close.

"13th. The close must be equally impressive and unaffected, not epigrammatic, unless where the subject warrants it, or where point of that kind is desirable, but simple, conclusive and satisfactory."

And in connection with these rules let the would-be scorner of this dainty piece of work, turn to the same *Book*, and read the many names indicating a variety of forms of the Sonnet: Sonnets with *Codas* or *Tails; Duodenary Sonnets; Mute Sonnets; Continuous* or *Iterating Sonnets; Answering Sonnets; Retrograde Sonnets; Chained* or *Linked Sonnets; Interwoven Sonnets; Crowning Sonnets; Comic Sonnets* as exhibited in the *Caudated* or *Tailed Sonnets.*

What a veritable Proteus it becomes in Wordsworth's imagination! A *Key,* wherewith "Shakespeare unlocked his heart;" a

small Lute, whose melody "gave ease to Petrarch's wound;" a *Pipe* which "thousand times did Tasso sound;" "a gay myrtle *Leaf*" which glittered

> Amid the cypress with which Dante crowned
> His visionary brow;—

"a glow-worm *Lamp*" whose ray "cheered mild Spenser; "the *Thing*" in Milton's hand "became a *Trumpet*, whence he blew soul-animating strains." While Deshler in his charming book, *Afternoons with the Poets*, calls it a diamond, because, "like the diamond, it is brilliant, compact, the most perfect when it is the most skillfully cut and most highly polished, and the most precious when its rude richness is the most elaborately perfected by art. And, finally, to complete the simile, the perfect Sonnet is as rare as the perfect diamond."

To recur to the form of the Sonnet. The one that varies most from the usual frame-work of the Sonnet, is the Caudated or Tailed Sonnet. It consists of the prescribed fourteen lines, but possesses an unbounded privilege of adding to their number. The *coda*, or tail, is joined to the fourteen lines by one or more joints of eight syllables, rhyming with its precursor, and two others of the customary length rhyming by themselves. The tail is usually shorter than the body, though sometimes much longer. The author of the *Book of the Sonnet*, says: "The inventor of this class of sonnets was moved by a genuine comic impulse. Humor is by its nature overflowing. The writer felt a disposition to run out of bounds; the bounds themselves produce a temptation to break them, the very restriction thus becomes a warrant for the license; and the form of the grave Sonnet was preserved, in order to enhance the gayety of its violation."

England possesses only two Sonnets of this structure; and strangely enough, held one of them in possession for two hundred years without knowing it as a Sonnet. It does seem curious that the stately Milton should give us the first specimen of the comic Sonnet in English. However, he jests very fiercely, and the stranger-sonnet "becomes very solemn in his company." In it he attacks the Presbyterians of the Long Parliament. It commences with:

"Because ye have thrown off your Prelate Lord;"

and closes with the familiar line:

"New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large."

This Sonnet proves that Milton went to Italian models for his sonnets, since he follows the strict rules for the construction of the *coda*, which are as precise as those of the body. It may consist of one or any greater number of tercets. "The first line of each tercet must be shorter than, but bear a definite proportion to, the length of the line in the body of the sonnet; *e. g.*, if the Sonnet be in decasyllable lines, the first of the tercet must be a six-syllable line. The first dwarf line must rhyme with the fourteenth line of the sonnet itself, but the rhyme in the remaining lines of the tercet must be different from any which have been employed in the sonnet." This form was introduced in the fifteenth century, passed out of fashion in the sixteenth, and was revived in the seventeenth. Milton may have seen some of these burlesque sonnets in Florence. Strangest of all, Milton uses a word in this sonnet which, while however proper for the indignant poet to use in his day, yet since "ladies, it is hoped, as well as gentlemen, will read the book," causes Leigh Hunt to exclude this sonnet from his "Book of the Sonnet," the objectionable word being "no longer admitted into good company." "A similar objection, oddly enough," he regrets, "applies to the only other sonnet of the kind in our language." Edgerton Webbe, "whose wit, scholarship, and rare powers of reflection would have rendered him one of the ornaments of his nation, had death not cut him down in his youth, is the author of the sonnet that shares the company of Milton's alone. Leaving the blank to be filled by three monosyllables, here is the sonnet as a specimen of the *coda*:

TO A FOG.

Hail to thee, Fog! most reverend worthy Fog!
  Come in thy full-wigged gravity; I much
  Admire thee. Thy odd dulness hath a touch
Of true respectability. The rogue
That calls thee names (a fellow I could flog)
  Would beard his grandfather, and trip his crutch:
  But I am dutiful, and hold with such
As deem thy solemn company no clog,
Not that I like to travel best *incog*.

To pounce on latent lamp-posts, or to clutch
The butcher in my arms, or in a bog
Pass afternoons; but while through thee I jog,
I feel I am true English, and no Dutch,
Nor French, nor any other foreign dog
That never mixed his grog
Over a sea-coal fire a day like this,
And bid thee scowl thy worst, and found it bliss,
And to himself said, "Yes,
"Italia's skies are fair, her fields are sunny,
"But, . . . ! Old England for my money."

Leigh Hunt's chivalrous deference to the ladies would deprive us of that exquisite touch Sterne gives to Uncle Toby at the death scene of LeFevre, as well as those fine words occasioned by "My Uncle Toby's" oath. Or again, this deference would take from us that aggravating predicament of Master Bultitude, in *Vice Versa*, when the dancing-master, Mr. Burdekin, insisted on the young gentleman dancing the hornpipe. But, most of all, we learn to love the Sonnet for its tender associations, and as a bond between kindred souls. "One touch of *sonnet* makes *all parties* kin."

Sidney Lanier says: "During the last three hundred years, whenever an English poet has had any personal and holy matters which he could not refrain from putting into form, he has mostly adopted the sonnet—one or other species of it, for that form. Each sonnet is like a letter from the poet to you marked 'confidential' at the top."

Charles Lamb—gentle Elia—with "affections warm as sunshine, free as air," has associated the loss of childhood's innocency forever with the sonnet:

We were two pretty babes, the youngest she,
The youngest and the loveliest far, I ween,
And INNOCENCE her name. The time has been,
We two did love each others' company;
Time was, we two had wept to have been apart.
But when, by show of seeming good beguiled,
I left the garb and manners of a child,
And my first love for man's society,
Defiling with the world my virgin heart—
My loved companion dropped a tear, and fled,
And hid in deepest shades her awful head.
Beloved, who shall tell me where thou art—
In what delicious Eden to be found—
That I may seek thee the wide world around?

What tender associations has he interwoven in "The Family Name," written at Cambridge; "Work;" "Leisure!" From his very heart well up that closing line:

> No deed of mine shall shame thee, gentle name.

What a sigh heaves in

> . . . . And bound the free
> And holiday—rejoicing spirit down
> . . . . . .
> . . . . . .
> To that dry drudgery at the desk's dead wood.

Who can refrain from entering into his feeling at Cambridge, while reading:

> My brow seems tightening with the Doctor's cap,
> And I walk *gowned;* feel unusual powers.

Wordsworth hath thrown into "The laconic soul of the sonnet" more varied sentiments than perhaps all other poets combined. In some instances, Oliver Wendell Holmes was correct, when he spoke of Wordsworth's Sonnets as "trivial in subject, solemn in style, vivid in description, prolix in detail, true metaphysically, but immensely suggestive of 'imagination,' to use a mild term, when related as an actual fact of a sprightly youngster." True enough, this criticism perhaps of the boy of Winander, but the piece is no sonnet, though Holmes speaks of it as such. His sonnets, generally legitimate, have among them many exquisite gems.

Paul Hamilton Hayne, among American poets, uses this form oftener than any other, and breathes into it many a lovely conceit. Yet he pays to George H. Boker a deserved compliment:

> It hath been thine to prove what use and power,
> What sweetness, and what glorious strength belong
> To the brief compass of that slandered song
> We term the sonnet. Thine hath been the dower
> Whereby its richly fruitful, fairy shower
> Of poesy hath flooded o'er our hearts;
> And thine the dominant magic which imparts
> Life to its thrilling music. Hour by hour,
> My soul from this small fountain, in whose deep
> The sunshine of thy passionate genius plays,
> Doth drink delight, till fancy melts in sleep,
> Charmed by the witchery of thy perfect lays,—
> Not dreamless, but flushed through with joys that keep
> Some fervent gleam of youth's voluptuous days.

Mr. S. Adam Lee, the American co-worker with Leigh Hunt, in *The Book of the Sonnet*, says of Hayne's Sonnets:

"Simple, passionate, direct, neither overloaded with ornament nor without its graces each one of his littte poems stands before us as a complete work in itself, owing nothing to an epigrammatic turn of surprise, nor to the too ponderous weight of the last line. His political sonnets are filled with patriotic fire and martial vigor; his philosophical sonnets are imbued with serene thoughtfulness and a far-reaching insight into the secrets of humanity; his personal sonnets are touching with the tender self-denial of pure friendship, or vivid with the burning flame of a righteous scorn; and his love sonnets are passionate with the instincts of youth, colored with the glow of early imagination, and subdued by the delicate modesty of a chastened yet evident desire."

He declares them to be "amongst the best that have been written in America." Mr. Hayne has steadily improved in his treatment of this genuine favorite of the poets.

But, above all others, the "myriad-minded" poet has hallowed the Sonnet. "With this key Shakespeare unlocked his heart." Illegitimate, very, are his sonnets—"fourteeners," Charles Lamb calls them—yet marvelous in their "boundless fertility and labored condensation of thought, with perfection and sweetness in rythm and metre." Coleridge says of them: "It seems to me that the Sonnets could only come from a man deeply in love, and in love with a woman." (They are supposed to be addressed to William Herbert, Earle of Pembroke, at once the most beloved man, as well as most licentious of his age.) "These extraordinary sonnets form, in fact, a poem of so many lines each; and like the passion which inspire them, the sonnets are always the same, with a variety of expression—continuous, if you regard the lover's soul—distinct, if you listen to him as he heaves them, sigh after sigh."

Lanier says of them: "Of course, to the young student these Sonnets must be mostly dark; but to the older soul they become as light itself; and perhaps it might be said without strain, that one's love and reverence for Shakespeare's Sonnets, and one's delight in them, may fairly be taken as a gauge of the exaltation of one's growth, so that the higher and sweeter we are, just so much deeper is our private glory in these wonderful modern Psalms of the person." Lanier thinks the first one hundred and twenty-six "revelations of friendship, and the last twenty-eight, of a curious sort of love." Along with these love notes should be read a

woman's heart unlocked, in the "Translations, Sonnets from the Portuguese," by Elizabeth Barrett Browning. Surely a bond between such kindred souls, if for nothing else, should win our love!

Let two more sonnets close this paper—the first one by Joseph Blanco White, an Anglo-Spaniard, and dedicated "To Night":

Mysterious Night! when our first parent knew
Thee from report divine, and heard thy name,
Did not he tremble for this lovely frame,
This glorious canopy of light and blue?
Yet 'neath a curtain of translucent dew,
Bathed in the rays of the great setting flame,
Hesperus with the host of heaven came,
And lo! creation widened in man's view.
Who could have thought such darkness lay concealed
Within thy beams, O Sun! or who could find,
Whilst fly, and leaf, and insect stood revealed,
That to such countless orbs thou mad'st us blind?
Why do we, then, shun death with anxious strife?
If light can thus deceive, wherefore not life?

Coleridge pronounced this sonnet "the best in the English language." While Leigh Hunt says of it: "In point of *thought* this sonnet stands supreme, perhaps above all in any language. Nor can we ponder it too deeply, or with too hopeful a reverence."

The other and last selection is by Richard Watson Gilder, author of "The New Day," and "The Poet and his Master," and admirably answers the question, What is a sonnet?

What is a sonnet? 'Tis a pearly shell
That murmurs of the far-off murmuring sea;
A precious jewel carved most curiously;
It is a little picture painted well.
What is a sonnet? 'Tis the tear that fell
From a great poet's hidden ecstacy;
A two-edged sword, a star, a song—ah me!
Sometimes a heavy-tolling funeral bell.
This was the flame that shook with Dante's breath,
The solemn organ whereon Milton played,
And the clear glass where Shakespeare's shadow falls:
A sea this is—beware who ventureth!
For like a fiord the narrow floor is laid
Deep as mid-ocean to sheer mountain walls.

METHODISM—MODERN SUNDAY-SCHOOLS.

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We purpose to give the connection of Methodism with the modern Sunday-School movement. That movement, it is claimed, began in 1781, when Robert Raikes organized his Sunday-School. Raikes has been honored throughout Christendom as the one to whom its origin is due. But this must be received with limitations, though this distinguished position has long been awarded to him, and though the Sunday-School world, met in Convention on the banks of the Thames, in 1881, to witness the unveiling of his statue, may seem to have confirmed it.

However this may be, the pious instruction of children was a divine ordinance, both in the Old and New Testament Scriptures. The children, from the first, were taken into covenant relation with God and His Church; and their religious education was enforced by divine sanctions. It was commanded in the law of Moses, "Gather the people together, men, and women, and children, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this law; and that their children, which have not known anything, may hear, and learn to fear the Lord your God, as long as ye live in the land whither ye go over Jordan to possess it." The following embraces not only all that is contemplated in the Sabbath-School, but much more:

"Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart and in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they may be as frontlets between your eyes. And ye shall teach them, your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. And thou shalt write them upon the door posts of thine house, and upon thy gates; that your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, in the land which the Lord sware unto your fathers to give them, as the days of heaven upon the earth."

And in the Christian Church, pious parents were commanded to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, that, like Timothy, from their earliest years they might be made acquainted with the Holy Scriptures; and the children were held to be parts of the household of faith, and as such received the rite

of baptism. How much stress was laid upon this duty, may be learned from our Lord's rebuke to His disciples: "Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven;" and from his touching appeal to Peter: "Feed my lambs."

There is no doubt that, in the Old Testament times, the greatest attention was paid by the Hebrews to the moral and religious instruction of children. Indeed, but little or nothing is said about secular education. All the precepts concerning education, in the Pentateuch, in the Psalms, in the Prophets, and in Proverbs, had signal reference to moral and religious culture under the law. Scarcely any mention is made of any other. Not that Hebrew children were otherwise uneducated; but so much stress was put upon moral and religious training, that the parents might be impressed with its supreme importance. To give to the child a sound moral and religious education, and teach him a trade, were indispensable requisites of Hebrew culture. That even the Hebrew leaders, prophets, and kings were taught secular knowledge, we learn only incidentally, as when it is said that Moses was brought up in all the learning of the Egyptians, and that Daniel was trained in the schools of the Chaldeans. And yet even theirs was not received from Hebrew parents, but in foreign courts. The author of the Book of Job was, doubtless, a student of natural history, and was versed in all oriental astronomy. And the intellectual culture and literary attainments of King Solomon were proverbial, and extolled in Oriental tradition with Oriental extravagance. In the schools of the prophets, in the temple, and—after the captivity—in the synagogues, the Hebrew youth were carefully instructed. But this instruction was chiefly, if not exclusively, concerned with religion. The Hebrew schools, in a great measure, were such as our Sabbath-schools would be, were our Sabbath-schools held every day in the week. They were still kept up in the days of our Lord and His apostles; and, after the destruction of Jerusalem, they were established at Japhne, at Lydda, at Tiberias, at Sepphoris, and elsewhere. In their schools the Hebrew youth, as soon as they were five years of age, began the study of the Holy Scriptures.

Catechetical instruction was common both in the Old and New

Testament Church. This was originally oral, as its literal meaning implies. Catechumens, in the early Christian Church, were converts in preparation for baptism. The Catechists were the teachers who furnished the questions and answers. These were afterwards committed to writing, and what was written and published was called a Cathechism, the original word being retained, which meant oral instruction by question and answer. But not only were proselytes from Judaism and converts from heathenism Catechumens, but such likewise were the children of pious parents, who were not old enough to be admitted to the eucharist. They were taught the Holy Scriptures, the doctrines of Christianity, and the nature and design of the sacraments. Now, what was this but such instruction as our children now receive, or should receive, in the Sunday-schools? And this instruction was chiefly imparted on the first day of the week, or the Christian Sabbath. And what were the catechists, but teachers, such as the Sunday-school teachers of the present day? "There can be no doubt," says Mosheim, when writing about the Christian Church in the first century, "but that the children of Christians were carefully trained up from their infancy, and were early put to reading the sacred books and learning the principles of religion. For this purpose schools were erected everywhere from the beginning."

All that is implied in Sunday-school instruction, though not called by that name, existed from the first in the Church, both before and after the coming of Christ. And for some centuries, it was kept up in the Christian Church; and it was not discontinued until the Church, having become corrupt, sought to cover up its corrupt teachings and practices. But how could this be more effectually done than by taking away the Bible from the people, ceasing all catechetical instruction, and bringing up the children in ignorance? And what was the work of the Reformers, but to restore the reading and study of the Holy Scriptures to the place which they occupied from the beginning, in the Christian Church?

It is claimed that the Culdees, in their religious houses of St. Andrews, Dunkeld and Lochleven, were the first to revive Sunday-schools, after they had gone into general disuse. It has been held that the Culdees preserved primitive Christianity free from the corruptions that existed everywhere else in the Church of Rome.

But it is now believed, on the best historical evidence, that "the 'pure Culdees' are familiar in poetry and legend, but are unknown to history." And not only so, it has been proved that the Culdees did not differ "in doctrine, in ritual, and in government" from "the monastic communities in the Latin Church"—that they "were more superstitious and corrupt than their brethren on the continent;" that "in ecclesiastical discipline and morals, there was the same inferiority," and that, "at no time distinguished above their fellows for learning and piety, they gradually became still more remiss." If these things are so—and the researches of modern Scottish and English historians prove them to be so—we fear that we must relegate to poetry and romance what has been written about the Sunday-schools of the Culdees.

But while this is true of the ancient Culdee monastic houses, which existed during the middle ages, in Ireland and Scotland, in Wales and England, there is no doubt that Bible instruction in institutions similar to our Sunday-schools, was observed by the Waldensians and Albigensians, the Wickliffites and Hussites; these pioneers in reformation sought to restore the primitive methods of teaching the children the word of God. And in the same noble work Luther engaged, as soon as he kindled the fires of the reformation in Germany. No sin he regarded more worthy of punishment than the neglect of the religious education of children. In his schools, which he set up in Saxony, "the children went early on Sunday mornings to the Church service; then to the school-room for scriptural and catechetical lessons; then again, at noon, to public worship except sometimes the younger children, who remained at the school-room to receive instruction adapted to their capacities; the older children were afterwards examined on the sermon which they heard."

In the Church of England, soon after its separation from Rome, special attention was paid to parochial religious instruction of children, on the holy Sabbath. But when that Church became cold, and the religion of its bishops, priests, deacons and laity degenerated into mere formality, and into the greatest laxity of discipline and morals, the practice grew rapidly into disuse. But not, at any time, did it cease altogether in the Established Church. At the time Wesley appeared, a few parish priests observed the cus-

tom. Here and there some holy woman kept it alive, as Susanah Wesley, the mother of John and Charles, in her husband's parish at Epworth, and there was, at least, one British prelate, who faithfully adhered to the good work, enjoined in the canons and recommended in the homilies of the Church. The good Bishop Wilson —to his honor be it said—in his Episcopal See, the Isle of Man, enforced the cannon, and saw to it that the children received proper catechetical religious instruction in all his parish Churches.

But to no man is the Church of Christ as much indebted for the revival of the primitive religious instruction of children, as to the Methodist John Wesley. The only parish which he ever had in charge was Christ Church parish, in Savannah, Georgia. There he not only revived the parochial custom of catechising the children in the house of God, upon the holy Sabbath, but he established a Sunday-school as worthy of the name, as any that now exists, or has existed, since the days of Robert Raikes. And this Sunday-school was kept up for two years, about forty-five years before Raikes' school in Gloucester.

January 26, 1737, Wesley writes in his journal:

"Mr. Ingham set out for England. By him I wrote to Dr. Bray's associates, who had sent a parochial library to Savannah. Part of that letter was:—Our general method is this: A young gentleman who came with me teaches between thirty and forty children to read, write and cast accounts. Twice a day he catechises the lowest class. In the evening he instructs the larger children. On Saturday I catechise them all; as, also, on Sunday before the evening service; and in the Church, immediately after the second lesson, a select number of them having repeated the catechism and been examined in some parts of it. I endeavored to explain at large, and to enforce that part both on them and the congregation."

The Mr. Ingham, by whom the letter was sent, was the Rev. Benjamin Ingham, of Queen's College, Oxford, who, while he remained in Savannah, assisted Mr. Wesley in his Sunday-School. The young gentleman, who also taught with him, was Charles Delamotte, the son of a Middlesex magistrate, a young man of excellent education, of talents and piety, who lived, after he left Georgia, to a ripe old age, and died in peace, in 1796. Rarely has it ever been that three such teachers are found in the same Sunday-school. The results we will let Mr. Wesley tell in his own words. We quote from his journal: "May 29, 1737. Being Whitsunday,

four of our scholars, after having been instructed daily for several weeks, were at their earnest and repeated desire, admitted to the Lord's table. I trust that their zeal has stirred up many to remember their Creator in the days of their youth, and to redeem the time, even in the midst of an evil and adulterous generation." And it did stir up many. "Indeed," adds Mr. Wesley, "about this time we observed the Spirit of God to move upon the minds of many of the children. They began more carefully to attend to the things that were spoken, both at home and at Church, and a remarkable seriousness appeared in their whole behaviour and conversation." "Who knows," he asks, "but some of them may grow up to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ?"

In his "Biographical Memorials of General Oglethorpe," the Rev. Dr. Thaddeus Mason Harris says that this—Wesley's method of instructing children in Christ Church Parish—"is a prototype of the modern Sunday-school." In his "History of Georgia," the learned William Bacon Stevens, Bishop of the Diocese of Pennsylvania, says that "this was a regular part of his Sunday duties; and it seems that John Wesley, in the Parish of Christ Church, Savannah, had established a Sunday-school nearly fifty years before Robert Raikes originated his noble scheme of Sunday instruction in Gloucester."

When I was in London, in 1878, the late Rev. Dr. Manning, then the Secretary of the "London Tract Society," recommended to me Sir Charles Reed, LL. D., as the proper person to write for me "Wesley and Sunday-schools" for the "Wesley Memorial Volume." Sir Charles, at that time, was a Director of the "London Tract Society," President of the "London School Board," a member of Parliament, and President of the "London Sunday-school Union." He was regarded the foremost Sunday-school authority in all Great Britain and Ireland. It was he, who, in 1881, as President of the "London Sunday-school Union," and the representative of all the Sunday-schools in the Three Kingdoms and on the Continent, delivered the address of welcome to the Sunday-school workers, who had met, from all parts of the Christian world to witness the unveiling of Raikes' statue. This distinguished and noble Sabbath-school worker I had determined, on the suggestion of Dr. Manning, to ask to write the article mentioned. And this

I did, notwithstanding the "London Sunday-school Union," of which he was the President, in their "Jubilee Volume," published but a short time before, had made not the slightest reference to Wesley's Sunday-school in Savannah.

A few mornings after the interview with Dr. Manning, I met Sir Charles Reed, at breakfast, in the rooms of the "London Tract Society," in Paternoster Row, when I presented the matter to him, and he kindly consented to write as I desired. I called his attention to Mr. Wesley's Sunday-school labors in Savannah, and soon afterwards sent to him such authorities as I had on the subject. In due time, he wrote the article, which may now be seen in the "Wesley Memorial Volume." In it, after mentioning Wesley's love for children, his school for colliers' children at Kingswood, and his school at the Old Foundry, in London, Sir Charles writes about Wesley's earlier work "in his Parish at Savannah, in 1736, where he had commenced," he adds, "the work which Raikes was permitted to accomplish more than forty years afterward." He then quotes, even fuller than I have quoted it, from Stevens' History of Georgia, what that distinguished prelate of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America says of Wesley's Sunday labors among the children in Georgia. Nor is Sir Charles Reed the only one, who, of late, has acknowledged that Mr. Wesley had a Sunday-school in Savannah, nearly forty years before Raikes' school in Gloucester. Many others—as the Rev. Dr. William Cooke, the venerable Nestor of the London pulpit—have acknowledged the same thing. Wherefore, to Mr. Wesley, and to Methodism, more than to Robert Raikes, belongs the honor of priority in the modern Sunday-school movement.

In 1765, John Wesley made a visit to High Wycombe. There he met Hannah Ball, a young lady then in the twenty-second year of her age, and "one of the chief members" of the Methodist Society there. In 1769, four years afterwards, and fourteen years before Raikes' school in Gloucester, this Methodist young woman began a Sunday-school in High Wycombe. "Miss Ball," says Mr. Luke Tyerman, "became one of Wesley's favorite correspondents, and, in 1770, wrote: 'The children meet twice a week, every Sunday and Monday. They are a wild little company, but seem willing to be instructed. I labor among them, only desiring to

promote the interests of the Church of Christ.'" Thus, in the Sunday-school of the Methodist, Hannah Ball, at High Wycombe, as Mr. Overton also admits in his and Mr. Abbey's "English Church in the Eighteenth Century," we again see Methodism's connection with the modern Sunday-school.

But before we proceed with the history of the movement, we must add a foot-note, which Mr. Buckle has appended to page 309, vol. II., of his "History of Civilization in England." "It is usually supposed," says Mr. Buckle, "that Sunday-schools were begun by Raikes, in 1781; but though he appears to be the first to organize them on a suitable scale, there is no doubt that they were established by Lindsey in, or immediately after, 1765." And, as we wish to present the historic facts as we have ascertained them, we must not omit to say that it is claimed that Sunday-schools were established by James Hey, in 1775; by the Rev. David Simpson, in 1778; and by Mrs. Catherine Boey, of Huxley Abbey, "long before Raikes was born." The birth of the Gloucester Sunday-school worker was in 1735.

We come now to Raikes' Sunday-school in Gloucester, where it seems to have begun in 1781, though it was not mentioned until it was mentioned in his Gloucester Journal, in 1783.

From Raikes' account of its origin, which he published in the Gloucestershire Tracts, he was pained to see many ragged children profaning the holy Sabbath in the streets of Gloucester. Seeing a young woman passing, he called her to him, and asked: "What can we do for them?" To this she responded: "Let us teach them to read, and take them to Church." "This conversation," writes Raikes, "suggested to me that it would be at least a harmless attempt, if it were productive of no good, should some little plan be formed to check the deplorable profanatian of the Sabbath. I then inquired of the woman if there were any decent, well-disposed women of the neighborhood who kept schools for teaching to read. I presently was directed to four; to them I applied, and made an agreement with them to receive as many children as I should send them upon the Sunday, whom they were to instruct in reading and in the Church Catechism. For this I engaged to pay them a shilling each for their day's employment."

Such is Raikes' own account of the origin of his school. From

himself we learn that the suggestion came first from the young woman mentioned. That young woman was a Methodist, an humble and pious Christian, and a true follower of John Wesley. She was afterwards well known in the history of Methodism as the devoted wife of Joseph Bradburn, one of Wesley's ablest and most useful itinerant preachers. On the Sabbath, when Raikes' Sunday-school was first opened, Sophia Cooke walked to the Parish Church, alongside of Robert Raikes, at the head of the ragged children, whom they had gathered from the slums of Gloucester. And thus we see that even Raikes was indebted for his plan to Methodism. His Sunday-school scheme had a Methodist origin, and it received a Methodist baptism at its birth.

The plan of Raikes was a noble one, and gave an immense impetus to Sunday-school instruction. From the time he published his first account of it, the great movement was fairly inaugurated. But to John Wesley, Robert Raikes himself was mainly indebted for his success. Wesley immediately published Raikes' account of it in his own Arminian Magazine, gave to the plan his unqualified approval, and urged its adoption upon his preachers and societies. The saintly Fletcher, at Madeley, and many other Methodists elsewhere, at once established Sunday-schools in their respective charges, and forwarded the good work. While many of the Established Church, and particularly Bishop Horsley, wrote and spoke against Sunday-schools, Wesley and his itinerants, with voice and pen, seconded the movement, and assured its success. Nothing could withstand the Methodist fire and the Methodist zeal, which were thrown into the movement. Wesley was the first to see that God had "a deeper end therein than men are aware of," and to speak of them as "nurseries for Christians." To his itinerants he spoke and wrote, encouraging the work with the same fiery zeal with which he preached to the felons at Newgate, and the colliers at Kingswood. To Richard Rodda, in 1787, he wrote: "It seems these (Sunday-schools) will be one great means of reviving religion throughout the nation;" to Duncan Wright, in 1788: "I verily believe these Sunday-schools are the noblest specimens of charity which have been set on foot in England since the time of William the Conquerer;" and to Charles Atmore, in 1790: "I am glad you have set up Sunday-schools in New Castle.

It is one of the noblest institutions which has been seen in Europe for some centuries, and will increase more and more, provided the teachers and inspectors do their duty. Therefore, be sure to watch over these with great care, that they may not grow weary in well-doing." And now, to give some idea of the impetus which John Wesley gave to Sunday-schools in England, it is estimated that, in 1787, only three years after Wesley wrote them up in his Arminian Magazine, there were more than two hundred thousand children already in them.

In this connection it is in place to speak of the character and objects of Raikes' schools, and of those under Wesley's supervision. Raikes carried the day-school into the Sabbath. While the Church Catechism was a part of the instruction, it was mainly secular. His schools were designed to teach such children the elementary branches—reading, writing and arithmetic—as were too poor to attend the day-schools. And in this service paid teachers were employed.

The Rev. Dr. Stoughton, in his "Religion in England Under Queen Anne and the Georges," says of Raikes' schools: "The instruction given included the elements of reading, writing and arithmetic; Bible instruction, for a while, was much neglected. Religious knowledge was chiefly conveyed through Catechisms; little room was allowed for the exercise of free religious conversation with the pupils, and the warm play of the spiritual affections."

How great the contrast between these and Wesley's Methodist schools! We have already seen how, and with what blessed spiritual results, Wesley carried on his Sunday-school in Savannah. Wesley's primary object in all his Sunday-school work, was to bring the children to Christ. Never did he allow himself, or his preachers, to delegate to others the duty expressed and implied in the Master's command to Peter, "Feed my lambs." His Sunday-schools were indeed "nurseries for Christians." Thousands were converted to God in them; and from them many were called of God to preach the gospel. In his Sunday-school plans Wesley was powerfully seconded by John Fletcher, whose very last public work was in behalf of the Sunday-schools which he had set up in and around Madeley. No one knew better how to interest children, and fix their attention, than that great and good

man. Any incident that occurred he seized upon for this purpose. Once a robin flew into the house; the eyes of all the children were intent upon watching the movements of the little bird. "Now," said Fletcher, "I see you can attend to that robin. Well, I will take that robin for my text." "He then," says Wesley, "gave them a useful lecture on the harmlessness of that little creature, and the tender care of its Creator." The result was, many children in Fletcher's Parish were led to Christ by the faithful and godly instruction received in his Sunday-schools.

But no one impressed children more profoundly, or led more of them to Christ, than John Wesley. They gathered around him wherever he went; they often blocked up the entrance to the Church where he was to preach, and even hung upon the skirts of his garments, that they might receive his blessing. Robert Southey, who became poet laureate of England, and Wesley's biographer, tells us, that, when he was a boy at Bristol, John Wesley laid his hand upon his head in blessing, and that he felt that touch as a benediction through all his subsequent life.

Robert Raikes, as we have also seen, kept up his Sunday-schools by paid teachers; John Wesley conducted his by teachers, who gave willing and consecrated service, free of charge. The love of souls for whom Jesus died, solely actuated John Wesley, his preachers and his teachers. The latter taught reading, and when it was necessary, even writing, but they taught gratuitously. Listen to Wesley's account of his schools at Boeton:

"From Mr. Peel's we went to Boeton. Here are eight hundred poor children, taught in our Sunday-schools, by about eighty masters, who receive no pay but what they are to receive from their great Master. About a hundred of them, part boys and part girls, are taught to sing, and they sang so true, that, all singing together, there seemed to be but one voice. The house was throughly filled, while I explained and applied the first commandment. . . . . In the evening, many of the children still hovering round the house, I desired forty or fifty to come in and sing, 'Vital spark of heavenly flame.' Although some of them were silent, not being able to sing for tears, yet the harmony was such as, I believe, could not be equalled in the king's chapel."

Of another visit to Boeton, he writes:

"This I must avow, there is not such another set of singers in any of the Methodist congregations in the three kingdoms as there is at Boeton. There cannot be; for we have near a hundred such trebles—boys and girls, selected

out of our Sunday-schools, and accurately taught—as are not to be found together in any chapel, cathedral, or music room, within the four seas. Besides, the spirit with which they all sing, and the beauty of many of them, so suits the melody, that I defy any to exceed it; except the singing of angels in our Father's house."

Now, there was no better judge of music, and good singing, in the three Kingdoms, than John Wesley. He not only revived vital godliness, but he gave to the Churches a pure hymnology, and pure church music. It is well known that his brother Charles' immortal lyrics, before they were adapted to Church worship, received the finishing touch of his more exquisite taste; and it is well known that the influence of this many-sided man upon Church music was as great as his influence upon hymnology. But let us conclude his account of his Boston Sunday-schools with one more extract from his Journal. Sunday, April 20, 1778, he was again there, and thus wrote:

"At eight, and at one, the house was throughly filled. About three, I met between nine hundred and a thousand of the children, belonging to our Sunday-schools. I never saw such a sight before. They were all exactly clean, as well as plain, in their apparel. All were serious and well behaved. Many, both boys and girls, had as beautiful faces as, I believe, England or Europe can afford. When they all sang together, and none of them out of tune, the melody was beyond that of any theatre; and, what is best of all, many of them truly fear God, and some rejoice in his salvation. These are a pattern to all the town. Their usual *diversion* (italics ours) is to visit the poor that are sick, (sometimes six, or eight, or ten together,) to exhort, comfort, and pray with them. Frequently, ten or more of them, get together to sing and pray by themselves: sometimes, thirty or forty; and are so earnestly engaged, alternately singing, praying, and crying, that they know not how to part."

Such were John Wesley's Sunday-schools! Where is there one like them? What improvement has been made on them? Oh! for Wesley's spirit in the preachers and in the teachers! We hear a great deal, in this day, about new methods. They are too often, we fear, but substitutes for Wesley's spirit, and Wesley's consecration. Would to God we could, in this Centennial year of American Methodism, go back to his methods, and catch the spirit which made his Sunday-schools such "nurseries for Christians."

And now something about Methodism's part in the Sunday-schools of America.

The first Sunday-school in America—after Wesley's in Savan-

nah—was established, in 1786, by Francis Asbury, at the house of Thomas Crenshaw, in Hanover county, Virginia. In 1790, the Methodist Conferences passed a rule for the instruction of poor children, white and black, in Sunday-schools. "Let us," so read the Minutes, "labor, as the heart and soul of one man, to establish Sunday-schools in or near the place of public worship. Let persons be appointed by the bishops, elders, deacons or preachers to teach (gratis) all that will attend and have capacity to learn, from six o'clock in the mornig until ten, and from two o'clock in the afternoon till six, where it does not interfere with public worship. The Council shall compile a proper school book to teach them learning and piety." This is said to be the first recognition of a Sunday-school by an American Church!

The "American Methodist Sunday-school Union" was organized in 1827. This measure, Dr. Bangs says, was hailed with delight by Methodists throughout the country. It received the sanction of several Annual Conferences, which recommended the people of their charge to form auxiliaries in every circuit and station, and to send to the general depository in New York for their books; and such were the zeal and unanimity with which they entered into the work, that at the first annual meeting of the Society there were reported 251 auxiliaries, 1,025 schools, 2,048 superintendents, 10,290 teachers, 63,240 scholars, besides 2,000 managers and visitors."

In 1840, the Sunday-school Union was formed upon its present basis. In 1844, the Methodist Episcopal Church was divided. In the two Churches which resulted from that division, there are now nearly four million of children, officers and teachers in their Sunday-schools. And since Asbury's Sunday-school in Hanover county, Virginia, millions have gone to heaven, who were saved through this instrumentality. What hath God wrought? To God alone be all the glory! Amen.

One cannot fail to notice two things which distinguished the Sunday-schools of early Methodism. The *first* was the insistance upon family religion, and the parental instruction of children at home in the things of God. No teacher, no superintendent, and no pastor, in Wesley's societies, could do for the parents the special duty expressed and implied in the command: "And ye shall teach

them to your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up." The Sunday-school was regarded not as a substitute for, nor even an auxiliary to, the parental religious instruction therein enjoined. It was an auxiliary, and but an auxiliary, only to what is expressed and implied in the added precept: "And thou shall write them upon the door-posts of thine house, and upon thy gates." For there is a special work which pious parents have to do, so exclusively their own, that they cannot delegate it to, or even share it with, another. It is as sacredly private as the family circle itself.

The *second* thing, which distinguished the early Methodist Sunday-schools, was the very close and intimate relation between them and the pastors. No Methodist preacher, who was one of John Wesley's sons in the gospel, dreamed of committing to another the special work required of him by the Master's command: "Feed my lambs." There could be no possible substitute for the pastoral relation; no substitute for pastoral instruction. Nor would any Methodist layman of those days tolerate a pastor who left the lambs of the flock to the care of others. Hence the preaching of the gospel held its rightful place in the Church of Christ, as the means ordained of God for the conversion of sinners, and the edification of believers. The Sunday-school was never permitted, directly or indirectly, to interfere with it. The children were an integral part of the congregation, and were brought up to attend upon the ministrations of the pulpit. Parents, at home, questioned them about what they heard: indeed, in the afternoon, no small part of the catechetical instruction of the Sunday-school was by the preacher on the sermon, which he preached, in the morning to the mixed congregation of old and young. Hence the children grew up, from their earliest years, to be Church-goers, and attendants on the preached word. The whole purpose of preachers, parents and teachers was the conversion of the children. And the pure and simple gospel, without any clap-trap, or extraneous means, was relied upon to effect it. The result was not only constant accessions from the Sunday-schools to the Church of Christ, but accessions of such as proved to be its most useful and devoted members. Trained in these "nurseries for Christians," and accustomed to

attend upon the preaching of the word, they never forsook it. A day in God's courts was to them better than a thousand. And they were glad when it was said, "Come, let us go up to the house of the Lord; "with the voice of joy and praise," they went "up with the multitude that kept holyday."

Such were Sunday-schools in the early days of Methodism; such their distinguishing characteristics. Are they the characteristics of the Sunday-schools of these days? has parental pious instruction the place it once had? is it not too much neglected? is not the Sunday-school relied upon as a substitute for it? and does the pastorate sustain the same relation to it, as in the days of our fathers? has preaching the prominence which it had then, and which God designed it should ever have? is not the pulpit too much divorced from the Sunday-school? are not the children brought up to neglect social and public worship, and especially the preaching of the word; and is it not true, that, as soon as they leave the school, having never been Church-goers, they continue to be non-church-goers? and is not this as well true of those who come into the Church from the Sunday-school as of those who do not? are not the only Church-goers, who come into it from the school, they who were trained to be such from early childhood? and are we not utterly at fault in our methods? have we not removed the old landmarks? and have not we greatly erred in removing them? Under our present plans, do not a great many, who do come into the Church from the Sunday-school, come into it never having been truly converted? and, having come into it, so to speak without the preached word, are they not content to live without it?"

In answer to these questions we can only say, if our present methods are better, the results ought to be better. If they have produced in our children an increased love and zeal for God and his worship, for his house and his preached word, they are better; but, if they have not, then they are not better, and we have erred. Whether we have improved in our plans or not, we have lost in the direction we have indicated. If with better methods our children have lost in love and zeal for God's house and the preaching of the gospel, how great is that loss! then how far we have fallen below the faith, the spirit, the zeal, and the devotion of our

fathers! If they, with poorer methods and with less facilities, raised up children, whose fiery zeal for God's house and the worship of the sanctuary ate them up, then how much intenser was their devotion to Christ than ours? how much greater was their spiritual power? and how much more fervid their zeal? Great Head of the Church, revive thy work! Raise up some one, commissioned of God as was John Wesley, to arouse the Church to higher and nobler things! Rather would we have poorer methods, and burning love for the souls of our children, than the best methods with lesser love. But, whatever the methods, sure we are that, unless the preaching of the gospel be restored to its Scriptural and Methodistic place in the work of soul-saving, we will add to the Church, out of our Sunday-schools, increased, and still increasing, multitudes of non-church-goers, who have not even the forms of godliness.

JAMES FENIMORE COOPER.*

AMERICAN MEN OF LETTERS SERIES: JAMES FENIMORE COOPER. By Professor T. R. LOUNSBURY, of Yale College, Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883.

This is the fifth volume of the series. It has been preceded by Mr. Warner's Washington Irving, Mr. Scudder's Noah Webster, Mr. Sanborn's Henry D. Thoreau, and Mr. Frothingham's George Ripley. It is to be followed by monographs of those Americans no longer alive, who have left behind enough to entitle them to be classed as men of letters. The plan is an excellent one. It is designed to give a condensed, but complete, sketch of each man. This is to be prepared by one who is himself a man of learning, and who has made a special study of the author of whom he writes. It is needless to say that in this day of prolific pens, and swarming publications, such a division of labor is not only highly

*This article is printed without a name, at the author's request. We would always prefer this course, if left to our own judgment. An article ought to be read and criticised on its merits; this will never be done when names are given. The editor would be glad to have more articles of this cast for the REVIEW.—EDITOR.

desirable, but absolutely necessary. There is no man living, either so wise or so silly, as to have surveyed the whole world of letters "from China to Peru." No wise man would have attempted it; and no man, however silly, would not have given up the attempt in despair, if it had been made. Hence, we repeat, in writing the biographies of the men who have figured in such different degrees and in such different fields of our Literature, it was wise for the editor—Mr. Charles Dudley Warner—to distribute the work among able assistants.

In the present case, the choice of a co-laborer was extremely happy. Prof. Lounsbury has made a most readable book. The style is clear, vigorous, pleasing. The subject matter has been thoroughly digested. The author is a complete master of his theme. That he has made Cooper, his career, his writings, a close exhaustive study, is patent. That he was equal to the task of fully unfolding the character of the novelist must be evident to all his readers.

While Professor Lounsbury has not produced a perfect biography, the defects are more negative than positive. Had he told us more of the inner life of Cooper, had he showed us more of the novelist in his family, around his fireside, among his friends, in his study, toiling with a daily and a nightly hand, it would have increased the biography in interest and in merit. This insufficiency no one deplored more than the biographer. But it was inevitable. Cooper had left a stern decree against the use of any material in the family for a life of himself. Again, if it be true, as has been asserted so frequently, that it is generally accepted as a self-evident proposition, that hero-worship is the ground-work of all biographic excellence, our author has missed the fundamental principle of success. For in hero-worship he certainly does not indulge. Frequently he differs from Cooper in regard to matters of policy, of politics, of religion, of the literary character and merit of his works, and even as to matters of common sense. But while Boswell's inimitable biography stands immutable in support of this theory, we are decidedly inclined to believe hero-worship is not essential to true biographic excellence. In a small degree, Prof. Lounsbury's book is a proof in point.

In 1820 Cooper began to write. He was then thirty-one years

of age. At this time the place held by America in the world of letters was a very insignificant one. Young, robust, and prosperous in material matters, it was absolutely without a literature, and almost without a man of letters. Charles Brockden Brown, pioneer in the field of fiction, had written several works not without merit. He had reveled in the weird and the supernatural. His stories were of great interest and told in a pleasing manner. But he had written nothing worthy of pre-eminent recognition. Besides, he had been dead ten years, and his successor had not appeared. He had left the fields of romance silent and tenantless. With this exception we had no literary representative worthy the name. Washington Irving had not sprung into prominence, nor had he written his best. Bryant, in his extreme youth, had startled a small circle of admirers by producing poems that proclaimed him a youthful prodigy, if not a genius. Prescott did not produce his labored history of Ferdinand and Isabella until seventeen years later. Bancroft had hardly graduated; Emerson was still at Harvard; Hawthorne had not even entered college; Maury, who did so much for his country, both by word and deed, and who has consequently been banished to comparative oblivion, was yet a boy; N. P Willis issued his first volume of verse in this year; William Gilmore Simms wrote nothing until seven years later; Longfellow was but thirteen; Whittier, but twelve; Holmes, but eleven; and Poe, but a sad and thoughtful boy of nine. Thus all the men of mark in the world of letters were either in their youth, or had achieved no reputation. The consequence was, that America was almost without a semblance of a literature.

But this was not all. Indeed, it is not the worst part of our history. Some of these writers, and some who are to fortune and to fame unknown, had attempted to catch the popular ear. But in that day Americans had not the national spirit which distinguishes their descendants. They were most modest in their aspirations and their claims. They claimed nothing but their own barrenness, and the privilege of reading English books, and of accepting English criticism. They aspired to produce nothing, to read nothing that came from an American pen. They made a point to agree with English thought in every respect. It had come to the pass where American thought was slavishly obedient to English

dictation. The country that had produced a brilliant coterie of statesmen and of warriors; statesmen of the calibre of Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and Randolph; warriors such as Washington, and Jackson; the country that had twice overcome the mother country in combat—this country had not thrown off the debasing, disgraceful shackles of literary slavery.

However much this state of affairs may be excused, by references to similar sterility in the literature of all other young countries, and to the especial and close relation of America to England, the position was a melancholy one for a literary aspirant. Such were the gloomy surroundings of Cooper. Never were obstacles more formidable. Never were they more fearlessly met or triumphantly overcome. He was writing for a people most wilfully blind to the merits of native genius. It came to be tacitly admitted that nothing good could come from this American Nazareth. Nay, the Nazarenes themselves were the authors and finishers of this unfaith; they encouraged the opinion. They looked to England not only to furnish their literary food, but to prescribe what was wholesome in that food. They could not judge for themselves. But Cooper was the most fearless of mankind. He published—an ominous title—"Precaution." At first, America, of course, was silent. Time must be given England to render her verdict. This she did in terms measurably favorable. The American press, and the public at its back, thereupon proclaimed "Precaution" a passable work. No more could have been said truthfully. Indeed, the first novel of our pioneer was one of the most unsatisfactory he produced. Considering the fact that he wrote about a subject of which he knew absolutely nothing—society life in England—the book was not a failure. He determined to try again. By accident he fell upon the subject for which he was most suited—adventure. He published the "Spy." It was a success. America was tempted to proclaim it such before England could be consulted. But the more prudent waited. As English opinion was most favorable; the success of "The Spy" became unbounded. It had a sale and a popularity unprecedented in American literature. In America, in England, Cooper at once became famous. Translations were made into German and French. The road of Cooper to further fame and to fortune was now so straight he could not

mistake. He wrote constantly, and with some exceptions wrote with great success. In the decade between 1820 and 1830, he produced some twelve books. Among these were most of those that have established the high position of their author in the galaxy of *literati*. These included three of his "Leather Stocking Tales," and several stories of the sea, such as the "Pilot" and "Red Rover." This decade may be said to be the golden period of Cooper's life. He was at peace. He enjoyed the admiration and respect of his countrymen. He was well known and esteemed across the water. His works had been translated into most of the languages of Europe, and many of those of Asia. A writer has said that, in traveling over the world, from New York to London, from London to Paris, from Paris to Berlin, from Berlin to St. Petersburg, from St. Petersburg to Constantinople, from Constantinople to Jerusalem, from Jerusalem to Ispahan, scarcely a shop-window did he observe that failed to contain the works of James Fenimore Cooper! What a commentary upon his popularity! What an evidence of his genius!

Up to this time Cooper was the idol of America, and almost the envy of Europe. His works had met the kindest reception at home and abroad. Obeying the natural inclination of breadth of mind and desire for knowledge, he went to Europe in 1826. Here, except for its effusive cordiality, he could not complain of his reception. To Cooper the attention he received, however, appeared not unlike that bestowed upon the bearded lady, or a two-headed calf at a variety show. He felt that he was looked upon as a miraculous exemplification of the maxim, truth is stranger than fiction, in that he was a man of genius, and yet actually came from America. All of this he resented. He was intensely patriotic. In his zeal he considered America immeasurably the superior of even England or France. To hear his country slightingly mentioned was most galling. Unfortunately, in England, such mention was neither mild nor infrequent. With more vigor than propriety, and with both more than discretion, he would retaliate by prodding the tender hide of the British lion.

The manners of the English people impressed him more by their chilliness, their brusqueness, their artificiality, than their amiability. Those of Cooper himself were not above criticism. He

appeared haughty and proud. He did not attract, but repelled. This was the ordinary effect upon strangers, whether at home or abroad. But the impression was more imaginary than real. However, the opinion of both the English and of Cooper, was mutually uncomplimentary.

If Cooper had any characteristic, it was a wonderful ability to get into trouble. As has been said, America and American institutions were the theme of London diners-out. Ridicule, abuse, and, to the authors, conclusive argument were indulged to prove that Democracy, with America for its victim, was going to the dogs. All of this Cooper keenly resented. He determined to crush it with a book. He wrote, in 1828, "Notions of the Americans." While the plan of the book was unfortunate, and contained a few errors, it will appear as just as it was conclusive to those of to-day who care to hear a refutation of fallacies which time has long since rendered ridiculous.

But however true a cause may be, to impress the judge of its truth, it is not advisable to inform him during the argument what a miserable ignoramus he is. This was Cooper's plan exactly. While persuading he did not conciliate. He lauded America to the empyrean; but, not content with this, he brought England down from that elevation. But the English critics, the self-imposed protectors of British rights, would not allow this without a struggle. In the melee, disdaining to answer the arguments of Cooper, they seized upon him instead of America, and hurried with him below. They attacked him and his works. Vituperation and abuse became the lot of the haughty, patriotic American.

This was not all. With the unaccountable depravity of humanity, and the proverbial ingratitude of republics, America found fault with utterances in a book written for its defence. Then began the low murmuring of the storm in America, that would eventually break forth into the malignant, blasting fury of the tempest. Thus, in England and America, Cooper had his enemies. As an evidence of the lofty criticism indulged at his expense, Hazlitt saw him strutting the streets of Paris, and with a delicate penetration of character that adds to our respect for his imagination, if not his veracity, drew the conclusion that he plumed himself upon being called the "American Scott."

Upon removing from England to France, he again found a chance to become unpopular. Contrary to his desire, he became involved in a controversy with a member of the Chamber of Deputies concerning the relative cost of government in France and America. Here, however, he wisely confined his remarks to his own country.

With a perversity almost phenomenal, an attache of the American Legation at Paris, took an opposite view of the situation, and, backed by his official position, proclaimed that Cooper was incorrect in his statement, in defending American finance. To this diminutive battery Cooper replied with heat and ability. Strange to say, this very readiness to uphold and defend American institutions found little favor at home. Stranger still, it met with attack. He was accused of "flouting his Americanism about Europe." To the sensitive, irritable nature of Cooper, this vilification, instead of thankful praise, had far from a pleasing effect. He began to fear America was not the Paradise he had supposed. That the people had retrograded he felt confident. He returned to America to see for himself, and because already he had been in Europe too long.

In November, 1833, he landed in New York. Human nature likes to have its forebodings or its prophecies realized, whether they be good or ill. It is likely to seek this fulfillment. It certainly expects it. This may partly account for the impression America made on Cooper, upon his return. He did not find the repose, the refinement of the old world. The young republic was more concerned in building a material prosperity, than improving the finer social qualities of life. Every one was in a rush. Everything was changed or changing. Cooper had remained the same, or had even gone backward in sentiment. Long contact with European ideas and European habits not unnaturally had that effect.

As dearly as Cooper loved and admired, as truly as every pulsation of his being was for America, he was not the man to allow these changes to go forward without a protest in language so soothing and ineffective as to enlist no attention. It was, in fact, this almost quixotic love of country that drew him forward. He attacked, not for the sake of finding fault, but to reform what he considered, pernicious habits in the people he loved.

To us of to-day, who can look back with smiling indifference upon these contests, it is hard to conceive that the censorious remarks of any one, however exalted, could create a small portion of the stir Cooper raised about his ears. Nor is the surprise lessened, when we remember the general characteristic of the people at that time. They were intensely active. They took little time for aught but matters of dollars and cents. The impression that America and her institutions were perfect was general, at least among Americans. That any number should have heard Cooper's blast is astonishing. That the complaisance of the American should have deigned more than an incredulous smile is as surprising. But such was not the case. Cooper received abuse beyond all limits. His character was assailed, his motives impugned, his works contemptuously noticed. This was equally true of those of a purely literary character, and of those in which he essayed to lecture our manners.

While Cooper's attacks upon the evils of the day may account for the unpopularity he came home to enjoy, it cannot altogether account for the revulsion exhibited towards his literary productions. During all this time he had written incessantly. Book after book, in marvelous proximity to each other, rushed from the press. Many of them were of the best he has written. Others could very well be omitted, either from the standpoint of Cooper's reputation, or the wealth of American literature. Still, there was no necessity for his popularity to decrease. In all reason, it should have increased. But there was another agent at work. Not only had a change come over the American people, but a change had occurred in the literary taste of both England and America. The novel of adventure had ceased to be the popular idol. Scott and Cooper gave way to a far less praiseworthy school. The Satanic school had arisen. Men, characterized by Southey in the "Vision of Judgment" as "writers of diseased hearts and depraved imaginations, who (forming a system of opinions to suit their own unhappy course of conduct) have rebelled against the holiest ordinances of human society, and hating Revelation which they try in vain to disbelieve, labor to make others as miserable as themselves, by infecting them with a moral virus that eats into their souls. The school which they have set up, may properly be called the "Satanic School." Bulwer was the master in English letters.

George Sand and Victor Hugo, ruled in France. The purity of Scott gave place to the corruption of Bulwer's earliest fiction. The moral heroes of "Waverly" and "Old Mortality," retired before the accomplished villians of "Eugene Aram" and "Ernest Maltravers." For the time, these overshadowed the virtuous productions of Scott and Cooper. The public were dazzled. But error can never plume itself for an extended flight. Ridicule and cool criticism, will wing unerring shafts—shafts that will bring error toppling to the ground. Thackeray wrote against it. He published in "Fraser's" an ingenious caricature of Bulwer, the story of "Catharine." In the depraved eye of the public, he said Bulwer's novels were "agreeably low, delightfully disgusting." The stars of Dickens and Thackeray rose, and that of the Satanic School rapidly faded away.

But Cooper's consorship and the transient displacement of the novels of adventure by those of gilt-edged crime, had the effect of rendering him very unpopular. Yet in either respect was he guity he guilty of nothing that justified depreciation of himself as a man or a novelist. Much that he had criticised deserved attack. The preference for Bulwer he of course could not help. The abuse he received was groundless and ill-humored.

But he was one of those unfortunate people that never allow a chance to pass to get into trouble. He would encourage abuse, dignified at times by the name of criticism, by labored replies to obscure attacks by the newspapers. Of no consequence in themselves, these attacks could only be dangerous in that they furnished Cooper a pretext to make things unpleasant by answering them. Seemingly bent upon making as many enemies as possible, he published in 1834, a "Letter to His Countrymen." The first part of this remarkably unnecessary book was taken up with refutations of forgotten accusations. The second half was filled with a discussion of the fight going on between President Jackson, and the United States Senate. Siding with the President, he inflamed the Whigs; criticising the use of the appointing power by the President for political purposes, he aroused the Democrats. There was nothing wrong in this. It was simply and inexcusably unwise. It is always dangerous to a man's literary reputation, to engage in polit-

ical controversies. His work is sure to receive the dislike that is felt against the author, by the side he opposes.

Drawn into the maëlstrom of vituperation by his "Letter," Cooper was the last man to attempt to climb out. He went in deeper. He wrote novels to enforce his dislike of American customs. He attempted satire. But he wrote invective. He dashed off a voluminous account of his travels. In these he had full opportunity to answer obscure criticism, and to preach sermons to his countrymen. He did not forget or neglect his English friends, and they received their full share of criticism. He showed his American friends their mistakes. He criticised them where they deemed themselves invincible; he praised them for what they might be inclined to apologize. Nor was he entirely wrong. That they were inferior to the Europeans in education, intelligence and manners, the gifts of a century-perfected civilization, he did not neglect to show. But his chief contempt was for those mistaken beings, always to be found in a government like ours, who apologized to Europe for our democratic institutions. These were the strong points of America. To people of to-day, these views can but be considered worthy of acceptance as true of America then, and partially true of America to-day. But the critics resented his sermonizing, and his fault-finding. They confused Cooper, the critic of American character with Cooper the man, and Cooper the novelist. Hence, both the man and his novels were the victims of intemperate abuse and of gross injustice.

It seems that Cooper had called upon himself, by this time, enough obloquy to satisfy the wildest desires. It appears incredible to us that so much force could have been lavished, either by Cooper or the press of the country, upon such small provocations. But even more senseless and more virulent abuse was in store for him. A trivial affair, in which Cooper acted as any man of spirit would have done, drew down the thunderbolts of the doughty knights of the quill. It was simply a misunderstanding and a local quarrel between the novelist and some of the inhabitants of Cooperstown, concerning the ownership of a piece of ground upon Cooper's place. The Whig press of the State assailed him with a vehemence beyond the bounds of human belief. He replied with many long articles in the papers, and with several tedious novels. This but added

fuel to the already sufficiently fed conflagration. The books were open to conflagration; nay, they merited it, and the press was not slow on this occasion, to give Cooper his deserts. It may be said that Cooper was now at war with the whole of America. It is certain he was at perfect peace with very few. The contest seems tremendously, hopelessly unequal. But Cooper was the John Randolph of American literature. Perhaps he was the most perfect master of invectives that America has produced. He carried on the war unceasingly. He routed his foes bravely, but they would return to the attack.

He now determined to silence them. He entered upon a contest without a parallel in ancient or in modern times. He displayed an ability, a fixedness of purpose, a moral heroism absolutely grand. It is of such stuff as Cooper that reformers and martyrs are made. It is such high qualities that lend grace and dignity and grandeur to man. It was such men that conquered the elements, and made them subservient to mankind. Such men hewed the forests and subdued the opposition of rugged nature to human progress. It was such men, after man had advanced to a higher ambition than mere physical existence, that freed *mind*, as their forerunners had freed *matter*. It was these that elevated the intellects of the people, tore from them the shackles of superstition and enthroned reason. Such men were Wickliff, Caxton and Luther.

And yet the efforts of Cooper were directed upon matters of small importance, and not without a ludicrous aspect. The praise due Cooper is not for the struggle in which he engaged, but for the superb manner in which he carried it on. His movement was nothing more than a fight against the press of the country, before the courts of law, for libelous attacks. Unremittingly, ably, triumphantly did he prosecute them. Not a lawyer himself, he conducted his own cases. He met and overcame the most acute legal minds of this or any other age or country. Against him were arrayed these legal functionaries, the tremendous weight of a howling, maddened Public Opinion, and the almost unanimous press.

Before this memorable war began it seemed that the newspapers and Cooper would vie with the other in applying epithets. One editor rather surpassed his brothers in the attack, when he gave

birth to this genial remark: "He is as proud of blackguarding as a fishwoman of Billingsgate. It is as natural to him as snarling to a tom-cat, or growling to a bull-dog. . . . He is the common mark of scorn, and contempt of everything American. The superlative dolt!" "In this refined and chastened style," remarks Prof. Lounsbury, "did the defenders of American cultivation preserve its reputation from its traducer." On the other hand, Cooper was not idle, nor did he despair. What his retorts lacked in brutality and vulgarity, they more than possessed in keenness. In a microscopic degree his statements were true. What he would say for the delectation of the latter-day "interviewers," were he unfortunate enough to know of their existence, it would be easier to speculate than conceive. However, looking not for future evils, he contented himself with assailing what was before him. Fortunately he looked not for the future. He affirmed of the enterprise of editors, that it was a "mercenary diligence in the collection and diffusion of information, whether true or false." The being most like our modern invention, the "interviewer," he spoke of as "a miscreant who pandered for the press." The whole team were the funguses of letters who flourished on the dunghill of the common mind; the sole use, in their opinion, for which the universe was created, was to furnish paragraphs for newspapers.

Such were the complimentary opinions held by Cooper and the press for each other, when the war for libel began. Suffice it to say, that the fight continued unremittingly for several years. At the outset, Cooper's advances were met by those whom he sued, with levity; as it progressed to their uniform defeat, levity gave way to anger; in turn anger gave way to consternation and remonstrance; and finally remonstrance gave way to submissive if sullen silence.

Cooper had conquered. He had silenced abuse. But he could neither remove dislike nor disarm criticism. The fire burned none the less fatally, though smothered securely.

One more controversy, one more fierce battle he fought, and one more brilliant victory he won. For this fight Cooper was to be no more blamed than for the stupidity of his adversaries. His able and exhaustive History of the Navy appeared. A quantity of useless and discreditable wrangling had been going on for years regard-

ing the relative merits of Commodore Perry and Capt. Elliot. The discussion had grown out of the battle of Lake Erie. Cooper thoroughly examined the question, and became convinced that neither side was wholly wrong. Hence he spoke highly of Perry, and not discreditably of Elliot. The friends of Perry raised a storm because Elliot was not abused. It was insufficient that Cooper should praise Perry; he should vilify Elliot. A storm of detraction of his book, and his character, burst through the temporary silence. The editor of the *Commercial Advertiser* brilliantly excelled as the most untempered libeler. Against him, therefore, Cooper directed his fatal charge of libel. The trial in court never came off. But the most crushing defeat came to Stone, and complete triumph to Cooper. Both parties agreed to refer their case to three of the ablest lawyers in the State. Before this august tribunal Cooper made the grandest defense of his history, and the most conclusive arraignment of his opponent. Henry T. Tuckerman was present at the novel trial, and he thus describes the circumstances:

"A more unpopular cause never fell to the lot of a practiced advocate; for the hero of Lake Erie was, and had long been, one of the most cherished of American victors. We could not but admire the self-possession, coolness and vigor with which the author, on this occasion, played the lawyer. Almost alone in his opinion—the tide of public sentiment against his theory of the battle, and the popular sympathy wholly with the received traditions of that memorable day—he stood collected, dignified, uncompromising; examined witnesses, quoted authorities, argued nautical and naval precedents with a force and a facility which would have done credit to an experienced barrister. On the one hand, his speech was a remarkable exhibition of self-esteem; on the other, a most interesting professional argument, for when he described the battle, and illustrated his views by diagrams, it was like a chapter in one of his sea-stories, so minute, graphic and spirited was the picture he drew. The dogmatism was more than compensated for by the picturesqueness of the scene; his self-complacency was exceeded by his wonderful ability. He quoted Cooper's 'Naval History' as if it were 'Blackstone;' he indulged in reminiscences; he made digressions and told anecdotes: he spoke of the manœuvres of the vessels, of the shifting of the wind, of the course of the fight, like one whose life had been passed on the quarter-deck. No greater evidence of self-reliance, of indifference to the opinion of the world, and to that of his countrymen in particular, of the rarest descriptive talent, of pertinacity, of loyalty to personal conviction, and a manly, firm, yet not unkindly spirit, could be imagined than a position he thus assumed, and the manner in which he met the exigency. As we gazed and listened, and understood clearly why, as a man, Cooper had been viewed from such extremes of prejudice and partiality, we recognized at once the generos-

ity and courage, and the willfulness and pride of his character; but the effect was to inspire a respect for the man, such as authors whose errors are moral weaknesses never excite."

The referees rendered their decision. Cooper was triumphantly vindicated. After he had put his enemies under his foot-stool, he said:

"This controversy was not of my seeking; for years have I rested under the imputations that these persons have brought against me, and now I strike a blow in behalf of truth, not from any deference to a public opinion that, in my opinion, has not honesty enough to feel much interest in the exposure of duplicity and artifice, but that my children may point to the fact, with just pride, that they had a father who dared to stem popular prejudice in order to write truth."

After this victory, Cooper rested on his laurels, and his enemies on their sullen oars. They sought other things to attack; they found other miserable foes of the press; they met other individuals with sinister designs upon its freedom, and they found it was not as expensive to protect the press from these as from Cooper—they had no such absurd notions of libel as that ingrate, that contemptible "enemy of America." Hence, Cooper was allowed to employ the evening of his life in strictly literary labor. He yet had ten years to live. He worked prodigiously. Seventeen works were hurried from his pen in that period.

Up to the year of his death he maintained in a remarkable degree his youth and his vitality. Untrammeled by the weight of advancing years, unannoyed by the puerile attacks of a galling press, he worked on bravely and well. During this interval of peace, he ceased to rake his enemies over the burning coals of his invective, and wrote for the love of nature and the amusement of the people. Up to the last moment, almost, he remained at his desk. But the insidious disease was rapidly, though secretly, sapping the life of the brave old novelist. On the 14th of September, 1851, surrounded by his family, the great controversialist, the great novelist, the able historian, James Fenimore Cooper, ceased to work, for he had ceased to exist.

With his death it seemed that all the harsh and ungenerous criticism with which he was hampered during life was discontinued. His faults—those existing in reality, and those existing only in the inflamed minds of his enemies—were forgotten. For a man of

such strong convictions, the lamentation over his death was nothing, if not unusual.

It may be truly said that the generation immediately succeeding the death of a writer, is the only one which can judge him accurately and justly. The prejudices that influenced his contemporaries, either for or against the writer, are simply matters either of amusement or of indifference to those who follow. Nor are they so far removed from the conditions, the surrounding influences, which made the author what he was, that they cannot understand and appreciate. Happy then is the truly deserving genius who lives sufficiently in the public memory to receive the attention and the verdict of immediate posterity. Woe to the ephemeral being who struts upon the literary stage, the admired of enthusiastic admirers, and who lords it over the poor devils who are their unsuccessful, but transcendently greater competitors. The reign of King Sham is short and inglorious.

It needs but little thought to show the truth of these observations concerning Cooper and his contemporaries. That the present generation is the first and best judge of the merit of the novelist is especially true in his case. Deluged with invective, floating in controversial gore, drawn in battles about which we of to-day care nothing so much as to be amused at the fallibility of humanity which they exemplified, that his antagonists should cease their attacks sufficiently to draw a critical breath, would have been as unnatural as it was impossible. Hence, we say, it is the privilege of the present generation, uninfluenced by passion, and indifferent to the matters about which our fathers raged, to give our verdict upon Cooper, his writings and his genius.

During his life, he did not escape the attention of certain literary oracles who generally find men about whom they can make themselves ridiculous. All writers of merit, according to these unhappy beings, are undeserving of attention, are deplorably without merit and destined to a soon and sudden oblivion. Indeed, so usual have these prophecies been made, that many of them exist in the public memory no longer than their oracular authors. It is only when the worth of the victim to the gloomy prophecy is so very great that his very worth perpetuates the memory of the prophecy and the author. Shakespeare has kept from oblivion one

or two of his critics. Byron and Keats have been equally kind. Dickens has been partially so. Cooper, however, has scarcely been able to rescue his. They were too numerous even for Cooper, and the patience of humanity, however great, has its limits.

It is more amusing than instructive to glance backward over the so-called criticism that solemnly affirmed, rather than pointed out, the miserable failures of Dickens and of Cooper. As an instance in point, we recall a review of Oliver Twist and its author, in the once formidable *Southern Literary Messenger*. The writer in language much more forcible than elegant, thus opens his admirable "criticism:"

"A writer who chooses to be known to the literary world by the name of 'Boz,' has, for some time past, been exhibiting his antics before the public. We have never sought his acquaintance, for the same reason that we should avoid a fellow who might thrust himself into an assembly room, and invite the notice of the company by the dress and grimaces of a Merry Andrew. We would ask ourselves, in such a case, what man capable of refinement would choose to be a buffoon? What man, possessing a particle of self-respect, would descend to an exhibition so degrading and disgusting? We should certainly suspect the intruder to be some clown of a circus, or bear-garden, escaped from his employer, and hold ourselves in readiness, at the first hint from the manager, to put him out."

It was in this delicate style that the moulders of public opinion gently reproved Dickens for having the audacity to write under the name of "Boz." The opinion of his work was no more flattering than of his *nom de plume*, and, we may add, was as forcibly expressed.

It seems that some publisher had actually published several works of this miserable fellow, Dickens, in a volume with works of genius. See what the worthy critic has to say as to this:

"We have said that, with a single exception, none of these tales is much better than those which we have abridged, though none of them is, *perhaps*, so excellently bad as those two (Dickens.) The excepted tale is called Edward Saville, and is by Charles Whitehead. We have never met Mr. Whitehead before, and should be happy to cultivate his acquaintance, had we not found him in such company. We hope he was begged into it against his will, or at least blundered into it by mistake. His little tale really surprises us as much as would the appearance of a genuine diamond among the glass beads and tinsel trumpery of a woman of the town. . . . . We are bound to return our acknowledgments to Mr. Whitehead for the pleasure we experienced in reading this little production, and we would requite it by a word of advice. He has

heard the adage *noscitur a socio*. . . . We, therefore, warn him against his associates, and call upon him to 'come out from among them, for he is not of them.' This advice will probably never reach him, but it may be of service to our readers hereafter, to recognize the name of Mr. Charles Whitehead as that of one who can write, and does write interestingly, and in good taste. It may serve an opposite and more important purpose to know that the gentlemen who have chosen Mr. Boz as their exemplar, as far as their names are given, are Samuel Lover, T. Haynes Bayly, Douglas Jerrold and others. We hope that our readers will remember and shun them as we shall do. They are bad company and dull company."—*Southern Literary Messenger, May*, 1837.

Thus did this censor of the press warn the public against the miserable upstarts, amazingly "dull" company, Charles Dickens, Samuel Lover, and Douglas Jerrold; and thus did he warn the wonderful genius, Charles Whitehead, of his danger and introduce him to the admiring public. This, at least, is an instance where the discriminating criticism of a contemporary has outlived the innocent subject of it.

The wiseacres of Cooper's day had many "Charles Whiteheads" with whom to make Cooper tremble with apprehension and jealousy. But Cooper's Charles Whiteheads were no more fortunate than the one who was so immensely superior to Dickens.

Consigning these criticisms of Cooper to the grave of forgetfulness, along with those who were to surpass Cooper in the race for honor and for fame, let us look briefly into the true merit of the novelist.

It may be paradoxical, but it is true, that Cooper's works are proved to be great by their very weakness. For, filled with grievous faults they certainly were, yet after thirty years have passed away since the last was published, they are popular both with the masses and the cultivated few. We think this alone a sufficient evidence that they are of no ordinary merit. That he did not achieve greater success was somewhat due to circumstances which he could have avoided, and somewhat to the insufficiency of the man himself. The besetting sin of Cooper was that he wrote too rapidly, and produced an amount of fiction that would have been ridiculous to every one except those who might be forced to read it. When we remember that the world's master minds have labored upon their grandest efforts with the care and attention that the sculptor devotes to the exquisite outlines of the statue,

and have even written and rewritten the simplest passages; when we remember that Cooper wrote some dozen times as much as Shakespeare or Milton, and when we know that he never revised his manuscript, we may well conclude that even a man of greater genius would have committed numerous and absurd errors.

In his stories, Cooper had neither method nor plot. If any one were to have followed his hero or heroine, as Cooper day after day detailed his experience, he would indeed be a wonder of foresight could he have told what would eventually become of him. Cooper, himself, did not know. Hence his characters were always doing the most impossible things, and getting into the most improbable and imminent of dangers. When his character reached such a stage that something strange, something miraculous must be done to get him or her in the proper position to get the story, as it were, on its legs and to traveling, the hero always went to sleep, and the heroine inevitably fainted. These little make-shifts, in the absence of plot and of method, were not the result of any want of resources, or of imagination, but because of Cooper's terrible haste.

Another fault was that he paid no attention to style himself, but was very anxious that every one else should do so. None was so quick to reprove carelessness as Cooper. His lectures to contemporaries were much more characterized by severity and tediousness of precept than by justice or by example. His sentences were loose, disjointed, involved, slovenly. He indulged in a regular cess-pool of punctuation. Frequently he would divorce his subject from his verb entirely. Not infrequently a singular noun would have the mortification of acting as the subject of a plural verb, and *vice versa*. These little idiosyncracies may be excusable, but it cannot be denied that the popular prejudice is in favor of the old rule, that a verb should agree with its subject in number and person.

A very serious objection to Cooper was that he generally wrote with a purpose. To name this as an objection may appear both strange and incongruous. But to our mind, at best, the novel with a purpose is far from doubtful propriety. Fiction was never intended, as a chief characteristic, to be didactic. It was invented rather to amuse than to instruct. That it should not do the latter, we would be the last to argue. In order properly to understand what we wish to express, it will, therefore, be necessary to define

what we understand by a novel with a purpose, and of which Cooper was frequently guilty. We mean, then, a work of fiction, which has for its chief aim the inculcation of some important moral, scientific or political truth. To this, all other matters must be subsidiary. But novels with such a purpose cannot reach a high degree, either of art or of interest. They are not upon subjects which can be satisfactorily treated in the light and popular style of fiction. Those who attempt it, spoil a novel and waste their efforts. We think this is true, under the most advantageous circumstances, when the object of the novel and the author are of the highest interest and merit. But neither Cooper nor his purposes were these.

Great, indeed, must be the merit of the book, and illimitable the patience of the reader, if a novel written to prove that Cooper was right and the people wrong in the Cooperstown affair, should prove a success. And yet Cooper wrote two novels to vindicate this important truth. Again, while we may admire his piety, we cannot appreciate his judgment, when he turns a novel into a controversial tract upon the superiority of Episcopacy; another to a vindication of the Trinity; another to discussing the advantages and disadvantages of marrying a member of the same Church, etc., etc. Many of these novels were written to prove what most people have never taken the pains to deny. The most exhaustive arguments were made to prove what every one regarded as self-evident.

But these were not the only subjects which Cooper wrote to advocate. He would save from oblivion the most absurd and harmless critic in the ephemeral newspaper, by turning aside to refute his unjust criticisms, in his novels and his simply horrible prefaces. Whether he adopted the novel idea of refuting in his prefaces these flings, which needed only to be refuted to be remembered, because of the tradition that the reviewer would be sure to read the preface and that alone, we do not attempt to say. However, he became, in these works, unbearably tedious. It is doubtful if any man that ever lived could have reached the high mark of mediocrity and pursue this course entirely. Cooper, however, was more unfortunate than most men would have been. As we have intimated, he was a person of infinite pride, of inflexible purpose and opinion, and an exquisitely sensitive nature. He could

not brook unjust and ungenerous assaults. He was a person of such strong convictions of pride and honesty withal, that he needed no second invitation to make the most elaborate exposition, or prolix defense of his position. The novel was the usual medium of the first, and he generally used it for the last.

The great wrong Cooper did himself by these purpose novels may be readily seen by comparing them with those in which his only ambition was to amuse. It seems impossible to conceive of the two kinds being the product of the same brain.

These defects, which we have named, are almost inexcusable on Cooper's part. All of these errors could very readily have been avoided. But we come now to discuss the more serious defects—defects which were constitutional and which it was impossible for him to overcome. In the portrayal of the higher and nobler characters, he failed. His heroes were commonplace. His women were almost absurd. He always selected as the highest type of manhood some negative character, who would always do and say the most impossible things. They were evidently the creatures of his imagination, being Cooper's models of propriety and excellence, but the object of abhorrence of every one else. His women in particular were the most correct of females. To say they were models of propriety would be to Cooper the acme of praise. Unfortunately, or fortunately, which, these women are few and far between. They occasionally appear in this life, but not in the character of lovers, but of old maids, lacking in the attractions necessary to excite intense admiration. Unfortunately Cooper had no sense of the humorous or he would have smiled at his own creations when anything but a smile was desired or expected.

But if Cooper's dress-parade characters were failures, his common specimens of humanity were just as successful. And therein most of his success will lie. Cooper would have been the last to believe it of himself, and yet he showed incomparably more genius in his minor or more vulgar characters than in the conventional hero and heroine of the story. His one creation of Leather Stocking, the noble son of the forest, is enough alone to make his name immortal and to render his memory dear to every lover of true nobility and worth of character.

One of the very strong points in Cooper's writing is his power

of painting nature. In this he excelled. Never has America produced a greater genius of description. To the devout lover of the rugged scenery of the primeval forest, to the enthusiastic admirer of the grandeur of old ocean in his majestic, calm or terrible tempest, we say read Cooper, the master.

It is only when our novelist is drawn forward into the delightful and ever-varying fields of adventure that we behold the grandest achievement of his wonderful genius. Probably no one, not Scott himself, the wizard of the North, could excel Cooper in the force, the energy, the picturesque beauty of his narratives.

We would be glad to dwell longer, upon this the brightest side of Cooper's career. But our space is almost exhausted. We have only a few more remarks to make.

The greatest refutation of the labored arguments made to prove Cooper's early oblivion is the fact that never have his works decreased in popularity. Great indeed have been the changes in the public taste and the corresponding change in the supply. Yet Cooper's popularity pursues the even tenor of its way. Nor has this success been without the protest of other candidates for favor. The height of phenomenal coolness in the assumption of pre-eminence, was a recent deliverance by the head of what is called, "The International School of Fiction." We have no disposition to join the united chorus of laughter, indulged in by the literary world at the expense of Mr. Howells, because of his bold statement of the superiority of his school to the other novelists. No wonder, under cover of the ridicule which he has met, he makes the statement that, "he doesn't remember" making any such statement. That he should forget his plain utterance, in the *Century Magazine* on this point, is more wise than natural. The calm dignity with which he proclaims the superiority of the International School, composed of himself and Henry James, Jr., and all the other tedious scribblers of fiction of the present day, is more disgusting than amusing.

This new school is directly opposed at every point of view to the novel of adventure. If the latter makes analysis of character subservient to incident, the former makes everything subservient to analysis. The hero, the heroine, and even the boot-black, is placed in the crucible and reduced to the elements. Not the

slightest movement can a personage make, but his motives are discussed with more thoroughness than ability, and with neither so much as tediousness. This is wearisome in the extreme. The story neither has a starting point nor a logical ending. The book simply comes to a stop after so many pages. Of incident there is none. The characters simply meet in Europe, (invariably in Europe,) and converse. They move from Baden-Baden to Paris and converse. They move from Paris to Geneva and converse. What is the subject of so much conversation no one can tell. There is little brilliancy and less of interest. The creations are bloodless and unsatisfactory. You read the book, put it aside and know no more than when you began it. Think of it two weeks afterwards and what pleasing recollections do you have? None. What creation of Mr. Howells, or of Mr. James, do you recall as a masterpiece? Have they produced or are they likely to produce any character who will live in the minds of the reading public?

And yet this is the school that is the popular idol, that is more pronounced than modest in its own expressed opinion, that smilingly assumes superiority not alone over Cooper and Simms, but even over Dickens and Thackeray.

We may be wrong, but while we confess to Cooper's faults, we express the opinion that Howells and James will be utterly forgotten when Cooper will be loved and venerated for his creations of "Leather Stocking" and of "Long Tom Coffin."

One of the not least objectionable features of the latter day fiction is its fashion of tampering with the marital relation. It has come to be the fashion to "analyze" the feelings and the actions of men and of women who seemingly have been unhappily mated and find out their mistake too late. This tendency is impure, disgusting and dangerous—if such mistakes are made, let them be hidden.

How different is Cooper. His novels are as pure as the evening zephyr. To turn from one of the latter-day creations to his is as turning from the stifled atmosphere of the ball-room to the pure, refreshing air of heaven. The noble and puissant advocate of truth, the patriotic American, the pioneer of our literature, the uncompromising foe of villainy, of sham and of toadyism, the portrayer of purity and virtue, he merits and will receive the grateful love and admiration of the people he loved so well.

PRAYER—OBJECTIVELY VIEWED.

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Prayer is natural to man. What is its nature and function? It is both a duty and a privilege; but how is the duty discharged and the privilege enjoyed? Is prayer, as some claim, only meditation, or is it aspiration, petition, and intercession? Does prayer move God, or does it only influence man? Is its function purely subjective or is it objective as well? These questions are practical and are constantly presenting themselves for investigation—they involve problems which demand solution.

Prayer is presented in the Bible, as petition, intercession, aspiration, and thanksgiving. This is its meaning in Biblical theory and practice. The precept and example of Biblical teaching reveal this. But this is not only the Biblical, but the general and popular idea of prayer. The living Church of to-day in its teaching and practice, reveals this as its interpretation of the Bible on this subject. It is the meaning which universal religion gives to prayer. But is prayer as petition ever answered? Does it move God to grant us favors and bestow upon us blessings which he does not grant or bestow upon the prayerless?

To answer this question correctly, we must first inquire: *What do the Scriptures teach us on this subject?*

The Jewish and Christian Scriptures are our divinely inspired books. They were written by men who wrote and spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. They contain revelations of moral, spiritual and religious truth. They are of Divine authority. What do they teach on the subject of prayer? This is an important question. To the Christian, the answer to this question from the Bible is final. Christ, the Divine teacher, says: "Ask and ye shall receive, seek and ye shall find." "Every one that asketh receiveth; he that seeketh findeth."—Matthew VII: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. "Whatsoever you ask the Father in my name he will give it you."—John XVI.: 2, 3, 24. "Ask and ye shall receive that your joy may be full." "And whatsovever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son." "If ye shall ask anything in my name I will do it."—John XIV.: 13,

14, 16. "And I will pray the Father and he will give you another Comforter that He may abide with you forever." "The fervent effectual prayer of the righteous man availeth much." "Is any among you afflicted let him pray." "Is any sick among you let him call for the Elders of the Church, and let them pray over him."—James v.: 13, 14. "And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he has committed sins, they shall be forgiven him." "Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed."—James v.: 14, 15, 16.

The Bible doctrine of prayer, as presented by Christ and his Apostles, shows that it is petition and intercession that moves God; that He will hear and answer our prayers for intellectual, moral, spiritual and material blessings. Wisdom, health, bread, pardon, peace, joy and salvation, are all given in answer to prayer.

The teaching and example of Christ, and Biblical instruction and history, alike show that prayer has objective power, and prevails with God.

Is the teaching of Nature in harmony with the teaching of the Bible on this subject? God has revealed himself in Nature and in man. The thought of God is revealed in his works, and the nature of God is revealed in his children. Man is the child of God, created in his own image. He is an intellectual, moral and spiritual being. He has not only a rational and moral, but a religious nature. Religion, worship and prayer are natural to man.

All men pray in seasons of danger. When calamity befalls them, and destruction threatens to engulf them, they instinctively pray. This is common to men of all nations and all ages. This shows that prayer is natural to man. Its common and natural form is petition, intercession and thanksgiving. Men cry to God for help and ask him for aid. They do this naturally. It is a religious instinct.

Prayer being natural, nature must be organized in harmony with prayer, and its answer: Nature in man and nature outside of man are not in conflict, but in agreement. The subjective and objective are in harmony. As nature is adapted to man, and man is adjusted to nature, prayer is natural to man, and as a means of securing blessing must be provided for. If this is not so then

nature's unity is destroyed, and nature's harmony is broken up. This would make science impossible, and destroy all ground of rational theology. Nature's unity is the basis of science and theology, as the unity of nature proves the unity of law and the unity of God.

On the subject of prayer and its answer, nature, the Bible, and man are seen to be in agreement; and God's works are in harmony with God's word. This thought presents an argument, and meets an objection, as it shows the naturalness of prayer and reveals nature as in harmony with man. The argument is conclusive, not only for the subjective efficacy, but the objective prevalence of prayer. The plan of God in nature and in man embraces prayer and its answer; for God as working in, through and by nature provides for all natural wants. Prayer being natural, the answer must be natural and in harmony with natural law. Not to pray is unnatural; not to expect an answer to prayer is to refuse to believe in the unity and constancy of nature. There is in men an intuitive conviction that God will answer prayer, and that by it as a means we receive divine as well as human help. This conviction is natural, universal and constitutional. If man's nature is true, this conviction must be true; if man's nature is reliable this conviction must be trustworthy. This subjective conviction points to an objective fact—this felt want of the finite points to the fullness of the infinite—"this human demand is evidence of the existence of a Divine supply." The voice of God in man is thus found to be in harmony with his voice in nature, and the Bible, and all combine in proclaiming the duty, power and efficacy of prayer. Men should pray, because prayer prevails with God.

This doctrine is in agreement with all the analogies of nature, life, and mind. The great law of prayer is this: We receive blessings because we ask for them. This is a universal law, and has been practically applied among all people, and during man's entire social and religious history upon earth.

There is no method or means for the attainment of blessings so common, so universal, or so reliable, as that of asking for them. Millions of the human race have no other means of securing either the necessaries or comforts of life. Everything is given for our asking. Love, sympathy, friendship, confidence, credit, help,

assistance, instruction, education, food, raiment, homes, friends, protection, reconciliation and salvation. All these blessings are given to man, every day, in every family, home, business-house, work-shop and school-room in answer to prayer, or because they are asked for.

This brings prayer under a general law, and makes it a means of universal blessing. It does not change its character as an expression of our need, and as a cry for help when it is addressed to God. If God exist, and is a personal being, it is rational to apply to him the same law that we apply to all other persons. Hence, Mr. Frothingham says: If we admit the personality of God, there can be no valid objection urged to prayer as a means of favor.—*Frothingham's Sermons.* The teaching of Christ on the duty and *efficacy of prayer* is only recognizing the existence of a universal law, which men practically apply in all their intercourse with each other, and which may be as rationally applied in our relations to God. If prayer moves man, as it evidently does, there is no reason it should not move God. If it moves the human, there is no reason it should not move the Divine Father. The influence of prayer on the earthly finite father, shows its power over a Heavenly Infinite Father.

This truth the Bible reveals, and thus shows its harmony with the analogies of nature and the constitution of man. But history and experience confirm the revelations of nature and the teaching of the Scriptures on this subject. In Biblical history, religious biography and Christian experience, the evidence of the objective, as well as the subjective influence of prayer, is conclusive. Thousands of men and women testify from their own experience of its power, and thousands of cases are given of its success. The induction from facts by which we establish the theory of prayer, is as wide as that by which we establish many of the laws of matter and life. It thus rests upon satisfactory evidence, and cannot be set aside without rejecting as false the experimental and historical proof upon which it rests; and to do that, would make it impossible for us to prove anything. If it be asked how do we know when God answers prayer, the reply is, we know it in the same way that we know that man answers prayer; we ask him to do it, and it is done. It is in this way that men know they are the

authors of their own acts. They resolve to perform an act, and it is performed. It is in this way that we know God answers prayer. We ask him to bless us, and we are blessed; to help us, and help comes; to comfort us, and we are comforted; to forgive us, and we are forgiven; to save us, and we are saved. We know that God answers our prayers just as we know that men do for us what we ask them to do. Our knowledge here is, therefore, just as reliable as in every other department of science.

This being so, our experience of the efficacy of prayer is just as reliable as our scientific experience. The experimental method of testing truth is the scientific method; and experimental evidence is the kind of evidence demanded by science, and it as conclusively proves the power of prayer as it does the healing power of medicine.

It is urged that prayer changes man, but cannot change God. We do not contend that prayer changes God's character or nature, but only his actions toward us. And if prayer changes man's character it must change the action of God toward him, or his government is not suited to the character of its subjects. The change in man produced by prayer demands and is met by a change in the acts of the Divine administration in regard to man, which proves that God is not unchangeable in his actions. This is all that successful prayer demands. That there is change in the Divine action, and in the forms and methods of the Divine manifestation is evident from nature. God does not do the same thing when He creates a world, and when He calls into being an insect. It is not the same act to form a mountain and paint a flower. It is a different work to kindle the fires of the sun and light the flames of genius. God is perpetually changing his action and varying his methods of work. This sort of change in God is all that is necessary to the objective influence of prayer. All that is claimed for it is that it changes God's action towards man, and causes him to grant to the man who prays blessings that He does not grant to the prayerless.

The God of nature and providence does for the man who works what He does not, for the man who will not work; and so the God of Grace does for the man who prays what He will not do for those who refuse to pray.

The claim that prayer cannot move God is neither rational nor Scriptural. There is a Divine humanity in God. There is evidently a divine side to humanity, and a human side to Divinity. Man is the son of God, and the son by the operation of the law of inheritance, is like his Father. The nature, attributes and perfections of the Father are transmitted to the son. Moses teaches us in his history of divine creation, that man was created in the image of God. In other words, he was made in God's likeness, endowed with the same intellectual, moral and spiritual nature. There is a mental and moral likeness between the Divine and the human. God and man have certain elements of nature and character in common. If this were not so we could form no correct conception of God's nature and character. To man a knowledge of God would be impossible. The same words have the same meaning when used in describing the nature and perfections of God, as they do when used in describing the nature and character of man. If this is not so, then they are calculated to mislead and deceive us.

Thought, purpose, plan, will, knowledge and wisdom, are the same in nature with God as with man. Benevolence, justice, righteousness, holiness, mercy, truth, goodness, piety, compassion, tenderness, have substantially the same meaning when applied to God as they do when applied to man. On any other theory, the Bible would be to us a sealed book. A revelation of God would be impossible, and man would be unable to gain any knowledge of the Divine nature and character. It is only in the light of this great truth that we can think or reason about God with any degree of certainty. Science is man's reading of God's thought, and to do this, he must think like God. The scientific study of Nature, therefore, shows that God and man think alike. If this were not so, man could not understand or comprehend the thought of God. Science is man's interpretation of Nature. But to interpret Nature, he must understand the divine thought revealed in Nature. There must be a mental likeness between man and God or true science is impossible. If theism, and not atheism, is true, God is the author of Nature; his thought is revealed in Nature, and science, if true, is the correct reading of that thought. Thus, to read Nature, requires a mind in harmony with, and adjusted to Nature, and in moral unity with the God of Nature. God and man must be

as one, or man cannot know God, or understand his works. The theistic spirit is, therefore, more scientific than the atheistic spirit. Faith is a better qualification for scientific study than skepticism, and Boyle is more reliable as an interpreter of Nature than Spencer, Comte and Mill. This unity of man with God, and this likeness of the human to the Divine, shows that as prayer can move man, so it will move God. The more a man is like God in nature and character, the more readily he responds to the cry of weakness, sin and sorrow. It is a proof of strength, and not of weakness, to be moved by the cry of another for help. Great natures are always generous. To be unmoved by a prayer for help, shows insensibility, and not greatness of nature. God is an emotional being, and like all beings with emotional natures of a high order, is moved by the presence of pain, want and sin. To such a Being man may address his prayer in confidence, feeling assured he will receive a gracious answer. The infinite Father, who loves all his children, will not turn away any who come unto him. He is more willing to bless, pardon, and save us, than we are to be blessed and saved. All the promises of the gospel teach this.

The objection urged against prayer based upon the knowledge and love, the wisdom and goodness of God, will not bear the test of logic, philosophy, or common sense. It is said God knows our wants, and our desires to have them supplied. If it is wise to supply them, He will do it without prayer; if it is not wise, He will not supply them in answer to prayer. Let us test this argument: God knows we want food; if it is wise, He will give it without work; if it is not wise and best, He will not give it for our work. This would prove that all work is as useless, and as fruitless as prayer. God knows we need knowledge; if it is wise, He will impart it without study; if it is not wise and best for us, He will not do it for our study and application. This would prove that all efforts to learn and acquire knowledge is unnecessary. This argument proves too much, and for that reason it logically proves nothing. Such reasoning applied in practical business life, would destroy all productive industry, and arrest all business, social, commercial, educational and moral progress. As a theory of life it is totally impractical. God could feed, clothe and dress men without labor; why does He require us to work?

Our work is not necessary to help God. It does not aid Omnipotence, or increase the infinite resources of the Creator. The demand for work is made for man's good. It is necessary for our development, growth and happiness, and God makes it the condition upon which he gives health, food, raiment, wealth and prosperity, in order to prompt us to industry. Want is the great motive to labor, effort, enterprise, discovery, invention and creation. The reason is, God will not supply our wants and meet our necessities without our own efforts. It is for the same reason He requires man to pray. Prayer is necessary to develop man's religious nature. It strengthens the tie that binds him to the Divine Father. For this reason He makes it the condition of his favor and blessing. It promotes the growth of piety. It provides for the exercise of man's religious affections, and the play of his spiritual emotions. As a part of worship, it stands related to all religious life, and increases all religious enjoyment. It may, therefore, be wise and good for God to give to the man of prayer blessings which he withholds from all others. They use certain means which no others use—they develop a certain character which no others develop—they are different from others, and should be treated differently. This shows the wisdom and goodness of God in adjusting man's nature and life to the law of prayer.

The foreknowledge of God is as consistent with the theory of prayer, and its answer, as it is, with the use of any system of means for the attainment of results. Its relation to all human effort is the same. If God has a provision of how I will act why place me under moral government? Who can answer? We may not be able to point out the precise method in which foreknowledge will harmonize with the freedom and responsibility of man, and with the use of means for the attainment of results; but we know man is free and responsible, and that God does require of us the use of means. Our action is not necessary to instruct God, but to develop and perfect our own natures, and for this reason He requires us to use our faculties in order to secure his approbation, favor and reward. Prayer belongs to this system of means ordained for the purpose of calling into action all the powers, faculties and affections of the human soul. The promised blessing is the human motive, but the perfection of man's nature is the Divine end.

Prayer is a prescribed condition of God's favor; but perfect humanity is the purpose of God in the whole arrangement. This is God's method, and it is wise and good. Modern scientists claim that science shows that all things are under immutable laws, and prayer cannot change results without changing the immutable laws of nature. The scientist will admit that industry, energy, enterprise, application, study, skilled labor, and intelligent work changes the result without changing the law; then why may not prayer do the same? Is it said the whole constitution of nature is adapted to man as a worker? I ask how do we know that nature is not adapted to man in prayer as well as to man in work? Prayer is as natural as work, and is relied upon by men as a means of blessing as truly as work; what evidence then have we that prayer is not as really in harmony with the constitution of nature as work? The universe must be a unit, nature must be in harmony, and as prayer is natural to man, it must be in accordance with the constitution of nature that prayer should be answered. Nature provides for all natural wants, and for the exercise of all natural powers; therefore, it must provide for prayer and its influence. Man can answer the prayers and grant the requests of his fellowmen without disturbing the order, deranging the harmony, or suspending the laws of nature; why cannot God do the same? Why can man do that in harmony with nature's order and constancy which God cannot? Has the creature more power over the creation than the Creator? Can finite intelligence do that which is impossible to infinite intelligence? If not, it follows that as man grants requests and answers petitions in harmony with the stability and constancy of nature's order, so can God. To deny this would be practical atheism. It is thus evident that science which gives to man so much power over nature, meets the objection to prayer which its teaching has caused, as what is possible to human intelligence, must be easy to Divine power, wisdom and love. Man does this by creating new combinations of natural laws and forces. He controls nature by adjusting himself to nature's order and laws.

By scientific study man learns how to combine his will and intelligence with natural forces, and thus produces new and wonderful results. Has not God as perfect a knowledge of the laws and forces of nature as man? The new combination and adjust-

ment of forces is, therefore, as easy to God the Creator, as man the creature. It is evident, from this fact, that natural laws that do not prevent man from granting the requests of his fellow-men, will not prevent God from giving a gracious answer to the prayers of his children. The more perfect man's scientific knowledge, the greater his power over nature, and the better illustration he is of God's power to control the whole machinery of the physical universe, for the education, development and salvation of man.

The blessings secured by prayer may not be given directly by God, but immediately through the agency of man. Nearly all our blessings are given by God through the mediation of men as co-workers with him. Life, health, culture, food, raiment and protection are all given us in this way. To employ men as the active agents in giving an answer to prayer, would be in harmony with all the analogies of nature and life. This is applying the same method in the spiritual department which we see is applied to all other departments of Divine and human activity. When a merchant sells you a piece of goods by his his clerk, it is as really his act, as though he did it himself. So when God sends an answer to prayer by man, it is as truly his gift and his act as if he brought it himself. This being true, all science and art may be, and doubtless are, employed by God through the agency of man, in working out the answer to the prayer of faith. Science, then, when practically applied, is one of the means through which God sends benefits in answer to prayer; and thus furnishes a satisfactory antidote to the poison of its own skepticism. Man himself may form the new combinations of law and force, in obedience to spiritual inspiration given by God, which will secure the results so devoutly prayed for by God's people. Men contribute largely to working out the grand moral and spiritual results of providence. This practically removes the whole difficulty presented by scientists to prayer as a means of procuring for man temporal and spiritual blessings.

The great lesson taught by all science, is the power of man over nature, of mind over matter, of the moral over the animal, and the spiritual over the physical. This shows the power of all minds, whether Divine or human, infinite or finite, to make the physical

and material do its bidding, perform its work, bear its burdens, run on its errands, and subserve its interest.

In the light of this great truth, so clearly revealed by science, is it not evident that natural and physical law cannot arrest the influence of prayer as a moral and spiritual force in the universe? The one great lesson, then, of all science, positively contradicts the unfounded skepticism of some men, in regard to the influence of prayer as a cry for Divine help.

The universe was made for man, belongs to him, is appropriated and enjoyed by him, and, as such, it will subserve the interest of his religion as truly as it does the interest of his science, commerce, art and literature. The teaching of science, when really understood, is most favorable to the success of prayer as a means of grace, and should influence all to live a life of Christian piety. Nature and revelation teach us to worship God, and love man. The objection that the success of the prayer of intercession would conflict with the freedom and moral agency of the man for whom we pray, as it may secure for them blessings which they do not wish or desire, is not rational or logical. When the labor of other men secures for us benefits for which we never toiled, it does not trammel our freedom or moral agency. Why, then, should the blessings secured to us by the prayers of other men do so? We live in society under social influence, and the action of others is all the time affecting us, but it does not destroy our freedom; so the prayer of others may influence our lives and fortunes without destroying the free action of will.

It is neither the Divine or human method to wait for men to get ready for all good before it is given. The truth, light, science, art, law and government, the Spirit of God, the Bible and the Church, come before we desire or ask for them, and by their presence, power and influence, change our thoughts, warm our hearts, and make us ready for their reception, use and enjoyment. This is God's method of dealing with us in nature, providence and grace; and it is because of this that we have the blessings and benefits of science and religion, the Church and salvation to-day.

It is true that prayer does not always receive the desired answer, that it sometimes fails. This is what we should expect. It is so with all human effort. The labor of the farmer does not at all

times secure the harvest. Medicine often fails to cure the patient. The wisest legislation often fails to prevent crime and reform criminals. The gospel does not convert and save all sinners. Shall we refuse to plow and sow, stop the pratice of the healing-art, abrogate all law, and refuse to preach or hear the gospel, because of partial failure? Men do not so think or act. We have confidence in agriculture, trust the curative power of medicine, rely upon legislation and law, and preach the gospel for the salvation of men in the face of repeated failure. The reason is that, as a rule, these efforts are crowned with success. It is so with prayer. There is repeated failure, but general success. As a means, and a condition of benefit, it is not infallible, no human means are. Man is not infallible. There is imperfection in all his efforts, because he is imperfect. From this imperfection results partial failure. But history and experience show large success.

By prayer human weakness clothes itself with Divine strength, and man becomes wise through Divine wisdom. In its exercise we enter into communion with God and enjoy a sense of the Divine presence. It lifts us above the earthly and sensuous into the presence of the spiritual and eternal. It calls into exercise our noblest faculties and highest aspirations. It is the source of the sweetest pleasures and purest enjoyments of life.

SYSTEMS OF EDUCATION.

BY F. M. EDWARDS, OF THE VIRGINIA CONFERENCE.

It is entirely reasonable that the subject of education should receive the best thinking of statesmen and moralists. It deserves also the study of the true Christian. The history of the world is plainly instructive as to these assertions. Whenever a great genius has arisen to give evidence of the grandeur of mental power, that genius has recognized the imperative demand for educational processes. The best specimens of the human race have never taken any other view of the interests of a nation than that involved in the assertion that the people must have opportunity for the acquisition of knowledge, if they are expected to reach excellence in any department of

human exertion. National suicide can be quickly accomplished by pandering to the vices of ignorance. Perhaps one of the strongest arguments which the theologian can ever use relative to the doctrine of depravity, is that drawn from the history of ignorance. An ignorant population cannot be trusted. Stern principle—that which demands the sacrifice of present ease or pleasure for future good—is rarely found among the debased specimens of humanity in savage life. The very fact that barbarian ferocity has had a history in our fallen world—that we find the normal story of races to be that of degeneracy from the original parent—that the descendants of Noah, a man thoroughly informed on the doctrine of obedience, became so quickly the grossest idolators, and the most degraded examples of ignorance; all this may be used as an argument to prove that (such is human nature) we cannot expect anything but downward movement, unless there be constant and great care in the adoption of training instrumentalities. To make no effort for increasing intellectual power, is to allow a degeneracy thereof; just as to make no use of a muscle is to allow a weakening of it. So also the moral faculties and the religious principles must be characterized by ascent or descent in excellence and power. To find an enlightened nation that takes no pains in the instruction of youth, that has no schools, colleges or universities; no literary societies, no printing presses or places for public speaking, no nursery discipline, and no parental teaching of any kind, is to find an absurdity equal to that of a religious man that never worships, or of an honest man that steals. Enlightenment presupposes a desire to enlighten. Philosophy is not philosophy if it be uncommunicative. Every noble specimen of the honorable philosophic tribe has been an active promoter of the advantages to be derived from his philosophy. Socrates, the great light that shone in the midst of moral darknes, whose shining was the more resplendent because of the surrounding darkness, was not satisfied to enjoy his ideas in solitude. He was a teacher. He sought the best opportunities for giving information on the highest, the most important themes of thought. He risked and lost his life in the honest effort to drive away Athenian ignorance.

Thus we see the alternative before us; we must give up enlightenment unless we enlighten. We must assert no claim to philoso-

phy unless we philosophize. We must be content to degenerate as a people unless we make industrious exertions for the education of the generation to which we must hand down a heritage.

One of the most encouraging signs of the times is found in the fact that so much attention is now given by governments, civil and ecclesiastic, to the subject of education, and that this attention is popular among the larger portions of earth's population. Even superstition is not now able to enforce the dogma that devotion claims ignorance as its foster-parent. Convents and monasteries are not now able to hide in cloistered darkness the tomes of written lore. Men demand that books should be printed and circulated. Nations have laws to prevent compulsory ignorance. Some have laws that look to compulsory education. All are, more or less, engaged in the study of plans for educational enterprises. We look with joy upon the part our own country is taking in the grand march of mind. The rush of thought that seems now so powerful is pregnant with good if guided wisely. The tidal wave of literary and scientific progress which is now moving is destined to overwhelm many an error of head and of heart, provided it be guided by the hand of wisdom and the behest of virtue to its proper mission. Will this proviso be met? To answer this question we ask another: What systems of education are our people, in their roused attention, willing to adopt? Are they to be satisfied with the mere existence of schools and colleges without making inquiry as to their character for guiding the youth to real usefulness in life? Will they be content to look complacently over the statistical tables and suppose they can measure learning by arithmetic, its value by dollars and cents, and its dignity by the cost of a school-house? Will they imagine that brain power and moral worth are to be graded as material substances, and hence, subjected to the laws of commerce or science of avoirdupois? In a word, will they be satisfied with mere show? take the shadow for the substance? or allow a fraud similar to that of a jeweler who palms off upon unsuspecting purchasers the baser metals for pure gold?

It will not do for a thinker to assert that the peculiar *modus* of a school has but little to do in the production of scholarship. As well affirm that the *modus* of a farmer has nothing to do with the

success of cultivation; that the attention of the miller has nothing to do with the excellence of his flour, as to say that the results of teaching are not largely dependent upon the *system* adopted by the teacher or the school authorities. Because a few persons of rare talents have reached excellence as scholars, in spite of defective modes of instructions and great cruelty or great carelessness in discipline, we cannot formulate an argument against the importance of great care in selecting a system. Had it been fact that in all the history of the past our schools had been characterized by nothing erroneous in discipline or in modes of recitation, what distresses would have been avoided in thousands of instances, and what progress in the development of the mental power and pecuniary prosperity of the people would ere this have been our heritage, no human thought can tell. If *some* minds reached higher attainments in statesmanship or in the sciences, when the beginnings of the educational process were such as were found in the average "old field" school in Virginia half a century ago, or in such institutions as found their historian in the author of "Georgia Scenes," how many minds would have reached eminence, and usefulness in the varied professions and trades, had the advantages of better training been common? It is plainly possible that large expenditures of money and exertion may be lost—worse than lost—by the adoption of plans which result in a fruitage far more deleterious than the darkest night of ignorance or the continuance of the greatest inconveniences of poverty; and this assertion is not refuted by the fact that Galileo and Copernicus wrought great results while living in an age of erratic teaching. The very difficulties encountered by these remarkable thinkers, constitute a proof of the sad crop to be gathered from error in method. Some system of education had been in practice from the earliest dawn of thought; why were the evidences of progress so small, and why were the evidences of evil so numerous? Retrogression in excellence may be concomitant with a sort of progress in science. The store-houses of learning may be the abode of scheming wrong and cruelty. The seat of a powerful University may be the place whence proceed influences that shall rivet the chains of ignorance upon multitudes, and the shackles of vice upon thousands. The pages of history recording the deeds of men during all the dreary years from

Constantine to Luther, or from Luther to John Wesley, may be constituted our court of appeals on this subject. What sentence comes therefrom? Evidently this, that serious thought on the part of educators as to their methods should not be second to the thought exercised relative to the importance of education itself. The patient *must* have medicine, but he would be suicidal to employ a doctor who would give strychnine for cod-liver oil.

Now, to ascertain a proper system of education—one that "worketh no ill" to the subject thereof, "or to his neighbor"—the educator must keep constantly in mind the end—the great end—the all-important design of the educational process. What is it? No true answer can be given to this inquiry which will fail to embrace a provision for "the life that now is, and for that which is to come." Present and future advantage to man must be the object in view—not present to the exclusion of future good, nor an entire disregard of the present advantages to be had, can be a wise design. It is folly to destroy the muscular power of one's arm in the preparation of an instrument to be used by the hand. It is far more folly to destroy the brain power of a human being in the attempted preparation of the brain for future action; but folly reaches its climax when it sacrifices all future good to present ease and comfort. A strong mind in a healthy body is of course the ideal man. If it be added that this strong mind is well guided by principles of virtue, we have a picture of what should be the aim of education. That there are some plans in the numerous schools of earth well calculated to injure, if not destroy the soundness either of the body or of the mind (or of both), we need not, because we cannot deny. That there is some plan which will avoid all injury to mind or body, and at the same time give all requisite knowledge, and the more important development of mental strength to use knowledge, and the still more important development of moral principle to use it *rightly*, we can with equal readiness affirm. To find out and follow this plan is the problem of education.

1. In this plan there must be provision made for the acquisition of knowledge, and hence for cultivation of the faculty of memory. The fundamental laws of science must be learned, their formulas must be remembered, the varied assistants which a student needs must be committed to memory, so that he will not be forced to a

long and tedious process of calculation at each step of his work in the solution of a problem. The time taken up in "getting by heart" the multiplication table is not time lost. It saves immensely in time over the process which would compel the student to refer to his book, or to put down twelve times eight marks on his slate every time he needs to use the formula 12×8=something. To have in the memory the truth that "the square of the sum of two quantities equals the square of the first, plus twice the product of the first by the second plus the square of the second"—$(x+y)^2=x^2+2xy+y^2$—is more to be desired than the necessity of going through the process of multiplication every time the squaring of the sum of two quantities is required. If the history of the exodus under Moses is to be a subject of profitable thought that history must be learned and remembered, we must not disparage either the acquisition of facts or the office of memory in storing them up. A good memory is a great blessing to its possessor, because he can make it a blessing to his race. A large store of acquired information that can be called up by the faculty of memory at any time there is use for it, is a valuable treasure. Hence, we see how much advantage a debater with a good memory and a store of facts has over an antagonist whose memory is poor. One of the directions then to be given to a student must be this: "Acquire fact and cultivate memory."

2. But the process of memorizing is very far from reaching the highest exertion of the student's mind. Nor can it be regarded as the most important part of the mental toil, unless we can say the aids to a work are more important than the work itself. The philosopher who gave the aphorism "knowledge is power" was not at the time thinking of the lurking fallacy therein, or he would have employed a different verbiage. The possession of tools will not make a carpenter; an engine is not an engineer; knowledge is not power of itself, but it renders power a possibility. There may be much knowledge with little power. There cannot be much power without knowledge. In the acquision of knowledge the student should keep constantly in mind the truth that he is not like an ant, accumulating a store upon which to exist in a state of inaction in after hours, but he is rather like the scytheman preparing his blade for skillful activity in the coming harvest; and like the successful

harvester he must study the way to use, as well as how to sharpen, the instrument of his work. A comparatively dull blade in the hands of a practiced reaper may do do more work than a sharp one in the hands of a person who knows not how to use it. But the very best results are to be discovered when the improved tool is used by the expert workman. We reach the conclusion that to put into the brains of youth a mere list of scientific facts is not to produce true scholarship. It is to teach boys to think that renders education valuable. To produce in the coming generation men whose minds, already strengthened by thought, shall be ready to engage in more thought for the benefit of men and for the glory of God, is an object worthy of the greatest exertion of our educators.

Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, is quoted as declaring that "it was not knowledge, but the means of getting knowledge which he had to teach." It is said his whole method was founded on the principle of awakening the intellect of every individual boy. Then and only then, memory becomes valuable in the process. Let it be insisted upon in school boards and in the public prints that recitation "*ipsissimis verbis librorum*" is not an infallible sign of real progress. It is a sign of memorizing toil; but a few questions put *viva voce* from the teacher outside the verbiage of the text, to test the thinking of the student, may discover that memory *alone* has been employed. Suppose at recitation a boy should recite very accurately the definition, "a noun is a name of any person, place or thing," and on being questioned as to the number of nouns in the sentence: "A good boy loves his parents," should give "six" as his reply, it would be very evident that his memory of words alone had been exerted in the former part of "saying his lesson." Nor would it be difficult to prove culpable negligence in the teacher who would allow such a recitation to pass as sufficient.

The picture of a Jewish school in Nazareth in our Lord's day, given by a writer in the *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopœdia*, is one from which little could be expected except to burden the memory with words not understood. It is in these words:

"The school-room is the interior of a squalid building rudely constructed of stone, with a domed roof and whitewashed walls, a wooden desk or cupboard on one side, and an inscription in Hebrew over the door. From the building, as we approach, comes the hum of many children's voices repeating the verses of

the sacred Torah in unthinking and perfunctory monotone. The aged teacher sits silent in the midst. As we look, we see his huge turban, his gray beard and solemn features appearing over the ruddy faces of the dark-eyed boys who sit on the floor beside him. . . . The scholars are the children of the richer members of the village community, of the Betlanim, or 'men of leisure,' who form the representative congregation at every Synagogue service; or of the 'standing men' who go up yearly with the village priest for a week in Jerusalem to fulfill similar functions in the temple ritual.—*Rabbi Jeshua, London.*

The "unthinking monotone" of this school is much after the fashion of some modern schools, in which the memory, alone, is the faculty upon which are based the hopes of parents and teachers for "brilliant Commencement occasions" to close up successful scholastic terms.

The former part of this article, urging the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation of memory, is not contradicted by the assertion we now make as to the worthlessness of that system which cultivates memory only, and imposes memorizing tasks and burdens of the cramming process upon minds eager simply to pass the ordeal of one great occasion, caring but little for the subsequent fruitage of inefficiency in the battle of life. There is value in memory—great value in the acquisition of knowledge—but there is a limit to the meaning of the word "value" in each case. An intelligent teacher will insist upon exactness and quickness in reciting the tables of weights and measures, but it is nonsensical cruelty to try to make a student repeat the table of logarithms in a work on surveying. It is a fact, too, that the cases of diseases from overtaxed brains are more frequently the effects of burdening the memory than of any other part of educational requirement. An Oxford professor says:

"Those who adopt the memory as their educational tool, are ever exerting greater pressure on their pupils. The acquisition of knowledge is held to be true education; and the more earnest and noble-minded is the feeling to rescue the young from ignorance, the stronger will be the effort to pile up knowledge on the memory, and the more fatal will be the consequences to the unhappy victims of such a theory of education. Additional hours are incessantly demanded for school, longer and more frequent lectures, to be remembered, are given, severer codes of attendance enforced, and thus a mass of over-education is required under which the brains of countless youthful sufferers sink into pain, and often into lunacy."—*Princeton Review for July. Article by Prof. Bonamy Price.*

The sentimemts found in this quotation, we fear, may be used by a certain class of extremists in favor of a lax discipline and a good time generally at college, to the exclusion of such requirements as are absolutely necessary in all educational schemes for the production of scholarship. It is wrong to overtask; therefore do not task the faculty of memory at all. Be content with faulty recitations and trust to your own explanations which may be forgotten as soon as uttered. Require next to nothing from the members of your class, fearing the cry of overtasking. These and similar pieces of advice may come from thoughtless men. In reference to the course to be pursued by the true educator in this, as in most of the enterprises of mind *in medio tutissimus ibis*, (in the middle course you will go most safely), is a proper motto. There is great danger in the system that overtasks; there is certain failure in the system that does not task at all. Success will attend that course which insists upon such employment of all the mental faculties (memory included) as will be most likely to result in the accomplishment of the great end of all proper training—the gift to the world of a strong and virtuous character. This gift must be the fruit of toilsome study in both the acquisition of knowledge and the study of knowledge after it is gained, followed by a wise use thereof. Let the teacher see that the scholar is himself dissatisfied to memorize sentences which he does not understand, and hence cannot apply. Let conversation test the possession of power to use the truth memorized. Teach pupils to think. Their toil will thereby become fruitful, pleasurable and not unhealthy.

3. The question as to the branches of study that should enter into the curriculum of an institution is by no means unimportant. What to study is not decided by telling how to study. The injunction to think is not complete when you do not give a subject upon which to think. Nor will valuable sequences mark the most continuous thought upon trifling subjects. To make a system of education produce the highest benefit to man it must be made to embrace such things as will conduce to the strengthening of mind, as well as furnish qualifications for the varied positions of professional or commercial life. The exercise of mind involved in the study of those things necessary for securing a cultivated intellect, may, to some, seem unimportant, unless the branches are all to be

used in the peculiar calling to which the man proposes to devote himself. This is an error. The changes in this life are so numerous that one does not know what peculiarity of his education may prove advantageous in coming crises of his history. The ship may sail many a league before finding an opportuuity to use some things which the wise captain has placed on board. But when the time arrives for their use it is too late to provide them. But aside from this view of a *possible* call for the actual use of certain parts of education, it is certainly true that mind becomes strong by the effort made to gain extensive scholarship. King Agesilaus gave only a half truth when in reply to the question: "What ought boys to learn?" He said: "What they ought to do when they become men." Of course they ought to learn to do what they will have to do when older; but it is equally true that every means ought to be used to make the mind develop its powers so as to be able to act to the best advantage and enjoy its own improvement. The grindstone, which is used to sharpen the axe of the woodman, is not employed at the time of felling the tree, but it is very important in preparing the axe for its mission. It is a source of gratification to know that the authorities of American colleges have shown no inclination to follow the men who clamor against the classics and desire modern languages to be substituted for them in the college demands for graduation. If ever such substitution shall have become general, then farewell to thoroughness in learning. The day of strong minds will have passed. The professor, before quoted, says:

"It is precisely in the labor demanded, the time consumed, the difficulty encountered, that the supreme value of dead languages lies. The thoughts of great men discovered, by painful labor and attention in languages to which sound and ear gave no help, are the fiercest enemies of cram, and the most powerful developers of the human brain. Lessons given in living languages need call for little thought, still less for translations. There is little labor spent in mastering their meaning; a shallow perception of the meaning generally suffices for the learner. The faculties of the mind are feebly summoned to awake and encounter the struggle of understanding. With an intelligent teacher and a living language much superficial work may be done, but it gives no guarantee for bringing out thought in the pupil. He is but feebly summoned to think."

Such words may strengthen the already formed determination to continue classical studies for the purposes of mental training. We

disparage no practicality in using the utilitarian branches of study; but in systems of liberal education let not the classics be crowded out by such a substitution as that proposed by Mr. Chas. Francis Adams.

4. Perhaps the problem of discipline in schools and colleges, is the one which presents the greatest difficulties to an earnest and honest educator. Especially in these days, when parents seem sometimes more unreasonable than students (or at least to encourage a restiveness under wholesome laws), does the difficulty become one of enormous proportions. In many cases the *fruits* of discipline are apparently expected without the *means* of discipline. Teachers and professors are thought to possess a sort of *hocus pocus* power by which miraculous transformations of character in students of previous bad habits, can be brought about by mere professional will without the use of correctives by way of restraint or penalties. The desire for popularity, too, on the part of instructors, because patronage is largely based thereupon, may cause a leniency of indulgence fatal to good government. To wait for popularity to come from the vindication of methods absolutely requisite to the best interests of the parties concerned, but which seem at first somewhat harsh, is too slow a process for the teacher whose desire for applause is master of his method. As in the ministry so in teaching, there should be an honest inquiry as to what is best before that of what is pleasing.

The rewards of fidelity may be late in coming, but they will be ultimately more valuable than the fleeting applause of the thoughtless. The consciousness of doing right is of unspeakable worth. It should not be bartered for the shams of mere policy.

But what is the true idea of proper discipline? What ends are proposed by the adoption of disciplinary requirements? Of course no answer can be given to these questions by an honest teacher, except such as will embrace the good of the scholar as a motive. To impress this upon the minds of pupils will aid very much in rendering the teacher's task less difficult. It must be a very depraved person that will not appreciate work for *his* good. Few students will acknowledge such depravity. This must give an advantage to teachers and college officers not to be despised. Let them employ it. The specific laws by which schools ought to be

governed may be divided into three classes—those that relate to study, those that relate to health, and those that relate to morals. Not dwelling upon the requirements for study and the preservation of bodily health, we would devote some space to the very great importance of that class of laws by which it is proposed to protect and promote good morals. In this department is generally found that laxity which may constitute the germ of destruction to all excellence in every department. In those institutions whose students board away from their parents, there is great responsibility resting upon the managers. It is a very sad thing to a virtuous parent to have his child return from college or boarding-school, ruined in morals by the very associations from which such large hopes of advantage had been entertained. How agonizing the thought that the hard-earned funds, intended for the securement of education for usefulness, have purchased a wreck of character, and consequently a future of despair.

Such is the state of things in our fallen world it is hardly to be expected that any institution can escape all trouble relative to morals. Wherever young persons are found, the agents of evil will there seek to ply their means of temptation. It is the utmost folly to neglect them until an injury has been received that may prove remediless. Nor can it be supposed that in a large number of matriculates, no one already skilled, to some extent at least, in the means of allurement, can be among them. Hence, while there is demand for defence against dangers from without, there must be care as to correction of *possible* dangers from within. These facts render it perfectly plain that any system of education, collegiate or academic, that ignores careful discipline is worse than worthless. The idea of supposing that there is no danger because the head of the school shuts his eyes, finds its equal in the action of the goose that vainly supposes she has eluded her pursuers by thrusting her head under the brush.

The rebound from the cruel rigidity of old systems, which gave no evidence of real discipline, but much evidence of cruel tyranny, is so great that fear may be entertained in regard to its effects. To let the idea of liberty permeate school circles until every vestige of authority is gone, is to defeat the end of all true education. "Order is heaven's first law," says some one. Hence the working of all

the systems of worlds, without collision and without disaster. In schools there must be order. Order implies authority; authority implies ability for its own maintenance. Criminal is the party that superinduces in the minds of students the notion that it is contrary to their manliness to be obedient to laws made for the advancement of the very object for which young men are sent to college or school. They should be convinced that laws are made for good, and that self-interest, as well as every idea of honesty, demands a conscientious obedience. In this connection it is proper to state that the supposition that there is any very great difference in the *principles* of the discipline to be adopted by the faculty of a college and those of an academy, as the names of institutions are understood in America, is a grave error.

In a college, as well as in an academy, the temptations from without, and the dangers from within, are of sufficient magnitude to call for the most careful guardianship over the morals of the young, on the part of tutors, professors and officers. To refuse the trouble of such guardianship for fear of having it named "suspicious espionage," is as unmanly as it is unkind. The honor of young gentlemen may be appealed to—they must be convinced that you rely greatly upon their love of right—that all scholastic rules are nothing but evidences of love to the young on the part of their originators—that the administration of discipline is nothing but the working of the noblest affection; we cannot be too positive in such declarations; but these sayings will not obviate the necessity of such a system of care as will cause an impossibility of the existence of systematic violations of law without the knowledge of the faculty. The great secret of discipline is found in a knowledge of the trend of influences. Many an error may be nipped in the bud by a knowledge of such influences; which error, let alone to its fruitage, would bring the most disastrous consequences. The trite saying, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," applies no where more truthfully than to systems of moral training. The honorable student will not object to precautionary measures. The schemes of the dishonorable deserve to be exposed.

5. Three parties are supposed to be called upon for active participation in the work of supplying educational facilities. The

State, the Church, and the parent, must each bring tribute to the enterprise of instructing a boy. The relative office of each is not difficult to understand, when we consider what part of human interests is entrusted to each by the very constitution of things. The work of the State has regard to good citizenship. The work of the Church has regard to eternal destiny. The work of the parent has regard to all the interests of his offspring for time and for eternity. It is easy to see how the teachings of all may harmonize; and the gifts of one may make the gifts of the other more valuable than either could be without the other. A good citizen is always made when a Christian scholar is developed; but Christianity is not always the companion of good citizenship. Neither the Church nor parents can supply *all* the funds requisite for the education of the masses; hence it is seen that no one party can justly exclude the other from partnership in the great work; nor can either justly or possibly take the whole burden upon itself. To give up all education to the State would be practically to ignore the moral or religious aspects thereof; and this would not be true education. What, then, seems to be the best policy? Clearly, this: Let the State cheapen education by its aid, so that all parents can secure the advantages thereof. Let the Church afford moral and religious influences, so as to make the work of the highest character. Let parents avail themselves thankfully of the aids, but see that home influences are co-operative, both as to scientific and moral progress.

The most important portion of a student's course, so far as school instruction can influence character, is that portion found between the primary school and the university. Hence, if State appropriations give elementary learning and university advantages, parents and the Church should engage to supply the academy and the college, for the reason that these latter have so much to do in the formation of moral character, because it is supposed that their instructions are given at a period of peculiar susceptibility and in the absence of parental oversight. The primary school on the contrary is supposed to be in the neighborhood of the parental roof. No class of schools can be of greater worth than that of academies of a high grade. They should always be under the guidance of educated Christian gentlemen whose influence will be entirely on the side of virtue and Christianity. Either by private

enterprise allied to the general Church, or by sectarian (not bigoted) institutions, this demand can be met. Denominational colleges, which should be amply endowed, will follow up the work; and, if all are truly faithful, the State Universities will be supplied with students whose character will be so formed that they can meet the exigencies and peculiarities of such institutions without moral harm. Surely it does not take a large amount of thinking on the part of the Christian philosopher to see that academic and collegiate education cannot be surrendered to the State with safety, even if the State were willing to take charge of the whole.

The possibilities of political corruption added to the probability of here and there having sceptical or irreligious professors, must be sufficient to convince the Church and the religious parents of children, that there ought to be no compromise on this subject. The aid given by State appropriations to free schools of a primary nature and to a State University, which will place those parts of the educational work under the control of legislatures, will be all that the true Christian can desire; feeling as he does, that more interference on the part of civil authorities would endanger the character of the influence given. That the Church must take part in the work of training mind, seems to have been an acknowledged dogma from the earliest ages of Christian thought. That she cannot, without inconsistency, fail to enter so important a field of usefulness as that found in scholastic toil, is plainly demonstrable from the close connection that exists between the different powers of mind, and hence the truth that the moral sense—conscience—cannot fail to receive more or less of education during the reception of literary advantage by the student.

The Church cannot be careless relative to a thing so intimately connected with the welfare of immortal souls. This being admitted, the particular place of her work must be that of academies and colleges. The academy is usually supplied by private enterprise. When found under the control of proper men, the Church should foster such an institution. The college proper needs endowment. The friends of Christian education should furnish that endowment and not suffer the harrassments of poverty to trammel the work. Of course, ability and piety should conjoin in the

faculty. The absence of either of these characteristics in an applicant, should be a sufficient reason for non-election.

The danger to a system of education wholly under the control of the State, has been rather sadly proved by the history of the free school system. The admission we have made that funds from taxation may be advantageously employed in primary schools, and in University enterprises, is not one made by all thinkers. We have made it, because of the lack of funds from other sources to destroy the tremendous evil of illiteracy among the masses. We do not say that the present condition of the public schools will demonstrate a profitable investment in the rural districts. The interference of motives merely political, in the selection of school boards and Superintendents at a time when politics can only mean partizanry, has largely destroyed public confidence. This writer has now in mind a case in which the removal of a Superintendent of county schools, wholly on account of his not agreeing with the dominant party, was succeeded by the appointment of a man whose reputation for drinking ardent spirits, was equal to his renown as a partizan. It was also generally understood that he was not slow to exercise influence in opposition to the plainest teachings of Holy Writ.

Another very grave defect in our free school system, is that found in the fact that the sessions are so short. In some instances teachers have been ordered to close after two months teaching. In some cases three, in others four, in none, more than five months, have constituted the length of the term. The reasons given for such a curious idea are that the funds are not sufficient for a longer term than five months, and the law requires that a school shall be discontinued before the expiration of that term, if there be not an average attendance of fifteen pupils during a month. For two reasons it is rightly argued that such a system spends money for naught, and that the people get no adequate advantage from their taxes. Such a system can expect only the poorest teachers; it places in the hands of even a good teacher no power to do much educating because of the shortness of the term. If we add to these two reasons the fact that by the law one or two indolent boys with indulgent or unwise parents, may deprive a whole community of

advantage, if any there be, from the school tax thereof, we will see the radical nature of the defect in the system.

The wonder is that it ever received the votes of legislators. To suppose that a teacher of any real qualifications will long remain in a situation that gives him small pay for only a small part of the year, is to suppose next to an absurdity. But these objections to the present system in Virginia will not constitute a valid argument against a good system of public schools. They do, however, show the danger of all systems that are under the control of party politicians, and give warning not to go further in subjecting school enterprises to the ever-varying wind of party success. If by federal aid the school funds can be so increased that the terms may be made of a sensible length, and the pay sufficient to secure good instructors, we may hope something from the outlay; and the moral danger of which we have spoken may be guarded against by parental teaching coincident with that of the public school. This latter, however, cannot be said relative to those schools of a higher grade in which the pupils are away from the parental home. Hence, we insist upon the truth that classical academies and colleges should never be under State control. The Church should endow the latter, and encourage good and able men in private enterprises establishing the former. Then may we expect the highest advantages to accrue to the nation from the tidal wave of favorable sentiment upon the subject of education.

LAWS OF THE DIVINE ACTIVITY.

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Distinct from nature or the known universe, God has a nature of his own which constitutes his being, his individuality, and his attributes and character.

This must be the ground and source of all his action. There can be no other before creation, and after creation there can be no other so high.

Hence, as this is eternal nature all Divine action would seem to to be a necessity, which, however, is denied on other grounds. It is therefore an open question whether the nature of God admits or

excludes the power of alternative choice and action; that is whether alternative freedom or rigid and unvariable necessity is the supreme law of the Divine activity.

Philosophers have generally answered this question in favor of necessity; and in this answer the majority of divines have concurred. But theology has here created a division, because of the supposed bearing of the question and its answer on the doctrine of human ability and responsibility. It is argued that if man is made in the image of God he must in this respect be like God. Hence, some of those who affirm the freedom of man in opposition to the necessity of volitions have affirmed the same of God; while all who take the opposite view of man, take the opposite view of God. Both of these parties affirm that God cannot transcend himself in creation, and cannot bestow upon a creature a power which he does not himself possess; whence, it seems to follow that if the alternative power of volition is not possessed by God, it is not possessed by any of his creatures, and if it is possessed by man it must be possessed by God.

Augustinian divines have generally held that this power belongs neither to God nor to any of his creatures; that it is a pure and empty fiction, alike impossible and inconceivable, so that, even as a fiction, it is only a verbalism. In modern times some Armininan divines have endeavored to expound and defend a doctrine of Divine freedom, which is shaped and begotten of their doctrine of human freedom. Dr. Whedon, one of the leading writers of the Methodist Church, in his work on the "Freedom of the Will," (p. 316,) states this theory as follows:

"We Arminians hold that God is freely good from eternity to eternity, just as man is good freely and alternatively for one hour. Infinite knowledge does not insure infinite goodness. Infinite knowledge, (which is a very different thing from infinite wisdom,) is not an anterior cause of infinite goodness; but both infinite wisdom and infinite holiness *consist* in and *result from* God's volitions eternally and absolutely, and perfectly coinciding with, not the wrong, but the right. God's infinite knowledge, ommiscience, is an eternal, fixed, necessary Being; God's wisdom and holiness are an eternal volitional *becoming;* an eternally free alternative putting forth of choices for the right. God's omniscience is self-existent. God's wisdom and holiness are self-made, or eternally and continuously *being made.* God is necessarily omnipotent and all knowing through eternity, but God is *truly* wise and holy through all eternity, but more *necessarily* than man through a single hour. God is holy, there-

fore, not automatically, but freely; not merely with infinite excellence, but with infinite meritoriousness."

"The Divine essence," says another Arminian, "in its inmost deepest ground, is *not determined being, but unlimited power of self-determination.* The primitive root idea of the God-head is an ever-living UNCONDITIONED WILL—an unconditioned will as the indivisible unity and perpetual DIFFERENTIATION OF REASON AND POWER, a will which realizes itself in self-affirmation (IPSEITY) manifests itself in self determination and choice (ALTERITY;) (!) and completes itself in the actualization of a final purpose (PERFECTION) (!!). The nature of God is distinct from his essence, is absolutely his own act. God, as the manifested God, is what He is by his own determination and choice. God is just because He wills to be just; God is holy because He wills to be holy; God is good because he wills to be good, not from any constraining IMMANENT NECESSITY, otherwise He would not be the object of praise, adoration, and love. If God is not good by virtue of his own determination and choice, then there is nothing praiseworthy or adorable in his nature, and all the thanksgiving of the sacred psalmody is meaningless; worship is groundless, religion has no significance, and love to God is impossible. A necessitated goodness can no more command our moral esteem than the uniform revolution of the planetary orbs, and where there is no moral esteem, there can be no love, no worship, and no praise."—*B. F. Corker, Theistic Con. of the World, pp.* 62, 63.

Dr. Julius Müller also says that "God is what He is wholly by self-determination.—(*Doc. Sin., Vol. 2d, p.* 129.) But in the next sentence he indicates or adumbrates a very vague notion of this self-determination by making it simply equivalent to action, just as if all action were freedom and self-determination: "The uncaused and primary beginning of all existence is freedom or action." He then quotes and adopts from Schelling the following: "There is ultimately, and in the last and highest instance, no existence but will. Will is the primary being." In accordance with this, and as a logical consequent of it, he affirms that all alleged necessary truths, mathematical or metaphysical, are the product of the Divine will. They spring, he says, directly from the perfect harmony of the Divine attributes, and this harmony from the Divine will. Here we have the outcroppings of an ultimate mental opacity which is wide-spread. When men can affirm that God is his own creator, they need find no difficulty in the utterance of any other paralogism. If God is the author of his own eternal attributes, it is but a small thing to allow him to be also the author of mathematical principles. Against this whole tissue we here enter this one protest on the philosphy of mathe-

matics. The truths of mathematical necessity are such because they are truths of logical necessity; that is, it would be self-contradictory to deny them, and that because of some proposition which we have already laid down either directly or by implication. Thus we contradict ourselves by saying that 2×2 are 5, simply because it is supposed that we have already defined 2 as=to 1+1, from which it follows by logical necessity that 2×2=4, irrespective of the will of God, or the existence of God, and God cannot alter it, even should He will to alter it—if we may be allowed to make so absurd a supposition, which, however, is as rational as the doctrine we are opposing.

On the other hand, necessitarians often conjoin freedom and necessity, and affirm their co-existence in both God and man, because all their volition is voluntary. This double position was formerly quite general among necessitarian divines, and it is probably equally prevalent yet. This confused Arminius, and rendered him equivocal, if not inconsistent. When once confronted with the affirmation of the Divine freedom, he repudiated it in very caustic terms as alike "false, and absurd, and blasphemous." He said: "If God be freely good; that is, not by nature and natural necessity, He can be, or be made to be, *not* good. As whatsoever any one wills freely, he can refrain from doing." So far as concerns the Divine nature and character exclusively, Arminius always sticks to this clear intuition; and in his "Disputation on the Nature of God," he says: "The Divine will is borne toward its object according to the mode of Nature, or according to the mode of liberty . . . . Thus, by a natural necessity, God wills himself, but He freely wills all other things." Here the distinction between freedom and necessity is clear, and Divine necessity affirmed concerning God's character, but freedom is affirmed concerning the creation and government of the universe. But in his public "Disputation on Man's Free-will and its Powers," he says: "Freedom from necessity always pertains to him, because it exists naturally in the will, as its proper attribute, so that there cannot be any will if it be not free." This is equivocal, for the extremest necessitarians will affirm whatever freedom belongs to the will as will, since they affirm a will and various volitions. But this cannot be anything more than volitional freedom, which may be a necessitated volition,

necessitated by the nature of the subject and its environment, and approved and chosen as the best. It is necessary, and, therefore, free, in being the product of the whole subject, and in that sense only, not in the sense of being the act of an agent, who, in those very subjective and objective conditions, had power to do otherwise than he did, which is the only freedom debated, and the only freedom we are disposed to consider and discuss, and that only in this paper relative to the Divine action.

Dr. Charles Hodge argues from God's alleged freedom to man's freedom, but in both these parties, freedom with him is that above described as belonging necessarily to all will as will, and which is equivalent to subjective necessity. Hence, he says that "to deny freedom to God, would be to deny him personality, and to reduce him to a mere power or principle." In the same strain he speaks of Christ and glorified saints as free, yet immutably fixed, whence he infers that they may now be free, though the course of their action is equally fixed and immutable. In this he is moving in the line of all other necessitarian divines. This argument on the relation of freedom to personality confuses even so able and learned a man as Julius Müller, who does not wish to play into the hands of necessitarians. He says: "*Freedom* being an active principle, can be conceived only as the will of a personal being, the principle of personality." I allow that will is a principle of personality; but the point of debate is not concerning the existence of will and personality, but concerning a certain alleged contingent attribute of this will, its power in some cases, or any case, to put forth either of two opposing volitions without any change, either in the subjective states or the environing conditions. Now it ought to be clear, at length, to even the common mind, that while will and freedom always imply personality, this alternative freedom, or will power, is not implied in the mere existence of personality and some power of volition. Only volitional freedom of some degree is implied in personality, while another form of freedom, that of alternativity, is by many considered as necessary to a creature's moral probation and responsibility before God; and this power, on the other hand, cannnot be attributed to God. At least, so I am at present under the necessity of thinking.

While adopting the Arminian view of human freedom, (with

slight modification,) yet relative to God, I stand with those who make the Divine agency a Divine necessity, and affirm, with Arminius, that He is not good, and holy, and wise, by his own free volition, but by eternal subjective necessity, and, with thorough-going Augustinians, that the same necessity determines all his actions in the creation and government of the universe. This Divine necessity, because subjective wholly, is not, in any degree, the effect of any external cause, it being a part of the theory that there is nothing external till it is created by this only eternal and immutable One.

This Divine necessity has on one side an aspect of freedom, to which we have already adverted. The will itself is really never coerced and never can be. The impossibility is intrinsic and insuperable; for in order to this it would have to will against its own volition at the instant of making it, which is self contradictory. In this sense, freedom is the essential and characteristic attribute of will in God or man. This is what we have meant to designate in the phrase already used of *volitional* freedom. This is very different from, and may or may not be associated with, the probationary moral freedom which could actually at any time have done otherwise than it did; and the former of these is often confounded with the latter, or, rather, made to overslaugh the latter. In this, Müller and all avowed necessitarians are countenanced by Milton in his posthumous treatise on "Christian Doctrine," in which he says: "God of his wisdom determined to create men and angels reasonable beings, and, therefore, free agents;" and he argues that this freedom belongs to them necessarily as rational beings, and exempts their volitions from the law of necessity. It is only volitional freedom which thus belongs to them—a freedom which belongs equally to God upon his throne and to the everlastingly perfected Spirits of the just in their heavenly mansions, and their action is necessitated, blissful and exalted, yet always just what it is from subjective necessity, which is also moral.

In contrast with this *volitional* freedom, it is of the utmost importance to have a clear conception of that which Arminians contend for as the *moral and probationary* freedom which belongs to rational beings under moral probation, and constitutes the power and limits the duration of such probation. This is a very

peculiar and extraordinary endowment. It is the moral flexor of the soul which, in any circumstances, can turn either way with equal force and to an equal extent. It is superior to all conditions and circumstances of natural force; so that it can always act for or against what is conceived as duty and right. In this endowment man has a degree of power to change all circumstances for better or worse in their moral influence, and to accept or reject the aid of Divine grace in support of the better force and volition and in opposition to all evil.

This probationary will-power is strictly supernatural. Its supernaturalness is vaguely recognized by its opponents in the ranks of natural science. They see that it introduces a new and apparently uncalculable element into the forces of the world. If it does not always and certainly conform to the law of uniformity, the perfection and completeness of their science are impeached. They are therefore all necessitarians—especially if non-theistic. On the other hand, they have never distinctly recognized the true and proper supernaturalism of this endowment, and so they have never given it the name. In this they are on a par with its friends and advocates, who have never seen the full and grand significance of their own doctrine. Yet truly supernatural this endowment must be, since it is distinctly affirmed to be *above nature and able to conquer nature;* and if it is not all that, it is nothing else than nature. If it were only one of the forms of nature force, it would be as irresponsible as the lightning, or the sunshine and rain, or the native dispositions of the animal world and their weapons of offense, as horns, fangs and venom, in which light it has never been treated either by God or man. Nature is a force which operates with necessary uniformity, the stronger always ruling, and known or inferred to be the stronger because of its ruling; and volition must follow the same law if the will is a purely natural force. It is not in that case probationary in the sense of contingency. It is what God has made it, and necessarily it always will be just that and nothing else, and according to its nature and surroundings it will always act with absolute and necessary uniformity. It is utterly void of any power of alternative action in the same state and circumstances; and if to possess this power is the characteristic quality of a probationary will, this quality is supernatural. It is there-

fore a constant example and proof of supernaturalism, which is as familiar as probationary moral choice; and it belongs to all men, and carries with it a demonstration of the existence of Deity and of a divine moral economy and its eternal issues.

This kind of will-power, we repeat, cannot belong to God. He is never under probation. While his will-power is superior to all created nature, it is not superior to his own nature, but must be in accord with it, totally, uniformly and forever.

There is a practical freedom which is not really a power to will, but a power of execution for the gratification of the will. In this sense men are often not free simply because they cannot do as they will or please. But this is not, as is often confusingly assumed in this controversy, any restriction to the freedom of the will. It is only a case of limitation of power in spite of will. Their will is perfectly good, and their volition is distinct and strong and persistent, but ineffectual. If their volition were effectual so that they could accomplish whatever they wished, that would not be the freedom of the will. They can will with equal facility whether results follow or not. A man with the motor nerve severed has just as much freedom and power to will locomotion as any other man, though it is certain that locomotion will not follow volition in his case, while in theirs it may. The restriction or freedom or power here does not concern volition and its freedom, but an extra volitional effect. No such limitations can attach to God, except in his relations to the probationary moral volitions of men. In this sense God enjoys a peculiar freedom above all others.

Then there is what I will designate as the psychological freedom, which also eminently belongs to God. Psychological freedom arises from the perfect harmony of all the faculties and their subjective effects, which is an essential element in the conception of a perfect being, especially of the infinitely perfect Being. In all the energy of his nature there can be no jar nor compulsion nor restraint. All his action must be the action of his whole being, and nothing within him can be indifferent or opposed. Saints and angels in heaven who have finished their moral probation, who have sloughed off all moral infirmity and have become forever established in holiness are also perfect in the same psychological freedom. It belongs to

all on earth in proportion as their whole nature has become adjusted to the moral conception and force, and only so far.

Our notion of freedom and necessity being made clear, we will now give attention to the proofs that the volitions of Deity arise from his subjective perfection by absolute necessity, asking the reader to bear in mind that this necessity is volitional, practical, and physchological freedom.

If God is infinite and eternal in his moral perfection He must be immutable in his moral condition. In himself, in his own nature, He comprises always infinitely the highest possible motives of action. These motives, it is assumed, are perfectly good, and, therefore, forever must continue to be good, which is implied in his psychological freedom, and all this implies that He *must* forever will accordingly.

Moral quality is the super-eminent quality, and to be void of it is at the utmost remove from infinite perfection, and in a being of such excellence, moral perfection cannot be supposed to be ever, for a moment, in the slightest degree of jeopardy. Infinite moral perfection must be *immutably* perfect. Dr. Whedon has strongly discounted the moral element from the conception of perfection, or at least *from perfect happiness*. In this he is almost original and solitary, and will so remain. Without moral excellence, omniscience and limitless power would only be boundless imperfection of character, and it would be horrible in proportion to the agent's power of achievement. Toward such a being distrust and dread would be universally the dominant feeling; and his worshipers would be only fawning sycophants, truculent, selfish and ambitious. His rule over his creation would, therefore, necessarily be very unhappy; and some daring Prometheus, should such a one ever rise, would be the true hero of the universe, and Shelly's "Prometheus Unbound" would be the ideal drama, and longed-for epic of the world. Infinite perfection must, therefore, be conceived as including moral excellence without alloy or limit, or possible eclipse or blot, or diminution of its perfect brightness. Nor could such a non-moral or immoral being be any happier than his subjects. He would view himself forever in the clear and perfect light of his own omniscience. He must, therefore, be perfectly cognizant of his own moral defect, and of how much better moral perfection

would be. He must always know, and never forget, that all created intelligence must view him in the same light, and every one of them must pronounce him intrinsically detestable so far as they know him. For reason, in its highest action, is always a moral faculty, and is, at once, Legislature, Judge and Executive. It discerns intrinsic qualities and the rights and duties they involve, and demands and enforces correspondent action; and omniscience would act thus upon itself with infinite effect, and know that in some finite measure created intelligences were doing the same. In this conflict between his character and his judgment, he would find in himself the essential elements of a hell, whose pains finite minds may partially escape through special mental obtuseness in the moral direction, while omniscience never could.

All this, however, is visionary and false in its base. Immoral omniscience would be wretched, but immoral omniscience is an impossibility combined with infinite power. Infinite intelligence and power knows what is best, and is able to achieve it, and, therefore, must achieve it. There is nothing whatever to hinder it, since all power is ultimately within himself; and it is impossible that there should be in such a being any motive in himself to frustrate the attainment of the highest end, for then infinite power is not in exercise, but a finite and imperfect power working toward an imperfect end, which contradicts the hypothesis of the action of a necessary eternal infinity of power.

That highest end is goodness, Omniscience must so pronounce; and therefore infinite goodness must, in all its action, be the servant of goodness. Only this can be the highest form and reach of power and intelligence, and to this highest form an infinity of power and intelligence is subjectively necessitated. If we should suppose in this being a power of evil passion which successfully opposes this highest action, we should destroy the conception with which we started, because such passion is an element of weakness and a source of failure. Still more is the supposition of such passion incompatible with the unitary conception of a Being of infinite perfection. All the passion of such a being is to be conceived as intelligent and self-approving and approved, and in harmony with all else in the Divine nature, an element of the common perfection, and not a source of internal conflict like the proclivities in man

and inferior animals. God is an absolute unity. Every part of him, who is without parts, is intelligence, power, and just or holy feeling, all alike; for each is pregnant with the other; and the possibility of any action except what these altogether dictate, is absolutely precluded. In favor of the good, therefore, there must be in an eternal Being of infinite perfection and eternal will in the sense of an eternal, self-approved state, but not in the sense of volition generating such state, for the state would not then be eternal. God's goodness is, therefore, voluntary, but not volitionary. Like his existence, it is an eternal, glorious necessity. Without it, He would not exist, for He would not then be God. That the infinite be good, is a logical necessity by having an eternal righteous will in consonance with a corresponding intelligence and power, and the will would no more be otherwise than it is than the intelligence and power can be other than they are, and both are an equal necessity.

Nor can we flank this argument and conclusion by saying that God's goodness is fixed and certain because of the eternal action of his volition which fixes it. If the fixity of his goodness depends on the fixity of his volition, irrespective of his nature, we have no guarantee whatever of that fixity. That guarantee is found wholly in the infinite perfection of that nature, which, therefore, cannot change, and which controls and necessitates all Divine volition. Here is the sure foundation on which we stand, and it is the only inspiration of a hope that cannot be confounded world without end.

Indeed, except on this basis, we can have no good and rational assurance that God is perfectly good now, or ever was, or will be. If God's nature control's not his will, of course, as the hypothesis assumes, He may, possibly, some time go wrong; and what is possible is not unlikely in a whole eternity to come to pass. Indeed, who can tell from nature that it has not already occurred? for there are innumerable facts in the structure and history of our world and its inhabitants, whence we may reasonably argue the imperfection of their author, the possibility being once allowed. Dr. Whedon discloses the grounds of his faith as follows: "We repose in perfect security, notwithstanding our freedomism, upon the unchanging integrity of many a merely free agent, much more upon the unchanging holiness of the God of ages." But according

to the hypothesis, there is a reason for the expected stability of man, which does not hold for the moral stability of God. It is a part of Dr. Whedon's argumentation on the subject that an infinite being might be perfectly happy, though infinitely evil or wicked. In that case, such a being can have no preponderating motive for continuing good, (unless he be subjectively necessitated by the perfection of his nature.) With man the case is entirely different. He is supposed thus, and thus only, under the Almighty rule, to secure his own highest and enduring good. In proportion as his moral intelligence is developed, he knows well that he cannot, and ought not, to be happy in moral perversity.

Dr. Whedon next argues that even on the scheme of necessity God is possibly mutable because the motives to evil may some time become stronger than the motives to good. But that supposition is contrary to the necessitarian hypothesis, which affirms that God is *immutable* in infinite perfection, that He finds all motives within himself before creation, and that after creation the subjective influences are always infinitely higher and mightier than all that can come from without, and that those external motives must coincide with the internal, because the product of them, in the main at least. Motives cannot change until He changes, and He cannot change.

The distinguished logician we are combatting concludes the chapter whence have we have quoted, as follows: "*Our reliance in this case depends more upon the firmness of our faith than upon the firmness of the object of our faith.* . . . . . But if I can trust that the Eternal never *will* apostasize just as firmly as He can trust that He never *can*, my ground of repose is as good as his." He does not see that, through ignorance or predisposition of some kind, our repose or trust may be equal, while the grounds thereof may be very unequal in point of rational reliability. We are well aware of the frequent existence of faith without a reason for it, and it is the rational grounds of faith we are seeking, and these grounds are not proven by the mere fact and vigor of a belief; and the anti-necessitarian cannot furnish any rational ground for his faith, and does not here attempt it, while the necessitarian has this ground in his hypothesis of the Divine volition necessarily flowing from the immutable perfection of his nature. Surely nothing could be

more callow than to say that "our reliance depends more upon the firmness of our faith than upon the firmness of the object of faith." Reliance and faith are the same, so that one cannot depend on the other except as one form of faith may depend on another. And to make the firmness of our faith in an object more important than the firmness of its object is sufficiently remarkable. The great duty, then, is to cultivate faith, not to ascertain any rational grounds for faith. This is, doubtless, the best for the theory this author advocates. But it will not do in the practical affairs of life, nor in science, nor will it do for us in theology; least of all in regard to the immutability of the Divine perfections.

Such reasoning is well mated by his extraordinary description of the notion of Deity which necessitarianism involves, with which he begins his chapter on the Non-necessitation of the Divine Will. He says: "God is thus an infinite substance, with no power but to be passively moved as *external* causation acts upon him. Necessity takes her stand *outside* and presses her causative forces upon his being. Deity is a clay moulded in the matrix of external causation and hardened to solidity. . . . . *Exterior circumscribing* causation is thus the God of God." No one but the author needs to be informed that this is a total misrepresentation of the necessitarian hypothesis and its logical implications. That hypothesis excludes all external causation by expressly making it always and supremely subjective. God acts from nothing but his own nature before creation, and after creation his own nature is infinitely superior in its influence. Before creation there is absolutely nothing external to operate as a cause in any degree, and God is not moulded in any matrix for He is not moulded at all. He is just what He always was and will be, and the figure of the hardened clay typifies its author's mode of reasoning infinitely better than our theory of the action of the eternal and living God.

No quality or attribute of God can "*result from*" any of his volitions. That would make him mutable and finite, and generated attributes are not eternal. To speak of an eternal product or effect of an eternal volition, is nonsense. Every term here, in spite of its adjective eternal, implies temporality; as product, effect, volition; and to call these eternal is self-contradictory.

The distinction between being and becoming, and the conse-

quent or parallel distinction between the essence and the nature or attributes of Deity—the one as always being, the other as always becoming—is a late and feeble progeny of a vanishing hyper-metaphysics. An eternal becoming is a self-contradiction. That which is eternal surely exists or has being, and an eternal becoming, where nothing becomes because it always was and yet never is, is, we think, by no means a becoming assertion in these post-scholastic and realistic times. At the least, a becoming is a change if not a beginning; and as God's wisdom and holiness are eternal, there is here no change. They are not forever ceasing to be and forever renewed or re-created. They simply *are*, and *are the same*, yesterday, to-day and forever. To say that they are "eternally and continuously being made," is to say that they never are made, never exist, for what is being done is not done.

That "the Divine essence in its deepest ground is not determined being," is another specimen of rudimentary metaphysics. Essence, or being without determination, is self-contradictory, for it is being without power or quality, which is always determinate, and whatever exists is quality. "An unlimited power of self-determination" in undetermined being, is another self-contradiction, because any such unlimited power is itself a determination of the most marked kind. Such a power attributed to an *immutable* being is still another contradiction, for so far as immutability holds all modifying determination from any source is excluded. The phase "unconditioned will," is another specimen of logical suicide, though it denotes one of the essential principles of the philosophy we are opposing. If the will is really unconditioned, it can utterly transmute or destroy itself and its subject; for in that case there is nothing in the being or attributes of God to serve as laws which limit or guide or control its action, which is contrary to every notion of God and of all quality. As God is eternal, and, therefore immutable, the same is true of all his attributes, for these are *i. e.* himself. God's volition cannot, in any wise, modify or change them; it can only qualify them. God's will cannot transcend the nature of which it is the executive. There is no more truth in the saying that God is holy, wise and good, because He so wills, than in the converse statement that He wills to be so because He is so. That He is so, is proof that his will coincides with it, but it is

neither cause nor effect of his will, and it consists not in his volition. To speak of volition as affecting the Divine character, is as impertinent as to speak of our own volition as determining our own existence and the forms of our existence, as men instead of angels; for these are no more pre-supposed by volition than the Divine attributes are pre-supposed by volition.

It is surely no better than blasphemy to hold that God can will to be unholy. "An immanent necessity" constrains him to be holy; and it is this which constitutes the infinity of his perfection, and furnishes the guarantee of the final and eternal triumph and entire felicity of the right. God "cannot deny himself," and, therefore he "abideth faithful" certainly and necessarily.

It is a strange way of arguing that because God is immutably good from subjective eternal necessity, he is not good at all, and not worthy to be "the object of praise, adoration and love." That goodness, beauty, or anything else is immutable and eternal, detracts not from its excellence and loveliness, much less annihilates it. Neither would evil cease to be evil by being conceived as eternal. Quality is quality, and the same quality, be it good or bad, whether it be temporal or eternal, whether self-engendered or otherwise. "Necessitated goodness" is the proper object of sarcasm only when it is conceived as necessitated *against* the will of the subject. But the goodness of God is not, in our theory, so necessitated. It is coincident with an eternal, static will, and constitutes that will together with the whole nature of Deity, for it is, as before said, pregnant with all his attributes. Hence, many creatures have qualities which command our love and admiration, though they are not the product of the volition of their subject, but a subjective necessity growing out of their inherited nature.

The moral immutability of Deity is not incompatible with his creation of a being, capable of willing either right or wrong. The conception of such a power in a creature is not self-contradictory, as such a power in God would be. The creature, being finite, may do, or be, either better or worse. It is mutable, and its possible changes may, in some degree, be left to its own determination. The production of such a creature does not imply that the Creator must be alike mutable. God has certainly made very many things which are vastly different from himself in susceptibility, and capac-

ity and form, as well as degree of power. Everything is not made in the image of God, nor is man in all things, as, for instance, his material attributes and sensual nature. To limit God to the reproduction of his own image in creation would be deicide. The limitation of God, thus affirmed, would lead to innumerable other limitations, till He were confounded with the world and its forces and laws. Creation is not necessarily a reproduction in kind. God creates because his whole nature so prompts, and, at the same time, determines what shall be created, and how it shall be governed; and it is not for us, *a priori*, to anticipate the nature of the created product, least of all, to limit the Holy One, except by his own holiness.

God must be supposed to have an end in view, subordinate or paramont in all his action. The paramont and ultimate end must be the highest possible; and that can be no other than his own pleasure and glory. This end is of infinite dignity and all else is finite. The sneer which atheism has indulged at this doctrine and at its logical consequent, man's worship of his Maker betrays mental obscuration. Of course this most sacred of principles, and all the more easily for its exalted sacredness, can be carricatured and presented in an offensive light. To speak profanely of the Deity as delighting in the perpetual praises of his own creatures and demanding this on pain of eternal damnation, may operate on some minds with more than the force of an argument. But the unbiased intellect will see that, as the created universe is forever finite, it can never be the highest conceivable end to God, and cannot, therefore, be an adequate motive to the Divine activity in the creation and government of the world, and that this end and motive can be fully found only in himself.

This will necessarily coincide with the highest good of the creation, as the pleasure and glory of a being of infinite perfection involves all possible good to the universe. As the New Testament condenses infinite perfection into love it is the pleasure and glory of infinite love which are his glory and end.

Since the creature is not God the two are greater than either, and so God has an end, though a subordinate one, in the creature, and that end is the creature's good. This is involved in the Divine pleasure and glory as infinite love seeking its own gratification.

There is nothing peculiar in the doctrine that God supremely seeks his own pleasure and glory. On the contrary, it is the expression of the supreme law of all intelligences. No agent can absolutely ignore himself. All pursuit of external objects finally terminates reflexively on the subject. This is equally a logical and psychological necessity. In the most pure, the most unselfish and self-denying forms of all activity, the agent never denies all of self, else there would be nothing left to act or to act from. In denying one portion of his nature, he obeys and gratifies another. Self-denial is always self-love, and they rise or fall together. He loves himself best who knowing best how to make sacrifice of himself, acts accordingly. The holier we are the more perfect is our self-seeking. In all our service to man or worship of God, we seek supremely and successfully our own pleasure and glory. Yet, in all this we are unselfish, and the unselfishness is necessary to the attainment of the end. Our love, benevolence, conscience, reason, will, are thence all gratified in the supremest measure; and this gratification we always seek in doing right and good. We do not always thus analyze the motives of our good actions into their elements, but this is none the less their uniform character. The bad man, on the other hand, denies his better and nobler nature in order to gratify the inferior. The only difference in this respect between a good man and a bad man is that one seeks supremely the gratification of the supreme, and the other the subordinate elements of his nature.

Whatever be the outer enticements or stimulants, they are such only through the subjective nature on which they terminate. Whoever plans or achieves anything is animated by an inner prompting of some kind, so that the action is always a pleasure either in itself or from its anticipated results. In all cases the object is subjective, whether you call it fame, or patriotism, or philanthrophy, or religion, or science, or philosophy, or power, or wealth. As with Arnold, American independence was subordinated to his own vanity and pride; so, on the other hand, much as Washington wished success to the colonies, we are proud to think that he would not have accepted it at the expense of his own moral convictions. He would thus subordinate, as surely as Arnold, the independence of America to his own individual pleasure and honor. He makes

himself after all the supreme concern in all his activity, however much it may concern the world. In a lofty sense he reverenced himself, which is his chief title to the reverence of mankind. We thus see and approve in the finite the operation of the principle which God has proclaimed as the law of his own action. The censure of the great teacher fell only on the pursuit of vulgar and selfish and immoral honor. When men identify their own honor with goodness, they may seek it with all their might, and the more zealously the better.

From these laws of the Divine activity it follows that the structure of the universe is absolutely the best possible. Though forever susceptible of improvement in the condition of its parts, because it is finite, yet the total plan and the laws it involves must be the best. We are not able before hand to tell what must be the elements of such a plan, nor to comprehend it always in its actual working, because we are finite. But there are some great principles which must preside and which we may be able to trace in actual operation.

One of these principles is that things of inferior dignity and worth are to be subordinated to the superior. On this there will be no dispute, nor can it be doubted that there is a difference in the relative worth of things in the world. The unconscious world is inferior to the sentient, though brute world. The latter are in turn inferior to the rational intelligence and moral feelings as seen in men. The moral conception and life is supreme in worth and dignity, and also in power to confer felicity or inflict misery. This, therefore, should be the end of all, and to it all else subservient.

Another principle is that the essential elements of the Divine nature must have due scope of action and manifestation. God's attributes must be exercised. They are irrepressible forces, and must work and make themselves known. With God this must be a subjective necessity, and the world needs it for its highest good since it is the action of God's nature which is the hope and source of all good. Exactly what shall be the form and effect of such action we may not prejudge. The revelation which God makes of himself must be our final and authoritative source of instruction. So much at least we can see.

There is also a law of duty to the creature which must control the action of Deity. While He is immutably perfect we are not thus precluded from applying to him a law which He is known to fulfill. In the very act of creating God puts himself under obligations to the creature, an obligation which varies with the nature, rank and condition of the creature, and because of his infinite perfection God must recognize and fulfil this obligation.

There is a law of benevolence to be observed toward all. He may not put any of his creatures to unnecessary suffering, and He seems bound to give to them some proper scope and advantage corresponding to their nature and dignity and with due respect to their mutual relation and total effect. But what these are He is, of course, the only competent judge.

There is an obligation under which He rests of showing distinguishing favors to the righteous, as righteousness and goodness are elements of supreme excellence and worthiness; and infinite perfection cannot fail to give them fit recognition and peculiar honor and felicity.

As the counterpart of this there is a law which binds the Deity to humble and chastise all wrong or unrighteousness; yet, still with pity for the transgressor as a sentient being, which is always the proper object of benevolent regard. The law of benevolence never dies, only it cannot operate without obstruction on bad characters. It is the moral wrong in them which is the object of detestation and punishment, that its force and virulence may be diminished and destroyed, if possible, after which, if that is ever effected, the benevolence, which had always sought their welfare, has free scope again. But it is beyond our power without revelation to decide absolutely whether all sinners shall be finally recovered from their sinful and wretched estate.

FREEDOM—HUMAN AND DIVINE.

BY REV. W. L. C. HUNNICUTT.

"If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and determines their motions, does govern itself, and determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them in the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice; and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing or commanding anything at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. So that if the Freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that; and if that *directing* volition be also free, in that also the Will is determined; that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and so on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series; and if that first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a contradiction: because by the supposition it can have none before it. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the *Arminian* notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the Will be not free, none of the following acts, which are determined by it, can be free."

The above is taken from the famous work of Jonathan Edwards on "The Freedom of the Will and Moral Agency," first published in 1754. By this work chiefly, he acquired a world-wide reputation as a metaphysician of the highest order. Able trans-Atlantic critics pronounced him "the highest of all his contemporaries," and "perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed among men," in the field of metaphysical argumentation. The above is a select specimen of his strong and subtle reasoning according to which every act of the human will is bound fast in the iron chain of fate. But mankind need not consent to be robbed of the "liberty wherewith God hath made us free," by even this masterly logic. This argument presents a most remarkable instance of what the logicians call begging the question, assuming, as it does, throughout the question in dispute. It is said: "If the Will determines its own actions, it *doubtless* determines them in the *same way* in which it determines the motions of the hands and feet, that is, by *antecedent volitions*." No, not *doubtless*, for there is grave doubt. Why is the will properly said to govern the motions of the body by ante-

cedent volitions? Is it not because the will itself must be supposed to be external to, and more or less distant from each member of the body, and therefore to require time and sequence for the transmission of its orders to the different members of the body? But this idea could not enter into any proper conception of the self-determination of the will. Is not the will an indivisible unit? Would not its volitions, on the supposition of its being self-governing, be each spontaneous, instantaneous, untransmitted, and independent of any antecedent, save the existing mind? One of the chief difficulties in connection with this question arises from the lack of proper words, and especially of proper illustrations by which to convey our ideas. The Arminian holds the will to be free in a sense to which there is no analogy in the universe save in God himself. To set out, therefore, in the discussion of the freedom of the will, with conceptions and expressions of its action which imply constraint, is to beg the question at the start; and to illustrate the origination of its acts by those things which are confessedly under the control of others, is not only equivalent to assuming what should be proven, but it is to fetter our own minds, while we befog and mislead the minds of all others who adopt the illustration.

It is even asserted that "there is *no other way* of the will's determining anything at all, except by antecedent volitions." Why not? That is the question. Says our author: "If that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will; and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom." Here the *will* and an *act of the will* are confounded. If the will cannot act without a preceding act of the will, then if it acts at all, it must have been acting from eternity. Every act must have been preceded by another. There could have been no primal act. It is as much as to say, the will cannot will without previously willing to will. All the acts of the will are first assumed to be related to each other, as the links in a chain, and then the possibility of a first link is denied, on the ground that there is no preceding link on which it may hang.

This argument rests upon the error of what Sir William Hamilton calls "a one-sided view of the finitude of the mind." By this method the infidel may easily prove, either that God as the

great First Cause cannot exist, or that He is himself the subject of eternal fate.

If we cannot conceive how anything can exist without being dependent on something previously existing, then we cannot conceive of God as a cause uncaused, and we should conclude, according to this mode of argument, that God does not exist. Likewise it may be argued that if the human will can put forth no act that is not determined by a preceding act of itself, then every act of God is, for the same reason, determined by a preceding act, and God is himself controlled by unalterable necessity, and that, too, a necessity not arising from his moral attributes, but natural, constitutional and invincible. If there is then any freedom in the universe, if it be not a vast complex machine, moving without a mover, there must be some other way for wills to act than that to which Edwards would confine the Arminian notion of freedom. If God is free, could He not make man also free? Why may not the human will be the source of volitions, as the sun is of light? Does the sunlight of to-day depend upon the sunlight of yesterday? Cannot God lodge power in man to be used, within certain limits, as freely as God uses his own? May not self-government be synonymous with freedom? Our inability to conceive the absolute commencement of volition is no argument against its possibility, since we are equally unable to conceive the absolute non-commencement or infinite regression of volitions. Volition in man must have had a beginning, or else man had no beginning. Why not then admit that the will is free, in the sense that its acts are not caused by anything outside of itself, and that they are independent of all preceding acts or states of itself; that it is a power which assimilates man to his Maker, and renders him capable of accountability to God?

Very different conclusions from those of Edwards may be reached by stating the argument thus: If the will governs itself it doubtless determines its own acts in a different way from that in which it controls the members of the body, which are external to itself. The actions of the body are determined by antecedent acts of the will, whose influence is transmitted to its various parts by those nerves which our Creator has supplied for this purpose; but the will, being an indivisible unit, cannot be conceived as

giving orders to itself, (except in a figurative sense which requires the idea of plurality of parts in the will,) but must be supposed to act in a manner peculiar to itself. It is itself the fountain of action. It can act for or against any and all motives, and cannot be forced by any power known on earth or revealed from heaven. Since then nothing can be thought to be the author of its own enslavement, and since our whole consciousness would be a lie and our accountability to God absurd, if our wills are controlled by any power outside of ourselves, we must conclude that the human will is sovereign in itself—the image of God in the soul of man. It is personality in man that wills and acts without compulsion. Otherwise his nature is a fraud and himself a machine or a slave.

If, however, according to the argument of Rev. Mr. Gill, in the January number of this REVIEW, God is himself the subject of necessity, then all support for the doctrine of human freedom, drawn from the supposed freedom of God, must fail. Mr. Gill maintains the freedom of man, as a probationer choosing and fixing a moral character; but denies freedom to God, as under subjective necessity to act just as He does. Yet it may be asked, if God's acts are determined, who or what determines them? God, or some other being or power? To say that the laws of his being determine them, is not satisfactory. Are the laws of his being stronger than God? If so, how did they come to be so, and how do we know that they will continue to be so?

To say that God cannot do otherwise than He does, is to make him a machine. To affirm that He will not do wrong, and that his choice will ever be the manifestation and criterion of wisdom and goodness, is to ascribe to him his true glory. The Scriptures declare that it is impossible for God to lie. No clear thinker would confound the impossibility here spoken of with that implied in the assertion, it is impossible for man to fly. The impossibility in the one case arises from physical inability, in the other, from moral indisposition. God will not lie, not because truth controls him, but because He maintains truth. It adds far more to God's glory to think that having the power to do wrong, He will always do right, than to suppose that He does right because He cannot do wrong. Can we not trust God with liberty?

There appears to be nothing gained by those metaphysical

philosophers and theologians who seek to find a surer criterion of right and wrong, and a firmer basis for moral law, than the will of God. They have sought it in "The authority of the State;" in "Something inherent in the nature of things," as "fitness," "truth," "relations," "moral beauty;" in "The highest happiness;" in "Pride gratified by flattery;" in "An inner reciprocal sympathy;" in "The Moral sense;" and in "Intuition." Why thus tax their brains for something stronger, surer, clearer, or more authoritative than the will of God? If there is an essential fitness in things, did not God make that fitness? And does not God maintain that fitness? Did not God ordain our ideas of fitness? Could He not have made us to think otherwise of fitness than we do, had He so chosen? Who dare answer these questions in the negative? And are the things that are determined by the will of God more stable than that will itself? The objection to the will of God as the ultimate rule of right seems to be that it is arbitrary; and, therefore, conceivably changeable. Why should anything be thought more unchangeable than the free will of God? Any such supposition involves the idea that God is somehow under the dominion of an established order outside of himself, or, at least, that He is controlled by the immutability of his own attributes. Who can affirm that aught is immutable, but the will of God? And that immutability we hold as we do God's existence upon faith alone.

If, however, according to the teachings of many moralists, the will of God is not the sole foundation of the moral law and the ultimate rule of right, it is certain no surer ground or rule can be found elsewhere. One says: "The law of God is supreme, unchangeable reason; it is unalterable rectitude; it is the everlasting fitness of all things that are, or ever were created." How does reason become unchangeable, but by the will of God? Did reason establish itself without God, and above God? Who decides what rectitude is? How did we come by the ideas of rectitude we have? Especially, what makes rectitude unalterable? Did it make itself so, or was it made so by our thoughts; or did God make it so? All such expressions as the above quotation seem almost meaningless, unless we suppose something to exist independent of God.

If all things, save God, were created, all the laws of thought are

the results of creative power, and, while we cannot even imagine how we should have thought or felt about right or wrong, or aught else, had we been created differently, we surely cannot limit God's power or prerogative, and say, He could not have made us to think fundamentally differently on any or all subjects from what we now do. Why, then, speak of "the everlasting fitness of things?" How can "everlasting fitness" be any better or stronger than the simple will of God? Did things have a fitness before they were made? Or did not their fitness arise from their relations as created? If, then, God made the fitness of things, their fitness only expresses his will.

To undertake thus, even in thought, to guarantee the moral stability of the universe by denying freedom and absolute creative authorship, even of moral distinctions, to God, is no gain to reason and a great loss to faith. Whenever we undertake to bolster the will of God by his attributes or by the postulates of reason, those attributes or postulates, will, in their turn, require to be bolstered, and we gain nothing in the end. As an origin of law, right and authority, there is nothing imaginable that compares with the will of the Supreme Being. All other sources of right and law seem to be the mere figments of human fancy. We are compelled to come to the incomprehensible and absolute first cause somewhere. Why undertake to rob the Biblical theology of its pre-eminent excellence and simplicity, tracing, as it does, the origin and support of all things to the will of a personal God, by our vague and endless endeavors to find something more stable than the will of God? Every suggestion of anything superior to the will of God savors of pantheism. As when we say that a thing is right, not because God wills it, but God wills it because it is right. Whence does the right come that rules God? Either from himself, or some other being. If from another, then we have another and a superior God. If from himself, then it is but the expression of his will.

All these varied attempts to find other foundation for right and law than the will of God, seem to be but the futile efforts of intellect to avoid the exercise of faith. Man would rather understand than believe. He prefers the pride of reason to the humility of faith. Yet he who will not believe where he cannot understand, can never take hold of the things of God. The exercise of faith

is God's supreme requirement of man, and the utmost duty of the soul to its Maker. The sublime simplicity of faith is marred by the anxious, though futile, attempts of reason to supersede or support it.

Biblical philosophy stands contra-distinguished from all other systems in ascribing to a personal God the origin, authorship, and absolute sovereignty in all things. The strongest and most laborious intellects of the ages have sought in vain for a more satisfactory foundation for that faith to which all must come at last, or wander "in endless mazes lost." Yet, even some believers in the Bible have, as has been shown, allowed themselves to be led by the speculations of metaphysicians to seek for a better foundation for right than the will of God. In so doing they have abandoned their strength. The attempt of the ancients to account for the support of the world by the serpent on the back of the tortoise, was not more futile than all attempts to find a basis for moral law outside the will of God.

Quite similar in origin and tendency is the doctrine which denies moral freedom to God. The Scriptures declare: "He doeth according to his will among the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou;" "for He giveth not account of any of his matters." It has already been shown that nothing is gained by denying freedom to God. Let us now inquire what the Divine oracles teach on the subject, not directly, but by necessary implication.

1. The fact that Adam was endowed at his creation with the capacity to choose moral good or evil, is a demonstration of the moral freedom of his Maker. If, as Mr. Gill maintains, God is ever under subjective necessity to act in a certain way, and that the best possible, how is it conceivable that He could endow his creature, man, with the power of choosing and doing either good or evil? If any deny that Adam was free to choose good, it is not proposed to reason with them now. That denial would lead to the doctrine of the eternity of matter, make the universe a machine, and God only a part of its matter or forces, sanction stoicism in philosophy, and lead to licentiousness for religion. But that Adam possessed the power to choose and do evil, is incontestably proven by the fact that he exercised that power. Now, it is inconceivable that

God could produce in his creature, man, moral powers which He did not himself possess, and could not exercise if he chose. Could God impart to man a moral, or other sort of power which He did not realize in his own being, or could not realize if He would? No powers can be supposed to reside in the creature which did not exist, actually or possibly, in the Creator. We may easily imagine the creature doing that which his Maker could not do, but not what his Maker could not do if He would. It is not forgotten or overlooked that Mr. Gill and others hold that the necessity which binds God to righteousness is wholly subjective. The purpose to create Adam was subjective, till it began to be realized objectively. That purpose embraced a capacity of free choice in God's ideal of his noblest earthly creature. Let him show who can, that God, if for any reason himself incapable of free moral choice, either could or would endow his creature, man, with such power. Yet Adam was so endowed, or else fated to do wrong. If the latter be affirmed, then must God be supposed not only to possess the power to do wrong, but to have exhibited it through man from the beginning to this day.

2. The Scriptures, in declaring that man was made in the image of God, do virtually affirm the moral freedom of God, in whatever sense freedom may be admitted as belonging to Adam. This argument must not be confounded with the preceding, for it is quite distinct. Man might have been free and not in the image of God; or he might have borne the image of God and not have been free, if God were not free. But, man being free, the first argument *inferred* that his Maker was free, if, moreover, man was both free and the image of God, this second argument *affirms* the unavoidable conclusion that his Maker must have been free also. All the force of the preceding argument passes into this, and herein receives the immense corroboration of the Scriptural affirmation that man, free as he was, was the image of his Maker. Whatever we may suppose the image of God as existing in man to imply, we can scarcely imagine man's highest attribute, his capacity for moral freedom, to be excluded from that image. We can but believe that the noblest attributes of man reflect most truly the image of his Maker. That image is usually supposed to consist in righteousness and true holiness. But to speak of a necessitated

righteousness, or a compulsory holiness, is to speak irrationally if not absurdly. If, then, the essential elements of the Divine image in man do not exclude, but necessitate moral freedom, why should such freedom be thought to be an impossible or an unworthy attribute of God?

The conclusion then follows, that if man at his creation was morally free, his Maker must have been free also. Or, if man was not free, he must have been somehow constrained by his Maker to the choice of evil, which assumption imputes a choice of evil rather than good to God; and he being immutable, must forever continue to choose the evil and compel his creature, man, to practice it; a conclusion too monstrous and revolting to be affirmed. The only alternative is, that God is free as to the choice of moral good and evil, and that he so created man, who, by the abuse of his liberty,

"Brought death into the world and all our woe."

This supposition, by no means, jeopards the great doctrine of God's immutability, which Mr. Gill says must not be given up. How can we be more certain that God cannot change than that He will not, though He can? His declared unchangeableness is simply a fact that challenges our faith. All attempts to guarantee it by seeking reasons in his attributes or in any conceivable relations of things, seem utterly vain, setting out in a circle of secondary reasons, each of which requires another, till we are finally driven to the will of God as the ultimate and self-sufficient reason for all things. If it be asked why do two and two make four, or why am I obliged to tell the truth, the answer is, I am so constituted that I cannot think otherwise in the one case, nor feel otherwise in the other. Could God have made me to think and feel otherwise? I dare not say that He could not. The relations of things result from their creation, and our apprehensions of those relations and of the duties which those relations suggest, arise from the adaptation of our minds to our surroundings. If we think in accordance with the true relations of things, we are sane; if we think otherwise we are, to the degree of that erroneous thinking, insane. If we act in accordance with our true relations we are good; if we act otherwise we are bad. To ascer-

tain the true relations of things to ourselves, is but to learn the will of God concerning us. Conscience, or the moral sense, is that in man which renders him capable of realizing a feeling of obligation or duty in view of his relations to God and his fellow beings. Hence, every imaginable form of the rule of right amounts, in its application, only to a man's own judgment of what he ought to do. But the great underlying question is what ought a man to think to be right? Is his conscience or his judgment of the fitness of things, or his sense of personal worthiness always a safe guide? By no means. These are but the divinely appointed aids to man in his efforts to find out that which is undoubtedly the ultimate criterion of right, the will of God. This will may be learned from God's word, or inferred from his works, or felt in the instinct of our souls, but is unquestionably the only ultimate rule both of our faith and of our practice.

It is concluded, then, that God is not only free, but the author and perpetual maintainer of all truth, right and law. He commands a thing not because it is right, or was right before He commanded it, but all his commands are the declarations of his will which is the fountain, criterion and law of right. Through the ages we expect God's commands to be consistent with all his previous works and words. This is, indeed, all that is really meant by the nature of things and the eternal fitness of things. Let it be remembered that things have no nature but what God gave them, and that things, as here spoken of, are not eternal, much less can their fitness be so, it being only the mutual adaptation of their relations and our ideas under the will of God. All mathematical, as well as other truth, rests upon the will of God for its basis. If there were no God there would certainly be no outward universe. Whether numbers be regarded as objective realities, or subjective conceptions of the mind, without God there would neither be things to be counted, nor minds to count them. If there were no God two and two would not be four, for neither one, nor two, nor four would have any existence. But does our belief that two and two make four, as things are, depend upon the will of God? Undoubtedly it does. A crazy man might think otherwise. If any man denies that we owe the sanity of our minds to God's providential care, these reasonings are not for him.

Suppose that in answer to the question: "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" It should be replied: In many things God does wrong. Would not such an answer be futile? "Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?" Shall a man argue against the standard of right? Or think against the criterion of thought? Indeed some do presume to arraign God's word and works for condemnation.

If the above question be supposed to imply that liberty, then may God be put under condemnation by his creatures, and the sovereign of the universe stand guilty at the bar of human reason. Is not the question rather a challenge for men to perceive and admire the righteousness of God? We can conceive of God as doing wrong only by acting out of harmony with himself. Our judgments of right and wrong spring from the constitutions of our minds as affected by all that is about us. We expect constancy and consistency in God, but if we should suppose that we had discovered aught to the contrary, our thoughts should be corrected by his will and works, and not his will and works by our thoughts. "He is before all things, and by him all things consist." "Yea, let God be true, but every man a liar." If harmony, fitness and truth bind God, He first established the harmony, designed the fitness and gave to truth her being, her beauty and her power; so that He is a law unto himself, which is the highest style of freedom. The will of God must forever remain the highest reason for itself, as well as for all things else, since whatever may be adduced to justify, sanction or support it, must be reckoned among its creatures or dependencies.

JOHN DE WICKLIFF.

By Rev. G. G. Smith.

Wickliff, a name famous in English and Church history, was born in 1324; and he died sixty years after this date, just in time to escape the stake. For over one thousand years the course of the Church had been downwards. Convents and monasteries sheltered thousands of priests and nuns, who, while professing to forsake the world, were giving themselves up to debaucheries. The

tribute levied by the Popes, and the wealth which it brought into Avignon, and afterwards into Rome, had almost replaced the rich treasures of the earlier conquests. Everywhere among the upper classes was wild licentiousness; and among the poor there was fierce brutality. England, not yet four centuries under the rule of the Norman, had lost much of the simplicity of the Saxon days, and was no exception to this general sweep of wickedness. Constant wars with France and Scotland, and constant strife between her own great families had increased this tendency to all that was cruel and base.

As late as 1380, four years before the death of Wickliff, Sir John Wrundell, about to sail for Brittany with troops for the war, entered forcibly into a convent and his troops carried the nuns away into their vessels; and when a storm arose, cast the poor wretches overboard, before they themselves were wrecked and lost, as they richly deserved to be.

There were some Universities—Oxford, Cambridge and Paris—but the studies of the schools were confined to the crude metaphysics of the period, Aristotle's Logic, and the Scholastic Theology of Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas. There had been efforts at reform; but the followers of Peter Waldo had been put down by the cruel sword of persecution. And although St. Francis had instituted his Order of begging friars, a hundred years before, and had turned their thoughts toward a heart purity as opposed to the mere externalism of the day, yet these disciples had grown rich by begging; and lives of quiet contemplation had given way to an indolent debauchery. Popes, curates, monks and nuns were slaves to lust; and, of course, the laity were no better, though they could hardly have been worse.

There is a stream which comes through the seas, and even in this fearful ocean of wickedness there was one different current. The tendency of the Church towards a religion entirely objective in its character, different from the piety of the Apostolic day, had been early evident; but the loss of all inner life of piety had not been reached without resistance. Tertullian, in the third century, although carried away by his warm African blood, to great error, had contended against it, and though the number may have grown lewer, every year there were still those who believed in a commun-

ion of heart with God, in an influence of a Divine Spirit upon the heart, far different from his influence on Church councils and Popes.

Side by side with Scholasticism had grown up Mysticism, which aimed at securing a union of the heart with God, and a holiness of life far beyond that which was believed to be essential by the masses. The Mystics were early classed among the heretics. Much of the history of the only saintly people of that day has perished, but still Bernard, Francis, and Dr. Tauler had lived; and the life of St. Catherine of Genoa, and Catherine of Sienna, show the character of the piety of some of the saintly women of those days.

John De Wickliff, a sturdy Yorkeshireman, went to Oxford to obtain his education, and to enter the priesthood during these times. He soon became distinguished in letters: he was chiefly concerned with the study of the Vulgate and the earlier fathers. While he was here, and yet a young man, the black plague swept on its career of destruction from the far East, and half of Europe died from the ravages. What effect this awful visitation had upon some, may be known when the Decameron, of Boccacio, written at this very time, was read amid the plague; but it did have better influence on the young priest.

Wickliffe was not unmindful of the corrupt state of the Church—he wrote his first small treatise on the "Last Days of the Church." Had he seen now the way of justification by faith? He certainly did see the truth of Christ's atonement; but his earlier books do not indicate that he had learned the way in which the blood is applied. The mendicant friars, who had sprung into being over a hundred years before, and whose professed aim was to live in poverty, and give themselves to active usefulness, as the disciples of Christ had done, established a colony at Oxford. They had proselyted so large a number to their order, that the thirty thousand students, claimed for the University, had been reduced to six thousand. War was declared against the friars by the University; and Wickliff attacked them with boldness. This was the beginning of his war against the Romish Church; that continued till his death.

Pope Urban made his demand for his thousand marks tribute from England. Now, whatever the English Parliament may do

unduly, there is one thing it will not do, and never did do—it will not pay tribute gladly, and it resisted this demand. This tribute had been paid, and yet for over thirty years it had not been, and they were loth to begin again. A monk attacked the right of the civil power to oppose the Pope, and defied Wickliff, whose attack against the mendicant friars had shown his animus, to refute his position.

Wickliff, right gallantly, took up the gage. He not only attacked the Pope's supremacy, but the character of the papacy itself, asserting that the Pope was but a man, and might be guilty of mortal sin. This talk might be heretical, but it pleased the lordly ears of John Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster; and he took the brave priest under his protection.

Wickliff was now warden at Oxford, and the Pope deposed him; but the University gave him the then rare degree of Doctor of Divinity; He went to the continent on a mission of the government to meet a papal envoy, and to correct some of the abuses of the papacy connected with the appointment of bishops in England. He returned to Oxford after a fruitless visit, strongly convinced that the Pope was anti-christ.

He had studied carefully the Latin Vulgate, and had determined to give the Bible to the English people in their own tongue. He labored at its translation, which he accomplished. Parts of the Bible had been translated before. Alfred the Great had translated the Psalter; Bede had translated a part of the New Testament; and unknown monks had rendered into English the first eight books of the same volume.

The study of the Bible and of the early fathers, had corrected many of his errors; and, while he bitterly opposed the contemplative life of those monks who were descended from the earlier Catholic mystics, he evidently had been impressed by the teaching of St. Bernard, and especially by Ambrose, Cyprian and Jerome, and the spirited religionists who had preceded him. The exact order of time, in which his books appeared, it is impossible now to state. Probably one of Wickliff's earliest books was, "Poor Catiff." This was a book of spiritual instruction, designed for the poorer classes. The style of the volume is in beautiful contrast with the English of three hundred years afterwards, and only modernized

in spelling, it presents a most delightful composition. He first recognizes the necessity of a proper creed, and shows himself to be ignorant of the true doctrine of justification by faith, confounding the faith which saves with a firm belief of fundamental doctrines of the New Testament.

The creed which Wickliff defends, save as it teaches the doctrine of purgatory, is such an one as would now be received by any of the orthodox Churches, and is remarkable for its entire freedom from papal corruption. Mariolatry, penance, saint worship, priestly absolution, and sacramental grace are entirely absent from this creed; and judged by the present standards of the Evangelical Churches, Wickliff, in 1365, was far more orthodox than many Protestants in 1877. The ethical teachings of the "Poor Catiff," are faultless—no higher standard of excellence could be presented. He admitted, with Luther, the propriety of certain pictures and images, designed to teach the ignorant, but said no honor should be paid to these images. The "Poor Catiff" is thoroughly mystical in its teaching. With a clear view of the character of a pure, spiritual life, of the merits of Christ's death, of the beauty of holiness, of man's duty to forsake sin, there is a complete absence of all teaching of the Holy Spirit, direct influence upon human hearts. Following the "Poor Catiff" alone, one would find himself where Paul presents one in the seventh of Romans.

In the part of treatise on belief on the Holy Ghost there is a simple orthodoxy of opinion with regard to the person and character of the Divine Spirit. This was a general defect in the mystical teachings of that and the period immediately succeeding. Tauler, á Kempis, and indeed all the leading mystics, taught that spiritual influences were rather a reward for Holy lives, than Holy lives a result from the Divine Spirit's power in the heart.

There are two beautiful chapters in the concluding part of "Poor Catiff" that might have been written by Thomas á Kempis or St. Bernard. The mystical idea of securing the sweetness of God's love by our own suffering pervades these chapters: "Only Lord be tears unto me as loves by day and night; for, unless a man be punished first by weeping and wailing, he may not come to the sweetness of God's love." It is certainly a strange fact that Wickliff should have so violently attached the Franciscans for

their pretended life of contemplation, and yet should have commended it in the Poor Catiff. This is evidence to show that this book was one of his early productions. Like John and Charles Wesley, mysticism seems to have been his school master to bring him to Christ; for, in his Postills, when attacking the curates, there is a very different tone than that which is heard in the tract under review.

After his attack on the monks and his open rupture with the Romish Church, he arraigned the curates, or priests in charge of Churches, in a most fearless and faithful way. The tract is interesting in the double light of presenting his views of what was demanded of a pastor, and as showing the true character of the priesthood at that time. Wickliff charged the clergy with covetousness. Simony, failing to preach, regard for traditions, and the Pope's law, rather than God's word, they ran after tithes, seeking worldly glory. "They despise true priests and keep back the Bible from the people."

Wickliff published a tract against the contemplative life as the priests led it, which shows that if he entertained, as we think probable, mystical views on this subject at an early day, he passed beyond them. In a short tract on prayer he attacks the newly introduced choral service which he says was contrary to customs of Christ and the fathers. "The Lord's prayer once said with devotion and understanding is better than many thousands without." He also reprehends the light singing of the times. At this period organs and artistic music were first found in English Churches.

The most important of Wickliff's tracts was "The Wicket," in which he boldly denounced transubstantiation; this was reprinted three centuries after, and was extensively circulated during the Reformation. His sermons were quite short, as were all the pulpit talks of that day. Intended for plain people, they are plain and pointed. Wickliff was really to England what Luther was to Germany. While not the father of the language, he gave it largely the shape which the best English has held to this day. Coming at a time when the old Anglo-Saxon was largely the vernacular of the English people; educated at a school in which the Norman-French was in constant use; thoroughly conversant with the Latin

of all ages, he was able to choose the best words for his thoughts. From the old English of his Bible, we see how little the best English has changed in five hundred years. Two centuries after Wickliff, and for near two centuries after that, there was a great change in the English tongue.

That all the main truths, held by modern Christians, were clearly taught by Wickliff, was not to be expected. He had very clear ideas of the atonement, but not such distinct views of the doctrine of a free justification by faith. He rather considered faith in God's truth as an efficient cause of holiness of life, than faith in the pure love of God, as shown in Christ, as securing absolution. He seems to teach that, through Christ, pardon was secured, but only to those who followed in the footsteps of the Church: the pardon resulted from holiness, not holiness from pardon. In some of these tracts, a correcter view of justification is presented. But in none of these tracts is the doctrine taught of the Spirit's operation on the human heart. This was almost a universal defect of the reformers in Wickliff's time, and Luther's.

Melancthon thought Wickliff was not acquainted with the way of righteousness by faith. It has been admitted that his teaching was defective, but no man preached Christ and the atonement more, nor sacramental grace or priestly absolution less. The writings of the Lollards show that this precious truth of free pardon, through Christ, was fully known by them.

Wickliff's life was a constant warfare, but John of Gaunt, and Henry Percy, stood between the intrepid reformer and the stake. When other than penal means were tried to make him recant, the old hero was true to himself. Once he was very ill, the priest came to him and told him he would die and be damned, unless he recanted. The eye of the sick man flashed back defiance, and he said: "I shall not die, but live to expose your wretched villanies again." When he was only sixty years of age, while administering the communion to his people, he was stricken with his last stroke, and the great reformer died. They buried him, and years afterwards his bones were taken from the earth, and burned and cast into the river. The river swept his ashes to the sea, and the sea washed the shores of the world; and so the teachings of the brave Yorkshire priest are the blessed heritage of mankind.

CONSECRATED HEROISM.*

Text.—For I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my separation is at hand. I have fought a good fight.—*II. Timothy, iii: 6, 7.*

"It is the preference of duty to inclination in the ordinary course of life; it is the practice of self-denial in a thousand little instances which forms the truest test of character, and secures the honor and reward of those who live not for themselves."—*Robert Hall, funeral sermon for Rev. Dr. Ryland.*

"But yet I know, where'er I go,
That there hath passed away
(a glory from the earth.") *Wordsworth.*

The setting sun appears larger to the eye than when at his zenith, but there is no increase in the magnitude of his orb. Not so when a Christian hero like St. Paul looks calmly from the rocks of a Roman prison on the stern visage of an unnatural death. The man then looks grander and is grander. Such a man stands on the summit of earthly greatness. Nothing save heaven is greater than he. The boundary line between the finite and the infinite has been reached; all worldly things have shrunk to their native insignificance, and the heart, long striving to realize its latent energies, finds itself possessed of supremacy over itself and its destiny. "All things are yours," he had said to the Corinthians, and death had been specified among the "*All things.*" But St. Paul had never verified the truth of his assertion in the immediate presence of death. The time of his departure was now at hand, and he speaks of it in a tone of assurance, too full for the intrusion of a subtle doubt and much too tranquil for anything less than the majesty of a divine repose. Touches of tenderness may well relieve the bare sublimity of the hour, else it had been oppressive. Thus his heart writes to Timothy: "Do thy diligence to come shortly unto me? . . . Only Luke is with me. Take Mark and bring him with thee." Sublimity of this kind leaves no power or property of the soul dormant. No slow decay is here; no interest

*A Memorial Discourse: George Foster Pierce, D. D., Senior Bishop, Methodist Episcopal Church, South. Delivered in St. John's Church, Augusta, Ga., Sabbath, September 7th, 1884, by A. A. Lipscomb, D. D., Emeritus Professor, Vanderbilt University.

of humanity prematurely enfeebled; no affection dead; the senses are not worn to exhaustion, nor is the soul of St. Paul reduced by age to the narrow consciousness of life and its relationship. Call him "*Paul the aged,*" but he is the aged oak, as proof as ever against wind and tempest, and, if it must fall, can only fall by the axe. No case like it, as to its peculiar features, is recorded in New Testament annals. Chosen individuals are the masterpieces of Providence in Christianity, and St. Paul heads the splendid array in this catalogue of intellectual and spiritual wonders.

Pause a moment and contemplate the attitude of the man. His career, widened into the scope and compass of a true life, is summed up in three memorable verses; even his epitaph is not left to others, but is written by his own hand; and the seal of the martyr's blood will not add one whit to the trustworthiness of history and epitaph. If you take the particulars in this generalization, you find a single germ-idea, out of which all these thoughts spring. "*I am now ready to be offered.*" The readiness monopolizes the emphasis. That is to say, he was ready to be unjustly and cruelly slaughtered by the sword of Nero's headsman. Time was when he withstood death and refused to abnegate the rights of self-preservation. But that time has passed and he is ready now. This involves much more than reconciliation to ordinary death. For a man may be ready to die peacefully in his bed and yet recoil from death by violence. Nature, too, is merciful in providing for the diminished action of organic sensibilities on the approach of dissolution, but nature offers no such aid when one is called to accept death as an infamous butchery. "*Ready,*" says the heroic Apostle, "*ready*" for Nero's headsman. On the one hand, then, he had none of the common mitigations of death. On the other, he had to endure the odium of a criminal, the sense of utter humiliation, so different from humility, in the contemptuous disavowal of his triple claim to humanity as Jew, Roman, Christian, the sense of ignominy in dying as the victim of the most shameless monster that ever aggregated in his own person the vices found piecemeal in tyrants. But at this extreme juncture, he was ready. And he was ready because heroism had been the habit of his life. From the moment Christ called him he declares: "*Immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood;*" then and there, under that Syrian noon,

self began to die; and the sanctified strength of high resolve grew in daily renewals till its final utterance: "*I am now ready to be offered.*" Often, indeed, men are unconscious self-prophets. Such verily, was St. Paul in the very dawn of his emergence from Saul of Tarsus. The early Saul only survived as an effigy of memory.

This promptness in responding to duty was the basic characteristic of Bishop Pierce. On the eve of celebrating his golden wedding in the ripeness of a contented and happy age, he used these beautiful words: "I left all to follow Christ, and I wish to record that He redeemed every word of promise to me. My life has been one of self-denial and close economy, but I have never suffered. Accepting Christ's teaching, I have lived like the lilies and the birds by the Providence of my Heavenly Father." "*Like the lilies and the birds,*" would be a poem if it were not a sermon. Fresh from the University of Georgia, he was acutely sensitive to the instincts of young manhood; and the glowing eye hailed from afar the visions of exaltant genius, and the yearning heart felt the stirrings of embryonic power to turn those visions into realities. But he felt called to the ministry of the gospel, and the call was no uncertain sound. It was clear, strong, authoritative. To obey cost him a severe struggle. The determination was taken once for all to consecrate himself to the cross, and thenceforth he "bated not a jot of heart or hope, but still bore up and steered right onward." Heroism is a principle before it effloresces into a sentiment. Heroism counts the cost and never reviews the arithmetic of the computation. Christian heroism believes in its instincts when wrought on by the Holy Spirit; and in no one whom I have known, was this instinct of feeling, side by side with intuition of thought, more deeply imbedded than in Bishop Pierce. It was in this instance the potency of a true promise—the initial tone of a prophecy destined to fullest utterance.

St. Paul gives us a satisfactory insight into the grounds of his readiness to be offered. First of all, the Christian and apostolic warrior comes into view: "*I have fought a good fight,*" and the precedence assigned to the military element in character accords perfectly with the laws of our constitution and the demands of our circumstances. Agreeably to the genesis of theism, as taught by Moses, man was created a sovereign and placed in Eden as the

immediate sphere of his sovereignty. Even then, however, in his primeval state, he was prospectively to "*subdue*" the outlying earth, Eden being the centre of sway and throne of empire. But he was put there on trial to test his capacity for this position as the image of his Maker, and in the trial he failed. Clothed with godlike attributes, exempted from the common law of mortality to which all lower creatures were subjected, and surrounded by everything which could minister to his earthly needs and higher tastes, he lost his innocence and fell. But he fell into the arms of Infinite Mercy stretched out in advance to receive him, and, from that instant, the holiness of acquirement by force of will and by sharp discipline under the grace of the Spirit contrasted with the endowments of mere innocence. And now, earth cursed for his sake, thorns and thistles crowding his steps, dust unto dust awaiting its stern fulfillment, the struggle set in against want and wretchedness, against suffering and sorrow, yet more against sin in the penitence and faith which were to be the birth-pangs of regeneration. Only such a being created in the likeness of God, could become such a sinner. Only such a sinner could involve himself and his race in consequences so wide-spread, so various, so tremendous. Only such consequences could necessitate the use of those military figures which rush so often to the lips and pen of St. Paul. The brain of this man was an armory of weapons, not one carnal, every one a weapon of assault on carnality, whether refined into elegance or degraded into grossness. His constant attitude was that of martial vigilance, united with martial statesmanship. "Endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ," was his estimate of manhood, nor had he any standard for the appreciation of lofty valor in his colleagues save the scars of battle they bore full-front on their persons. "Always causeth us to triumph," was his daily exultation, and, along with that: "Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."

The warrior Paul: how free from the lower nature, whose aid is so eagerly sought when conflict springs up in the affairs of life! What a debtor most of our fighters are—intellectual men—good men—when mind meets mind in antagonisms of debate! Yet, this man was humble and gentle; in his own eye the chief of sinners, and not worthy to be called an apostle; content to wear a thorn in the

flesh lest he be exalted above measure, and, nevertheless, winning the right and privilege of grace to say: "I have fought a good fight." "*Good*," when he braved the fanatical prejudices and passions of his countrymen; "*good*," when he liberated Christianity from plausible thraldom to Judaism; "*good*," when he asserted, vindicated, established the equality of all Christians, whether Jews, Greeks, Romans; "*good*," when he organized Gentile Christianity and created an epoch in human brotherhood; "*good*," when he supplied the mould in which were cast the fortunes and the renown of modern Europe; "*good*," when he himself, an inspired man, was such a depository of inspiration as to furnish the "high endeavor, and the glad success" to millions; "*good*," when every missionary, who walks the earth, treads in his footsteps; "*good*," when he faced the despotism of Rome, and found in her monumental hills a prison and a grave.

There are many torches blazing in the darkness of the world, but there is only one light. And this flame shone conspicuously in St. Paul, who was the preacher, by eminence, among the apostles, and the most admirable of them all, as a model for ministerial imitation. The cardinal idea he had of the gospel is contained in this great text: "I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek." Is there anything in power of which to be ashamed, and especially such power as the Christian hero only exhibits? Physical power—can you count its admirers? Mechanical power—see its joy of success when M. Angelo swung the dome of Florence over St. Peter's at Rome. Military power—what penalties have been paid for its achievements, from Julius Cæsar, in whose single arm the might and prowess of antiquity culminated, to Napoleon, the last of his imitators, who tried, on the arena of the same Europe, to repeat his brilliant exploits, and who, after conquering the Alps, died a prisoner in the solitude of the Atlantic. Intellectual power—what price too costly for its honors? But, in Christianity, St. Paul found the power of God, and its transcendent issuance was faith, so that the highest activity in man, answered to the highest glory of God—power and wisdom being united in Christ. Elijah saw himself dramatized in the wind, the earthquake, the fire of the mount, and learned to recog-

nize God at last in the still small voice. From the outset of his mission, St. Paul knew where his power lay. Judaism was intent, not on making a man, but a Jew; he broke with it forever. Philosophy had but one aim—not to develop a man, but a Grecian; therefore he threw back the charge of foolishness on its boasted wisdom. This was the strength that girded the warrior Paul. Against the embattling array of the Greeks in sculpture, poetry and learning, the governments, the religions of the world; against the odds of selfish interests; appearances all opposed to him, and his looks, voice, and manner, discrediting him in the eyes of mankind; in the face of mobs, in the presence of death; behold the attitude of this man! Power has transformed his weakness into strength, and even his physical infirmities have become the organs of a victorious force.

I may claim that Bishop Pierce had as intense a sympathy with this sort of power as any preacher of our times. In him, it was not an attribute, nor a quality, but the sum and substance of attributes and qualities. Every fibre in his frame was spun to make the iron cord, on which, as on an Æolian harp, the zephyrs might play their softest melody, or the thunders shatter their billows of sound. Make an inventory of his more obvious gifts, and what were they? A spinal column pillaring a brain that was a magazine of forces where battle was to be done for the Lord of Hosts, the temperament of an effective preacher with its correlated endowments direct from nature's plastic hand; the facial vocabulary with its compass of physiological language and a range of expression which subordinated every nerve and muscle to its service, and the concert of utterance led by a voice of singular melody; these were his to such an extent as to make him remarkable among remarkable men. Add to them a perfect unconsciousness of self, the man hidden in the preacher, the preacher hidden in the Gospel, gesture, tone, cadence, left to the impulse of self-suggestion, so that the oratory was the exact reflex of an eloquence as natural as breathing. Add, again, the beauty of his person, and his graceful indifference to the grace of the rhetorician's arts, and his fine disdain of artificialness, and you have only pictured the outsideness of the man. Look into his heart—the heart as architect of soul and body—and tell me if the language of the Psalmist: "*Your heart*

shall live forever," was not authenticated to reason quite as irresistibly as to faith? The secret of the Bishop's greatness as a preacher lay in a heart that gathered thoughts, images, diction, into itself and fused them as in a furnace, so that in his best hours, the current of ideas and illustrations was never allowed to flow forth without careful regard to the temperature, and that temperature the warmth of the Sun of Righteousness.

Little know most men of the temptations incident to a man of genius in the pulpit. Most of these may be summed up in the intrusions of self as the self of intellect, the most insidious shape of selfhood. To conquer this weakness is a marvelous achievement of grace. And yet our brother gained this victory, for he early learned that self-denial of intellect has precedence of all other self-denials, and is the very ground and root of their existence. One of his favorite texts was: "But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block and unto the Greeks foolishness. But unto them which are called both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Here it was, or on some kindred text such as: "God forbid that I should glory," etc., that the military element in all high eloquence appeared in him. "Military element," I say, for this is the salience of pulpit speech. Considerate, sympathetic, human-hearted, it must be, and yet resolute, uncompromising, dauntless. To preach Christ crucified is to preach him as Christ to the conscience, the will and the heart. Not content with portraying him as the Christ of the intellect and the tastes, the genuine preacher makes everything subservient to Christ as God's wisdom and power. For one, I recall Bishop Pierce most vividly in discourses on the texts just cited; and as those hours thrill their way on to this memorial morning, I think of him as Wordsworth's "*Happy Warrior*," who, in some critical conjuncture, is "attired with a sudden brightness like a man inspired," and yet as one

> "Whose master-bias leans
> To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes;"

And yet more as a man answering to the words in which the heart of the subject is condensed:

> "More brave for this, that he hath much to love."

Bishop George Foster Pierce was born in Greene county, Georgia, February 3d, 1811. In 1826, he united with the Methodist Episcopal Church; in 1829, was graduated at our State University; in 1831, entered the ministry in the Georgia Conference and was stationed at St. John's Augusta, in 1832, 1843 and 1844. He married in 1834, was elected President of Wesleyan Female College in 1837, and became President of Emory College in 1848; in 1854, was made a Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and, at the time of his death, was senior Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

The dates of his birth and death include nearly three quarters of a century, a most prolific period in the world's history; and, moreover, a period which scarcely allowed any interest of civilization, art, science and literature, any form of national or international relations, any traditions or beliefs that claimed hereditary honor, to remain what they were a hundred years ago. The man of the Reformation under Luther now came to know himself, to realize the plentitude of his endowments and the uses that challenged their activity, so that liberty of thought and action not only broadened its area and called forth resources long latent, but intensified to the utmost the spirit of self-inquisition. Men are not products of their age, and yet the age has its influence, often too subtle for analysis, but none the less potent. Men are not creatures of latitude and longitude, but these are no inconsiderable factors in human development. Men are amenable to race laws, to family and social laws, to circumstances reducible as yet to no laws, but nevertheless, every individual has a fixed personality, and, by virtue thereof, recombines the alphabet of human elements in a character, a set of habits, an interior method amid an external order, which are altogether and exclusively his own. The combination spells a new word and it is his baptismal name among his fellows. Hereditary law gives us nature; personal law gives us individuality of character; and thus we have the general in the man of the race, and the special in men who embody the divisional phenomena of the race. By reason of this providence of inter-relations, nations and communities are distinctively what they are.

Our deceased friend had a strongly marked idiosyncracy. If

we could trace its ancestry far back, we should probably find that the freedom of the ancient forest, the picturesqueness of rural landscapes, "the strength of the hills" that reminds the Psalmist of God, the aroma of flowers, the songs of the birds that come nearer to the articulations of the human heart than any other of nature's many voices, and with all these, the minor forms of companionship, as sought and found among natural objects in their abounding aspects of cheer and gladness, had provided for him no ordinary blood. Though not the man, the blood is the life, and, in no instance, loses its hold on the primal forces of our being. Our friend was a large debtor to his inherited blood. A more genuine child of nature, as to inlets of impression and outlets of refined communicableness, you have not known. The genealogy was understood by him and valued at its true rate. "*I have lived,*" said he, "*like the lilies and the birds;*" a beautiful testimony to the sacred worth of instinct as taught by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount. A soul of kinship to flowers and birds has connections other and far higher than those binding us to poetry and art, which, in this respect, are a pre-existent Judaism, ordained long before Moses, and most typical and sympathetic with Christianity. The discipline of attachment to animate and inanimate objects has vast uses, nor can any one tell the intent they reach in the economy of the Holy Spirit by shaping our better nature. Our friend saw deeper meaning in these than lie on the surface. And hence I have spoken of him as a very genuine child of nature where nature is most like her Lord. The original man in Eden, it strikes me, was the only man who had much the advantage of him in this particular. And I am very sure that He was all the more a child of grace for being one of the elect among the offspring of nature.

> "The soul confers
> On what she holds, her own divinity."

True, O poet; but it is not the most pleasant of the surprises of reciprocity when the body, so often at an extreme from the soul, seems endowed with the capacity of repaying, in a large measure, the conferments of the soul? Our friend was blessed with a body that commended his spirit beforehand to instancy of attention and regard, and, in his case, first impressions were not illusory. Better

for him, perchance, better for us certainly, had he prized the body more highly as a marvelous coadjutor of the soul in his ministerial office. For the noblest use to which the body can be put, is that of the orator, and especially the pulpit orator, and, in this sort of auxiliary training and service, it would be hard to find his match. But in this he grew forgetful as the years advanced. More and more self-denial, verging on self-sacrifice, became the law of his whole being, till at last the great silence fell from heaven on his lips.

If he had this inherited capital to start on, he was favored even more in his immediate family. Methodism had then risen into prominence as a most salutary and gracious reaction of the eighteenth century against the conventional dotage of the seventeenth century. Methodism had won the home and the heart of his father's household to itself, and in its mould the young Pierce was shaped. The natural has its own matrix, but the personal and spiritual are cast and recast in different moulds until the finality of manhood is formed. This will appear more clearly, if we recall what our civilzation was in the early part of the present century. The circumstances of our country had begun to assume continental dimensions. Two wars—one for the freedom of the soil and its institutions, and the other for the freedom of the seas, had been successfully fought by our arms, and, with tremendous odds against us, we had come too near failure to indulge in military conceit and gratulation. One of the grand results of these wars was an immense outgrowth of common sense, of sturdy virtues, and of practical statesmanship. The form of our civilization showed definite signs of an American type; and though English traditions and character had an authoritative influence on the Atlantic slope, the West betokened the course of the empire. The democratic impulse of our political philosophy, augmented by physical laws, stirred the popular mind: the American was no longer an expanded Englishman, but a fresh product and type of Providence. Although not long out of his cradle, and even yet in the nursery, he had learned the muscle of his limbs and power of his mind, and, in the competency of the age, stood forth in his strength as the inhabitant of a hemisphere that had delayed to rise from the ocean till his forefathers were ready to occupy its virgin realms with their citizenship,

industry, enterprise and piety. They were natives now, not foreigners; and, born of its physical grandeur, they, themselves, by their stature and strength, foretokened the magnificence of a home and sanctuary for modern life in keeping with the hills and mountains that scaffolded its collossal proportions.

Akin to this same spirit of organized and diffusive activity, Methodism had the saintly enthusiasm of the cross. The sturdy pioneer, with rifle and axe, went arm in arm with the Methodist preacher, carrying his hymn-book and Bible. It was a primitive civilization, bound by no factious alliance to an old-time religion, each honoring the other in simple and home born tastes. There were not many books. What there were belonged to the natural aristocracy of thought. Men made good use of themselves, believed in their own capacities, and were intent on making society, instead of society making them. Like the forests, they fed and thrived on their own soil, nourishing that soil while appropriating its food. Then, the South was acknowledged in the sagacity of her leadership, in the prowess of her arms, and the chivalry of her blood; then her womanhood had the unsought admiration of universal homage; then sections were a blessing, not a curse; then, too, we had a common citizenship without suspicion, and a brotherhood of intellect and sentiment, with naught but generous rivalry. The stars of the flag were as the stars they symbolized—set in the same sky and kindled by the same light.

Under such circumstances, the younger Pierce began his career as an humble Methodist preacher. The straw of Bethlehem had not lost any of its ancient virtue, while many a home, from the Potomac to the Gulf, had the reflected glory of the Virgin Mother in its womanhood. By his rare gifts, and the rarer accompaniments of independence and unusual moral courage, the elder Pierce had already overtopped his contemporaries.

Nearly in all cases, the fame of a father obstructs the distinction of a son; but, in this instance, the reputation of the one seemed rather to heighten the attractions of the other. Far from the younger Pierce was a self-announced candidacy for public honor; and yet, as the fragrance of the magnolia betrays the forest where it blooms, or the music of the nightingale in the hedge where it sings, so the genius and lovely virtues of George F. Pierce charmed

the soul of Georgia. Those were days when States were States in this, that they made national reputations for their sons. From the cities and rural districts of Georgia and South Carolina, the fame of the young orator went forth, and when his celebrated New York speech was delivered, the scholars and critics of the land were startled into admiration. The man and the magic of his words made the impression; the printed words sustained the impression; and, henceforth, his distinction was assured.

It is the simplest of stories. The merit was profoundly genuine, and merit—thanks to eternal laws—never fails to win. Find it where you may, it always has something divine lodged securely in its innermost essence. Not more certainly does the rainbow spring its arch over the firmament than genius and goodness justify their instincts. Of course our brother had superior natural endowments, but art is mightier and grander than nature when art fulfills the purposes of God, the source of both. He was fortunate in having just education enough for his special work. I deem it a happiness that he escaped the buckram and tight-lacing of the schools. If the wings were encouraged to fly, not a feather was plucked from their strength and grace of motion. Prominent in him was that basis of broad and massive common sense, which is never lacking in well proportioned and symmetrical genius. Perceptions quick and vivid; instincts prompt to seek alliance with them; analysis methodic without metaphysical and logical formulation; imagination adapted to the pulpit; a facile command of choice words and their fittest collocations; at times uncommonly racy and habitually as lucid as Paley and as idiomatic as Bunyan and Defoe; these were foremost qualities of his intellectual constitution. That useful quality of humor which Shakspeare had and Milton had not, he possessed, and as occasion served, it sparkled and flashed. Irony, too, he had, and ridicule and sarcasm, that were full of humor, etc., but they were held in check. If he stung, he stung not as a fretful wasp, but as a bee guarding the honey harvested on its thighs. Sometimes he failed, the wondrous faculty of speech overtasked, but he failed only by comparison with himself. Singularly instinctive, he drew the instincts of multitudes to himself, and it would be hard to find a parallel to the long, firm hold he had on the public mind of the South. Nor did he ever abuse the instincts

of others, never sought popularity, which he accepted as a trust from God to be sanctified. Unspoiled himself, he spoiled no one, pandered to no infirmities, caressed no weaknesses, and had naught of the spirit that covertly patronizes others. The manliest way was always to him the best way. Open, guileless, magnanimous; trustful of himself and others; not afraid of his impulses; every attribute of his being had its union, and still more, its unity in the soundness and sincerity of his nature. Ask you the explanation of all this? The man's life was hid with Christ in God. It was hidden to be revealed. It was revealed. Our eyes have seen it; our hearts have felt it. Thanks to Almighty God our Father for a revelation so resplendent!

All over now? Nay, nay. If Abel, in the obscurity of a remote age, "*being dead yet speaketh*," what may we not affirm the perpetuation of a speech like his in such an age as ours? Examples never die. Immortality is located in no distant sphere. It is now, it is here, it is his, it is ours. The office he honored so grandly may find a successor, but it can never find such a man as he. The niche he filled is vacant; so it must remain, and the vacancy is his immortality. When this mourning drapery shall have been removed; when our sorrow shall have been healed, as all noble sorrow is soothed and comforted, and the Angel of grief has lifted from our eyelids the heavy shadows brought from his grave; in those serener moments of the future, shall we not then know, as we cannot know, while the affliction is "grievous," that "blessed are the dead who die," as he died, "in the Lord." Worthy are the words of the added emphasis: "Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors and their works do follow them." Enter into rest and enjoy thy sublime repose, thou illustrious servant of God! And may the spirit that animated thy heart and exalted thee in daily companionship with Christ, descend in a new and fuller baptism on us and hallow our affection for thee in a deeper and devouter love for thy Lord and ours!

LIBRARY TABLE.

THE CONFLICT OF CENTURIES: By C. W. MILLER, D. D. Nashville, Tenn.: J. B. McFerrin. 1884.

We have read and re-read, with pleasure and profit, the above-named work by Rev. C. W. Miller, D. D., of Kentucky. The author is generally clear and concise in the statement of his views. The reader is not troubled to know just the thought which his words convey; though sometimes, at least, a passing word upon a closely related thought, would have placed that of the author in a clearer light.

Sin, its nature, and consequences, and the mode of relief from them, are the leading subjects treated.

As the author's views are somewhat in advance of the times, he may expect, and, indeed, has been meeting with, some opposition. Indeed, some who concur with him for the most part, are slow to take position, because of a reluctance to disturb old and settled opinions. But surely it is a mistaken conservatism which would leave the great body of the Church groping in the midst of errors, from which investigation had already relieved these conservative members.

This is, in many respects, a fast age, but it chooses to re-examine religious creeds and tenets for itself; and those who blindly hold to the old land-marks, will, after awhile, be punched up from their slumbers by the requirements of truth, and find that a newer and better survey has left them sleeping upon untenable ground in a diseased locality. I think the quotations from the works of Wesley, Fletcher, Watson and Clarke, show that these good and great men, as they increased in Scriptural knowledge and religious experience, either modified their earlier opinions upon the subject of the condition in which infants are born, or else, what is worse, that they became inconsistent with themselves. I remember, when many years ago, I first read in Mr. Watson's Exposition his comment upon Matthew XIX.: 14: "But Jesus said, suffer little chil-

dren, and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," I thought him inconsistent with the teaching in his Institutes upon the subject of depravity and human condition at birth. I accept gratefully the better opinion of our author that Mr. Wesley and his co-laborers modified their opinions in consistency with truth as they obtained clearer views of it. In that comment of Mr. Watson, he holds children at birth to be "subjects of God's spiritual kingdom and in VITAL connection with Christ." Then, surely, they are not born sinners. Dr. Clarke's comment upon the same text, is: "A great part of God's kingdom is composed of such literally"—meaning children, of course.

Mr. Wesley commenced his ministerial career a believer in baptismal regeneration, and that children were born in a condition "deserving God's wrath;" but he repudiated both these opinions when, in earnest search for the truth, he was led by the Spirit to higher and clearer views of the economy of the Gospel. Since Mr. Wesley and his compeers modified their tenet as they climbed into higher light, we may expect further modifications of Protestant faith as religious knowledge increases, unless we assume that our tenets are already perfect.

Indeed, since the days of Wesley and Watson, some of the opinions then held with confidence, and still taught in our text-books, have been sliding from under our feet almost imperceptibly. One of Mr. Wesley's sermons maintains the doctrine of a material fire for the punishment of the wicked in the coming life. Now, a minister among the best informed, who would so preach, would be a rare specimen. Our text-books still teach that death among the lower animals, was the result of the Adamic transgression. But such preaching now, would be excused only upon the plea that the preacher was behind the times. From the shallow notion of baptismal regeneration, which a majority of the Christian world are to-day wearing superstitiously, as a sort of amulet, and the abject slavery of the iron-clasping doctrine, that God positively and absolutely fore-ordains whatsoever comes to pass; as Methodists, we think that the Christian world has been slow in relieving itself. But our Calvinistic brethren are waking up, and throwing off this latter notion. And, unless we are prayerfully thoughtful and inquiring, they will doff that folly, before we are wholly relieved

of a dogma equally absurd—that children are born into the world *sinners*, in such sense as exposes them justly to endless punishment, apart from a divine mercy which, somehow or somehow else, *after* their birth, intercepts between them and so hard a fate, if they die in infancy. We may call such a procedure justice, but that it is justice is unthinkable.

Our author has done good service to the Church in collecting the authorities, and giving quotations from them, which show conclusively that, up to the time of Augustine, while the early Church held that Adam's transgression resulted in temporal death to his posterity, and an impairment of their moral powers, the calamity was regarded, not as a sin for which they were punishable, but as a disease which needed a remedy, which was furnished in and through Christ. The authors Dr. Miller quotes, are the leading authorities of the respective ages in which they lived. He quotes from Hagenbach, a German Church historian, born 1801, died 1874. This author summarizes the doctrine of the Church, from 70 to 254, thus: "The effects of Adam's sin upon his posterity, were restricted to the mortality of the body, the hardships and miseries of life, also admitting that the moral powers of man have been enfeebled by the fall." From the collection of authorities by the German historian above named, our author quotes from Gregory of Nazianzen, Bishop of Constantinople, born 326, died 389, as holding that "the mind and soul had been considerably impaired by sin, but not to the entire loss of free-will." Athanasius, born 296, died 373, the father of orthodoxy, as holding that "man has the power of choosing good, as well as evil." Chrysostom, born 347, died 407, who insisted, "most of all, upon the liberty of man and his moral self-determination, and passed a severe censure upon those who endeavored to excuse defects by ascribing the origin of sin to the fall of Adam." From Knapp, another German author, born 1753, died 1825, he quotes the summary of the doctrine of early Greek authors: "That the corruption of human nature began after the fall of Adam, and has been diffused, as a universal disease, through the whole human race. That this evil, however, in itself considered, is to be regarded as an actual sin, and, as such, to be punished by God, they do not teach, but rather the contrary."

Our author then refers to Justin Martyr, born 105, died 165, as teaching, in his first Apology, that "we are born into the world without our knowledge or choice, and, inferring therefrom, that there is nothing, at that period of life, of the nature of guilt." And, in his second Apology, "that each man, by free choice, acts rightly, or sins." Irenæus, born 130, died 202, as maintaining the same doctrine. Clement of Alexandria, died 220: "The child, who has never personally transgressed, cannot be subjected to the curse of Adam" (the punishment of his sins); yet all who "have the use of their reason are led, by this their moral depravity, to commit actual sin, and so become liable to punishment. Cyril, of Jerusalem, born 315, died 386: "Sin is not in men according to nature." Origen, of Alexandria, born 185, died, 254: "God gave no man a stony heart by a creative act, but each individual heart is said to become stony through his own wickedness and disobedience."

We have quoted from our author some of the authorities we refer to, not always using his language, or the language of those from whom he quotes. Either was sometimes too long. But his authorities show clearly that, in the prevailing opinion of early Christians, our inheritance from the fall is not a sin, deserving punishment, but a disease, an imperfection needing help. Still, with the help we have, we are free to will and practice obedience, or sin against God.

After the time of Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, born 354, died 430, so great was his authority, the prevalent opinion was changed. He held that all Adam's prosterity were present in his loins, and participated with him in the original transgression, that we are born guilty of that first sin, with all our moral corruptions as a part of the penalty, and come into the world exposed to eternal punishment. That baptism relieved from this calamity by regeneration. From his time, all along down the ages, has come this doctrine of transmitted original sin, and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, which had a still earlier starting point.

To make war upon these and cognate errors, "The Conflict of Centuries" was written.

Our author takes exception to the definition which he quotes from Pelagius, of what sin is, the doing of a "wrongful deed."

He says: "This is but one part of a proper definition of sin;" "that there is a rebound of the 'wrongful deed' which superinduces in the soul *sinfulness*, a *state* which abides as a *moral pollution* after the transient act has passed away." He says, also, that sin BEGINS in the wrongful deed. This mode of stating the definition leaves room for the inference that he holds the resulting *pollution* as deserving punishment as well as the sinful act. True, in another place he quotes Mr. Wesley's definition of sin in 1772: "Nothing is sin, strictly speaking, but a voluntary transgression of a known law of God, as we think the true definition. But this definition is quoted not to adopt it as his own, but to show that by this time, Mr. Wesley had given up his earlier opinion, that punishable sin was inherited, as set forth in his treatise upon the subject, published 1757.

To set forth more clearly the proper work of regeneration, he restates this *state, predisposition* to sin, *uncleanness*. He describes this recoil upon the soul as *indurating, blinding* and *deadening*, its faculties, and paralyzing its powers. He then tells us that "Regeneration is the removal of this disturbing force." Has sin in its direful recoil hardened the heart? Regeneration removes that hardness. Has sin produced blindness and deafness? Regeneration restores sight and hearing. It breaks up the *state*, the dominating *habit*.

Now this definition of regeneration seems to me to embrace the work of a growth in grace, as well as the being born again. As soon as regeneration takes place one is certainly and instantly a child of God, and prepared for heaven. But all the work above described does not occur immediately. Death frequently occurs before all this attainment is made. On the 273d page this much is admitted: "It (regeneration) removes from the empire of the soul the dominating power of sin." "It does not remove depravity. The regenerate man is still depraved." "The appetites and tendencies *formed* by *debauch* are *not removed*, but power is given to control them." Now this, as we think, is a true statement of the case. But these tendencies formed by debauch, by the *habit* of sin, are not suddenly removed by regeneration. The increased inclination to licentiousness, drunkenness, or other vicious habit, is not removed instantly, but power is imparted to *control* it. Sin

severs us from Christ; regeneration unites us to him again, and through him the power is imparted instantly to control every tendency to wrong, and discharge every duty to live blameless before God. And this union and power is the cleansing from all unrighteousness—it occurs contemporaneously with pardon. True, every Christian grace begins to germinate, but at first is only the blade, the ear, then the full corn in the ear. Sight is only partially restored. At first "men are seen as trees walking." Sin destroys no faculty of the soul, it only prevents and turns them away from God; regeneration turns them back again to God.

These "predispositions" of the lower nature existed in their proper degree in the perfect man before the fall. The appetites and passions have no regulative principle in themselves, and no moral quality. This is in the higher nature, in the *enlightened consciences* which should control them. Limborch, whom our author quotes extensively, says in one of these quotations, on page 99: "Concupiscence is three-fold. There are some first motions in our hearts (natural propensions or 'predispositions') which are agreeable to our nature." "These first motions were in our first parents before the fall." . . . . Now if such motives were sinful, then, there would be sin prior to the first sin, which is absurd."

When Eve looked upon the forbidden fruit, there were three ideas presented which were agreeable to her pure nature, namely: "That it was good for food, that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise." This was all before she had sinned. These propensions belonged to her in her state of innocence, and were yet agreeable to her mere animal nature. These, however, were more than counterpoised by her love for God, her desire for his approval, and her sense of obligation to obey God, her sense of oughtness as the voice of conscience is sometimes called. She was *upright.* But looking upon the tree, she was, with her own free-will, drawn away with her own "lust and enticed," or inflamed, set on fire. Our author, on page 158, sets forth the teaching of the passage in James better than I can: "Eve *looked* upon the interdicted fruit and *desire* awoke." Her mind dwelt upon its desirableness. "It was a tree to be desired to make one wise," "pleasant to the eyes," and "good for food," and her "*desire*" was *inflamed,* set on fire; then the will rose and

co-operated with desire, and "sin was conceived;" and, putting forth her hand, "she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." Thus her "sin" was "finished" and brought forth "death." These primary appetites and passions belonged to the first pair and were sinless. The voluntary co-operation of the will with the lust, in the continued contemplation, inflamed or set it on fire, and sin was conceived; then followed the sinful *purpose*, and the sinful act was brought forth. The sinful act severed the sinning pair from God, blunted the conscience, darkened the understanding, exposed the sinning pair to temporal death by their expulsion from the garden, and inflamed and strengthened the indulged propensions so that these parties were no longer able to govern themselves and keep the Divine law.

This power of obedience was again imparted by virtue of the prospective atonement, when the gospel was preached to them: "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head," and they believed, "and it was counted to them for righteousness."

But their restoration to the Divine favor did not remove the physical consequences of their disobedience. They were still exposed to temporal death. They had been developed in the direction in which they had employed themselves, just as we are at the present day; and these strengthened animal propensions still remained which now they could control only by aid of the Holy Spirit. This acquired, intensified propension to evil, and enfeebled power for good, was a physical, not a *moral condition*, and was an inheritance to their children after their restoration; just as the acquired conditions, corporeal, mental and emotional, of men now converted after great wickedness are transmitted.

Adam and Eve had no children until after their expulsion from the garden. The laws of the natural and spiritual world were the same when Cain and Abel were born that they are now. And they inherited from their parents only in the same way that we inherit from our parents now.

Now, our author holds that this intensified propension to wrong, this *depravity*, is not sin. "That the regenerate man is still depraved." And the forcible argument with which he sustains the proposition is worth the labor of many times reading his book in order fully to possess it.

But a still further *intensification* of this "inclination to sin" by personal trangression, he considers as sinful, as *moral pollution.* And hence the reason of making regeneration to embrace it. But besides the fact that it is not wholly and suddenly removed by regeneration, it is a part of the Divine penalty for transgression. This act of God, under Divine law, is certainly no sin to the culprit who deservedly suffers it. It may be just enough to shoot a man down for his sins, but to shoot him for falling is absurd. To sentence a man to prison for robbery is all right; but then to try to punish him for being in the penitentiary is all wrong. Sometimes eternal puishment is defended on the ground that men continue to sin in their world of woe, but this is to forget that the spiritual notion of sin is that it is "a voluntary act of a free moral agent." He deserves this loss of his freedom, but he is no longer a responsible party.

Men may intensify their depravity by sinful *acts* which are sin; but this increased intensity is not sin, but only their punishment. So men think their naturally amiable qualities are virtues; their natural love of truth, justice, humanity, patriotism. This, too, is a kindred mistake. If they are inherited qualities, we are fortunate in the inheritance, but they are no more virtues than is a good appetite in a healthy man. If they are the result of good actions previously performed, they are the *rewards* of virtue.

We are to be rewarded or punished according to our *works.* And these works are virtuous or vicious according to the ruling motive under which they are performed. A virtuous action must have a regard for the will of God as the leading motive. Other motives may accompany subordinately, but the leading one must be a sense of *oughtness* to make it virtuous.

Our conclusion, then, is, that the book will do great good in helping to remove from the mind of the Christian world an error that has come down to us through many centuries—that our depravity is sinful. But the writer limps, as it seems to us, in his definition of sin, and, as a consequence, in his definition of regeneration.

All depravity, or inherited imperfections, we shall be relieved from in the resurrection, for Christ, the second Adam, "hath the pre-eminence." And "where sin abounded" (in the first Adam)

"grace did much more abound" in the second Adam, the Lord from heaven.

But will all the consequences of a sinful life be removed even in eternity? "Rewarded according to our works," not for them. Works devolop Christian character; we develop in the direction in which we employ ourselves. All the soul there is in a man converted late in life, after much wickedness, will be saved; but he will have less soul with which to enjoy heaven; even though he has awarded to him the freedom of the Eternal City.

Florida. A. A. R.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES: By HENRY M. HARMAN, D. D. Fourth Edition. 1 vol., 8vo., pp. 798. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

The passage of Dr. Harman's excellent *introduction* to its fourth edition in a period of about five years, is indicative both of the satisfactory character of the work and of the chasm in American theological literature which it so well fills. In the preface to this edition, the author says that he has examined and endeavored to refute the theories of Graf, Wellhausen, Kuenen, and W. Robertson Smith. All of these writers teach that the priestly laws of the middle books of the Pentateuch were not recorded until the period of the Babylonian captivity, and that they were completed in the time of Ezra. These views are familiar to American theologians mainly through the publication of certain of W. Robertson Smith's lectures under the title of "The Old Testament in the Jewish Church." Dr. Smith was, at that time, professor of Hebrew in one of the Scotch Presbyterian institutions, but has since become Lord Almonur's Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. His doctrines have excited wide-spread attention and comment both in the evangelical and in the rationalistic school of criticism. "When I discussed the genuineness of the Pentateuch, in the first edition," continues Dr. Harman, "the new critical opinions did not seem important enough to demand a separate refutation. Since that time I have examined them again, and studied nearly the whole Hebrew Bible with special reference to them. As a result, it seems to me perfectly clear that the entire

Pentateuch is older than any other part of the Old Testament; I have, therefore, no change of view to announce and no concessions to make to the new critical school."

This fourth edition contains very large additions and alterations in the portions relating to the Pentateuch. We notice, also, three additional chapters on the manuscripts, versions and editions of the Greek Testament. These are an admirable summary of the knowledge in the possession of critics on these important elements of New Testament study.

There is one little point upon which we should have been glad if the learned doctor had touched in his preface. It is observable that certain statements, that might be regarded as independent, concerning the Books of Jonah and Second Peter, are withdrawn. Has Dr. Harman seen sufficient ground for changing his views? Or has this been done under ecclesiastical or editorial pressure?

Vanderbilt University. J. J. T.

IRENICS: By JAMES STRONG, S. T. D., LL. D., Professor in Drew Seminary. 1 Vol., 12mo., pp. 215. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

We took up this volume with great expectations, and laid it down with keen disappointment. It is a series of essays, in which the author attempts to show the virtual agreement between, (1) Science and the Bible; (2) Nature and the Supernatural; (3) The Divine and the Human in Scripture; (4) The Old and the New Testaments; (5) Calvinism and Arminianism; and (6) Divine Benevolence and Endless Punishment. These are great themes, and worthy of the best efforts of the most richly endowed, and the most widely read theologian. Dr. Strong's treatment is superficial and popular, not to say puerile or insignificant. The whole compass of his little book would not suffice for the intelligent and thorough discussion of one of the issues he raises. The essays read more like Sunday-school talks than the utterances of the justly distinguished principal editor of a great theological cyclopedia. It may be that we have mistaken the ends which Dr. Strong sought to accomplish. But, at any rate, the announcement of a book on such topics, by such a man, created expectations which this volume wholly failed to satisfy. The spirit of the book is

truly catholic and irenical. But this is all that can be said. As a contribution to the settlement of the radical problems dicussed, it is *nil*. J. J. T.

Vanderbilt University.

NEW AND COMPLETE ENGLISH-GERMAN AND GERMAN-ENGLISH POCKET DICTIONARY: By Dr. J. F. LEONHARD TAFEL AND LOUIS H. TAFEL, A. B. Ninth Edition. 12 mo., 374 pp. Philadelphia: I. Kohler. 1884.

This is a very convenient and handy dictionary for the use of schools. It is well bound so as to resist the wear and tear to which it is to be subjected. The print is clear, though necessarily small—mostly nonpareil. It is likely to prove as satisfactory as most books of its class. For the accurate translation of important works in German, of course this book is insufficient. It probably will suffice for the preparation of the lessons ordinarily assigned in our colleges. It is proper to remark, however, that many persons, followers of the Natural Method in the teaching of the modern languages, with some show of reason, have discarded the use of such books as this, proclaiming that when the pulpil is studying German, he should be provided with a dictionary in which the definitions of the German words are given in German. This is in keeping with their practice of using German only in teaching German, and French in teaching French. In this way alone does it seem that a person can in any degree whatever learn to think in a foreign language, and to use it with any ease. Certainly the results by the Natural Method are, to a great degree, satisfactory, whereas, after years of study by the ordinary way of translation, there is little facility in the use of the language studied, and none at all in conversation.

COLLEGE GREEK COURSE IN ENGLISH: By WILLIAM CLEAVER WILKINSON. 8vo., 302 pp. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

This is the fourth book by the same author in a series of abridged ancient classics for English readers. These books form a part of the Chautauqua course, and are intended for the vast number of those who cannot or do not take a collegiate course in

Latin and Greek. The number of these is likely to increase, and it would seem to be an excellent idea to furnish persons who are desirious of forming some acquaintance with the works of the ancients with an opportunity to do so. Very few have the courage to attempt to read through the complete works of Cicero or Plato, even in an English dress. Hence the utility of such a book as the above, which shall, in the small space of three hundred pages, select and include the most interesting and instructive works of ten or a dozen authors, giving the substance of parts and a literal and elegant translation of other parts of these works. Aside from he benefit to be derived from the study of Latin and Greek as languages, there is little doubt that the majority of pupils would become better acquainted with the thought, if not the style, of the classical authors by reading carefully the book under review than they do at present by their labored efforts of translating a page or two a day. As even the graduates of our colleges cannot compass the whole range of Greek and Latin authors, and but few entire works of any author, this series is worthy of their attention as well as that of the persons who have never entered college. We will bear in mind that many eminent persons have recommended the use of translations for becoming acquainted with the works of foreign authors. Prominent among these stands Emerson, who says: "I should as soon think of swimming across Charles River as of reading all my books in originals, when I have them rendered for me in my mother-tongue." Mr. Wilkinson's series is worthy of all commendation.

"ONE LITTLE REBEL:" By JULIA B. SMITH. 12mo, 316 pp. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

So far as this book has been read it has been found to be a story told in a moderately interesting manner. Not having finished the book, it is not known whether the ardent little ten year old Georgia rebel (?), after having gone North, saw the error of his ways and repented or not. In the hundred pages perused the author exhibits no rancor in dealing with her subject. Only incidentally does she misrepresent the South. She mentions almost, as a matter of course, barrels of whisky and casks of wine in the cellar of

Col. Moale, who is one of the best citizens of the country. She makes her little hero to carry a pistol regularly and to shoot with it as true to the mark as a veteran. This is in keeping with the ideas Northeners have of the South, but it is entirely erroneous. The author, like most writers of children's books, has fallen into the error of putting speeches into the mouth of her hero that are far beyond his years. There is little conformity to nature in the way in which most books for children are written.

SPIRITUAL LIFE: ITS NATURE, URGENCY, AND CROWNING EXCELLENCE: By REV. J. H. POTTS, A. M. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

This is a very neat volume of over 200 pages, sold for $1.00. It is written by the Editor of the *Michigan Christian Advocate*, of the M. E. Church. The book consists of eleven chapters, and traverses a wide field in its survey. Mr. Potts says:

"Not as containing anything especially new or sensational on the snbject of the higher life, are the following pages given to the public. Presenting little of the doctrinal or speculative, and nothing of the controversial or dogmatic they seek only to call attention to the existing necessity for a purer life and a better work in the Churches. The author recently received, from a pastor, a private letter in which was written: "Unless one is in the direct work of building up souls in Christ, he can hardly be aware of the awful darkness which has settled upon the minds of nine-tenths of all Christian people, and the terrible struggle they are making to keep on the 'legal' side of Christian experience."

The whole tone and tenor of the book is to advance the Christian in spiritual life. Hence a chapter is devoted to the discussion of "Holiness," on which subject the author may be considered in accord with the earlier theologians of the Wesleyan Churches. The book may be read with great profit by all Christians; it will be read with pleasuae by all of that class who have an exalted ideal of Christian purity.

POSSIBILITIES OF GRACE: By ASBURY LOWREY, D. D., author of POSITIVE THEOLOGY. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

Dr. Lowrey's book contains 468 pages, and it is beautifully bound and printed. Its aim and scope are the same as the preceding volume; but it is a more elaborate treatment. "Holiness"

is the theme on which the author discourses learnedly and elaborately. He gives a historical view of the subject, as it has been taught at different eras; and the different phases presented are herein unfolded. His discussion will enable the reader to comprehend the importance attached to "holiness," by many eminent men. The author belongs to the most advanced class, as to the standard of holiness set forth. He makes earnest effort to expound and advocate sanctification as a distinct work, subsequent to regeneration. It is a book calculated to arouse thought, excite effort, but not to allay controversy on this transcendental subject.

CHAPTERS FROM THE LIFE OF A PREACHER: By REV. J. W. BURKE, Macon, Ga. 1884.

Mr. Burke's book first appeared in the *Wesleyan Christian Advocate*, of which he is Assistant Editor. He called it an "Autobiography," in the series of chapters that run through a year in his paper. And it is entitled "Autobiography," in book form, the words above being a sub-title. If a reader should conceive of this volume as strictly a life of Mr. Burke, written by himself, he would make a wide mistake. The author's life, for a long stretch of years, is indeed given by his own hand, and is therefore entirely reliable. But he has interwoven so much concerning others in his narrative, that it may be deemed a miscellaneous presentation of men and things of his day. He has given many a little picture of persons and events of deep interest to the present generation. If he can sell a copy to everybody he has mentioned (generally with favor), and to their near kin, he will soon be called on for a new edition. These sketches have been read with pleasure by the readers of the paper; and we learn the book is having a good sale.

HISTORY OF METHODISM: By Bishop H. N. MCTYEIRE, D. D. Nashville, Tenn.: J. B. McFerrin. 1884.

This is a book long needed; and recently it has been eagerly expected. When the Methodist people of this section learned that Bishop McTyeire was preparing a history of Methodism much pleasurable anxiety was excited. As this was the Centennial of Methodism in America, the idea of the public was this book was needed to give impulse to the celebrations of the year, to aid in the

great objects of the times. Not a narrow view this, yet, far too narrow when this book is fully understood. It is not a mere compilation hastily patched up for an emergency and destined to be laid away when the present occasion is gone. A Methodist history was in demand; if the reader please, a history written by a competent hand of our own Church was a great want. It has come; and it will long remain a standard book in Methodist literature. We had histories before, great and small, volumes of real merit, but none exactly up to the demand. Most of our Southern histories have been mainly local in their scope, confined chiefly to particular Conferences, hence lacking in a most important feature to give completeness and satisfaction. There needed to be a volume more comprehensive in design and execution, extending not only through the entire South, but to the whole Methodist world, past and present. All the streams of Methodism issue from a common source, and whether we begin at the fountain head and descend, or proceed synthetically by ascending in many steps and stages, backwards or upwards, such a book as this was all-important, not only here, but everywhere. Our people do not read much; and this volume, from local inspiration, may elicit attention to their Church history that otherwise would not exist. Besides, if the Southern Methodist people have made history, why should not our own gifted sons write our chronicles Other pens very ready to this work have not performed it exactly to our satisfaction. Methodism has had a wide theatre in the South, and in this section has wrought its greatest work. It was essential for a broader and better view to be taken if our own Church should ever be properly understood. We were too large every way to be veiled in obscurity or minified by comparisons. For many reasons this history ought to have been written; and for as many it deserves to be read.

We do not seek to disparage the histories which have won a high place in literature, (such as Abel Stevens' History of Methodism,) but we wish to assert their merits, though great, are not supreme. And if the merit be admitted to be high, yet, one serious defect attaches always—they do not fully and truly represent our own people. Nothing would seem easier than to do justice to us, as the facts of history were easily accessible. If we think thus, it is because we fail to consider the peculiarity of our social system,

and the force of that prejudice, which, for a century, has warred upon our section. Our history is our vindication.

Bishop McTyeire has not written a Southern Methodist Church history in the sense of making a partisan record and advocacy. He has simply viewed matters from a point not taken by other writers, except those among us who have written for mere Conferences. There is no trace of a purpose to unduly exalt our own men and section: we only perceive judicial fairness in his work. Bishop McTyeire's volume is large, comprising nearly seven hundred pages—a ponderous book by a weighty man.

Just from the press, our copy was so recently received as to forbid a full and close reading. We have, however, looked nearly through it, and with much gratification. While we have expected little new to us, and so far have not been disappointed, we have more in the manner of presentation where we looked for entertainment.

The Bishop's style as a writer fitted his work admirably. His brief, sententious, compact sentences, not only give great force to what he writes, but he is enabled to write much in small space. To take in hand a vast mass of undigested, complicated facts, and to so arrange them that the array will be pleasing and instructive, this is a hard task belonging to every historian. Success can only be had by a discriminating, organizing mind; and by a method of writing that discards superfluity and employs the most potent condensation.

In these qualities, Bishop McTyeire excels, and is most conspicuous. His mind is of the judicial order; and no other sort of mind is fit for history. There must be the weighing of evidence, the sifting and eliminating process essential to reach just conclusions from complex facts, to make the record and reflections reliable. The author fails not in this requisite.

And in matters much controverted the character of his mind is a guarantee against acrimonious and severe censures directed against men whom he recognizes as worthy of admiration despite differences in opinion. We have read much in the book, and have not detected an instance of departure from a grave, dignified, and impartial treatment of any and all matters discussed.

If this history is not in demand everywhere among Methodists,

we shall be much mistaken in our estimate of the book, and the people called Methodists. Our own ministry will surely read it, and encourage its sale. Northern Methodists, too, are fully as much interested as our own people; for it is history written ably, written fairly, written correctly.

It is a great attraction of the volume that it has numerous steel engravings of the most prominent of Methodist leaders, Bishops, Editors, and preachers. These plates—containing forty faces—are worth the price of the volume—$2.50. This is certainly very cheap for so large a volume. Dr. McFerrin, Agent, deserves high credit for the style in which he has done his work—the type, binding, etc., are all that could be desired.

J. W. Burke & Co., Macon, Ga., will keep the History on sale at Nashville prices. Let orders come in briskly. Here is a book, at last, that is destined to last.

CENTENARY THOUGHTS: By BISHOP R. S. FOSTER, Cincinnati. Cranston & Stowe. 1884. Price $1.50.

Bishop Foster, of the Methodist Church, has written enough to make it unnecessary that our readers should have an introduction. He is a man of a very unusual combination of logical and rhetorical power. Nothing that he writes is weak, and nothing dull. His "Objections to Calvinism" was his first book: this showed the skillful polemic. The Bishop has been conspicuous in his Church, ranking among its highest dignitaries, not only officially, but in real, recognized ability.

The name of this volume clearly indicates its drift. It is designed to instruct Methodist people as to what Methodism is, what it has achieved, and what are its capacity and prospects. Bishop Foster would elevate and enlarge the views of all Methodists, by giving them an intelligent apprehension of Methodist history, doctrine and economy. He would inspire noble sentiments, and endeavors by a review of the past, and by a prospective survey of the future. Writing, as he does, with uncommon vigor and beauty, no mind of capacity and taste can read his book without admiration and profit. As our own people are equally concerned with this Centenary of the Church, and as our own literature of this sort is scant, they would serve themselves well to read Bishop Foster.

The author discusses every matter of moment concerning our affairs, in a lucid, expository way. He has much to say about sermons and preachers quite appropos to our times and our ministers. Lack of information is the great obstacle to all the noble endeavors of this particular period. Hence, we hail with delight every effort to enlighten our people as to their doctrines, and Church institutions. The direct outcome of the year may not meet anticipations, so far as financial plans are concerned; but the after and distant results are fairly to be computed in any proper estimate of the schemes of this memorable year. The intelligence of the Church will be greatly increased; and we believe its liberality will be largely improved. Bishop Foster's volume is at a moderate price.

THE GROUNDS OF THEISTIC AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF: By GEO. P. FISHER, D. D., of Yale College. New York: Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Dr. Fisher is well known as a writer of books, and from his contributions to periodical literaturo. He is professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. We have to say of this book that it is made up of discussions on the leading question of the age—Theism and Christianity. The author traverses the whole field, and is a champion of the faith worthy of leadership and honor. The anti-theistic theories are several, and each is treated in the course of the argument. Evolution, Agnosticism, Pantheism, Materialism, etc., are ably presented as they are, and have received not only intelligent exposition but deserved animadversion and refutation.

Miracles are elaborately discussed—their value considered, and their credibility established. Scientific objections to Christian belief receive such attention as their pretentious teachers claim—there is no effort to deny or shun difficulties, nor is there any betrayal of the cause by concessions and surrender. Dr. Fisher being a historian has the habit of seeking authority common to men of his class. Hence there is no meager, partial view of any subject taken, either for or against Theism and Christianity. We get what the strongest votaries have thought and said on both sides; anything short of this completeness is mere trifling and delusion.

The volume contains nearly five hundred pages of matter of the deepest moment. Our readers will find nothing weak or commonplace in this book—it is the production of a man highly cultured, whose energies are directed to the maintenance of revealed religion against every combination and resistance.

We cannot wholly avoid considering such topics if we would. While the enemy is in the field and at the front in defiant attitude, the foe must be repelled, or a surrender be made. The pulpit is not the place for such argument; the press is the proper vehicle for this debate, owing to the polemical extent of the controversy and its extreme intricacy. If we would keep pace with the thought of the age books like this must be read, they must be severely studied.

CHRISTINA; OR, THE PERSECUTED FAMILY—A TALE OF SORROW AND SUFFERING, FOUNDED ON A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE VAUDOIS: By Rev. J. DILLON. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 12mo. 232 pp. $1.00.

A neat little book of over two hundred pages, written in a vein of piety about the persecutions endured by the peculiar religious people in Europe, who have survived such hostilities from the papal Church for so long a time. The author says:

"The following story is founded upon facts gathered from the history of the Vaudois. Many of the characters are historic, and occupy an honorable place as distinguished ministers and able leaders in civil and religious affairs of that people. The story, designed to illustrate the cruel, persecuting spirit of Rome, is true to the fact, and could be confirmed, were it necessary, by contemporaneous history. It is now placed in the hands of the young reader, with the earnest prayer that its perusal may give him as much pleasure and profit as its composition has afforded the author."

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH: By PHILIP SCHAFF. Thoroughly revised and enlarged. Vol. II. Ante-Nicene Christianity, A. D. 100–325. Vol. III. Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, A. D. 311–600. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

These volumes complete the new edition of the author's History of Ancient Christianity, the first volume of which, treating of Apostolic Christianity, was noticed in the January number of this REVIEW for 1883.

The second volume covers the period from the death of John the Apostle to Constantine the Great, and records the history of the age of persecution and martyrdom. Like the first volume, it has been greatly enlarged. Twice the number of pages accorded to this period in the earlier edition, are devoted to it in the volume before us. Several new chapters, and quite a number of new sections have been added. Some changes have also been made in the order of the chapters; and the various discussions, opinions, and references have been brought down to the date of publication. The value of the work has accordingly been greatly increased.

The third volume, in which the history of the Church, from Constantine the Great to Gregory the Great, is given, is substantially the same as the earlier edition treating of this period. Some valuable additions, however, have been made to this part of the work, which add materially to its usefulness.

The work, as a whole, is now, so far as we know, the best history of the period of which it treats in the English language. It contains and presents the results of the latest and most thorough scholarship of the age, and its bibliography, especially, is unsurpassed. Moreover, it is written in a clear and attractive style, which makes it a pleasure to read its pages. We are pleased to note that, in the preface of the revised edition of the third volume, Dr. Schaff promises soon to give to the public the history of Mediæval Christianity to the Reformation.

A RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPÆDIA: OR DICTIONARY OF BIBLICAL, HISTORICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND PRACTICAL THEOLOGY. BASED ON THE REAL-ENCYKLOPÆDIA OF HERZOG, PLITT, AND HAUCK: Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., LL. D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Associate Editors: Rev. Samuel M. Jackson, M. A., and Rev. D. S. Schaff. Vol. III. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers, 10 and 12 Dey street.

The present volume concludes this valuable Religious Encyclopædia. The hopes awakened by the first volume, which we noticed shortly after its publication, have been fully realized in the subsequent volumes.

The work, as a whole, is a truly admirable one, and worthy a place in every library. The three volumes which constitute it, and which contain over two thousand six hundred double-columned, large octavo pages, but nevertheless are not inconvenient to handle, embody an unusually large amount of interesting and important information. The list of subjects is indeed very full, and the treatment of them is, with rare exceptions, all that could properly be expected in a work of the kind. Ministers of the Gospel especially will find the work very useful and convenient to have at hand for reference. In condensed form they will find in its pages the results of the latest and best scholarship on most subjects pertaining to biblical, historical, doctrinal and practical theology.

The thanks of all interested in religious knowledge are due to Dr. Schaff and his Associates for editing this work in such admirable manner, and to Messrs. Funk and Wagnalls for the convenient and excellent form in which they have given it to the public.—*Reformed Quarterly Review.*

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY: By HENRY B. SMITH, D. D. LL. D. Edited by William S. Karr, D. D., Professor of Theology in Hartford Theological Seminary. 8vo, pp. 630. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son.

Professor H. B. Smith was, no doubt, among the very best thinkers and writers in theology, of the recent past, or rather of the present, for by his works he is still among men. Thoroughly scholarly, as to his reading and study of broad and liberal views and modes of thinking, yet a firm believer, and devotedly attached to the theological system in which he had been educated—a modified Calvinism—to harmonize which with his own broader and more scriptural views of Divine truth was his life-work, the present volume is his best monument. But it is his own only as the temple was David's; for as David gathered the materials and Solomon built the temple, so the matter of this treatise was prepared by him whose name it bears, but its form and structure is the work of the editor.

As a system of theology, this work is eminently scriptural, orthodox, and evangelical. That the author comes to his task with strong and intelligent predilections toward certain methods of viewing and

stating Christian doctrine, is everywhere manifest, and these determine his relations to existing theological schools of thought. He is an Augustinian, and yet he avoids the peculiarities of Augustin's notions on such points as the *realism* of sin and righteousness, and his process of sinking the individual man and merging all his spiritual interests, for time and eternity, in the consolidated federation of the race. He is a Calvinist as to the positive side of that system, but not so as to the negative side; for while he insists upon the doctrine of the Divine predestination, he also holds to the freedom of the human will, really and practically; and he claims that it is not unreasonable for us to suppose that the apparent antagonism of these two postulates is only apparent, and that beyond the range of our vision they perfectly harmonize. A special excellence of this work is the clearness—the cleanness—of the style of the writing, and of the mode of stating the several propositions, indicating the completeness of the author's processes of thought upon the subjects discussed. Obscurity in writing is more frequently the result of incomplete mental processes than of lack of facility in the use of language; and it is quite evident that in this case every thought had been completely formulated in the mental laboratory before it was committed to writing. And yet here, as in nearly every system of theology, a large share of what is set forth has been accepted simply because it is the traditional faith of the Church, and not because such points have been thoroughly examined, each upon its own evidence. This is perhaps unavoidable, but it suggests the thought that not improbably some of these accepted points may yet be called in question, and, after more adequate inquiry, modified or rejected. There remains very much land to be explored by rational and devout free-thinking.—*Methodist Quarterly Review.*

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

WHAT IS TRUTH.

Modern thought is supposed to have made sad havoc with the fair dreams of faith and affection. This has been done in the name of science, of logic, and even of morality. The wickedness of believing propositions which cannot be verified, has been dwelt upon, and conscience has been invoked to rout the rabble of beliefs and dreams. Meanwhile truth has remained, austere and sublime, offering no rewards, except the vision of itself, and proposing no punishment beyond exclusion from that vision; but yet for noble souls an all-sufficing object of worship and service. A scruple, however, arises at this point which it is worth while to study.

All along the line of thought and religion, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good have formed a trinity of factors, which, it was thought, must enter into the Supreme Being, that Something or Some One in whom all things live. Some have emphasized one factor and some another; but the mind of the race has insisted on all three as equally necessary and as mutually independent.

Often and often have men given up cherished faiths and conceptions at the bidding of Truth; but they, in so doing, have always found that all that made the old conceptions precious has been restored to them in a still higher form. Thus, in religion we have changed again and again our conceptions of the Creator's working, and men have cried out in fear and anger at the loss. But the conception has grown in grandeur and majesty, so that it would be felt by the Christian world as a great religious loss if we had to return to the conceptions which ruled the thought of even a hundred years ago. To one cognizant of this fact it may well become a rallying cry: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In this way of abandoning partial conceptions for larger and higher ones arises that enthusiasm for truth as such which is said to be a special mark of the scientific spirit. In this way, also, one might

come to hold the form of belief somewhat loosely, as being always on the point of passing into a fuller and better expression.

But this conception of Truth is an unverifiable ideal. From a logical standpoint, it is an idol of the tribe; from a psychological standpoint, it is a projection of our own nature upon the world of reality; and from a religious standpoint, it is simply a subordinate element of the religious ideal elevated into supremacy. Such an enthusiasm for truth tacitly assumes that the real is the perfect, that it is something which our thought can never transcend and which it can never depart from without falling into weakness and error. When this unverifiable ideal of perfection and infinite fullness is dropped out of our conception of truth, there remains nothing but bare fact, known or unknown.

But truth, as merely matter of fact, has no basis for enthusiasm, but only a practical value. For example, water boils at 100° C. This is not truth in the sense in which philosophers have spoken of it, or iconoclastic thinkers have raved over it. This is simply a fact of practical importance, but of no further significance. And if we root out the ideal element, the divine thoughts which seek expression, the deep foreboding of the infinite and perfect, the transcendent meanings of things, the universe reduces to a system of such matters of fact. There are icebergs at the poles. Quinine is bitter. The Mississippi runs into the Gulf of Mexico, and the earth is some ninety million miles from the sun. These facts have more or less practical significance, but no one would soberly claim that this sort of truth demands our reverence, our enthusiasm, our devotion. We demand, says Strauss, in "The Old Faith and the New," a work written in the interests of atheism, the same reverence for the cosmos which the Christian demands for his God, and declares that the pessimism of Hartman impresses him as blasphemous. But really, if the universe is only a collection of facts without ideal meaning, one is quite at a loss to see how one could either reverence or blaspheme it. There is nothing worshipful in the fact that the earth goes around the sun, or that bodies attract one another directly as their masses and inversely as the square of their distances. If the universe have a meaning, or if it be the expression of a mighty plan, of a flawless beauty and a perfect goodness, we can conceive that our highest duty and supreme privilege should

be to know the truth; but otherwise we are quite unable to find anything more than a practical value for it, and the proposition to erect truth into an object of reverence and worship seems like proposing to adore the fact that the earth turns on its axis once in twenty-four hours, or that water will not rise in a pump above thirty-three feet. Neither of these propositions seem adapted to be read or sung in churches or to be chanted around an altar.

In short, neither facts nor laws have, in themselves, more than a utilitarian significance. Any value which they may have beyond this is due entirely to the unverifiable ideals, or meanings, or perfections which they are assumed, or believed to serve or express. When the iconoclast is seeking for another idol of the tribe to shatter, it might be well for him to inquire whether Truth does not fulfill all the conditions. As for facts, we shall continue to reckon with them on a utilitarian basis.—*Prof. Borden P. Bowne, in New York Independent.*

POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION OF POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE.

Every one who aims to understand the deeper significance of either the problem of polygamy, or the divorce question, should not fail to read the suggestive article in the July number of the *Andover Review*, by Mr. Edward Stanwood, on "National Jurisdiction over Marriage and Divorce, as Affecting Polygamy in Utah." It is a remarkably fresh and valuable contribution to a phase of the discussion which must inevitably receive increasing attention. The opinions and arguments advanced by Mr. Stanwood will not, in several respects, carry conviction to all minds; but they open anew important approaches to the subject. It is my present purpose to throw out some remarks on it, and the subject it treats.

1. The article is another recognition of the real nature of the question raised by Mormon polygamy. The recent speech of Senator Brown, of Georgia, was a sign of the times. This is another. When we go beyond the partisan purpose and sectional spirit of that speech, to its fundamental proposition, that *morally* the divorce and remarriage, for slight causes in the States, is closely allied with the polygamy of the territories, it is not easy to deny the position. The moral quality of the two is much alike. The

moral quantity in each may be quite far apart. F. D. Maurice clearly saw this when, in the third lecture of his "Social Morality," published fifteen years ago, and a classic upon this subject, he said: "Every one may join with M. Comte in his earnest protest against the license of divorce, which some European countries have sanctioned, and which Milton—logically, I think—connected with his defence of polygamy."

Had Maurice lived to read the records of the increase of divorce in Europe, and more especially in the United States, since he wrote these lines, his mind would have been quick to take in the American sweep of this question of the family, which underlies the great social questions of New England and Utah, of the East and the West, of the North and the South. It is not a time for either sectional flings or partisan blindness. We may not relax efforts to suppress the villainous system of Utah; but we must go at it with our eyes open.

It is this breadth of view that makes the article of Mr. Stanwood noteworthy. He says: "The question of polygamy is a part, in a political sense, it is the most important part of a broader one. By settling that broader one on correct principles, and only in that way, can the country acquire the right to deal directly, and at close quarters and effectually, with the institution which threatens so much mischief in our Western territories. It is the purpose of this article to maintain this proposition: "*That the National Government should acquire, by an amendment of the Constitution, full and conclusive authority over the whole matter of Marriage and Divorce.*" The object of this amendment, with him, is two-fold. It meets the evil of polygamy, and of conflicting divorce laws, at the same time. For the former object the amendment is urged, because, "in no other way than by exercising authority over the entry into the married state, can Congress extirpate polygamy in the territories, or deal with it at all in the States of the Union, should it ever, by any means, get a foothold in one or more of them." He thinks "polygamy could not survive openly anywhere, under a national marriage law, and that the secret practice of the abomination would destroy it and the Church which tolerated it." And for making the amendment cover marriage, he gives the reason that "whatever tends to show the expediency of a

national divorce system tends, also, to point to the propriety of placing marriage under the same jurisdiction."—*S. W. Dyke.*

HOLINESS AND RIGHTEOUSNESS.

The *London Quarterly Review* (Wesleyan) has an able article on the above topic, from which we make the following suggestive extracts, as *appropos* to the present trend of thought in the ranks of Methodism in Europe and America. It is a good sign of the times that so much attention is directed to HOLINESS; and it is well, also, that the cognate doctrine of Righteousness should receive more consideration.—EDITOR.

The two inscriptions, "Holiness to the Lord" and "the Righteousness of the Law," were written separately and together on the whole economy of Judaism. The former was inscribed, so to speak, over the altar—the symbol of consecration to God; and the other over the ark, which was the sanctuary of the law. We should soon lose ourselves if we followed the words separately; their combination is our governing thought. And it was the glory of the Levitical system that the two were combined in the very temple itself. "Upon it," the Levitical priesthood or temple service, "the people had the law enacted," or "received the law" (Heb. vii. 11). The meaning of these words is much discussed, but at least they indicate a true union between the altar and the law. The highest and most important instance of the union is found in the ark within the holiest; the law and the propitiatory altar were there actually one, foreshadowing the mystery of the atonement, through which the holy God would come and make the unclean holy, and the righteous God count and make transgressors righteous. Hence it was prophesied of the new covenant: "I will put My laws into their mind," providing for righteousness; and "I will be to them a God, and they shall be to Me a people," providing for sanctification. But it is obvious that these terms are as such the two characteristics of the ancient dispensation, as well as of the new covenant. Looking back upon the Old Testament as a whole, we see that the two commanding and universal ideas of religion are obedience to law or righteousness, and consecration to God or holiness. These govern everything. The God of the Hebrews was "holy in all his ways, and righteous in all his

works"; holy, as separate from all evil, and providing that his people should enter into fellowship with himself; righteous as the governor who gave the law, and making his servants righteous. Their Scriptures were the "law" and the "holy writings." Their future Messiah was "the Holy One," or "the Anointed," and "the Righteous Servant;" combining, though they know not how or why, the attributes of entire consecration, or spotless holiness and perfect obedience, or finished righteousness. In fact, the law, with righteousness or unrighteousness as the alternative, and the altar, with sanctification or unholiness as the alternative, run through the whole of the documents of the first covenant. It is impossible, and it is needless, to say which had the pre-eminence. While as yet the temple existed the two were on the same level. Each of the words was, to the devout Jew, the symbol of all that was dear to him in his religion. The question could not arise about dividing them: holiness and righteousness were inseparable. Since the Dispersion, it has been otherwise. Having no temple, and no real altar, the Jews have comparatively lost their ancient and peculiar idea of holiness. But all the more tenaciously do they hold fast the eternal law, and the righteousness that is bound up with it. The Thorah has not its old companion the altar; it has alone the double honor that once was divided between them. In fact, the beginnings of this were seen in earlier times, when the whole of Scripture was "the law."

OUR CENTENNIAL.

Our press has teemed with contributions on the Centenary of American Methodism. Many of the writers have displayed ability and a critical and comprehensive grasp of the situation. There has been, of course, much expenditure of ink in presenting platitudes familiar to all people of intelligence.

A survey of the past brings to view a wonderful moral revolution and advance in Europe and America, directly and indirectly attributable to our doctrines and polity. It is only a partial view—a narrow one—to look at simply the vast numbers enrolled in the ranks of the several Methodist orders. These amount to millions—about four millions in America alone. But the *differentia* of Methodism is this: It was and is a great religious awaken-

ing, a revival, which has pervaded to some extent the whole of christendom. The indirect results of the spirit, the genius of Methodism, are, perhaps, quite as noteworthy as the direct consequences.

Nor do we properly conceive the real extent of the movement under Wesley unless we consider the advance in civilization, in culture, proceeding from the great array of schools, colleges and universities. These came by degrees; at first the effort was mainly to evangelize the vast masses degraded by sin. After this, it was a natural result and comparatively easy to elevate the people in mental culture. The Centenary of 1839 gave a great impulse to education in the Church which brought into existence a great many institutions of learning; and this process is yet in vigorous operation.

By the combined agencies of religion and education our people have advanced in material wealth to the foremost place (in America;) and to-day the Church occupies a position the most commanding.

Men may doubt, many do, concerning the retention of the original spirituality of the system. Some consider the great force nearly expended, and Methodism no longer may claim superiority in this regard to other evangelical Churches. The fear of Wesley concerning the effect of riches on the doctrine and discipline of Methodism may not be sneered away, as a vision of a mind too intense in its action always to be sober. Beyond any questioning his fears were well founded in an accurate knowledge of human nature, and the forces which rule society. There is such a tendency as he pointed out—religion leads to wealth, and wealth leads to an abatement in the very religion which created it. Such a result is not inevitable, but there is great danger. Now, there has been an immense responsibility accruing by this augmentation of numbers and wealth—the capacity of the Church, for good and great things is immeasurably increased.

To make our people feel the force of this is no easy matter. The chief object of this marked year in our annals, is to develop on a scale commensurate with duty the means of our people. How far success in this direction may be realized, is so far problematical, that we have about equal grounds to fear and hope. Should the

outcome of the year exhibit no appreciable growth in the grace of liberality, then the discovery will be painful and shameful. But if the two millions of dollars asked for by the Church, in behalf of leading benevolent objects is forthcoming, there will be cause for profound and devout gratification. It would show that our progress has been *real*, and that the history of the past is a glowing prophecy of greater achievements in the future.

If men of large means rise to the height of the occasion, and give their thousands; if multitudes of moderate wealth give by the hundreds; if all give according to the measure of their ability, then the sum named above will be attained. Let the matter be duly the subject of prayer, of preaching, of talking, of doing, till the close of this memorable year.

SOUTHERN SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES.

The September issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, (Boston, Mass.,) contains a very able essay on this topic, by Dr. Charles F. Smith, Professor in Vanderbilt University. The discussion is full, and covers every phase of the subject. We would be glad if all our educators were in possession of the article. There is much in it that tends to our humiliation, but this feeling might lead to amendment.

The author justly, not too severely, reprehends the low standard adopted in most of our so-called colleges. He animadverts on the defective preparation for college, the want of good preparatory schools; but he especially denounces, as every sensible man should, the wretched shams set up all over the land and called colleges. These exist by the hundred in the South. All of them are about equally pretentious, but the Southern colleges are of very unequal merit. Some of them are deserving confidence and admiration—many are not above a respectable academy.

Prof. Smith, evidently, from his facts and figures, etc., enables an inquirer to see our situation in a light not calculated to inflate sectional pride. Be it understood this author is a true Southron, and is wholly free from even a taint of hostility to our section. He is a son of Dr. Whitefoord Smith, of Wofford College, South Carolina.

THE METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

This old and well known Quarterly has very promptly appeared on the last day of this quarter. We perceive no change in its make-up, certainly no declensions in its merit. In pursuance of directions of the late General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church it will hereafter be issued as a Bi-monthly, reducing size of each number to one hundred and sixty pages, without change of price except in this way. The purpose is to adapt it more to the general reader. We had discerned before this, what surprised us, that the *Review*, after a run of over fifty years, found it hard to keep a strong support, so little relish, comparatively, is there for a literature of the higher sort. What effect this new departure may have remains to be seen. Two effects are possible—there may be a letting down the standard and a real deterioration in the print, a loss of rank among its kind, or there may be a gradual toning of the people to a higher literary taste; and the ultimate outcome may be good.

CLOSE OF SIXTH VOLUME OF THE REVIEW.

With this work of the pen and printer the sixth volume of our QUARTERLY comes to its close. Its appearance has been delayed a week by the failure of the paper mill to furnish paper in due time according to contract. This is but a trifling delay, not greater than usual with similar prints, but we wish to say the fault is not ours. Editorial work has been forward and up to time. Though we are also publisher, yet the printing and mailing is done by contract with J. W. Burke & Co., Job Printers, etc.

We believe the mechanical work is above criticism; everything that could be asked; everything that has been promised has been performed. The REVIEW is a large and costly periodical, beyond the average in size and appearance, but not beyond other prints of its grade in price.

As to its literary features and claims, it is not very appropriate for the editor to speak, inasmuch as he is a regular contributor, and having supervision and selection of articles it would not be becoming to extol his own work. Very many capable of judging have expressed satisfaction and high praise. This has encouraged us in our arduous toil to make a periodical of the highest grade.

We were not altogether in the dark as to the task to be done to reach this result. Well aware of the apathy in the Church in respect to literature of this sort, indeed, of every kind at all elevated, we never counted on a very large support. It was to be expected that articles of the proper grade would not be easily obtained. Keeping steadly in view our aim and end we have sought to meet all reasonable expectations, and believe we have succeeded. If a great "London Review" has to make the confession (as one has done) that sometimes the reputation of that Review had to rest (for a quarter) on one or two articles, we think it a fair achievement to have never issued a number without the concession of five or six *first-class papers* according to the judgment of our most critical readers. Having done so well in two years, we really hope by the time we are as old as the Review alluded to our pages will present reading not now to be found always in the best prints of Europe or America.

Ardently desiring to advance our people in those tastes in which they are much deficient, we press the claims of the QUARTERLY.

Readers are desired, many readers—as to writers they are among us, and if not in our section they could be found.

With a view of extending our circulation we have decided, after much hesitation, to reduce the price of the QUARTERLY hereafter to $2.50 per annum, *invariably cash.* This we do, not because the present terms are high, for they are not, but with a hope that the increase of subscribers will more than compensate for loss by reduction.

Moreover, we speak absolutely, we cannot print such a periodical without serious risk of financial loss, which cannot be taken in the absence of any salary for our labor. This risk we have borne for two years, and, while actual loss has not been sustained, yet all the profits of the business (which exist on paper) are unreliable for any personal advantage, or for any purpose of improvement. This should not be the case; and it shall not be. If our subscribers desire greatly to promote this enterprise, they will promptly renew and remit the cash, especially as the rate is reduced.

One reason which necessitates the adoption of cash in advance is that credit makes necessary the keeping of accounts, etc., which would require a clerk, and this cannot be afforded. To

prevent all errors and misunderstandings, sure to arise where small amounts like these are to be entered, we insist on payment in advance.

But there may be some who, at the time, cannot send the amount ($2.50), small as it is. Let these do this if they prefer: They may send a due bill, payable at Conference session, for $3.00—this will be accepted in lieu of the money. We distinctly state that the lower cash price is preferred to the credit plan. This latter is only offered to meet exigencies.

We desire all our subscribers to notify us at once as to their desire in this matter—we wish to know how many copies are called for, and must know in order to make our contract with the printer.

Brethren and friends, please heed this call without delay. The payment of subscriptions may be made at Conference sessions, if desired, but let us know your *intention*.

Our loss, by the credit system, has been so great it must be abandoned. This occurs in various ways. A man gives no notice of intention to renew, does not report change of office; the QUARTERLY continues to go (for this is custom and also law), the failure to get the REVIEW is pleaded as reason for refusing to pay, and sometimes the plea is made that the REVIEW was not ordered to continue. We would avoid all these grievous troubles, and more serious losses. There is no way to escape but in adhering to advance payment, or to its equivalent.

We appeal to our preachers to subscribe, and to give aid to the enterprise by leading our intelligent people to send for the REVIEW. Nothing which can be done to make the enterprise successful, will be neglected by the editor.

Our Church papers could aid very much by giving prominence to the name, terms, and character of the QUARTERLY. The people are entitled, at least, to know there is such a print in existence—this much might be given easily to readers, and greatly to the advantage of the enterprise.

J. W. HINTON,
Macon, Ga. *Editor.*

EDITORIAL NOTES.

The Editor respectfully appeals to all subscribers in arrears, to remit by Post-office order, or in small bills, or by postal notes.

All remittances are made at our risk.

We desire to know who of our subscribers intend to renew for 1885; and this should be communicated at the earliest day. We have found that we cannot safely presume on a purpose to continue, from the fact that no notice to discontinue has been received. Fair as such a presumption is, it is practically annulled by its non-recognition by most subscribers. The loss falls on the Editor.

After hesitation, we have determined to reduce the terms of the QUARTERLY to $2.50 per annum, to be paid invariably in advance. If a subscriber has not the money, he may enclose a due bill for $3.00, payable at Conference sessions, twelve months afterwards. This is not preferred, but will be allowed to meet exigencies. By this plan, the system of credit is virtually abolished, and with it the necessity of keeping accounts—a source of great trouble, in view of the small amounts to be entered on books. The Editor asks immediate attention to all changes in post-offices. Write plainly.

THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF THE

METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH.

THE [illegible] has closed the [illegible] of its [illegible] series of publication, it [illegible] hope [illegible] the [illegible] year, [illegible] is [illegible] in our Church [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] between [illegible] minds [illegible] of [illegible] regard to [illegible] great [illegible] [illegible] protestive, running [illegible] The [illegible] Literature [illegible] in [illegible] Review [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] Hence [illegible] for [illegible] support and [illegible]

[illegible] J. W. BENTON, Editor,

Macon, Ga.

P. S. Dr. [illegible] J. W. [illegible] A. [illegible] Jan. 1, the [illegible] Publishers, [illegible] the [illegible]

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